

Demosthenes & His Time

A Study in Defeat

Raphael Sealey

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A Study in Defeat

RAPHAEL SEALEY

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To Dorte-Freyja Sealey

Wind und Regen
sind mir oft entgegen.
Ich ducke mich, lass es vorübergahn;
Das Wetter will seinen Willen han.

Georg von Derfflinger

Preface

From 1951 until 1954 I was supported by the generosity of the Craven Committee in the University of Oxford and of University College. The gratitude I now tender is late but in consequence deep. For since 1954 I have learned to recognize increasingly the benefit I derived from the wayward reading which those patrons allowed. Thanks to them I made first acquaintance with the speeches of Demosthenes. I dreamed of writing a work to cover every Demosthenic question. But after a time I found good reason to put that desire aside. Many Demosthenic questions have been treated so well by Schaefer and Blass that their work cannot be surpassed, or at least I cannot surpass it. Even so I continued hoping to write in moderately extensive form about the career of Demosthenes. But an obstacle arose to check me; my attention was diverted repeatedly into questions about the authenticity, date, and mode of composition of particular speeches. At last I recognized that many of these questions are not susceptible to definitive solutions. One can only delineate the limits within which speculation is possible. Once I had seen this, I set to work in 1983.

It is a pleasure to thank G. L. Cawkwell for kindnesses of more than one type. As my teacher he introduced me to the study of ancient history. Later, by publishing extensively on Demosthenes and other fourth-century topics, he gave me ideas to think about. This book is largely an *Auseinandersetzung* with him. Perhaps he will do me the further kindness of correcting my errors.

Intellectual debts must also be acknowledged to the works of two scholars, who are scarcely mentioned in the book. From Sir Ronald Syme I have learned that history need not be written from the point of view of the people who won. From G. Himmelfarb I have learned that history can still be written.

I tender warm thanks to the Department of Classics, Brown University, for inviting me to give the C. A. Robinson, Jr. Memorial Lecture for 1990; I seized the opportunity to utter ideas that now appear in chapters 4, 5, and

6. One or two stock remarks may be added. The dates in the book are B.C. The translations are mine. But now the book keeps glancing toward Ver-tumnus and Janus.

Berkeley, Calif.
17 June 1992

R. S.

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Map of Greece and the Aegean Area follows page 1.

Demosthenes and His Time

GREECE AND THE AEGEAN AREA

This map illustrates the geographical layout of ancient Greece and the surrounding Aegean Sea. Key features include:

- Regions and Territories:** Macedonia, Thessaly, Macedonia, Attica, Boiotia, Euboea, Doris, Phokis, Lokris, Arkadia, Elis, Messenia, and others.
- Major Cities and Towns:** Pella, Pydna, Larissa, Pharsalos, Thermopylai, Naupaktos, Delphi, Orchomenos, Thebes, Plataia, Megara, Corinth, Phleious, Olympia, Mantinea, Argos, Epidauros, Tegea, Megalopolis, Sparta, Athens, Peiraios, and others.
- Islands:** Thasos, Chalkidike, Skiathos, Peparethos, Skyros, Leukas, Arkarnania, Kephallenia, Zakynthos, Kythnos, Seriphos, Siphnos, Melos, and Kythera.
- Water Bodies:** Aegean Sea, Ionian Sea, and the Gulf of Corinth.
- Geographical Features:** Rivers like the Axios and Haliakmon, and mountain ranges like the Taurus and Pindus are indicated.

I o n i a n
S e a



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Introduction: The Subject

The life of Demosthenes and the history of Demosthenic Athens are a story of failure. When the orator was still a boy, his city launched the Second Athenian League, which, in its professions and perhaps in truth, was a promising experiment in international organization. But by the time Demosthenes began to make his voice heard in public meetings, the most powerful of the allies had seceded and had defeated Athenian attempts to recover them. Moreover, Macedon under Philip II was emerging as a neighbor of greater power than the Greeks of the Balkans had known before. The activity of Demosthenes culminated in protracted attempts to outmaneuver the Macedonian king in politics and diplomacy. He succeeded in bringing together as formidable a coalition as could be hoped for, and when the armies met at Chaironeia, the forces of the confederates were at least as numerous, perhaps rather more numerous, than those led by Philip and his son, Alexander. But the Macedonians won.

To live on after defeat can be sadder than death in action. From the battle of Chaironeia Demosthenes and his fellow citizens learned that they could not hope to challenge the Macedonians, unless circumstances took a strange turn. They had to wait many years. At last, when Alexander returned from India to Babylon, his high-handed treatment of his senior officers raised the possibility of divisions among the Macedonians. When the news came of Alexander's death, the Athenians launched a new war and brought a formidable coalition into being again. But in spite of jealousies there was enough fellow feeling among the marshals of the Macedonian forces to defeat the Greeks in the Lamian War. When Antipater reached the northern Peloponnese, Demosthenes committed suicide.

The intrusion of Macedon into Greek affairs was the triumph not of an idea but of armed might. The contrast between two pairs of figures will illustrate the change thus brought about. In 388 an Athenian fleet of 32 triremes besieged the Spartan commander, Nikolochos, in Abydos, where he held 25 triremes. In 322 the Macedonian commander, Kleitos, with 240 warships defeated an Athenian fleet of 170 warships at Abydos.¹

If it is not the historian's task to cheer victors, the Athenians of the time of Demosthenes may deserve his attention. There is another reason why Athenian politics and policy of that age call for study. The evidence is good, far better than for any other period in the development of ancient Athens. Primary sources include numerous speeches of Demosthenes. It is difficult to determine how well they have been preserved, and this question will be treated in an appendix. It is also difficult to discover sometimes whether Demosthenes told the truth, but the wary historian may learn something even from an utterance intended to mislead its original audience. The same considerations apply to the extant speeches of Aischines and to the pamphlets composed in the form of speeches by Isokrates. These latter, however tendentious, may show what lines of thought were acceptable to the Athenians or some of them at the times when each pamphlet was composed. Excavation has recovered plentiful Athenian inscriptions of the fourth century. Those bearing on the Athenian League are especially informative. Narrative histories for the fourth century are mostly secondary; Diodoros, Plutarch, and Justin supply a good deal of information about the effects of Chaironeia and about the Lamian War. For the early part of the period the narrative of Xenophon, though much maligned, is contemporary testimony and indispensable.

The greatest tribute to Demosthenes was paid unwittingly by Philip II. In the evening following Chaironeia he held a carouse and chanted the formulaic opening of some Athenian decrees as an iambic tetrameter: "Proposed by Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of the deme Paiania."² In modern times the career of the orator has attracted miscellaneous biographers, mostly professional scholars, but the sequence has been interrupted by a retired French statesman. His book on Demosthenes is mainly to be remembered for the reason that he gave why Philip, after subduing Greece, turned his attention to the Persians: "car, en ce temps-là, notre Gaule était dédaignée."³

Undoubtedly the most valuable of the books devoted to Demosthenes is the three-volume work by Arnold Dietrich Schaefer. Piety and other considerations demand recognition of the author's career. Born in 1819 on the outskirts of Bremen, Schaefer studied as a young man at Leipzig. He lived at a time when critical study of history was achieving its first efflorescence and a man could concern himself with more than one of the fields that have since developed into separate specialties. He planned research in Old High German with a view to *Habilitation*, but he abandoned this plan when he was offered a position in a Gymnasium at Dresden. While he was there he wrote his first book: *De libro vitarum X oratorum* (1844). When he was thirty-eight years old and the first two of his volumes on Demosthenes had appeared, he achieved the ambition of his career; he entered the educational service of the Prussian kingdom as professor at Greifswald. Eight years later he moved to Bonn and he continued teaching there until he died at the somewhat early age of sixty-four. Unlike most of the people who wrote Greek history in the nineteenth century, Schaefer was a professor not of classical philology but

of history. His works included a history of the Seven Years' War in two volumes.⁴

His *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* has proved to be the most lasting of his works. With care and erudition he scrutinized every question known to him in the career of his hero and the contemporary activities of the Athenians. Since Schaefer's time a modicum of additional evidence has been discovered; the papyrus fragments of Didymos on Demosthenes, first published in 1904, are valuable. Detailed inquiries have brought greater clarity, notably on questions of chronology. But the major weakness of Schaefer's work was shared by many of his successors well into the twentieth century. He and they assumed that at any one time in Athens a party of leading men, defined by a distinctive program, directed policy and continued to do so until a rival party with a different program unseated the former by winning the preference of the sovereign people.⁵ This assumption was drawn from observing the conflicts between government and opposition at the courts and in the parliaments of nineteenth-century Europe. In fact Athens did not have what is called in the United States an administration or in modern England a government. On the exceptional occasions when a Greek city acquired such an entity, the word for it was tyranny.⁶

Since the Second World War assumptions made previously about Athenian politics have come to be challenged. Instead of looking for a simple division between government and opposition, some historians have recognized that groupings among leading Athenians were numerous and each group was held together more by personal ties than by any distinctive program. General considerations of theory, prompted by advances in the social sciences, have been brought to bear on classical Athens, and they have yielded fruitful results.⁷ But an ounce of evidence is worth a pound of theory. Some have gone so far as to offer an "atomistic" picture of Athenian politics, as it may be called, a picture, that is, in which ties between politicians were relatively weak and ephemeral and each man spoke only for himself on each occasion.⁸ The rival merits of such a picture and of one that recognizes personal but lasting ties between politicians will need to be considered in studying the period of Athenian development that is best documented. It is indeed remarkable that attempts to write the life of Demosthenes have been rare since the Second World War, although his enemy, Philip II, has been the subject of several good books.⁹ Perhaps a victory that insisted on an unconditional surrender has directed the attention of historians to victors of the past.

The history of Demosthenes and of Demosthenic Athens needs to be written in the light of current understanding of Athenian political society. That will be the subject of this book. But the question arises, Where to begin? The year when Demosthenes was born was not epochal in the history of his city. Schaefer began in 404, when the Athenians suffered their greatest disaster at the hands of the Spartans. Yet perhaps a better perspective can be reached. The rivalry developing slowly between Athens and Sparta after the repulse of Xerxes gave rise to three wars, which have come to be called the First Pel-

oponnesian War (ca. 460–446), the Peloponnesian War (431–404), and the Corinthian War (395–386). These wars differed in character. In the last Athens was no longer the ruler of subject allies but a member of a confederacy, in which some others could rival Athens in power. But in the later years of the Corinthian War the Athenians tried to extend their sway over maritime cities in much the same way as they had done in the Delian League. In 387/6 they lost the war because they were outmaneuvered in the Hellespont by the Spartans, who had won the collaboration of Persia. In 405 the same combination had defeated the Athenians in the Hellespont and made a siege of Athens possible. The disaster of 387/6 was neither so costly nor so humiliating as that of 405/4. But in consequence of the later disaster the Athenians abandoned imperial ambitions and shaped gradually a policy that brought a league of new type into being. The epochal year, the starting point for the story, is 387/6.

Chapter 1 will consider the crisis of that year and the war that led to it. Chapter 2 will pause to survey the Athenians and their environment. It will consider the composition of Athenian society, the constitution, the other Greek cities with whom the Athenians came into contact, and at some length the Persian Empire. For the northwestern marches of the empire will play an intermittent and sometimes large part in the story. Later chapters will proceed in chronological sequence.

1

The Crisis of 387/6

The Ruse of Antalkidas

To understand the predicament in which the Athenians were caught in 387 one must look at a city, Abydos, and at a Spartan, Antalkidas. For Abydos provided the harbor whence the Spartan commander contrived to outmaneuver the Athenians and seize control of the straits. It was on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, opposite Sestos, and for some years it had been for the Spartans their most reliable base in or near the eastern Aegean. In 394 Pharnabazos, commanding a Persian fleet and having Konon the Athenian in his service, had defeated the Peloponnesian fleet off Knidos. The two admirals followed up their victory by sailing into the eastern Aegean and freeing the maritime cities from Spartan control. Spartan harmosts fled from most of the cities and the liberators were welcomed. But Derkylidas, a highly competent officer who had an old grudge against Pharnabazos, was in Abydos at the time of the battle of Knidos. He rallied the people of Abydos to the Spartan cause and he captured Sestos. When Pharnabazos and Konon attacked Abydos, Derkylidas withstood them successfully.¹

In 389 Derkylidas returned to Sparta and was replaced in Abydos by Anaxibios. In the previous year an Athenian fleet had sailed through the Hellespont and won the adherence of Byzantion and Chalkedon. Anaxibios recognized the importance of the revival of Athenian power in the straits. When he was ready to depart for Abydos, he persuaded the ephors to give him modest reinforcements, so that he could harass the Athenians. The latter responded by sending Iphikrates to the Hellespont with somewhat larger forces, and during 388 Iphikrates overcame and killed Anaxibios by a stratagem. But the Spartans and their sympathizers still held Abydos.²

In 388 Antalkidas as navarch took supreme command of Spartan naval operations. When he heard of the death of Anaxibios, he sent his own second-in-command (*epistoleus*), Nikolochos, to take control of Abydos. On the journey thither Nikolochos raided the island of Tenedos at the approach to the Hellespont and took booty. Athenian squadrons from Samothrake,

Thasos, and other places in the neighborhood came to the aid of the Tenedians and then based themselves in the Chersonese. From there they blockaded Nikolochos in Abydos by sea, but Nikolochos was able to keep his land communications open.³

Antalkidas saw that the war could be won in the Hellespont and that he would have adequate forces, if he secured Persian subsidies. In 392 he had gone as Spartan envoy to Sardes and had convinced Tiribazos that it would be expedient to direct Persian support to the Spartans in the war among the Greeks. Tiribazos had gone to the court but had not been able to persuade the king to change his policy. Artaxerxes II was slow to forget that in the early years of his reign the Spartans had rendered help to the pretender Kyros. Yet he continued to esteem Tiribazos.⁴ By 388 Artaxerxes was ready to be persuaded. He had gone to war against Evagoras of Cypriote Salamis in the meantime, and the Athenians had sent warships to help Evagoras. In 388 Antalkidas joined Tiribazos at Sardes, and the two men together traveled to the court. They returned the next summer with a royal promise of material support for the Spartans, if the Athenians and their allies did not accept the terms of peace proposed by the king.⁵

Antalkidas proceeded by land to Abydos and took command of the Peloponnesian ships there. Nikolochos in Abydos was still blockaded on the seaward side by Athenian ships under Iphikrates and Diotimos. They could rely on places in the Chersonese for anchorage. At Tenedos there was a further Athenian squadron commanded by no less than four officers, Demainetos, Dionysios, Leontichos, and Phantias. When Antalkidas heard that Iphikrates had sailed away through the Propontis against Chalkedon, he seized his opportunity. He set sail by night in a northeasterly direction and gave out that he was making for Chalkedon in order to help its citizens in defense against Iphikrates. So Demainetos and his three colleagues set off in pursuit and sailed into the Propontis. But Antalkidas had not gone so far. He had put in at Perkote on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont and concealed his ships there. Indeed Phanokritos of Parion, a local man well disposed toward the Athenians, approached Demainetos and his colleagues and warned them of the stratagem of Antalkidas, but they refused to believe him.

When the Athenians had thus sailed away, Antalkidas returned from Perkote to Abydos and took control of the Hellespont. Promptly afterward eight Athenian ships under Thrasyboulos of Kollytos came from Thrace in the hope of joining the other Athenians. Antalkidas sent his twelve fastest ships against them and captured them all. Soon he was joined by twenty ships from Syracuse, by some from the part of Ionia controlled by Tiribazos, and by others from the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. Hence he had more than eighty warships at his disposal. Late in the summer, when merchant ships carrying grain set off from the Black Sea to sail through the straits into the Aegean, Antalkidas impeded the ones bound for Athens and diverted them to his own allies. The Athenians had to negotiate peace.⁶

The ruse that Antalkidas carried out with skill was not in conception original. In 388 Iphikrates from the Chersonese was operating against Anaxibios at Abydos. Anaxibios marched south overland with much of his force to Antandros and secured the adherence of that city. Iphikrates, looking ahead to his return, crossed the Hellespont by night, landed in the most deserted part of the territory of Abydos, and concealed his men in ambush in the hills. He instructed the ships, which had conveyed him across the strait, to sail at daybreak in a northeasterly direction along the coast of the Chersonese; thus he created the appearance of being engaged in exacting financial contributions from the local people, as was his custom. So when Anaxibios set off from Antandros northward to return to Abydos, he thought that Iphikrates was sailing in the direction of Prokonnesos. When the men of Anaxibios were making their way in an extended column with the van in the plain of Kremaste and the rear still on the slope, Iphikrates attacked him by surprise, killed him, and pursued his troops to the walls of Abydos, although some of them made good their escape into the city.⁷ Antalkidas was already navarch when this minor passage of arms took place. A year later he could surely reflect on the irony of history.

The Corinthian War

The war that was brought to an end in 387/6 clarified the distribution of power among the cities of Greece. The severe defeat inflicted on Athens in 404 had not corresponded to the lasting balance of resources between the protagonists of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians recovered and they surmounted the bitterness and distrust engendered by revolution and civil war.⁸ By 395 they could think of resisting the hegemonic power, although they dared not act alone. Fortune provided allies. Argos had long resented Spartan pretensions. Moreover Boiotia and Corinth were dissatisfied with the terms of peace, on which the Spartans had insisted in 404, and with their subsequent policies. In addition the Spartans had embroiled themselves with the satraps of western Asia Minor; in and after 399 they had sent troops to operate there, professedly in defense of Greek cities against Persian claims.

In 396 Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, sent Timokrates of Rhodes to European Greece to foster opposition to Sparta. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and Athens. A generation later historians disputed the question, How far were the bribes of Timokrates responsible for the outbreak of war?⁹ At least his mission revealed the prospect of Persian subsidies to meet the costs of warfare. Furthermore in each of the places he visited he could tell men discontented under Spartan hegemony that they had sympathizers in the other cities. The occasion for war developed from a traditional dispute at the border between Phokis and Lokris. The Thebans intervened in support of the Lokrians. The Spartans decided that the time

had come to humble Thebes and they prepared an expedition. Anticipating its arrival, the Thebans sought and gained the alliance of Athens. Lysander gathered troops from the northerly allies of Sparta and invaded Boiotia. The Boiotians defeated him at Haliartos and killed him.¹⁰

The defeat of the Spartans at Haliartos in 395 was relatively small in scale but it had large effects. A coalition hostile to Sparta was brought into being. Its members included Boiotia, Athens, Argos, Corinth with its colonies of Leukas and Ambrakia, the cities of Euboeia, those of Thracian Chalkidike, and some tribes of the northwest.¹¹ The allies created a *synedrion*, a body of deputies to sit permanently at Corinth and direct policy. That was the model followed later by the Athenians when they founded a new league in 378. For 394 the allies gathered a force in the territory of Corinth; their strategic aim was to confine the Spartans to the Peloponnese. The Spartans recalled King Agesilaos and his army from western Asia Minor. The purpose for which Pharnabazos had sent Timokrates to Greece was thus achieved.

The Spartans won major battles on land in 394, but the military situation became deadlocked. Fighting continued in and near Corinth for many years, but neither side could overcome the other. In 392 the Spartans sent Antalkidas to Sardes to try to divert Persian support to their side. Thereupon the Athenians, the Boiotians, the Corinthians, and the Argives also sent envoys to Sardes. The deliberations were inconclusive. The Athenians and their allies were distressed to find that Antalkidas prevailed with Tiribazos. But Tiribazos did not prevail with the king, and so the war and the current alignments continued. Negotiations followed within Greece toward the winter of 392/1. Four Athenian envoys were sent to Sparta and brought back a proposal of more favorable terms; the Spartans agreed that the Athenians should keep Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, ancestral possessions of which they had been deprived in 404. When the four envoys reported back to Athens, embassies came from Argos and Corinth. There was a debate in the assembly, and the outcome was that Athens refused the terms of peace and exiled the four envoys.¹²

The war encouraged the aspirations of the Athenians. They began rebuilding the fortifications of the Peiraieus and the Long Walls in 395/4. In 393 Konon brought them money from Pharnabazos to enable them to complete the task.¹³ By 392 they had recovered Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. In 390, fearing a resurgence of Spartan naval power, they sent out Thrasyboulos of Steiria with forty warships. It was their largest and almost their first naval expedition since the end of the Peloponnesian War, and it achieved signal successes. Making his way to the Hellespont, Thrasyboulos reconciled two Thracian chieftains with one another and made them allies of Athens. He won over Byzantion for the Athenians and set up a customs station to exact a tithe on merchant ships that came from the Black Sea. His operations continued into the next year and took him to Lesbos and Aspendos, where he was assassinated.¹⁴ An inscribed decree of 387/6 shows that the Athenians gained ascendancy at Klazomenai during the operations of Thrasyboulos. The decree provides that Klazomenai shall owe no other financial obliga-

tions to Athens beyond the twentieth that he had instituted. The nature of this exaction is unknown; its name suggests the levy of a twentieth on goods carried by sea, which the Athenians had imposed in 413 as more productive than the tribute previously paid by the allies. The twentieth and the expedition of Thrasyboulos are mentioned also in a decree honoring two Thasians.¹⁵ Epigraphic evidence can never be more than a random sample. If Klazomenai and perhaps Thasos paid a twentieth to the Athenians by 387/6, presumably some other cities did so too. By 388 the Spartans had good reason to entrust control of diplomacy and naval warfare to Antalkidas. Their sole prospect of success depended on diverting Persian support to their cause.

The steadfast pursuit of international power by the Athenians during the war shows that among them the violent divisions of 404/3 were over. There was a large measure of agreement on policy. It is illustrated by developments of 395, and suggestive light was shed on these by the discovery in 1906 of fragments of a detailed history, which has come to be called the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*. In a much studied passage the author told how toward 396 Epikrates and Kephalos had persuaded the Athenians to undertake actions opposed to Sparta. For example, Athens had sent weapons and men to the force that was gathering under Konon in Cyprus for service under the Persians. The author explained that Thrasyboulos and others had tried to restrain the Athenians from such deeds, which could provoke the Spartans. Yet when the Boiotians came to Athens for help in 395, the alliance with them was proposed by Thrasyboulos, and when the proposal was put to the vote in the assembly, no one voted against it.¹⁶ Evidently the issue dividing Thrasyboulos from Epikrates and Kephalos was not the desirability of opposing Sparta but the question of choosing the right opportunity.

The war brought the triumphs and deaths of Konon and later of Thrasyboulos. Nothing suggests that they were political allies. Some have argued that they diverged in policy. Konon was willing to enter Persian service and rely on Persian help toward resuscitating Athenian power, but Thrasyboulos, it is suggested, dreamed of restoring an Athenian empire of fifth-century type, an empire fully independent of Persia.¹⁷ Yet this thesis is flawed, because in 390–389, when Thrasyboulos achieved his successes, Persian help was no longer available to the Athenians. There is little point in asking whether he would have accepted it, had it been offered. A view that looks more for personalities than for programs is to be preferred.

Inquiry into Athenian internal politics of the Corinthian War was stimulated by the publication of the first fragments of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* and has been pursued with care. Indeed this subject has become something of a test case for reconstructing the Athenian political scene.¹⁸ The evidence suffices to suggest much but only to establish little. Attempts have been made to discern lasting alignments among leading Athenians, but they rested in large part on the assumption that the common service of five named Athenians as envoys to Sardes in 392 bound them together as political allies. In fact common service on an embassy does not necessarily mark

political ties; the Athenians sometimes chose men of different groups for the same embassy in order to bind them all to the policy.¹⁹ The general criticism has been voiced that criteria have not been established for recognizing political friendship among Athenian statesmen. Indeed it is difficult to refute a view which says that on each occasion each Athenian spoke only for himself. Yet a different view can be defended. Admittedly evidence is too scanty to allow any lengthy inquiry into criteria. But it is reasonable to suppose that, if two names are linked in at least two contexts, the linkage is more likely to reflect alignment than accident.

This rule of thumb can scarcely be dignified with the name of a criterion. But bearing it in mind one may approach Epikrates and Kephalos. They are linked by the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* because even before the outbreak of war they advocated provocative actions toward Sparta and in this they differed from Thrasyboulos and some other leaders. Kephalos is known from an incident of 400/399. He pleaded in support of Andokides, when the latter was on trial in that year. Andokides in his speech of defense named Agyrrhios as one of his own enemies.²⁰ Epikrates and Andokides suffered misfortune in 392/1. They were among the four envoys sent to Sparta to negotiate and exiled by the Athenians on their return. The man who prosecuted them was Kallistratos, the nephew of Agyrrhios.²¹ In short, Kephalos and Epikrates are linked about 396; Kephalos and Andokides are linked against Agyrrhios in 400/399; Andokides and Epikrates are linked against the nephew of Agyrrhios in 392/1. The pattern may be accidental, but it may reflect lasting alliance between Kephalos, Epikrates, and Andokides.

Again the early career of Iphikrates deserves scrutiny, both for his possible alignment and because he will play a part in the story to be told in later chapters. In 393 or 392 Konon established a force of mercenaries, equipped as peltasts, in the territory of Corinth and entrusted command of it to Iphikrates. Leading this force in 390, Iphikrates collaborated with Kallias to destroy a *mora* of Lakedaimonian troops, when it was retiring from Lechaion. On this occasion Kallias is described (by Xenophon) as *stratēgos* of the Athenian hoplites but Iphikrates as commanding officer (*archōn*) of the peltasts. The difference of wording, surely deliberate, may imply that Iphikrates was not an officer of the Athenian state but had received command of the peltasts from the man who had established them near Corinth. It follows that Konon had confidence in the military talent and the loyalty of Iphikrates. The defeat of the *mora* near Lechaion became famous; it showed how effectively light-armed troops could be employed against hoplites.²² Iphikrates justified thus the trust that Konon had placed in him. According to a late but learned scholar, Iphikrates first distinguished himself at sea.²³ The remark suggests naval service under Konon, for in the mid-390s there were not many war fleets on which an Athenian could serve.

Iphikrates was the first of his family to achieve distinction. When Harmodios, a descendant of the tyrannicide, criticized his humble birth, he retorted: "My family admittedly begins with me, but yours ends in you."²⁴ Lack of extensive inherited ties may help to explain why he could change his

alignment later. But even a man without ancestors has a father. The name of the father of Iphikrates is known; it was Timotheos. Konon's father was another Timotheos.²⁵ The name was common. The coincidence of the patronymics may be accidental. Alternatively it may indicate that the tie with Konon, from which Iphikrates benefited in the early stages of his career, was inherited from a previous generation.

The King's Peace

In 387/6, when the Athenians decided to make peace, their allies were not willing to continue fighting without them. This fact illustrates the preeminence of power that Athens had attained within the coalition. Tiribazos accordingly issued a general invitation: such Greek states as wished to hear the terms of peace the king had sent should dispatch envoys to Sardes. When the envoys arrived, they listened to the following letter.

King Artaxerxes considers it just that the cities in Asia and, of the islands, Klazomenai and Cyprus should belong to him, but the other Greek cities, both small and large, should be made autonomous, except for Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros; these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. If either of the two sides refuses to accept this peace, I will make war on the recalcitrants, in collaboration with those willing to join me, on land and on sea and with ships and with money.²⁶

The king himself was much vexed by the affairs of Cyprus and gave them his attention in the next years. Klazomenai, though an island, was so close to the shore that it could be classified with the cities of the mainland.

Although the royal letter recognized that two sides had been at war, the peace was not in form a bilateral treaty mediated between the belligerents but a general statement of principle applicable to the cities of European Greece; all were to be autonomous. This form had been adumbrated in the abortive negotiations of 392, when one of the obstacles had been the failure of Antalkidas and Tiribazos to recognize Athenian claims to Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.²⁷ In virtue of its comprehensive character, the agreement is well called a treaty of "common peace." The same term is applicable to multilateral agreements of similar type brought into being later in the fourth century, although one cannot be sure that the expression "common peace" was used in negotiations.²⁸

The principle enunciated as the basis of peace in 387/6 was that Greek cities should be "autonomous." Statements of general principle in international relations are only feasible if they do not say much. The word *autonomos* had come into use about the middle of the fifth century. It was vague but systematically vague. That is, in each utterance where it occurred it derived meaning from its context and usually from some other stated condition, with which it was contrasted (see appendix 3). When the context provided neither contrast nor any indication of a material condition, the word

lost all descriptive meaning but retained overtones of approval. Deprived of a defining context, a provision for *autonomia* was an expression of piety or hypocrisy. It had a long life in diplomatic relations. In 387/6 the real question was not what autonomy meant, but who the Greek states were. Artaxerxes and Tiribazos left it to the Spartans to answer that question. For the exercise of power in Greece the most important provision of the peace was the assertion of the king's right to the cities of Asia. From 399 until 394 the Spartans had challenged that right by sending armies into Asia Minor. Once the Spartans gave up their pretension to protect the Asiatic Greeks, the king was content that they should order the affairs of the European cities. He would not need to carry out the threat of warfare, expressed in the closing sentence of his letter.

The Greek envoys who had listened to the letter at Sardes returned to their cities. These accepted the proposed peace and sent deputies to Sparta to swear the oaths. When the envoys from Thebes claimed to swear on behalf of the Boiotian federation, King Agesilaos refused to accept their oath and insisted that the cities of Boiotia should swear separately. The Theban envoys went home for new instructions. Without waiting for them to return, Agesilaos gained authorization from the ephors for a campaign, advanced to Tegea, and began collecting forces there. Before he could set off northward from Tegea, the Theban envoys returned with the news that Thebes disbanded the Boiotian federation.

During the war Argos and Corinth had formed a close union, probably in successive stages, and Corinthian opponents of the union had been driven into exile. Agesilaos now threatened military action against both cities. So the union was dissolved, the exiles were received back into Corinth, and some other Corinthians withdrew into exile.²⁹ The league of allies headed by Sparta and conveniently called the Peloponnesian League in modern times remained in existence. Obviously the mutual obligations of its members did not infringe their autonomy.

For the Athenians the peace meant the loss of Klazomenai and any places they may have gained on the mainland of Asia Minor. But they kept Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. Excavation has recovered part of an inscribed decree of the Athenians about Lemnos.³⁰ The text shows that land had been confiscated on the island, presumably from partisans of Sparta some time after the battle of Knidos. It has frequent references to Athenian cleruchs in Lemnos. The decree was passed in 387/6, but one cannot tell whether it was passed before or after the conclusion of peace.

In relation to Athens the question must be faced whether the peace settlement included additional terms, beyond those of the royal letter quoted by Xenophon. When envoys went to Sparta to swear oaths, there was time for further negotiations. That additional terms were reached has been asserted and denied.³¹ Some of the points at issue are of no great moment. It makes little difference whether the treaty said that each city should retain its own territory, or that the Persian king could do as he wished with the Greek cities of Asia, or that foreign garrisons should be removed, or even that exiles should be recalled. Some at least of these provisions could be understood.

Others, such as the recall of Corinthian exiles, could be brought about by the threats of Agesilaos.

But one additional provision of material importance has been suggested and has to do with Athenian fortifications. Early in 378 there were no gates on the Peiraieus. When the Spartan officer commanding a garrison at Thespiiai made a raid into western Attica and was acquitted at his consequent trial in Lakedaïmon, the Athenians were outraged. According to Xenophon, "they put gates on the Peiraieus, they built warships, and they came to the aid of the Boiotians with all enthusiasm"; according to Diodoros, "they voted that the treaty had been broken by the Lakedaïmonians."³² It is suggested that the two authors record different aspects of a single Athenian decision. Supposedly the king's peace required the Athenians to remove the gates from the Peiraieus, but in 378 they denounced the peace and put the gates back.

The inference is ingenious but goes rather beyond the report of Diodoros. He does not say that the Athenians denounced the peace; he says that they said the Spartans had broken it. Moreover, a later incident throws light on the gates to the Peiraieus and on what the Athenians thought about them. Near the middle of the summer of 346 the assembled Athenians learned that Philip of Macedon had imposed severe terms on Phokis. In alarm they voted a decree moved by Kallisthenes "to bring the children and the women in from the fields, to put the forts in a state of defense, to fortify the Peiraieus, and to celebrate the sacrifice of the Herakleia in the city."³³ Surely "to fortify the Peiraieus," the phrase used in the decree of Kallisthenes, means the same as "to put gates on the Peiraieus" in Xenophon's record for 378. Early in 378 and early in 346 the gates were not in place in the Peiraieus. Their absence does not reflect any provision of the peace settlement of 387/6. The fourth-century Athenian liked to believe that he lived in a secure world (see chapter 2).³⁴ In normal times he did not install the gates to the fortifications of the Peiraieus, although he kept them in readiness in case of emergency.

Athens in the Shadow of Antalkidas

The peace of 387/6 was not severe for the Athenians in its material provisions, but their disappointment was bitter. Their bitterness is echoed in a decree with which they voted honors to Phanokritos of Parion, whom the four generals in the Hellespont had not heeded. Most of the preserved part of the decree is an amendment, stating explicitly and precisely the reason for the honors:

Because he made a report to our generals about the voyage of the ships, and if the generals had believed him, the enemy's triremes would have been captured.³⁵

The man who proposed the amendment was Kephalos. Perhaps he cherished resentment since the banishment of Epikrates and Andokides five years before, if they were his friends.

Many Athenian officers had operated in the straits in 387 and many underwent political setbacks. Of the four generals who had not believed Phanokritos, one, Dionysios, was tried and condemned, and the other three probably suffered the same misfortune.³⁶ Thrasyboulos of Kollytos, whose eight ships had approached the Hellespont too late, was prosecuted, doubtless on this occasion. He was either acquitted or at least not sentenced to any severe penalty. Four years later he pleaded at the scrutiny of a candidate for the archonship, but the other party dared to say: "He [Thrasyboulos] betrayed our ships and made our city deliberate about survival."³⁷ Iphikrates, who had sailed against Chalkedon after Antalkidas reached Abydos, entered the service of the Thracian king Kotys and married a woman of his family. The marriage provided occasion for Athenian comic poets to make jokes and may well have taken place in 386.³⁸ If that date is right, Iphikrates probably went from Chalkedon to Thrace without coming back to Athens. Diotimos had collaborated with Iphikrates in besieging Abydos. He may have fallen into temporary obscurity; he is next attested serving at the battle of Naxos in 376 and commanding some ships at Syros afterward.³⁹

Another man who suffered misfortune, probably about 386, was Agyrrhios. He had been active in the 390s, notably in introducing and increasing payment for attendance at the public assembly. In 389, when Thrasyboulos of Steiria was killed near Aspendos, Agyrrhios was sent to succeed him in command of his fleet. Naval operations took him as far as Lesbos at least. Some time he was condemned to pay a fine and, being unable to pay, he stayed in prison for many years. The likely occasion for his condemnation is the conflicts of 386. A generation later people remarked on the fact that his nephew, Kallistratos, had not tried to exercise political influence for his release.⁴⁰ Kallistratos survived.

Caution characterized Athenian policy in the years following the conclusion of the peace. In 386/5 Hebryzelmis, a Thracian king, exchanged messages with the Athenians. It is not clear what was at issue. The king presumably asked for action of some kind, but the Athenians responded with a grant of empty honors.⁴¹ Again, it is likely that about this time they gave up their claim to administer the property of the temple of Apollo at Delos; probably the Delians tried to take over the administration and the Spartans upheld them.⁴²

Early in 384/3 the Athenians made an alliance with Chios.⁴³ The decree ratifying it ordered the election of five men, who should sail to Chios and exact the oath from the Chian authorities. The name of one of the five is familiar and suggestive; it is Kephalos. Historians have often discussed the Chian alliance as a preliminary to the league launched by the Athenians with more ambition five or six years later. That is just. But the opportunities of 379–377 could not be foreseen in 384. The predominant note of the alliance with Chios was caution. The document expressed insistent respect for the peace currently in force, for the Lakedaimonians, and for the Persian king. The Athenians were also cautious in their choice of ally. The Chians were known to be conservative people, who owned plentiful slaves and attained prosperity by avoiding risks.⁴⁴

In yet another respect the alliance with Chios was cautious. The military obligations accepted by the contracting parties were stated in these words:

If anyone attacks the Athenians, let the Chians come to their aid with all their force as far as possible, and if anyone attacks the Chians, let the Athenians come to their aid with all their force as far as possible.

Each city was to help the other but only as far as possible. That phrase rendered the obligation nugatory. If the *casus foederis* arose, a reluctant ally could plead impossibility. The alliance amounted to little more than opening diplomatic relations. Even so, it could serve to test the tolerance of the Spartans. Would they allow Athens and Chios this modicum of independent action? Evidently they did, for they made no response to the alliance. Two years later the Athenians took the bolder step of sending an embassy to Olynthos, but the Spartans were more sensitive to that (see chapter 3).

In the years of peace after 386, the outlook of the Athenians on international affairs was cautious but not feeble. They maintained and increased the strength of their fleet. They had had about seventy triremes in the summer of 387. In 378, when they renewed their naval efforts, they had a hundred.⁴⁵ The years of peace may have brought economic recovery, as had happened after 403. The fragmentary decree honoring Hebrizelmis provided that some Athenian envoys were to make a report to him "concerning the ships at PI——." The Athenians could send out small squadrons to protect their vital interests. What those interests were will be considered in chapter 2.

As the years passed, the bitterness prevalent among the Athenians in 386 diminished. A speech delivered at the end of 383/2 gives some indication of their current mood. It is preserved as the twenty-sixth among the speeches attributed to Lysias and it indicates its circumstances. During 383/2 Leodamas had been chosen archon for the next year but disqualified at his formal scrutiny (*dokimasia*). Evandros was chosen in his place. A friend of Leodamas set about challenging Evandros at his scrutiny and delivered the extant speech. The allegation against Evandros was that under the Thirty he had stayed in the city, served as cavalryman and councillor, and harmed the Athenian community. Thus the speaker tried to resuscitate the old antagonism between the men of the city and the men of the Peiraieus.

The speaker's undertaking was feeble. The treaty of reconciliation that put an end to the civil war had already been observed for twenty years. The speaker said that the hearing, where he spoke, had been postponed until the penultimate day of the year and that on the last day of the year the courts could not meet. It is likely that the courts (except the courts for homicide) did not meet on the last three days of any month.⁴⁶ Evidently the speech was delivered before the council. That body conducted the preliminary inquiry at the scrutiny of the nine archons, but the decision could only be taken by a court. Thus the speech could not achieve its professed aim of disqualifying Evandros. It was no more than a petty attempt at harassment. Such behavior was to be expected in a friend of Leodamas. A man born to failure, Leodamas made himself known later as the inveterate and ineffectual enemy of

Kallistratos and of the latter's ally, Chabrias. The activities of Leodamas and his friend should not be taken to reflect any sentiment widespread among the Athenians.

Thrasyboulos of Kollytos had been instrumental in unseating Leodamas and prepared to defend Evandros. The latter is the figure of greatest interest in relation to the speech. In spite of harassment, he held office as archon in 382/1.⁴⁷ Moreover Evandros had put in an earlier appearance in the extant or plausibly restored records of Athenian policy. It was he who proposed the reply to Hebryzelmis in 386/5. The odium of having stayed in the city under the Thirty did not exclude him from political activity in the 380s. Old antagonisms were fading.

2

The Athenians and Their Environment

In 387/6 the Athenians had to yield to the power of the Spartans, who had the approval and active support of the Persian king. So it is proper to pause and ask what manner of men the Athenians were, what sort of Greek neighbors they dealt with, and in what form Persian power confronted them. This chapter will therefore deal with the size of the Athenian population, its wealth, and its supply of food. It will proceed to the constitution and political scene in Athens. Other Greek states will be noted briefly; not much needs to be said about them. Persia, on the other hand, is less well understood. From time to time in the fourth century Athenian policy responded to developments in the northwest frontier of the Persian Empire, a “frontier” that embraced Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Egypt. An excursus will be needed and will lead to consideration of the war in Cyprus, which induced Artaxerxes to listen to Tiribazos and Antalkidas in 388/7.

The Population, Wealth, and Food Supply of Athens

Some figures for the total of adult male citizens of Athens are preserved from the later part of the fourth century. Demetrios of Phaleron, who governed Athens for the Macedonians from 317 until 307, conducted a survey of the population.¹ The figure for adult male citizens in this survey was 21,000. Again, in 322 Antipater altered the constitution by restricting active citizenship to those whose property was worth at least two thousand drachmas. Diodoros says that those owning this amount or more numbered 9,000. According to the manuscripts of Diodoros those whose property was less than two thousand drachmas numbered 22,000, and Antipater gave them the opportunity to migrate to Thrace. Probably only a few hundred emigrated. Plutarch, referring to the same change, says that those excluded from active citizenship amounted to 12,000.² In view of the total recognized by Demetrios it is reasonable to correct Diodoros’s figure for the disfranchised

men from 22,000 to 12,000 in the light of Plutarch's statement. Thus the total for 322 would be 21,000.

The figure of 9,000 for the men of property gains some support from an incident of 411. In that year the revolutionaries proclaimed a plan to restrict power to men who could serve as hoplites, and they expected these to number some 5,000. But according to a forensic speech, when the list was compiled it bore 9,000 names.³ Perhaps there was an approximately constant body of some 9,000 men whose property qualified them to serve as hoplites. Indeed the forces fighting against the Spartans at Nemea in 394 included 6,000 Athenian hoplites and 600 Athenian cavalry, and for the battle of Mantinea in 362 the Athenians supplied 6,000 infantry and some cavalry.⁴ If the forces on active service in these two battles were men from their twentieth to their forty-ninth year of age, the total of adult men owning hoplite property would be about 9,500.

Further figures lend support to an estimate of about 12,000 for the poorer men, who could be recruited for naval service. In 352 the Athenians resolved to send a fleet of forty triremes to sea and to recruit rowers aged up to their forty-fifth year.⁵ Since the nominal crew of a trireme was 200, the number of rowers envisaged was 8,000. The total of adult men owning less than hoplite property would be about 13,000, if those among them who were between their twentieth and their forty-fifth year numbered about 8,000. Again, in 373 the Athenians voted to send sixty triremes to sea and entrusted command to Timotheos, but he could not find enough oarsmen in Athens and he went to recruit more from the islands.⁶ His difficulty shows that there were among the Athenians far fewer than the requisite number of 12,000 within the age limits for active service.

The figures noted so far accord with a total of 21,000 adult male citizens. This figure gains further support from an incident of about 330. The property of Diphilos, amounting to 160 talents, was distributed among the Athenians and each man received fifty drachmas. These sums imply that there were 19,200 recipients.⁷ To sum up, one may well conclude that in the fourth century Athens had about 21,000 male citizens who were in their eighteenth year or older. Patently this figure is highly approximate. The total must have fluctuated with the fortunes of warfare and with the rise and fall of prosperity. It could also decrease somewhat in consequence of emigration, especially when Athens had cleruchies abroad.

Lately this conclusion has been challenged and a different interpretation of the census of Demetrios has been offered.⁸ His survey is called an *exetasmos*, a word that can most readily mean a muster for military purposes. A military survey never includes all the men; it omits administrative personnel and the physically unfit. The former may be estimated at 5 percent of the total. On the basis of European figures of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a conservative estimate of the physically unfit would put them at 20 percent of the total. Consequently, it is suggested, Demetrios's figure of 21,000 available for military purposes is far less than the total of adult male citizens. One may, then, accept the figure of 22,000 from the manuscripts of

Diodoros for those who had less than 2,000 drachmas in 322, and so the total of adult male citizens would be about 31,000.

Critics of this argument should admit that the survey of Demetrios may well have tried to find the total manpower available for armed service. Administrative personnel may have been omitted and 5 percent may be a reasonable estimate; the question has little importance, since calculations from the poor data extant must recognize a margin of error much larger than 5 percent. The crucial issue is that of estimating the physically unfit. A percentage drawn from European nations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries should not be assumed for ancient Athens. Modern medicine keeps the unfit alive longer; that is, at any one time the proportion of people unfit but alive is higher in a modern nation than in fourth-century Athens. Some of the inventions of "modern" medicine have already been current in Europe for a long time. Eyeglasses, for example, were first developed toward the end of the thirteenth century, and they decrease the incidence of accidental death among the shortsighted.

It must be concluded that the challenge to the thesis that adult male citizens numbered about 21,000 does not succeed. In particular the naval data of 352 and 373 imply that those owning less property than hoplites amounted to a total much nearer to 12,000 than to 22,000, and the distribution of the property of Diphilos implies a total of adult male citizens nearer to 21,000 than to 31,000. But the challenge is valuable as a reminder that any figure reached for the citizen population of the fourth century must be very approximate. To recognize a margin of error of about 10 percent can scarcely be excessive, in view of incalculable factors including administrative personnel and the physically unfit.

For the male citizens one must allow a complement of women and children sufficient to preserve the population from decline. The incidence of death in all age groups was doubtless high by modern standards. Although there are no statistics, one must reckon with the infirmities of the very young and of the old, and among people in the prime of life, with frequent death in battle or in childbirth according to sex. Women were probably less numerous than men, especially in the part of the population which did not own enough property to supply hoplites. For in times of scarcity women are likely to have suffered more from undernourishment than men. Perhaps one may put the normal total of citizens—men, women, and children—at 80,000 and recognize a margin of error of at least 10 percent.

Apart from citizens there were aliens among the free population. Probably the status of "metic" (*metoikos*) or resident alien was acquired in the fourth century by staying in Attica a month, there being no further requirement such as an intention of permanent residence.⁹ Metics were liable for military service. They paid a poll tax, the *metoikion*, at an annual rate of twelve drachmas for a man and six drachmas for a woman.¹⁰ The survey conducted by Demetrios of Phaleron reported that there were 10,000 metics. If the survey was restricted to people who could be required for military service, it did not include women. Alternatively Demetrios may have calculated his total

for metics from the records of the poll tax, which was paid by women as well as men. People became metics in each of two ways. First, some of them came to Athens as free people who were citizens in their native places. Second, if an Athenian manumitted one of his slaves, the former slave became a metic.¹¹ Metics could not own land or buildings, but they may have varied in wealth as widely as citizens did. Some metics, such as Pasion the banker, became wealthy. The people to whom Pasion lent money included statesmen, such as Timotheos,¹² but there is no reason to suppose that Pasion or any metic exercised political influence. His elder son, Apollodoros, attempted political activity, but he did so long after the family had received Athenian citizenship.¹³

Attempts to estimate the number of slaves in Attica suffer from great uncertainty. Probably no count was made in antiquity. Estimates based on annual consumption of grain have varied between 20,000 and 75,000. The best figure concerning slaves is transmitted by Thucydides. He says that in consequence of the occupation of Dekeleia by the Spartans in the later stage of the Peloponnesian War "more than 20,000" slaves deserted. That was a major loss.¹⁴ Slaves were employed in a great variety of tasks, including domestic service and crafts of all kinds. The only activity relying wholly on servile labor was the mining of silver at Laureion. Employment of slaves in agriculture was probably not extensive. Citizens who owned large amounts of land usually held relatively small parcels scattered widely over Attica. In this way they took advantage of a variety of landscape to grow a variety of crops and minimized the risks caused by local fluctuations of rainfall. To employ slaves extensively on scattered plots would have entailed high costs of supervision. It was more profitable to lease land to tenants on varying terms.¹⁵

The considerations presented here suggest that the total population of Attica was more than 100,000 but less than 200,000. Greater precision is neither attainable nor necessary. For whatever the true figure between the stated limits may have been, it is evident that adult male citizens were a privileged minority. They took care of their womenfolk and their children, they tolerated resident aliens, and they made slaves work. Something has also become apparent about distribution of wealth among Athenian citizens. The attempts to restrict political power by property in 411 and in 322 show that a division was recognized between those who owned enough for service as hoplites and those who did not; the two classes numbered about 9,000 and about 12,000 respectively. Aristophanes recognized this line of division when he wrote:

It is the life of a beggar (*ptōchos*) to stay alive without having anything, but it is the life of a poor man (*penēs*) to live thriftily and attending to his tasks, and to have nothing left over but not to be in want.

Linguistic usage respected the distinction. The indigent 12,000 were called "beggars" (*ptōchoi*). They lived from hand to mouth, often in the service of

rich men or of the state, which employed them as laborers or rowers. Most of the men of hoplite property were said to be "lacking resources" (*aporoi*) or "poor" (*penētes*), that is men who engaged in toil (*ponos*). They had the minimum of property for independence, often in the form of a small holding.¹⁶

There was a further line of division among those who owned at least enough for hoplite service. It arose from the system of liturgies or fiscal burdens. From the earliest times rich men had met the expenses of public activities, such as equipping teams to compete at festivals and fitting out warships. In return they received admiration and loyalty from their less fortunate fellows. At the battle of Artemision in 480 Kleinias commanded his own trireme, which he equipped at his own expense.¹⁷ One may presume that its crew developed warm sentiments toward him. By the second quarter of the fourth century the liturgies were of two kinds. First there were the two military liturgies. One of these was the trierarchy, the cost of making a warship ready for sea and keeping it in good condition. The state supplied the hull, some equipment, and pay for the crew, but the trierarch had many expenses of maintenance to meet. Sometimes at least there was competition among trierarchs to see who could fit out his ship best and most promptly.¹⁸ The other military liturgy arose from the *eisphora*, or tax levied on property for warfare. In 378/7 the Athenians reassessed their property and grouped those liable to pay the tax in a hundred symmories or contribution groups. Within each symmory the three richest men paid in advance the whole sum required from their group and then tried to recoup themselves from the other members. This second military liturgy, the *proeisphora*, was born thus by the 300 richest Athenians and was probably instituted in 378/7, when the *eisphora* was reorganized.¹⁹ The other liturgies were far less expensive and can be called "agonistic" or "festival liturgies." They were expenses incurred in connection with festivals, in particular in preparing teams for athletic or musical competitions.

In the middle of the fourth century people still volunteered sometimes to serve as trierarchs.²⁰ But the trierarchy was burdensome and compulsion was often applied to make men undertake it. When a naval expedition was voted, the generals nominated rich men to serve as trierarchs. A man who thought that another was financially better able to serve could have recourse to the procedure of *antidosis*, that is, he challenged the other to undertake the trierarchy or exchange property with him.²¹ Sometimes two men served together as joint trierarchs for a single ship. In 358/7 or possibly shortly before the law of Perikandros was passed, distributing the 1,200 richest men into twenty symmories or contribution groups for the trierarchy.²² In 340 a law of Demosthenes was passed, restricting the burden to the 300 richest men.²³ The system of a hundred symmories for the *eisphora* imposed compulsion on the 300 to pay the *proeisphora*. Volunteers may usually have sufficed for the agonistic liturgies. These were a relatively inexpensive way of winning popularity, and by performing an agonistic liturgy one could gain exemption from all liturgies for a year.²⁴ So the number of men performing

agonistic liturgies may have been larger, but probably not much larger, than those liable for the military liturgies.

In consequence it is reasonable, and it has lately become customary, to speak of "a liturgical class." Its members were recognizably different from the rest of the 9,000 men of property. Isaios alluded to the distinction thus in a forensic speech:

You are all my witnesses that my mother's brothers, Chaireleos and Makaratos, were not among those who perform liturgies but among those who own modest property.²⁵

Everyday speech applied the words "rich" (*plousioi*) and "having resources" (*euporoi*) to the men who performed liturgies. People of such wealth were associated with large houses.²⁶ It has been estimated that a man whose property was worth less than three talents was exempt from liturgies, but a man owning four talents or more was not likely to escape for long.²⁷ In the fourth century large fortunes, exceeding markedly the minimum liable for the military liturgies, were few and conspicuous. When Demosthenes came of age and sued his guardians, he said that they had recorded his property in the symmory as worth 15 talents and thus they had put him in the same category as Timotheos.²⁸ The latter had inherited 17 talents from his father, Konon.²⁹ People remembered that Kritoboulos owned more than 8 talents and that Nikeratos, the son of the wealthy Nikias, left an estate of 14 talents at death.³⁰

Between such fortunes and indigence there were infinite gradations of wealth among the Athenians. Even so, it has become apparent that the Athenians did not draw a single line, separating the rich from the poor; on the contrary they recognized two lines of division and therefore everyday language distinguished three categories: the rich, the poor (those who had modest property and engaged in toil), and the destitute. The tripartite division recognized in Athenian usage should give pause to those who suppose that political differences reflected a divergence between rich and poor.³¹ Holders of such theories may at least be invited to say where they draw the line between rich and poor and how their line compares with the lines of division recognized in Athenian thought.

Men of the liturgical class had the leisure to engage frequently in political activity, if they so desired. The historian should search among them for the political leaders, for the men who took initiative in formulating policy. It could therefore be important to discover the size of the liturgical class. On this question two theories are current. The one estimates the liturgical class at about 200 to 400, the other at about 800 to 1,200. There do not seem to be adequate grounds at present for choosing between these alternatives.³²

It remains to ask how the Athenians were fed. Staples of diet included grain (wheat and barley), olive oil, wine, and fish. Only the first of these had political importance. At ten of the forty meetings of the assembly held each year the agenda included "grain and defense of the territory." The administrative officers at work in the markets included "guardians of grain." Once

there had been five of these in the city and five in the Peiraeus, but by the 320s there were twenty in the city and fifteen in the Peiraeus.³³ The difficult question is, How much of the grain consumed in Attica was imported?

Until recently it was believed that the Athenians imported nearly all of their grain. From an inscribed record of firstfruits offered at Eleusis in 329 it was calculated that in that year Attica itself grew only 28,500 *medimnoi* of wheat. Demosthenes said that Athens drew half of its import of wheat from the Pontic area and that the amount drawn from there annually was 400,000 *medimnoi*. If these figures are even approximately reliable, it follows that most Athenians depended on imports for subsistence.³⁴ Lately this conclusion has been challenged.³⁵ It has been pointed out that the year 329 may have been exceptional. Calculations have been made for the possible yield of grain per hectare in Attica. Early in the present century the yield of wheat in Greece could be as low as 500 kilograms per hectare with a ratio of 1:3 between seed and yield. But, it is argued, intensive cultivation improves yield; frequent digging, for example, can conserve moisture. On the basis of comparative data from modern or relatively modern times it is suggested that classical Greece could reach a yield of 1,000 to 1,500 kilograms per hectare with a ratio of 1:10 between seed and yield. If so, the arable land of Attica could produce enough in wheat, barley, and olives to feed some 150,000. On this view the Athenians could produce enough or almost enough to feed themselves.

These calculations are impressive and the conclusion is possible. Let it be admitted that the record for the single year 329 is not an adequate basis for generalization. But within the calculations there may be a factor of uncertainty. One can ascertain with accuracy the performance of strains of grain that are still extant. Current strains have been developed by selective breeding since the eighteenth century. One cannot tell what strains were sown in the fourth century or how they performed. It is not impossible that selective breeding was practiced in antiquity; here the argument from the silence of extant sources has no force.

Fortunately the political historian can avoid the question, How far did the Athenians depend on imported grain? and ask instead, How far did the Athenians think that they depended on imported grain? Policy is determined not by the economy, but by what people believe about their economy. On Athenian belief Demosthenes (20.31) speaks with a clear voice:

We rely on imported grain more than all the rest of mankind. The grain brought here from the Pontic district is about equal to that arriving from all other sources overseas.

There were additional sources within the Aegean area. Grain was grown in Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros,³⁶ although it is not clear whether there was much surplus for export. An annual rent paid in grain from the Chersonese is attested.³⁷ Euboea may have been a significant source of supply. Commenting on the loss of Euboea in 411, Thucydides said that the Athenians

had been deriving more benefit from that island than from Attica. Later Andokides said that the Athenians at the height of their power had owned two-thirds of Euboea, an exaggeration no doubt but a flattering one.³⁸ Sources further away were Egypt and Sicily.

Nonetheless, the source of grain that had the greatest impact on Athenian policy was the area north of the Black Sea. In 405/4 and in 387/6 their enemies overcame the Athenians by winning control of the grain route through the Hellespont. Something can be discovered about the manner in which the grain fleet sailed and about the time of the year. There are indications from three years. In 340 Philip II seized the merchant fleet of 230 ships carrying grain at Hieron, kept the 180 ships bound for his enemies, and let the others go.³⁹ On 24. Metageitnion 362/1 the Athenian assembly met in alarm. The news included a report that the people of Byzantion, Chalkedon, and Kyzikos were holding up the merchant fleet because of their own need of grain.⁴⁰ In 376 a Peloponnesian fleet prevented the grain ships from sailing beyond Geraistos at the southern extremity of Euboea. The Athenians sent a fleet to sea under Chabrias and defeated the Peloponnesians at Naxos. The battle was fought on 16. Boedromion.⁴¹ Evidently the grain ships did not sail singly or in small groups, as the harvest came in, but waited until some time after the middle of summer and then sailed together in convoy about the second or third month of the Attic year.

The Constitution and Politics of the Athenians

The Athenians believed that their laws had been written for them at an early date by Solon. By the later part of the fifth century, the code of Solon, whether well or badly preserved, had become inadequate, and confusion had arisen as decrees were added. So steps were taken to revise the laws. The work of revision was completed by a board of five hundred lawgivers, who were at work from 403/2 until 400/399. The measures ratified as laws by the five hundred lawgivers were inscribed on walls standing free in the Stoa Basileios "so that anyone who wishes may inspect them." Small fragments of the inscribed texts have been recovered by excavation.⁴² The laws, brought into an up-to-date condition, gave the Athenian citizen a sense of security.

The Athenians distinguished between laws (*nomoi*) and decrees (*psēphismata*). The latter could be passed by the council of five hundred or by the assembly, which all adult male citizens were entitled to attend. Philosophers sometimes tried to say what difference of content distinguished measures proper for laws from those proper for decrees. Aristotle thought that laws must be stated in general terms but decrees regulate particular matters. The author of the *Definitions* preserved among the works of Plato said that laws are permanent but decrees have only temporary validity. The distinction of content proper for laws and decrees may not have been stated in any official document, such as a law, but the formulations of the philosophers doubtless reflect Athenian opinion. Moreover a study of measures passed in the fourth

century has found that the Athenians usually respected the distinction. Decrees ordered particular and temporary actions. They covered matters of foreign policy, including questions of war, peace, and alliance. But the Athenians did not usually make general rules of permanent validity in the form of decrees.⁴³

One of the measures enacted during the revision of the laws said:

No decree of the council or of the assembly shall have greater authority than a law.⁴⁴

That is, the assembly, taking decisions by the vote of a majority, could only act within the framework laid down in advance by the laws. To uphold this restriction the Athenians had a judicial procedure, the *graphē paranomōn* (the action against an illegal decree). After a decree had been passed by the assembly, any adult male citizen who had not suffered diminution of civic rights could challenge the decree by prosecuting the proposer before a court. The challenger as plaintiff tried to show that the decree conflicted with one or more of the laws. The court decided by a majority for the plaintiff or for the defendant. In doing so it either annulled the decree or allowed it to come into force. The court did not have authority to modify the decree but only to uphold or reject it. The *graphē paranomōn* is first attested for the year 415, and several passages show that it existed before 403.⁴⁵ It follows that even before the revision of the laws the Athenians believed that no decree should have greater authority than a law.

A procedure for amending the laws is attested in the fourth century and may have been instituted during the revision of 403–399. If anyone wished to bring about an amendment, he addressed himself first to a meeting of the assembly. If a majority of that meeting became convinced that there was reason for making an amendment, the *prytaneis*, the current committee of the council of five hundred, had to put the item “lawgivers” (*nomothetai*) on the agenda of a later meeting of the assembly. In the meantime the law to be amended and the proposed amendment(s) were displayed on whitened boards in a public place. The later meeting of the assembly decided how the lawgivers should hold their sessions and whence they should draw their salaries. The same meeting elected five men to defend the law that was challenged. The lawgivers were drawn by lot from the list of 6,000 men available to serve in the courts; probably each board of lawgivers numbered 501, 1,001, or a higher figure after the manner of a court. The final step toward amending a law took place at a session before a board of lawgivers and proceeded much as a trial. The man proposing the amendment appeared as plaintiff, the five men elected by the assembly defended the current law, and the lawgivers decided by vote between the two alternatives but had no power to initiate modifications. Their decision was final; that is, the matter was not sent back to the assembly.⁴⁶

Even after an amendment had thus been ratified, it could be challenged by a judicial procedure, the *graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai* (the action

against having proposed an inexpedient law). This was parallel to the *graphe paranomon*. The challenger appeared as plaintiff before a court. The proposer appeared as defendant. The court found for the one party or for the other but could not make any detailed modification in the law. This procedure is first attested for 382/1, when the defendant was convicted and executed.⁴⁷ Apart from the general notion of inexpediency, a new law could be challenged by this procedure if the man proposing it had not repealed explicitly the law that it replaced.⁴⁸

Lawgivers were drawn from among those who could serve in the courts, and it will be proper to call to mind the composition of the judiciary. The list of 6,000 citizens available for service in the courts was revised each year.⁴⁹ People who had incurred the penalty of diminution of civic rights⁵⁰ were inadmissible. To qualify for admission to the list one had to be at least thirty years of age and one had to swear the *dikastic oath*.⁵¹ Judges (*dikastai*) were drawn by lot from the list of 6,000 in sufficient numbers to man the courts (*dikastēria*), as needed. For *graphai*, actions that any citizen could initiate, the standard size was 501 judges, but for serious cases two or more panels could be put together to give courts of 1,001, 1,501, or even more. For *dikai*, actions that only an interested party could initiate, courts customarily consisted of 401 or 201 judges, according to the value of the object in dispute.⁵² In every trial the judges heard the speeches of each party in turn and then decided the issue by the vote of a majority without deliberating. If in consequence of the nature of the case the question of inflicting a penalty on an unsuccessful defendant arose, the court met in a further session on the same day to choose between the rival penalties proposed by the two parties.

The *dikastic oath* began with the following clause:

I will vote in accordance with the laws and with the decrees of the people of Athens and of the council of five hundred, and on matters where there are no laws, I will vote in accordance with the most just opinion.

That is, the Athenians thought that the laws had said in advance what was to be done in the circumstances they specified, but other circumstances arose which the lawgiver had not foreseen. In these other circumstances, in these gaps between the laws, the judges were to decide at their best discretion.⁵³ The Athenians did not suppose that with a good understanding of the acknowledged laws one could elicit from them by analogy a solution to a predicament they did not cover explicitly. Pleadings argued by analogy, but the belief that one can reach an authoritative ruling thus was foreign to the Athenians. That belief was first developed by the Romans and it made a science of law possible. The Athenians had no such science. Consequently on the one hand there was a factor of uncertainty in their administration of justice, and on the other they were free from the desire of legal experts to exercise power.

Decisions were taken in Athens by bodies of two kinds. One was the assembly. It passed decrees by vote of a majority. Business was prepared for it by the council of five hundred. The council was divided into ten equal

prytaneiai, drawn from the ten *phylai* into which the citizens were divided, and each *prytaneia* was on duty to receive current business for a tenth of the year. The initiative of the assembly was limited, since it could only act on the agenda prepared for it by the council. Ultimately the power of initiative was exercised by the single citizen, who approached the council and the assembly. In the middle of the fourth century the assembly met at first three times and later four times in each *prytany*. The council could pass measures if action was needed before another meeting of the assembly could be held.⁵⁴

The other type of body that took decisions was the panels drawn from the 6,000 men recognized for judiciary service. These panels provided courts, which met frequently, and boards of lawgivers. Indeed a session of a board of lawgivers was much like a session of a court; the known difference is that lawgivers voted by a show of hands but judges by casting counters.⁵⁵ These panels could make and unmake laws and men, but they did not have the power of initiative. A panel of lawgivers could only be constituted at the behest of the assembly, and the ultimate initiative was exercised by the single citizen, who set out to have a law amended. In judicial procedure, too, initiative was exercised by the single citizen as plaintiff; he approached the magistrate competent for his business and the magistrate called a court into session.

Classical Athens had no single organ exercising comprehensive authority and deputing powers to all other organs.⁵⁶ On the contrary powers and functions were distributed among many organs and a significant role was allowed to the single private citizen.⁵⁷ It is mistaken to attribute supreme and comprehensive authority to the assembly and regard the courts as "cross sections" of the assembly.⁵⁸ The minimum age of thirty years, the requirement of an oath, and the limitation to 6,000 ensured that the roster from which courts and lawgivers were drawn was palpably different from the assembly. Moreover in crucial respects the panels drawn from the 6,000 exercised authority superior to that of the assembly. A disappointed litigant could not appeal the judgment of a court to the assembly. On the contrary a court could invalidate a decree passed by the assembly, and a panel of lawgivers could amend the laws, which in turn limited the freedom of the assembly.⁵⁹

As early as the middle of the fifth century the Athenians distinguished between the assembly and the courts as independent organs. This can be inferred from a decree passed, probably in 446/5, to regulate relations with Chalkis. The Athenian council and *dikastai* were to swear an oath, and one of its provisions ran thus:

I will not drive the Chalkidians out of Chalkis, and without trial I will not deprive any private person of his civic rights or penalize him with exile or seize him or kill him or deprive him of his property without the *dēmos* of the Athenians.⁶⁰

That is, the Athenians might inflict severe penalties on a citizen of Chalkis in either of two ways. First, the Chalkidian might be tried by a court and found guilty. In this case the trial gave him a chance, good or poor, of estab-

lishing his innocence. Second, the penalties might be inflicted by a vote of the demos, the assembled people, of Athens. This second and more sinister possibility did not guarantee the unfortunate Chalkidian any chance of defending himself. By distinguishing the two ways in which penalties might be inflicted on a Chalkidian, the Athenian oath gave clear recognition to the separation of the powers.⁶¹ The Athenian citizen's demand for security required independent courts to uphold the laws.

The Athenian constitution allowed every citizen opportunity to participate in political activity. Much has been written of late on the theme of participation. Indeed Athenian institutions went some way toward making citizens participate. Apart from the roster of 6,000 for service in the courts, the council required 500 members each year and each citizen was only allowed two terms of service.⁶² Aristotle's figure of 700 as the number of other officers has been defended as true.⁶³ But most officers were chosen by sortition and had tasks merely of routine administration; their offices were not a way to exercise power. For the study of politics attention must be directed to the few offices filled by election, notably the ten annual generalships and the embassies. Tenure of the generalship brought hereditary prestige and there could be bitter competition at the election.⁶⁴ Furthermore, since policies were determined by the assembly, primary attention should be given to the men who spoke there and proposed measures.

A statistical approach to discovering degrees of participation has been attempted.⁶⁵ The Athenians had no single word for "politicians"; the nearest word was the expression *rhētores kai stratēgoi*, "orators and generals." It occurred in at least one law and in many passages in fourth-century speeches.⁶⁶ The word *rhētōr* could be used of anyone who spoke in the council or the assembly, or proposed a decree in either of those gatherings, or proposed a new law to a board of lawgivers, or served as plaintiff in a *graphe*, or pleaded in support of a party in a trial. When the word occurred in laws, it had this wide sense. It was one of several words for a politician, others being *symbolos*, *politeuomenos*, and *dēmagogos*. But in speeches rhetor, like these other words, often had the narrower sense of someone who spoke frequently or regularly in the assembly, the council, or the courts.⁶⁷ The difference of meaning is illustrated by the speech of Hypereides *For Euxenippos*. Euxenippos had been chosen to perform a single public task but afterward he was challenged in court for the way he had acquitted himself. The prosecutor invoked the law providing for conviction "if someone, being a rhetor, accepts money and does not speak the best for the demos of the Athenians." In defense Hypereides argued that Euxenippos was not a rhetor.⁶⁸

Lists have been compiled of people known from literary sources, mainly speeches, and from inscriptions to have engaged in political activity between 403 and 322; similar lists have been made for the years 355–322, the best documented part of the fourth century. The number of men known to have engaged in political activity at least once between 403 and 322 is 379.⁶⁹ The figure is impressively high, and still more suggestive figures have been reached by studying decrees of the shorter period. Epigraphic and literary

sources preserve the names of 82 citizens who moved 181 decrees in the period 355–322. But this period saw 1,300 meetings of the assembly, if it met at first three times and later four times in each prytany. From Aristotle's summary of the standard agenda for each meeting one may suppose that some 13,000 decrees were passed between 355 and 322. The decrees known are only a small proportion of those 13,000, and so the proposers whose names are known are likely to be only a small proportion of the citizens who moved decrees. Extant decrees permit the guess that about half of the decrees passed by the assembly were probouleumatic, that is, they ratified recommendations of the council. If in any annual council of five hundred the number of members who proposed the decrees lay between 25 and 50, it has been calculated that the number of men who proposed probouleumatic decrees between 355 and 322 was between 700 and 1,400. Demographic tables provide the figures 43.5:21 as the ratio between all adult male citizens alive at any time between 355 and 322 and the number alive in any one year of the period. If this ratio is applied to the figure of 700–1,400, it follows that in any one year the number of men who proposed decrees was between 340 and 680.⁷⁰

Such figures show that the number of citizens who did not merely take their turn in the council and the courts but engaged, at least to a minimal extent, in active political behavior was large. It is, however, acknowledged that the number of those who took political initiative regularly was far smaller. As noted already, the number of men known to have engaged in political activity at least once between 403 and 322 is 379. But the number known to have engaged in such activity at least twice is 117 for the period 403–322, and 68 for the period 355–322.⁷¹ Details about some leading men clarify the picture. Demosthenes is known to have moved 39 decrees. Aristophon was prosecuted and acquitted 75 times under the procedure of *graphe paranomon*. Timarchos is said to have moved more than 100 decrees.⁷² There were no clear lines but infinite gradations between men who regularly took political initiative (the professional politicians, as they may be called), men who did so intermittently and even frequently but not regularly, men who did so rarely, and men who did so once in a lifetime or never. Yet colloquial language contrasted the first of these classes with the other citizens. Orators addressing the assembly distinguished between “we who come forward” and “you who remain seated,” or between “the *politeuomenoi*” and “you, the *demos*.”⁷³ People recognized the place where Demosthenes habitually sat in the assembly.⁷⁴ In an excited moment Demosthenes exclaimed in court:

Yet among you, gentlemen of Athens, there have been before my time many famous and great orators, the noted Kallistratos, Aristophon, Kephalos, Thrasyboulos, ten thousand others.⁷⁵

“Ten thousand” was an exaggeration. A recent inquiry concludes: “The number of ‘professional’ and ‘semi-professional’ politicians must have been very small, perhaps only some ten to twenty citizens.”⁷⁶

The risks of a political career were high. A general who was not successful in a campaign was likely to be prosecuted under the procedure of *eisangelia* “for betraying a city, or ships, or a land force, or a naval force.” The same procedure was available against anyone who “being an orator accepts money and does not speak the best for the community of the Athenians.” A large proportion of known generals and politicians was tried and condemned, some to death and some to heavy fines.⁷⁷ A public debtor who failed to pay the sum by the ninth prytany of the year incurred diminution of civic rights. If he died owing a debt to the state, his heirs inherited the debt, and sons could not disclaim an inheritance, although more distant heirs could. A man needed wealth, if he was to have the leisure to engage in political activity frequently, but as a wealthy man he incurred the somewhat erratic burden of the liturgies. A pleader, alleging that his adversary was richer and therefore better able to accept such a burden, said:

The laws provide antidoseis each year for this reason, that in point of property not many of the citizens customarily retain continuous prosperity.⁷⁸

In the fourth century few politicians succeeded in transmitting sufficient wealth to their sons for these to remain within the liturgical class.⁷⁹

A man could grow rich by political activity. Acceptance of money for proposing decrees was tolerated. Gifts were made by one's fellow citizens or by foreign states. Some men of political power went so far as to extort money by threatening prosecution.⁸⁰ But the acknowledged reward of political activity was honor, as Demosthenes (19.99–100) indicates in a remark which is incidental and therefore probatory:

You do not compel anyone to take up public affairs. But when someone convinces himself of his own capacity and comes forward, you behave like honest and kind people. You give him a sympathetic hearing free from envy; you elect him to office and you entrust your affairs to him. If he then achieves success, he will receive honor and have advantages over most people on that account. But if he fails, shall he utter excuses and pretexts? That would not be just.

Timē, “honor” or “prestige” or “esteem” or “status,” had acquired for the classical Greek as heavy a load of associative meaning as “love” for the Christian.⁸¹

Before asking how professional politicians could influence the assembly, one must inquire into the number of people who attended. Payment for attendance was introduced early in the fourth century and increased, until it reached one and a half drachmas for one meeting of each prytany and one drachma for the others.⁸² So average attendance may have been higher than in the fifth century. For some purposes a quorum of 6,000 was required. This was true, in the first place, for votes ratifying a grant of *adeia*, that is, a grant in advance of exemption from statutory penalties for a forbidden activity.⁸³ But such votes may have been infrequent. More importance belongs to mea-

sures granting privileges to specific persons. These were to be voted in accordance with the following law:

A law applying to a specific person, as distinct from one applying to all Athenians, is not to be made except with the sanction of 6,000 voting secretly.⁸⁴

The phrase "as distinct from one applying to all Athenians," shows that this law concerns privileges to be voted for citizens, not those proposed for aliens.

A privilege granted to aliens with some frequency in the fourth century was Athenian citizenship. On the procedure for such grants a pleader provides information and begins with the following statements:

In the first place there is a law in force for the community to the effect that it is not permitted to make anyone an Athenian citizen unless he is worthy to become a citizen in virtue of his services to the community of the Athenians. Furthermore when the assembly is persuaded and grants the gift, the law does not allow it to become valid unless by vote more than 6,000 Athenians voting secretly put it on the agenda of the next meeting.⁸⁵

If the second of the quoted sentences is to be believed, the first step toward a grant of citizenship was a vote of the assembly with a quorum of 6,000. Since many grants of citizenship were made, it would follow that meetings often drew an attendance of 6,000 or more. Yet some caution is required before drawing this inference. The pleader paraphrases the law without citing it word by word. The first of the quoted sentences hinges on the concept of "services" (*andragathia*), a vague notion; surely the law itself said something more precise. The pleader has diverged somewhat from the exact tenor of the law; he may have misrepresented it.

Means of influencing the assembly are difficult to discern. The vote was normally taken there by a show of hands.⁸⁶ So interested people could ascertain how their fellow citizens voted. Perhaps economic pressure was exerted. There were houses and rooms for rent in Athens and tenant farmers in Attica.⁸⁷ In any community rich men can find ways to influence the political behavior of poor men. Yet the silence of the extant sources suggests that direct influence of wealthy men on voters was not significant. Greater importance should be attached to a feature of ethical outlook. Greeks admired a man of magnificence, a man who had capacity, including wealth, and displayed it by ostentation and generosity. Aristotle gave a high place among virtuous characters to "the man of great mind," defining him as "one who thinks himself worthy of great things and is worthy of them." Like other virtues of character in Aristotle's view, this one is a mean between two extremes and it is more opposed to the one extreme than to the other. Humility is a worse vice than arrogance.⁸⁸

In trials, especially trials with political aspects, recognized politicians often came to plead in support of litigants. Their influence with the judges may have sprung from the average Athenian's respect for a man of magnif-

icence. A late source tells of an attempt to overawe a court. When Iphikrates was on trial in 354/3, he stopped speaking and showed his sword. Thereupon the judges "became alarmed lest he arm his private following and surround the court, and so they voted to acquit him."⁸⁹ The author who tells this story may have been misled by his knowledge of Rome in the time of P. Clodius. Yet in itself the story is not incredible. Certainly, when a political case was being tried, bystanders sometimes crowded around the court.⁹⁰

The assembly was a mass meeting, whatever the habitual number of people present, and it could be carried away by mass emotion. The question arises whether a small group of political leaders could exploit the susceptibility of the assembly by placing their supporters to shout or otherwise manifest sentiment in an effective way. Both material and literary evidence has been brought to bear on this question. Some markers of stone and some beddings for pillars in the Pnyx have been explained as showing that a distinct place was assigned to each of the ten phylai.⁹¹ But this interpretation of the scanty remains has been questioned. Moreover, even if at some stage separate places in the Pnyx were assigned to the different phylai, one may still wonder whether there were officials and reasons to make citizens sit in their proper places.

The literary evidence may lead further. There is, first, the story of the ostracism of Hyperbolos. In 415 the assembly voted to hold an ostracism. Rivalry between Nikias and Alkibiades had become acute, and it could be expected that the vote would choose between them. But a few days before the vote was to be taken Alkibiades approached Nikias and suggested that they should combine their forces against a third man, Hyperbolos. Nikias agreed to this, and in consequence Hyperbolos was ostracized.⁹² The story implies that even at an ostracism, where voting was secret, small groups of determined men could sway the outcome. But its reliability has been doubted on the ground that Plutarch lived some six hundred years after the event; he may have misunderstood classical conditions, for these differed much from those of his own time.⁹³

For the same reason doubt has been cast on another statement of Plutarch, that about the middle of the fifth century Thucydides son of Melesias made his supporters sit together in the same part of the assembly to increase the effect of their opposition to Perikles.⁹⁴ In view of the doubts with which a late source can be regarded, special attention should be given to an indication offered by Thucydides the historian on conditions of his own time. Describing one of the debates preceding the dispatch of an expedition to Sicily, he makes Nikias speak thus of the adherents of Alkibiades:

When I see them now sitting over there and encouraging that same man, I am filled with alarm. In opposition I encourage older men, if anyone is sitting beside one of those, not to be ashamed of appearing weak, if he does not vote for war.⁹⁵

The passage is not as clear as could be wished. It recognized that an older man, on whose sympathy Nikias counts, may be sitting beside an adherent

of Alkibiades. But in its earlier phrases the passage points to supporters of Alkibiades sitting “over there,” presumably near him, and thereby encouraging him. The remark implies that a leading man, such as Alkibiades, could place his followers where they might have most effect on the emotions of the assembly.

Some historians, facing the question whether Athens had political parties of any kind, have drawn a fruitful distinction between parties among politicians and parties among voters.⁹⁶ The sole text that might suggest the existence of parties among voters proves the opposite. It is a somewhat impassioned remark of Demosthenes (2.29 = 13.20); he complains that previously the Athenians paid the property tax by symmories but now they conduct their politics by symmories.

There is an orator as the principal on each side, and subordinate to him a general and those who are to shout, the three hundred. The rest of you assign yourselves, some to the one side and others to the other.

Although the comparison with the contribution groups is imperfect, because these constituted only one “side,” the passage is a description of a two-party system. It is intended as reproof and caricature. So it implies that a two-party system would be incompatible with the proper behavior of the Athenians.

Among politicians alignments of friendship (and antagonism) arose. In 411 there existed numerous associations, each bound by an oath to help its members in lawsuits and elections.⁹⁷ Normally these associations competed with one another. In 411 they were persuaded to put aside their divergences and cooperate. The consequence was revolution. The general word for such an association was *hetaireia*. The troubles of 411 and of 404–403 may have brought the word into disrepute. In the fourth century it does not occur often in political language, but a speaker could apply it to the adherents of his adversaries, alleging, for example, that they were pledged to help one another with forensic testimony.⁹⁸ Friendships continued. If two men are brought together in the course of their public activities, they will either quarrel or they will increase their respect for one another. As noted previously, the significant question in the present state of knowledge is whether political friendships in Athens of the fourth century were lasting or ephemeral. A later chapter will note friendship lasting some twenty years or more between Androtion and Timokrates.⁹⁹

The Other Greeks

Greek cities were numerous and various. Calculations of their number have been instructive. The names of the cities of Greece, including all lands of the Delian League but omitting Sicily, south Italy, and Cyrene, have been counted and have yielded a total of more than 630. Many of the names are mentioned only once in the imperfect remains of ancient literature. So allowing for places that have escaped record, one estimates a total of rather

more than 750. One divides the arable area of civic land by this figure and finds that the land of the normal city varied between some 25 and 100 square kilometers. Censuses have been taken intermittently since A.D. 1879. In the early part of this period, before there was major migration to the towns of the mainland, the Aegean islands bore the largest population they could sustain. A calculation has been made on the basis of the highest density of population attested for the islands in modern censuses and has found that, with an arable area in the range from 25 to 100 square kilometers, the normal city of antiquity had between 230 and 910 adult male citizens. A complement of women and children must be added. The result of the calculation is approximate, but even if the margin of error is large, the conclusion stands. The normal Greek city was minute.¹⁰⁰ The contrast with Athens explains why the Athenians, confident in the power of their city, could believe that they lived in a safe and stable environment.

In the eyes of an Aegean islander, Athens was an enormity. It becomes easy to understand how a squadron of Athenian warships could bring many maritime cities into alliance. For example, Arkesine on the island of Amorgos probably had about 300 adult male citizens, including those too old to row. It was not feasible for such a community to equip a trireme. It might maintain a very few penteconters for protection against raiders. Siphnos and Seriphos each sent one penteconter to fight the Persians in 480, when there was reason to make the utmost effort. Each of them was an independent city controlling its own island.¹⁰¹ Most of the cities that play a part in narrative histories of Greece were larger than the average. This is true not only of major powers, like Corinth, Thebes, and Argos, but also of humble places like Megara and Poteidaia. The small size of the typical city had consequences for its political history. Probably each had an assembly of the men of military age; that was a town meeting, where news could be made known and respected men could voice their opinions. The tasks to be performed annually by officers of the city were scarcely more numerous than the men who had the wealth and leisure to perform them. So there was little likelihood of political conflicts, and institutions remained rudimentary. The average city had no political history.

Yet a goodly number of cities were large enough and wealthy enough to afford constitutional development. Daunted by the variety of these, some historians have tried to impose a classificatory dichotomy: democracy or oligarchy. Certainly these two terms were employed in political rhetoric during the Peloponnesian War. They figured sometimes in diplomatic propaganda; it was argued that cities of like constitution should ally against others.¹⁰² But the prudent historian will be on his guard against the arguments of ambassadors. After the manifold fortunes of the archaic period, and amid the differences of opportunity furnished by the geography of Greece, it would indeed be amazing if every classical city emerged either as a little democracy or as a little oligarchy. Research of a recent type shows that the dichotomous classification is worthless. Inquiry has been made into the pattern of settlement traceable in some large or moderately large cities. In three cities the

relationship between town and countryside has already revealed much. In Thasos the town oppressed and exploited the countryside. In Elis a political union of a fragile kind was achieved about 471, but the villages retained a high degree of independence. In Athens the Kleisthenic organization integrated the central town and the rural villages into a harmonious city. In the face of such pronounced differences, one cannot expect the three cities to behave alike merely because some historians call them all "democracies."¹⁰³

Apart from Athens, the cities that were major powers in 387/6 call for brief review. Thebes was one of the few cities to gain advantages from the Peloponnesian War. Early in the conflict Athenian threats gave the Thebans the opportunity to absorb some towns of their neighborhood. After they had joined the Spartans in garrisoning Dekeleia, they benefited from the ruin of the Athenian countryside. They carried off equipment, including even the woodwork and tiles of the houses, and they were on hand to buy slaves and other possessions at low prices.¹⁰⁴ In 387/6 Agesilaos made the Thebans disband the federation of Boiotia. If international circumstances changed, they might have a chance to restore it. A contemporary found Boiotia comparable in size of population with Attica.¹⁰⁵

In 404, when the Athenians were besieged and tried to negotiate peace, the Thebans and the Corinthians called for the destruction of Athens, but the Spartans resisted this demand successfully.¹⁰⁶ Sparta may well have wished to preserve Athens as a check to the ambitions of Corinth and Thebes. The latter two cities learned that their hegemonic ally, Sparta, was becoming an obstacle to them in the new configuration that arose from the defeat of the Athenians. Thebes, being further away than Corinth, was more ready to put its dissatisfaction on display. When Agesilaos gathered his forces to sail for Asia in 396, he tried to offer sacrifice at Aulis in imitation of Agamemnon, but the boiotarchs, the eleven commanding officers of the Boiotian confederacy, sent a squadron of cavalry to forbid him; the horsemen even threw his sacrificial offerings from the altar.¹⁰⁷

When opportunity arose for political action instead of ceremony, the Corinthians were ready. In 395 they joined the new league, formed to oppose the Spartans. During the ensuing war an association was formed between Corinth and Argos. Judgments on this union have varied. In modern times it has sometimes been hailed as a promising experiment in international cooperation. Xenophon took a different view: Corinthian quislings, who had taken control by massacre and expelled the best citizens, reduced their own city to a mere appendage of Argos.¹⁰⁸ Both judgments are true. Corinth had evidently declined in power during the Peloponnesian War. In the fourth century it was no longer as capable of independent action as in 432 or 421, when it had alarmed the Spartans by threats to desert them.¹⁰⁹ On the contrary it had to take precautions more than once against Athenian attempts at occupation.¹¹⁰

Argos had shown the extent and limits of its weight in Peloponnesian affairs during the years from 421 to 417. It was recalcitrant toward Spartan aspirations and the Spartans could not reduce it. But the Argives were not

powerful enough to offer other cities an independent lead against the Spartans; they would only take aggressive action if they could rely on the support of a stronger power, such as Athens.¹¹¹ Likewise in the Corinthian War the Argives joined the enemies of Sparta but agreed to peace once the Athenians had to desist from fighting.

The internal structure of Lakedaimon, the state headed by Sparta, has attracted many modern studies. Much has become clear, but some things remain enigmatic. The record of the interaction of the Spartans with other cities shows that their prosperity and their power depended on controlling Messenia. After the Thebans had liberated Messenia early in 369, Sparta ceased to exercise influence beyond the Peloponnese. The notorious decline in the numbers of Spartan citizens had set in before then¹¹² but without impairing the power of the city. At least in 388 Tiribazos convinced Artaxerxes that Sparta was the city to back in Greece. His judgment testifies to Spartan power. Artaxerxes had no intention of committing any forces of his own to maintain tranquillity in Europe. Persian intelligence was evidently good. A couple of years after 369 Artaxerxes recognized that the time had come to rely on Thebes.

That change lay far in the future, when the peace of Antalkidas was concluded. Meanwhile the Spartans were free to arrange the affairs of lesser Greek cities as they thought fit. In 385 they concocted charges against the Mantineans and made them abandon their city and disperse into five villages. A year or two later they compelled the city of Phleious to recall its exiles.¹¹³ These actions were of no concern to the Athenians, for both cities had long been subordinate allies of Sparta. Some actions carried out by the Spartans outside the Peloponnese could even be welcome to the Athenians. Plataia had been destroyed in 427–426 and the survivors had found refuge at Athens. It was restored sometime before 379, and probably by the Spartans under the peace of 387/6. They installed a garrison.¹¹⁴

The Northwest Frontier of the Persian Empire

With the help of his Persian friends, Antalkidas achieved spectacular success in 387. At the Olympic festival of 380 Isokrates bemoaned the consequences and complained that Greece was weighed down under Persian pressure. Some historians have accepted this image from Isokrates and supposed that Greece remained in this unhappy condition until the Macedonians liberated it. That view has been refuted.¹¹⁵ In the fourth century Persian kings did not conduct themselves as masters of European Greece. Occasionally they recruited troops there and for that purpose they sometimes mediated peace settlements. The Greek cities pursued their own quarrels, although sometimes one or another of them enhanced its moral authority by professing to uphold the king's peace. In his later writings Isokrates abandoned the picture he had drawn in 380 of Hellas under Persian pressure. There will be no attempt to restore it here. But conditions in the Persian Empire and espe-

cially in its northwest region were part of the framework within which ambitious Greek cities operated. The Spartans had learned this lesson during the Corinthian War. The Athenians, being concerned for the grain route through the straits, took note of changes occurring on the Asiatic shore of the waterway. Excellent studies of Persia and of some of its western satrapies have appeared in the past twenty years. A modest digression will draw results together.

Ancient empires did not have uniform organization or tidy frontiers. Power, concentrated in one or a few centers, could be exercised in a close and bureaucratic fashion over the heartlands of the kingdom, but it was often diffuse and even precarious in the outlying provinces. Tablets of clay, which have come to be called the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, illustrate a highly centralized despotism exercised by the Persian government.¹¹⁶ Daily payments, especially rations in kind, were issued, sometimes on an enormous scale, to high officials and their numerous subordinates and were recorded with precision. Rations were issued in a similar fashion to foreigners traveling on diplomatic missions. Large numbers of humble people were transplanted and settled in villages by the government at its discretion. But in the territories west of the Euphrates the character and incidence of Persian rule varied. The cities of Phoenicia and Cyprus had submitted voluntarily to Kyros, the founder of the empire, or more probably to his son and successor, Kambyzes.¹¹⁷ So they had to be treated with respect. Though subjected to Persian satraps and required to pay tribute, they retained their own kings and their institutions. They were valued for the contingents of warships they could put at the king's disposal.

Lydia, on the other hand, and Egypt had been conquered by Kyros and Kambyzes respectively. The Persian ethos encouraged ambition in the satraps, who replaced the former kings. Allegedly Oroites, the satrap of Sardes, was taunted at the king's door by the satrap of Daskylion because he had not set about conquering an island so easy to subdue as Samos. Herodotos tells the story but does not vouch for its truth. He may have acquired it from Greek informants who, as travelers or traders in the empire or as secretaries of varying rank to Persian officers, had good opportunity to learn the outlook of the imperial nation.¹¹⁸

The ambition of satraps in outlying provinces created a constant, though often latent, source of tension between them and the king. A man who was keen to enlarge his satrapy might also desire greater freedom from the king or even independence, or the king might suspect him of harboring such a desire. Soon after Dareios became king, he conceived suspicion of Oroites. He had his reasons. Oroites had killed his rival, the satrap of Daskylion, and when a messenger had brought him bad news from Dareios, Oroites had let him set off on his return journey but had killed him in ambush. Dareios knew that it might be difficult to overthrow Oroites; the latter had a body-guard of one thousand Persians and held Lydia, Ionia, and Phrygia. Dareios called for volunteers to overcome Oroites by a stratagem and chose Bagaïos by lot from among the thirty who presented themselves. So Bagaïos traveled

to Sardes, bringing numerous letters sealed with the royal seal. When he was received in audience by Oroites in the presence of the bodyguards, he bade the secretary, an appointee of the king, read out the letters in turn. Observing that the guards respected the king's missives, Bagaïos bade the secretary proceed to the penultimate letter. This forbade the guards to continue in the service of Oroites, and on hearing it they surrendered their spears. Finally a letter was read telling the guards to kill Oroites, and they did so with their swords. This story, told by Herodotos (3.126–28), may have gained in transmission, but it illustrates the peril inherent in a royal attempt to overcome a distant satrap.

Artaxerxes faced similar difficulty toward 395, when he decided to remove Tissaphernes, the satrap of Sardes. Tissaphernes had failed to drive Spartan forces out of western Asia Minor. But he had an army and therefore an open attempt to overthrow him might provoke rebellion. Xenophon's account of his fall (*Hellenika* 3.4.25) is suggestively laconic:

The king of the Persians held Tissaphernes responsible for the devastation inflicted on his land. So he sent Tithraustes and cut off his head.

Tithraustes was no less a person than the king's chief minister, an office the Greeks translated as "chiliarch." Later sources add credible details. Royal letters were sent in advance to cities and satraps. Tithraustes came to Kolosai in Phrygia. Through a subordinate officer he lured Tissaphernes away from his army and seized him when he had laid aside his dagger to take a bath. His head was sent to the king.¹¹⁹

Places on the outskirts of satrapies distant from Persia might be drawn into a relation of dependence. When Kambyzes prepared to attack Egypt, he asked Polykrates, the tyrant of Samos, to send him a naval contingent. Polykrates sent him forty triremes. Herodotos (3.44–45) was not sure whether they reached Egypt. Some years later Dareios sent an expeditionary force to reduce Samos and entrust it to Syloson, the exiled brother of Polykrates. The family is next heard of about 514, when Aiakes, the son of Syloson, led a contingent of ships to assist Dareios on the expedition into Skythia.¹²⁰ It would be pointless to ask whether Polykrates was a friend or a subject of Kambyzes at the time of the preparations against Egypt; choice of the one word or the other would merely reflect a difference in point of view. Again, at least one ship from Mytilene served under Kambyzes during the conquest of Egypt. When Dareios invaded Skythia, Koes went with him as commander of the Mytilenaians, and as a reward for his services on this campaign Dareios made him tyrant of Mytilene, whatever that may mean.¹²¹ Apart from these suggestive details, one cannot discern the steps whereby Mytilene was brought under Persian influence.

When Dareios built his palace at Persepolis, coins of Abdera, Aigina, and Cyprus were deposited in the foundations. Probably these deposits reflect a ritual, and the coins were chosen to mark the furthest points to which Per-

sian authority extended in the northwest. Abdera had become an important center in consequence of the establishment of a Thracian satrapy after the expedition into Skythia. A revolt in Cyprus had been overcome about 496, and Aigina had given earth and water to Persian heralds in 491.¹²² But these places were not subject to any organized system of imperial administration.

The incidence of Persian authority varied greatly in the enormous expanse of highland, which stretches from the southwestern shore of the Caspian westward to the Aegean Sea. The satraps of Daskylion and Sardes near the western end of these highlands were the Persian officers with whom Greek cities had most frequent dealings. Xerxes sent Artabazos to the satrapy of Daskylion or Hellespontine Phrygia in 478 or soon after. Artabazos was the son of Pharnakes, who appears in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets as Parnaka and was a person of the greatest importance. The descendants of Pharnakes continued at Daskylion all through the fifth century¹²³ and much later. The one among them whose career is most fully attested is Pharnabazos. In the winter of 413/2, when the Spartans were planning to extend the war against the Athenians to the eastern shores of the Aegean, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, the satrap of Sardes, each sent envoys to invite the Spartans to his own satrapy. In 412 the Peloponnesian fleet operated off the coast of the satrapy of Tissaphernes, but in 411 Pharnabazos invited it to come further north. So when Tissaphernes ceased to provide supplies, the Spartan navarch Mindaros led the fleet northward from Miletos toward the Hellespont. Tissaphernes set off for the Hellespont to complain to the Peloponnesian commanders.¹²⁴

The two satraps differed in policy toward the Spartans. Tissaphernes hoped that they and the Athenians would wear one another out, so he rendered some financial support to the Spartans but limited it. Pharnabazos, on the other hand, was wholehearted in his devotion to their cause during the Ionian War. Late in 411 he took part in the battle of Abydos, riding his horse into the sea. At the battle of Kyzikos in 410 he was present in the city, and after the defeat of the Peloponnesians he succored the survivors, set them to build new warships at Antandros, and supplied money and timber.¹²⁵ In the next years he continued military and diplomatic activity vigorously in the same cause.¹²⁶ In consequence of Athenian concern for grain brought from north of the Black Sea through the Hellespont, geography dictated that the Peloponnesian War would be decided off the coast of the satrapy of Daskylion, but changes in command on the Spartan and the Persian side deprived Pharnabazos of the share he might have hoped for in the outcome. Dareios II gave his son, Kyros, overriding authority in the west and Lysander knew how to collaborate with him.

Thanks to information supplied by Xenophon, Pharnabazos is known to the modern reader at a more personal level than any other Persian. At Daskylion, as the historian (*Hellenika* 4.1.15–16) tells, Pharnabazos had his “royal palace” (*basileia*, a word worthy of note). Around it were many large villages, which supplied limitless produce, and there were excellent hunting

grounds, some in fenced parks and others in the open country. A river well stocked with fish of every kind flowed past the palace, and there were wild fowl in plenty.

The rivalry of Pharnabazos with Tissaphernes continued early in the fourth century. Pharnabazos resented the fact that Tissaphernes received supreme command of operations against the forces that Sparta sent to western Asia Minor.¹²⁷ The enmity was more than personal; it sprang from the ambitions that their location prompted in the officers commanding the two satrapies. When Tithraustes had executed Tissaphernes in 395, he opened negotiations with Agesilaos, the Spartan king in command of operations in Asia. They discussed preliminaries, but Agesilaos needed to send to Sparta for authorization to accept the proposed terms. While Agesilaos waited for a reply from Sparta, Tithraustes suggested that he should take his army to the satrapy of Pharnabazos and plunder that. Agesilaos agreed but extorted thirty talents from Tithraustes for the expenses of the journey.¹²⁸

Reaching Hellespontine Phrygia in the fall of 395, Agesilaos devastated the territory of the satrapy. He wintered at Daskylion. But Apollophanes of Kyzikos, who had long been an associate of Pharnabazos and had lately contracted ties with Agesilaos, arranged a conference between the two men. The meeting throws a good deal of light on the principles and policies of Pharnabazos.¹²⁹ When assurances had been given, the two principals came to the agreed place. Servants spread rugs for Pharnabazos, but he dispensed with them when he saw that Agesilaos and his staff of thirty were sitting on the grass. After greetings had been exchanged, Pharnabazos as the elder spoke first. He reminded the Spartans of the loyal services he had done them in the Peloponnesian War; he had never treated them with duplicity, as the late Tissaphernes had done. Yet now they had reduced him to such a condition that he could not get dinner in his own land, unless like a wild animal he collected the leavings of the Spartans. The fine buildings and parks, which his father had left him and which had been his delight, had been demolished or burned.

When Pharnabazos had uttered these reproaches, the thirty staff officers were at a loss what to say, but after a pause Agesilaos replied that hostile relations between sovereign states must supersede private ties between their citizens. Continuing clumsily in this vein, he came to the point by suggesting that Pharnabazos should rebel against the king and ally with the Spartans. Pharnabazos replied that he would join the Spartan cause if the king set another officer over him, but as long as he was directly accountable to the king and to no intermediary, he would continue to fight against the Spartans.

This utterance of Pharnabazos explains why he and doubtless other Persians of high rank remained loyal to the king, even though the location and resources of a satrapy might provide the opportunity and sometimes the temptation to rebel. Pharnabazos was *reichsunmittelbar*; he had the privilege and dignity of being accountable only to the king. As a loyal officer he could expand his sphere of authority at the expense of the next satrap or of

independent neighbors. Revolt would scarcely improve his opportunities of aggrandizement. At the same time the loyalty of Pharnabazos was conditional. A few years before the colloquy with Agesilaos he had been resentful, when the king gave Tissaphernes supreme command in western Asia Minor, but he had tolerated the situation and collaborated with Tissaphernes in hope of driving the Peloponnesian marauders from his satrapy. Perhaps in 395 he hoped that the tenor of his reply to Agesilaos would become known to the king.

Pharnabazos achieved the greatest successes of his career at sea. Early in the 390s he gained the approval of Artaxerxes II for a naval offensive. The preparations were to be made in Cyprus. Bringing money, Pharnabazos persuaded the kings of the cities of the island to build ships and he took into his service Konon, the Athenian who had found refuge at Cypriote Salamis after the battle of Aigospotamoi. Probably in 396 Konon took part of the fleet to Kaunos, and from there in 395 he provoked in Rhodes a revolution which overthrew the friends of the Spartans.¹³⁰ In 394 Pharnabazos led the whole fleet toward the Aegean. He kept direct command over the Phoenician contingent but entrusted the Greek ships to Konon. The fleet of the enemy was commanded by Peisandros, the brother-in-law of Agesilaos. Pharnabazos brought Peisandros to battle off Knidos and defeated and killed him there. After the victory Pharnabazos and Konon sailed on a mission of liberation to the islands and the Greek cities of the Asiatic coast. They expelled the Spartan harmosts or resident officers, urged the citizens to fortify their citadels, and promised them freedom. Thus the Spartan ascendancy in the Aegean collapsed.¹³¹

In 393 Pharnabazos with Konon sailed toward European Greece. He was bent on punishing the Spartans for the damage they had inflicted on his land. Advancing from Melos, he raided parts of Lakonia. He came to the isthmus of Corinth and addressed the synedrion of the allies, who were at war with Sparta. He gave them encouragement and financial subsidies. He also gave money to Konon for the purpose of completing the restoration of the fortifications of Athens. Then he returned to his ancestral satrapy.¹³² He had inflicted such severe setbacks on the Spartans and aroused such effective opposition to them that he could enjoy again at leisure the buildings and parks which had been his delight before. Within a few years (at the latest before 387) Artaxerxes II summoned Pharnabazos to court, gave him his daughter in marriage, and sent Ariobarzanes as satrap to Daskylion.¹³³ Did Artaxerxes recall him thus because in consequence of the successes he feared in Pharnabazos an overmighty subject? Perhaps not. The alliance by marriage was a mark of esteem, the king was to employ Pharnabazos in a highly responsible command against Egypt in future, and Ariobarzanes was the brother of Pharnabazos.¹³⁴

To the east of Hellespontine Phrygia lived the Paphlagonians, and their condition is characteristic for some nations of Anatolia. Toward 395 their king, Otys, had been summoned to confer with Artaxerxes but had not complied. So he was willing to ally with Agesilaos, when the Spartan king came

north in the fall of the year. An alliance and a meeting were brought about through the good offices of Spithridates, a Persian who believed himself wronged by Pharnabazos and had captured much of the satrapy. But the alliance did not last. During skirmishes of the ensuing winter Herippidas, a Spartan officer anxious to demonstrate his own importance, captured the camp of Pharnabazos but refused to allow the Paphlagonians their share in the spoils. So Spithridates and the Paphlagonians departed for Sardes with some hope of achieving reconciliation with the Persian officer there.¹³⁵ From these activities it appears that the Paphlagonians were independent but their independence was precarious. A royal summons to their king could well be understood as a first step by the Persians toward reducing them to submission. Otys resented the summons, took advantage of quarrels between Persian commanders, and showed them the military value of his following.

The satrapy of Sardes was richer than that of Daskylion. In the fifth century and the early years of the fourth it included Lydia, Ionia, and Karia. Tissaphernes had an estate in Karia and exerted himself to protect it against Spartan attacks; doubtless it consisted of extensive land, like that around the palace of Pharnabazos at Daskylion.¹³⁶ By 392 Tiribazos was in command at Sardes. Artaxerxes had honored Tiribazos with a personal privilege; when he was present, he alone was allowed to help the king on to his horse. He is said to have performed this service on the battlefield of Kounaxa, when the king's first horse had been injured.¹³⁷ In 392 Sparta sent envoys to Sardes to confer with Tiribazos, and so Athens, Boiotia, Corinth, and Argos sent envoys to oppose the Spartan arguments. As noted in chapter 1, Tiribazos became convinced that the interests of the Persians required a change of policy; they ought to support the Spartans. He went up-country and advocated his policy to Artaxerxes. The king was not convinced yet. He did not disgrace Tiribazos, but he divided the territory, sending Strouthas to take command in Ionia and entrusting Karia to Hekatomnos, a man of local power from Mylasa.¹³⁸ The descendants of Hekatomnos remained in control of Karia until the time of Alexander. But Ionia was incorporated anew into the satrapy of Lydia at an unknown date. In 388/7, when Tiribazos made a new journey to the king, he was accompanied by Antalkidas, the Spartan who had approached him in 392, and this time he persuaded Artaxerxes to carry out the desired change of policy.

East of Lydia were the independent tribes of the Pisidians and, north of them, the Mysians. Their independence, like that of the Paphlagonians, was precarious. Pharnabazos fought the Mysians and the Pisidians repeatedly.¹³⁹ In 401, when Kyros gathered an army in the hope of making himself king, he alleged that he was raising troops to attack the Pisidians; he had fought them and the Mysians before.¹⁴⁰ It is reported that in and after 395 "most of the Mysians" were independent of the king.¹⁴¹ The report implies that some of them were not independent. Tension, intermittent or continual, between the ambitions of Persian officers and the desires of the tribesmen should be inferred. It need cause no surprise to find a Persian bearing the title of satrap of Mysia about 362.¹⁴²

The coastal plain of Kilikia in southeastern Asia Minor was very different from the highlands of the interior. Extensive and fertile, it had easier communications with Syria than across the Taurus range toward the north and west. Its political condition under the Achaimenids was not unlike that of the Phoenician cities. It supplied warships and was a dependent kingdom. Its king at different periods was called Syennesis; the word may have been a title, not a personal name.¹⁴³

North and northeast of Kilikia lay Kappadokia. It was large and bordered on Paphlagonia toward the west. Its satrap early in the fourth century, Kamisares, probably ruled only a part of Kappadokia. He married a woman from the royal house of Paphlagonia. Probably he began the expansion of his territory which his son continued. About 380 Artaxerxes in person led a difficult campaign against the Kadousioi; they lived near the southwestern shore of the Caspian Sea and had been in revolt since late in the reign of Dareios II. Kamisares was one of the officers whom Artaxerxes took with him, and he lost his life during the campaign. But his son, Datames, distinguished himself in the operations and was allowed to succeed to his father's satrapy.¹⁴⁴ Not long afterward Artaxerxes sent instructions to Datames to overcome the king of Paphlagonia, who was recalcitrant toward the Persians. This Paphlagonian king may have been identical with the man who had once spurned a summons to the royal court. Datames, whose mother was the sister of the father of the insubordinate king, proceeded against him with care and captured him alive.¹⁴⁵ One may guess that the royal instruction to operate against the Paphlagonian was welcome to Datames and may even have been prompted by him. Artaxerxes rewarded him well and put him in command of planning an expedition against Egypt.

In the limitless expanse of Asia Minor there were other tribes and districts. There was Kataonia, a land of hill forts and mountain passes, sandwiched between Kilikia and Kappadokia; Datames was to operate there later with characteristic success. Northwest of Kilikia dwelled the Lykaonians, whom Kyrös considered himself free to plunder in 401 because they were independent of the Persians and hostile.¹⁴⁶ In the north the Bithynian Thracians were supposedly subject to the satrap of Daskylion, but they often fought against him.¹⁴⁷ Enough, however, has been said to illustrate the varieties of status in Anatolia and to introduce men and nations who have a part to play in the ensuing story.

The Cypriote War

The treaty of peace concluded in 387/6 recognized that the king's realm embraced the cities of the Asiatic mainland and among the islands Klazomenai and Cyprus. The latter island is far enough from the Aegean and from the coasts of Kilikia, Syria, and Egypt to be relatively safe, but it is near enough to those coasts to provide an excellent base for an adventurer who wishes to plunder them or for a king desirous of conquests. Its population

has been of mixed origin with varied accretions for more than three thousand years. It has often been pivotal in international rivalries. It has good harbors, fertile land, and a delectable climate. In the fourth century it was said to have "nine cities worthy of note," although as with all such figures, it is not easy to say how the count was made.¹⁴⁸ Toward 396 Pharnabazos chose Cyprus as the place to prepare his naval offensive against the Spartans. The kings of the cities built him warships. Zealous among them was Evagoras, an adventurer who had returned from Kilikia, perhaps in 411, and had seized Salamis with fifty henchmen.¹⁴⁹

In 394 and 393 the naval operations of Pharnabazos and Konon brought benefits to the Athenians. Afflicted, perhaps, by national self-flattery, the Athenians expressed their gratitude to Konon and Evagoras. They set up statues of both men in the agora near the Stoa Basileios and near the statue of Zeus Eleutherios. They did not set up any statue of Pharnabazos. They granted Evagoras their citizenship. Part of an Athenian decree granting him honors has been recovered. It praises Evagoras for deeds he has performed "as a Greek on behalf of Greece."¹⁵⁰ The meaning of this phrase is opaque. The Greek spoken in Cyprus was very strange.¹⁵¹ At least Evagoras liked to be called Greek.

By 390 he was in revolt,¹⁵² but the cause of his breach with the Persian king should not be sought in nationalist sentiment or indeed in any initiative taken by Evagoras. He was expanding his kingdom at the expense of other cities of Cyprus. The kings of three of them, Amathous, Soloi, and Kition, appealed to Artaxerxes for help. The Persian king had to make a choice: which side would he regard as rebellious and which as loyal? One cannot tell whether his decision was determined by calculation, advice, or luck. The outcome may suggest that his choice was imprudent, but the outcome could not be foreseen in 390. Artaxerxes recognized Evagoras as contumacious. It took the efforts of ten years to subdue the rebel.

Cyprus was of value to the Persians not merely for its own sake but also because of its geographical relation to Egypt. Its strategic significance was illustrated by developments of 343/2, when the Persians at last achieved success in a renewed attempt to recover Egypt; their first step, before advancing on Egypt, was to reduce Cyprus and Phoenicia. Egypt, a most valuable satrapy, had been in revolt since before 400. Because of the desert it was difficult to lead an army against Egypt and especially difficult, if the invader did not have a fleet to support him. If Cyprus held out in revolt, it was likely to be drawn into alliance with Egypt, and the Persian would not be able to draw on the harbors of the island for his operations. Moreover the enemy might make those same harbors his base for harassing any fleet the Persian might bring against Egypt from Syria. Some time between 390 and 387 Artaxerxes ordered Hekatomnos of Karia and another officer to attack Evagoras. Their expedition reached Cyprus but failed of its objective, although no details are known.¹⁵³

The Athenians sent naval squadrons to help Evagoras in 390 and the next few years, although these did not all get through.¹⁵⁴ At least it should now be

clear why the king became willing to listen to the advice of Tiribazos and set him to bring about peace among the Greeks. Since the treaty of 387/6 declared Cyprus a Persian possession, and since the peace was brought about through a strategic defeat of the Athenians, the latter would have to desist from helping Evagoras. Moreover once the Yavan, as the Persians called them, stopped fighting one another, their unemployed could be recruited by the king and his officers. The Persian perspective was recognized accurately by Diodoros, when he wrote under 387/6:

Now that his difference with the Greeks had been resolved, the king set about preparing forces for the Cypriote War. (14.110.5)

The information preserved on the war against Evagoras is scanty, but some relationship can be discerned between the operations and Egypt.¹⁵⁵ Evagoras had won control over much of Cyprus. He had gained influence in Tyre and other cities of Phoenicia. Allegedly he had entered into negotiations, openly or secretly, with Hekatomnos of Karia and others who were disaffected toward the king, although the historian should beware of reports of secret intentions. Above all he gained an alliance with Akoris of Egypt and received in consequence on different occasions men, supplies, and money. Persian preparations took a long time; the state of war lasted for ten years (390–380) but fighting took place only in the last two years of that period. A large Persian armament gathered in Kilikia under the command of Tiribazos; he entrusted the land forces to Orontes and the fleet to Glos. The force landed in Cyprus but had strong resistance to face. The resources of Evagoras included already seventy Cypriote and twenty Tyrian triremes. Now he built sixty more triremes and gained fifty from Akoris. But a naval battle off Kition ended in a victory for Glos, and the Persians set about blockading Salamis. While the siege was in progress, Evagoras entrusted command to his son Pnytagoras and sailed by night with ten triremes for Egypt to seek more aid. But Akoris gave him less money than he expected, and soon after his return to Salamis Evagoras opened negotiations with Tiribazos.

The disappointing response of Akoris to this final appeal of Evagoras indicates some change in Egyptian policy. The change and the long duration of the Persian preparations against Evagoras can be explained by a curious remark of Isokrates. In the *Panegyrikos*, prepared for delivery in 380, he wrote:

Since the revolt of Egypt what has he (the Persian king) achieved against those who hold that land? Is it not true that he has sent the most distinguished Persians, Abrokomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazos, to the war and that they after delaying three years have suffered more harm than they inflicted and have finally departed in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with independence but now seek to rule over their neighbors? (4.140)

There is no other evidence of an unsuccessful expedition of the Persians against Egypt in the 380s. When a similar expedition failed in 373, there

were repercussions elsewhere in the western lands of the empire. If a major expedition had failed some ten years earlier, one might expect to hear of consequences. Yet the allusive remark of Isokrates gains some credibility because he mentions an interval of three years and names three commanders. He may have distorted his information and it may have been distorted by the time it reached him, but the specifics of his remark imply that there was some information. The most likely reconstruction is that the king authorized the three officers to take diplomatic steps, accompanied by a show of force, and the outcome saved the face of the king while allowing Akoris to remain independent and even to expand his rule on a modest scale. Consequently Akoris no longer had need to keep Evagoras in revolt.

Evagoras, then, returned disappointed to Cyprus and opened negotiations with Tiribazos. The two men reached agreement on some points: Evagoras would give up his rule over the other cities of Cyprus and keep Salamis alone, and he would pay an annual tribute in a fixed sum. But Tiribazos demanded that Evagoras undertake to obey the king "as a slave obeys his master." Evagoras refused this and insisted that he would only be subordinate "as a king is subordinate to a king." So negotiations broke down. But at this point Orontes, allegedly at the instigation of Evagoras, sent the king a letter with accusations against Tiribazos. The most damaging charge, and one which to judge from the outcome may have been true, was that Tiribazos had been winning the subordinate commanders into his personal following with gifts, honors, and promises. The king found the charges plausible and sent instructions to Orontes to arrest Tiribazos and send him up-country. This was done, and Orontes took over supreme command in the war. But the men, incited no doubt by their officers, became insubordinate and began to desert. Evagoras held out in Salamis, and Orontes had to agree to his demand. Evagoras was to retain Salamis alone and pay a fixed tribute annually, but he undertook to be subordinate "as a king is subordinate to a king."¹⁵⁶

It is proper to ask what material difference there was between this undertaking and one to obey "as a slave obeys his master." Conjecturally one may call to mind the response of Pharnabazos to Agesilaos (above at note 129) and suppose that Evagoras too insisted on being *reichsunmittelbar*. It would follow that the cities of Cyprus, like those of Phoenicia, had and retained a privileged status. In A.D. 1291 the cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden bound themselves by an oath of perpetual alliance because they insisted on being accountable, not to any intermediary, but directly to the emperor.

The aftermath of the Cypriot War is of no great importance. At court the trial of Tiribazos was delayed until Artaxerxes had carried out his unsuccessful campaign against the Kadousioi. Then the accused was acquitted. But meanwhile Glos, who had married a daughter of Tiribazos, became anxious for his own safety. He had won the loyalty of the ships' captains under his command by granting them favors. He rose in revolt and secured alliances with Akoris of Egypt and with Lakedaimon. But he was assassinated and a certain Tachos succeeded to the command of his force. Tachos

founded the town of Leuke near the mouth of the river Hermos on the west coast of Ionia. When he died soon afterward, the cities of Kyme and Klazomenai competed for possession of Leuke, and Klazomenai won.¹⁵⁷ It is not known who Tachos was. If his name has been transmitted accurately, he would appear to have been Egyptian.

Much about the Cypriote War must remain obscure for want of fuller and more precise information. But one conclusion emerges with clarity. Developments in Egypt could have decisive effect on the stability of Persian rule in the lands bordering the eastern Mediterranean. That conclusion will need to be borne in mind when attention is given to the Persian expedition of 373 against Egypt. Instability in the satrapies of Asia Minor could bring insecurity to the Aegean and the Hellespont, and the Athenians would have to take note of that.

3

Athens and the New League

The setback inflicted on the Athenians by Antalkidas in 387/6 made them abandon imperial ambitions. But they conserved their naval resources, and after a few years recriminations among them began to give way to concord. So much was recognized in chapter 1. The present chapter will tell how Spartan blunders enabled the Athenians to develop a new league, how the extension of Athenian influence by sea prompted new rivalries within the city, and how the growth of Theban power led to a rapprochement between Athens and Sparta.

Spartan Ascendancy Consolidated

In 384, when the Athenians contracted their alliance with Chios, the Spartans took no action against them. The course of the Corinthian War had taught the Lakedaimonians not to concern themselves with the eastern Aegean. At the conclusion of the conflict they concentrated on ordering affairs in the Peloponnese and central Greece. But the Athenians, finding their alliance with Chios tolerated, could venture on a diplomatic advance to the northern shore of the Aegean. One could not tell beforehand whether the Spartans would oppose such a step. In 382 the Athenians sent an embassy to Olynthos, the capital of the Chalkidian federation. This organization had been founded in 432 on a small scale but it had expanded by absorbing more cities into a close confederacy with uniform laws and common bodies of government. It held Poteidaia at a strategically valuable location as an ally. On the east two cities, Akanthos and Apollonia, resisted its aspirations and guarded their independence. But to the west it had grown sufficiently to include Pella in Lower Macedon. Its strength attracted the attention of powers in central Greece; the Thebans sent an embassy at the same time as the Athenians. The Olynthians welcomed the two embassies and resolved to send envoys of their own in return.¹ There arose thus a possibility of a coalition of three major powers independent of Sparta.

The Olynthian embassies intended for Athens and Thebes never traveled. The Lakedaimonians welcomed an appeal from Akanthos and Apollonia for protection against Olynthian ambitions. The Spartan assembly decided to take action and summoned a congress of the allies. This body resolved to send its whole field army, which had recently been reorganized to yield a paper strength of ten thousand. The muster and dispatch of such a host would take some time, and meanwhile a Spartan officer, Eudamidas, was told to travel north with two thousand men recruited in Lakedaimon.²

Eudamidas went ahead with part of his force and won promptly the voluntary adherence of some of the northern cities, including Poteidaia.³ The rest of the two thousand followed under his brother, Phoibidas. When he reached Thebes on his journey, Phoibidas was approached by a small group of Thebans, whose leader was Leontiadas. A plot was made, the gates of the Kadmeia or Theban acropolis were opened treacherously to Phoibidas, and he installed a garrison. Leontiadas arrested his rival, Ismenias, and went to Sparta to offer explanations. Public opinion in Sparta expected that Phoibidas would be called to account, because he had acted without instructions. Instead the Spartans set up a special court, drawn from themselves and their allies, to try Ismenias, and he was executed. Some three hundred Thebans who sympathized with him escaped to Athens.⁴

Thus by two actions in 382 the Spartans showed that they would assert themselves against places they could reach by land, even if the journey took many days. The seizure of the Kadmeia was swift, but the war against Olynthos proved to be long and difficult. Teleutias, the brother of King Agesilaos, led the federal force to Chalkidike, and now it included a Theban contingent. He was killed in battle during the next year. His successor, King Agesipolis, brought out reinforcements drawn from Lakedaimonians and volunteers. But he died of a fever at the height of the following summer. Polybiades replaced him in the command and completed an effective blockade of Olynthos. So the city surrendered in 379 and sent envoys to Sparta for terms. The Spartans insisted on a close alliance, whereby Olynthos would supply troops whenever Sparta demanded them.⁵

While Agesipolis was operating against Olynthos, trouble came to a head in Phleious. Within a few years after the peace of Antalkidas the Spartans had made this city restore its exiles. Now disputes arose between the men who had returned and the other citizens. The latter resisted stubbornly because they thought that the Spartans would not send out a second king with an army while the first held a large force in Chalkidike. They were mistaken. In response to a request of the returned exiles and with due authorization from the ephors, Agesilaos led an army against Phleious and demanded the surrender of the acropolis. When the Phleisians refused, he besieged them until they yielded after a year and six months. In the settlement he established a court of a hundred Phleisians, drawn equally from the two sides in the conflict, "to determine who should live in the city and who should die."⁶

At the Olympic festival of 380, while warfare was in progress at Olynthos and Phleious, Isokrates delivered a speech (*Panegyrikos*), which is preserved. Its framework was a plea for reconciliation between Sparta and Athens, so that the Greeks could turn their united forces against the Persian Empire (4.17, 188). As the orator admitted, this theme was not original (4.3–8). He expatiated on the past services of the Athenians, including the welcome they had given to Demeter and their generosity in initiating for mankind the cultivation of grain (4.28–29). He tried to rebut the criticisms brought against the Athenians for the policies they had pursued in the Delian League. He said, for example, that they had not taken any of the land of Euboia (4.108–9). A dozen years earlier Andokides (3.9) had boasted that the Athenians at the height of their power had owned two-thirds of that island. Andokides exaggerated. Isokrates lied.

In his assessment of the situation of 380 Isokrates was not realistic. He said:

Of the Greeks some are under us and others are under the Lakedaimonians. For the constitutions, through which they administer the cities, have divided most of them in this way. (4.16)

But no Greeks were subject to the Athenians in 380. The alliance with Chios had not created a relation of subordination, and there is no reason to think that the constitution of Chios resembled that of Athens. Again, toward the end of the speech, Isokrates said:

We must ourselves consider what prosperity we would achieve, if we directed against the mainlanders the war now in progress among us and carried away the prosperity of Asia to Europe. (4.187)

A few lines later he reiterated his recommendation for reconciling Athens and Sparta. The combined effect of these remarks was to suggest that Athens and Sparta were at war with one another at the time of the speech. They were not.

Isokrates' diagnosis of the troubles afflicting the Greeks and his recommendations sprang from his own fantasy. Athenian policy was to be developed along new and advantageous lines by better men and better ideas.⁷

The Athenian League Founded

After narrating the surrender of Olynthos, which took place in the summer of 379, Xenophon (*Hellenika* 5.3.27) paused briefly to review the consequent situation in Greece. He observed that Spartan ascendancy appeared secure and that the Athenians were "isolated." Perhaps he had overlooked the alliance with Chios, or he may have considered its terms too feeble to relieve the isolation of the Athenians. Before the end of the sailing season of 379, the Athenians sent out embassies to invite some cities to join them in

alliance. Favorable responses were received. One cannot be confident in identifying cities that allied with Athens at this stage; Byzantion is likely, and Mytilene and Methymna are possible. An Athenian inscription giving an alliance with Byzantion is poorly preserved but should belong to an early stage in the work brought to fruition in 378/7.⁸ The terms of alliance were doubtless cautious. Respect may have been expressed for autonomy, perhaps also for the Persian king and the peace he had provided. The Athenians had recently taken material steps to demonstrate their good behavior to the king. The latter had entrusted to Pharnabazos the task of preparing an expedition against Egypt. Pharnabazos found that the Egyptian rebel Akoris had recruited a force of Greek troops under an Athenian commander, Chabrias. In the winter of 380/79 or perhaps earlier Pharnabazos sent envoys to Athens to complain and to ask for Iphikrates. The Athenians recalled Chabrias and sent Iphikrates to serve under Pharnabazos.⁹

About the middle of winter 379/8 exciting news came to Athens from Thebes. Seven of the Theban exiles who were sheltered in Athens had made their way to Thebes, killed the polemarchs who were concluding their term of office, and called out the Thebans to arms. Two Athenian generals, who held forces near the border, had marched promptly to support the liberators. Threatened thus by Theban and Athenian forces, the Spartan garrison on the Kadmeia had agreed promptly afterward to withdraw under terms.¹⁰

The question of the degree of Athenian responsibility in the liberation of the Kadmeia must be faced. Did the two generals, who held forces on the border and took them to Thebes, act at their own sole discretion or did they have authorization from some further organ, in particular, from an organ that could commit the people of Athens? Secrecy was necessary to the success of the coup. The council of five hundred could hold a secret session.¹¹ But a plan is not likely to remain secret for long, when it has been made known to five hundred men. If the plan was to succeed, the two commanders had to hold their men in readiness near the border. In doing so, they could scarcely escape the notice of their fellow officers. They may have confided their plan to some of their colleagues on the board of ten generals. But the proper question to ask is not whether the two generals acted with authorization. As observed in the Introduction, the Athenian republic did not have an administration of modern type taking comprehensive responsibility for policy. It had numerous officers and each of these had his own sphere of activity. The proper question is whether the two generals would subsequently be called to account.

The liberation of the Kadmeia created an international situation which was both critical and unclear. A Spartan garrison had been expelled, but this action would not necessarily precipitate war between Sparta and Thebes. The expulsion could be defended under the provision for autonomy in the peace of Antalkidas. So Athens did not yet have to choose between Sparta and Thebes. Promptly after the liberation, the Thebans sent envoys to Sparta to negotiate a treaty of peace. The Spartans rebuffed them by making excessive demands.¹² Instead the Spartans decided to send an armed force.

Yet there was division and uncertainty among them. Agesilaos did not wish to command the expedition. As he recognized, if he led it, his fellow citizens would say that he was involving the city in trouble and expense to support former tyrants. So he excused himself on the legalistic pretext that he was beyond the age for active service. The expedition was entrusted to the other king, Kleombrotos. It was this officer's first command. While it was still winter, he led a force of citizens and allies north through Plataia, a town on which the Spartans could rely against the Thebans, to Thespiiai. Thence he advanced into Theban territory and encamped there. He stayed for sixteen days and then retired to Thespiiai. He left a third of the allied force in Thespiiai and appointed Sphodrias to command it; he entrusted money to Sphodrias and authorized him to raise mercenaries. Then he withdrew to the Peloponnese and disbanded the remainder of his army.¹³

When Kleombrotos led his men southward from Boiotia, some of them criticized him. They complained that he had inflicted as little damage as possible on the Thebans. The criticism was ill conceived. It would not have been to the advantage of Sparta to antagonize the Thebans unnecessarily. Kleombrotos had made an impressive show of force in central Greece in spite of the difficulty of campaigning in winter, and he had installed a large garrison under a daring commander in Thespiiai; that was evidently to be the base for maintaining the Spartan presence in the neighborhood of Boiotia and Athens. Recently the Thebans had offered to negotiate peace with Sparta. The show of force by Kleombrotos might induce them to renew the offer in a humbler spirit.

Moreover, Kleombrotos may have desired to impress Athens as much as Thebes by his expedition. When he began his march northward, Chabrias took a force of Athenians with light arms to hold the route through Eleutheraï. This position was not well chosen for the defense of Attica, but it blocked the easiest pass for Kleombrotos to choose as he came from the Peloponnese against Boiotia.¹⁴ From remarks of Plutarch it has sometimes been inferred that the Athenians had contracted an alliance with the Thebans straight after the liberation of the Kadmeia. Plutarch implies as much, but he has many inaccuracies on the crisis attending the liberation.¹⁵ In any case the force held by Chabrias on the route through Eleutheraï was a more decisive statement of Athenian policy than any alliance. But the expedition of Kleombrotos brought about a sharp change in the behavior of the Athenians. They saw that the Lakedaimonians could no longer be checked in the territory of Corinth, as during the Corinthian War, but were able to march past the western border of Attica against Thebes. So they tried their two generals, who had helped in the liberation of the Kadmeia, and they executed one of them. The other had left Attica and he was sentenced to exile.¹⁶

Thus at the time when Kleombrotos carried out his expedition, the mood of the Athenians was one of anxiety. But they now took a step to improve their international security. They gave firmer shape to the alliance, to which they had invited cities to adhere. They created a syndedrion or common

council, consisting of deputies from the allied states.¹⁷ Doubtless it was modeled in part on the synedrion of allies that had sat at Corinth during the Corinthian War. It was to remain permanently in session at Athens. Within the synedrion each of the allies was to have one vote. Athenian generals were to command federal operations, but Athens alone of the allies had no vote in the synedrion.¹⁸ Policy was to be determined jointly by two equal bodies, the Athenian assembly and the synedrion of the allies. However cumbersome in appearance, this arrangement is not known to have impeded efficiency. Presumably the exclusion of Athens was intended to ensure that the synedrion should not relapse into the impotence that had afflicted the synods of the Delian League. Possibly further assurances were issued or exchanged at the time when the synedrion was brought into being. There is no reason to suppose that any purpose of resisting Spartan pretensions was acknowledged explicitly. The fact of the synedrion mattered more than any words uttered. Verbal declarations might have little value, since it was often possible to find a reason for renegeing when the *casus foederis* arose. But the synedrion, being a permanent institution, provided means for action.

The Spartans responded to this novel phase of the emergent League by sending three envoys to Athens to negotiate. At least one of them was an adherent of Agesilaos.¹⁹ A first step toward frustrating their mission was taken by Sphodrias. Setting off with his men from Thespiiai, he marched into western Attica by night. At dawn he was in the plain of Thria. He made himself conspicuous by seizing farm animals and destroying buildings. The three Spartan envoys were taken by surprise. They assured their hosts that Sphodrias would be called to account and executed. The question of his purpose in making his raid is difficult. He had alleged that he intended to seize the Peiraieus. But it would not be possible to penetrate so far into Attica without being checked effectively. It is more likely that he intended his raid to take him precisely as far as he did penetrate. That is, he hoped to intimidate the Athenians by showing that they could not even defend their own territory. In such an endeavor, bluster about designs on the Peiraieus would not be inappropriate.²⁰

Relations between the major powers were altered, not by the raid of Sphodrias, but by its sequel. The ephors summoned him to return to Sparta and face a capital charge. The Council of Elders judged Spartan citizens in cases where the penalty was death. Sphodrias had the prudence to stay away from Lakedaimon. Kleombrotos and his associates wished to acquit Sphodrias because he was their friend. They brought personal influence to bear on the other king, Agesilaos. After some hesitation Agesilaos expressed himself in favor of acquittal. He admitted that Sphodrias had committed the offense with which he was charged, but he argued that the accused had conducted himself admirably ever since childhood and Sparta had need of such men.²¹

The scandalous acquittal of Sphodrias clarified the international situation. When the Athenians received the news, they installed the gates on the Peiraieus, they voted that the Lakedaimonians had broken the peace, they built ships, and they set about aiding the Thebans with vigor.²² In the sum-

mer of 378 Agesilaos led an expedition against Thebes. He had apparently been rejuvenated since the winter. The Athenians sent a large force, allegedly five thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, under Chabrias to Boiotia to help the Thebans. Agesilaos found the plain of Thebes fortified with ditches and palisades. He fought a campaign of maneuvers and skirmishes, inflicting some damage on the fortifications and the installations of the countryside, before he retired to the Peloponnese.²³

In response to the acquittal of Sphodrias the Athenians gave still clearer form to the new League which they were bringing into being. The alliance was now directed against Sparta. The members could proclaim a purpose of upholding freedom and autonomy in accordance with the king's peace against Spartan encroachments. At this time, too, the Athenians negotiated the admission of Thebes to membership in the League and issued an undertaking not to found cleruchies in the territory of the allies.²⁴ A good deal of information about the League in the final stage of its formation can be derived from a decree proposed by Aristoteles and well preserved on inscribed marble.²⁵ It was passed in the seventh prytany of 378/7, that is, more than half a year after the raid of Sphodrias. Some at least of its clauses reiterated things that had been said before. For example, the general invitation to Greek cities to join the League was renewed. It should be supposed that many decrees were passed and much diplomatic activity took place in the time between the acquittal of Sphodrias and the vote taken on the decree of Aristoteles.

In its preamble the decree referred with respect to the Persian king and the peace he had provided.²⁶ Much of the text consisted of assurances made by the Athenians to their allies. Each state that joined the League was to be free and *autonomos*, observing the constitution of its choice. No member state was to be required to accept a garrison or a supervisory officer or to pay tribute. Elaborate provisions guaranteed the allies against Athenian possession or acquisition of land in their territory. Any current tenures of this kind were canceled. Any inscribed documents at Athens that were unfavorable to the allies were to be destroyed; this provision would cover any current agreements enabling Athenians to possess land in allied territory. For the future no Athenian should acquire land, privately or publicly, in allied territory by purchase or mortgage or any other means. A procedure was instituted for bringing any offender against this clause before the *syndedrion* for trial. The prohibition against acquiring land publicly forbade resumption of the fifth-century practice of founding cleruchies in the territory of the allies.

The spirit informing the decree of Aristoteles and its assurances needs to be noted. Historians used to give a moralistic account of the history of the Second Athenian League. It began, they supposed, with high hopes and fair promises, but after a time the Athenians relapsed into the imperialistic practices of the fifth century, founding cleruchies and installing garrisons in the territory of allied cities. This way of understanding the development of the League has been challenged. It has been noted, for example, that cleruchies founded by the Athenians later in the fourth century were not sent to the

territory of cities adhering to the League, and that the Athenians should not be criticized for installing garrisons when they were welcomed by the state receiving them as a source of protection.²⁷ The challenge need not be reiterated here, although the question may need to be kept in mind in the following chapters. For the present it suffices to observe that the undertakings made by the Athenians in the decree of Aristoteles were not necessarily inspired by generosity. The aggressive ambitions developed by the Athenians in the Delian League had been frustrated ignominiously in 405/4, and the attempt to revive them in part in the Corinthian War had been checked in 387/6 with less humiliation but equal effect. The spirit of 378/7 was one of realism. Accordingly the diplomatic framework chosen for the new alliance was different. The Delian League had been a defensive and offensive alliance, for its members swore "to have the same friends and enemies."²⁸ But the Second Athenian League was a defensive alliance. The preamble to the decree of Aristoteles stated the purpose "in order that the Lakedaimonians may allow the Greeks, being free and autonomous, to keep the peace, enjoying (all?) their own territory in security" (lines 9–12).

When the decree of Aristoteles was inscribed, space was left on the stone below the text for the names of cities joining the new League. Only the first six names were inscribed in the same hand as the decree. These were Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Thebes. These names mark the extent which the League had reached by the seventh prytany of 378/7. The members were not numerous but they were powerful cities. In the same year the Athenians carried out an internal reform that illustrates their resolve to fight the Spartans with vigor and, if necessary, for a long time. They reorganized the mode of exacting the *eisphora*, the property tax levied for war. An assessment was made of the property of each citizen, and the total was found to be 5,750 talents. The prospective taxpayers were grouped in a hundred symmories, and the three richest members of each were burdened with the *proeisphora* or liability to pay in advance the whole amount due from their contribution group. The tax on property had sometimes been levied before, although little is recorded about it.²⁹ The reform of 378/7 reflects a desire for efficiency and equity. One would like to know who initiated it; it may be possible to suggest a name shortly.

One could further wish to identify the Athenian statesmen who launched the Second League. Aristoteles of Marathon, who proposed the decree of the seventh prytany of 378/7, is credited by Diogenes Laertios with "forensic speeches of some charm."³⁰ Under his decree he and two others were chosen as envoys to go to Thebes. Evidently he was a man of consequence, but nothing more precise can be said about him. The other two envoys sent to Thebes were Pyrrhandros of Anaphlystos and Thrasyboulos of Kollytos. Pyrrhandros had been one of five envoys sent to Byzantion when Athens contracted an alliance with that city, and late in 378/7 he proposed an alliance with Chalkis.³¹ Thrasyboulos of Kollytos has already been recognized as a man prominent in the 380s (chapter 1 at note 37). In 403 he had been one of the men of Phyle and of the Peiraieus.³²

More can be learned from the names of three men who were among the generals elected for 378/7.³³ They were Timotheos, Chabrias, and Kallistratos. Timotheos, the son of Konon, was born toward 414 and may have served with his father in 394–393. Not much is known of his activities before 378; being a man of essentially military talent, he may have had little opportunity since the peace of Antalkidas. He had inherited a large fortune from his father and by the middle of the 360s he was known as one of the richest men in Athens.³⁴ Chabrias had served in the later stages of the Corinthian War.³⁵ Later he entered the service of Akoris of Egypt,³⁶ perhaps to escape the debacle of 387/6.

Later in the 370s Timotheos and Chabrias were to quarrel. As early as 378 they had independent claims on the attention of the electorate. Timotheos boasted a father who had done the state some service, and Chabrias had military experience to his credit. In the early days of the Second League diplomatic skill may have been needed to make them cooperate or at least avoid impeding one another. The activities of Kallistratos in 378 may have been more diplomatic and political than military. He is not known to have commanded an armed expedition then or at any stage in his career. He had made himself felt in Athenian affairs as early as 392/1 (see chapter 1 at note 21). He shared his later successes and misfortunes with Chabrias. There is no objection to supposing that he contracted ties with Chabrias as early as 378. He may have recognized that the combination of a soldier and a politician could be highly effective. It has been suggested that the principles of the Second League reflect his political ideas.³⁷ There is little evidence to connect him directly with the foundation of the League, and a generation later he was remembered as the man who persuaded the Athenians to help the Spartans in 370.³⁸ But the circumstantial case for associating Kallistratos with the policies realized in the League is strong. In the 370s, when the League was growing vigorously, Kallistratos achieved major prominence.

The historian Theopompos, a younger contemporary of Kallistratos, said that the latter invented a euphemistic name for the financial payments that the Athenians took to levying from their allies. He also said that Kallistratos was intemperate in pursuit of pleasures but careful in attention to public business.³⁹ Theopompos disliked the Athenians. The words he used of Kallistratos were as near as he could come to recognizing one of them as a talented financier and a farsighted statesman. Presumably Kallistratos had much to do with founding the League and developing it in the next years, perhaps also with the reform of the *eisphora*.

The Growth of the League

After reporting the admission of Thebes to the new League and the Athenian undertaking against founding cleruchies, Diodoros says that the first cities to join the League were those of Euboia except Hestiaia. On the front of the stele of Aristoteles, a second hand inscribed the names of Chalkis, Eretria,

Arethousa, Karystos, and Ikos. An inscription preserves an alliance between Athens and Chalkis and is dated to the Attic year 378/7; presumably it was passed some time after the decree of Aristoteles. It is reasonable to accept the tradition that the adherence of the Euboian cities was their response to the efforts of Timotheos.⁴⁰

In 377 Agesilaos led his second ineffectual invasion of Boiotia, and Chabrias operated against him there.⁴¹ Later in the same season Chabrias conducted a further campaign, of which Diodoros (15.30.5) gives a brief account: Chabrias ravaged the territory of Hestiaia, fortified a position there, and installed a garrison; then he sailed among the Kyklades, winning over Peparethos, Skiathos, and some other islands. On the front of the stele of Aristoteles, the next group of names cut in a single hand comprises Perinthos, Peparethos, Skiathos, Maroneia, and Dion. The last named was in Euboia, and like Peparethos and Skiathos, it may have joined the League in consequence of the operations of Chabrias. That Chabrias approached Maroneia on the coast of Thrace is possible, though not likely, and a campaign among the Kyklades cannot have taken him anywhere near Perinthos. Maroneia and Perinthos may have joined the League on their own initiative. In the case of Perinthos, good offices may have been offered or pressure exerted by the mightier neighbor, Byzantion. But the further possibility cannot be excluded that Athens sent small squadrons of predominantly diplomatic character to the northern Aegean and to the straits, areas in which it was interested.

In 376 Kleombrotos led an army of the Peloponnesians northward, but he was checked by the Thebans and the Athenians at Mount Kithairon and could not reach the territory of Thebes. Thus for three years the Spartans had sent expeditions against their enemies by land but had made no headway. So they resolved to prosecute the war by sea. They equipped a fleet of sixty triremes and sent it out under Pollis as navarch. By stationing squadrons near Aigina, Keos, and Andros, Pollis prevented merchant ships, which were bringing grain to Athens, from sailing past Geraistos at the southern extremity of Euboia. The Athenians manned a fleet and sent it to sea under Chabrias. He escorted first the grain fleet to the Peiraieus. Then he brought Pollis to battle off Naxos and defeated him. Henceforth he gave a distribution of wine to his fellow citizens every year on the anniversary of the battle.⁴² Ostentation was justified; the Athenians retained naval ascendancy in the Aegean until the Lamian War.

Some cities inscribed on the front of the stele of Aristoteles may be presumed to have joined the League during the campaign or in consequence of the victory. They include Tenedos near the entrance to the Hellespont and Poiessa in Keos, also several islands in the heart of the Aegean like Paros. Some of the entries are no longer legible and probable suggestions of names to be restored include one city of considerable power, Kos, not far from Rhodes. The total of names inscribed on the front of the stele was twenty-eight or twenty-nine. It is likely that the last of these was inscribed in 376. In 375 the Athenians set about inscribing names on the left side of the stele.

Another epigraphic source provides information about the ascendancy achieved by Chabrias in the islands and coasts of the Aegean in virtue of his victory. When he returned to Athens, the assembly voted him a statue, to be set up in the agora, and a crown of gold. The work of making the statue probably continued through the winter and was completed in 375. Considerable fragments of the base have been found and put together with skill and patience.⁴³ The base was decorated with inscribed notes and designs in relief, recording wreaths of olive granted to Chabrias by miscellaneous communities. Among these were the people of Mytilene, the troops stationed there, and the naval squadron serving at Syros, an Aegean island that should probably be restored on the front of the stele of Aristoteles. There was also a wreath granted by Philiskos and his men at Abydos; he was the chief lieutenant of Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. It should not necessarily be supposed that Chabrias himself had visited all the cities that saw fit to honor him. After the battle Chabrias sent his young colleague, Phokion, who had commanded the left wing at Naxos, to some islands and offered him twenty ships. Phokion preferred to take only one ship, but he returned afterward to Athens with an escort of many ships supplied by the allies, who also gave money.⁴⁴ The source for this story is late and the account may have become colored by the moralistic tradition on Phokion. But it appears that after the battle Phokion sailed to some islands, and if so, Chabrias may have sent other colleagues to others at the same time. Even so, indications to be noted shortly suggest that Chabrias sailed in the north Aegean in 375.

The statue with which the Athenians honored Chabrias after the victory is noteworthy for its stance.⁴⁵ Probably Chabrias was shown standing with his spear upright in his right hand; his shield was resting on the ground and was leaned against his left knee or thigh. This position corresponded to the position of modern infantry "at ease"; the man was not burdened with the weight of his shield but was ready to take it up and go into action, as soon as the command was given. That was the position in which Chabrias had made his men await the charge of Agesilaos in Boiotia in 378; impressed by their discipline and their confidence, Agesilaos had halted his advance. In 375 rivals of Chabrias might find the stance of the statue arrogant. Moreover, in the fourth century it was an innovation among the Athenians to set up monuments of individual commanders. The first man to be honored with such a statue in the agora in his lifetime was Konon.⁴⁶ In his day he had been the man most respected by the Athenians and by the cities of the Aegean area. By 375 the achievements of Chabrias and the following he had won among the Aegean cities had cast a shadow over the memory of Konon. The son of Konon might be jealous.

Further expansion of the League and rivalry between Chabrias and Timotheos can be traced in the records for 375. In that year Chabrias sailed to Abdera on the coast of Thrace opposite Thasos. The people of Abdera were engaged in a difficult war against the Triballoi, but Chabrias drove the barbarians away and installed a garrison.⁴⁷ The Abderites were duly inscribed

along with many other names on the left face of the stele of Aristoteles. It may be conjectured that the voyage on which Chabrias reached Abdera took him also to some of the places attested on the base of his statue for honoring him with wreaths; this may be true of Mytilene and Abydos.

Literary sources tell of an expedition conducted by Timotheos to the northwest in 375 and they give it a credible context.⁴⁸ The Lakedaimonians, whose land force had been checked at Mount Kithairon in the previous year, now prepared to send their men by sea across the Corinthian Gulf against Boiotia. So the Thebans asked the Athenians to send a fleet round the Peloponnese; they thought that the Spartans would have to recall their army to protect their own territory against seaborne raids. The Athenians in response sent out Timotheos with sixty warships. He sailed round the Peloponnese to the northwest and won the adherence of Kerkyra. The Spartans, urged no doubt by the Corinthians who had long been interested in their Kerkyraian colony, sent out a fleet of comparable size under Nikolochos. Timotheos defeated Nikolochos at Alyzeia, and although in itself the battle was not decisive, Timotheos raised additional ships from Kerkyra, so that he had a fleet of seventy warships and predominated in the northwestern theater. During this expedition he won over the cities of Kephallenia and of Akarnania to the Athenian cause, and he secured the friendship of Alketas, king of the Molossoi in Epeiros.

Some of the powers approached by Timotheos can be recognized among the entries on the left face of the stele of Aristoteles. These include the Akarnanians, Alketas and his son Neoptolemos, and Pronnoi in Kephallenia. Apparently the other three cities of Kephallenia did not join the League. The list also includes Abdera and other Aegean cities, which may have joined in response to the travels of Chabrias in 375 (or even late 376), namely Elaious (in the Chersonese), Ainos, Samothrake, Dikaia (near Abdera), Neapolis, Dion (on the promontory of Athos), Thasos, and the Chalkidians, that is, the federation headed by Olynthos. These names clarify the extent of the influence attained by Chabrias.

There is still more to be learned from the inscribed list. While Timotheos was still in the northwest, two Athenian envoys came and told him that a treaty of common peace had been concluded and so he could sail home. On his journey he passed the island of Zakynthos. Civil strife had arisen there and some Zakynthians had been driven into exile. Timotheos restored the exiles to the island and installed them in a fort called Arkadia, although their enemies continued to hold the city.⁴⁹ A Zakynthian entry appears on the left face of the stele of Aristoteles, but to understand its implications one must consider the arrangement of the entries on that surface.

Three or possibly more hands are to be distinguished on the left face of the stele. Calling them X, Y, and Z, one may distinguish their work thus:

1. Hand X inscribed an entry of two lines. It began level with the opening of the substantive text, as distinct from the prescript, of the decree on the front. Not all letters of the entry are legible. It recorded "the demos

of the [. .] raians.” Defensible restorations are “Theraians” and “Pheraiaans.”⁵⁰

2. The next twenty-seven (or twenty-eight) entries were inscribed in a different hand, which will here be called hand Y, although it may be more than one hand.⁵¹ These entries begin immediately below the entry made by X.
3. Below the last of the entries inscribed by Y there was an uninscribed space. It was equivalent in height to sixteen lines of text on the front of the stele. Below this space hand Z inscribed a single entry in several words, namely “the demos of the Zakynthians that is in the Nellos.”

Understanding of these data became much improved when it was observed that the entry made by Z begins on a level with the opening of the list of names on the front of the stele. That is, when the mason of Z set to work, he did not see names higher up on the left face and append his entry to them; on the contrary, he saw names only on the front and inscribed his entry on their level to associate it with them.⁵² In other words, the Zakynthian entry was the first to be made on the left face. The other entries on that face were made in consequence of operations of 375. So the Zakynthian entry may have been inscribed before those operations were carried out. The place called “the Nellos” is not known. In view of the early date of the Zakynthian entry, the Nellos should not be identified with the fort Arkadia. It is more likely to be the position on the mainland where the banished Zakynthians had established themselves in exile.⁵³

The significance of the word *demos* in the Zakynthian entry needs to be recognized. In the writings of Greek historians and philosophers the word *demos* often means one side in a political conflict, and the other side is then designated as “the few” or “the men in power” or otherwise. But in the speeches of Athenian orators, which are closer to the everyday language of politics, *demos* hardly ever has a partisan sense; it means the whole body of citizens.⁵⁴ The nearest modern word is “the community.” Possibly in the Zakynthian entry the word was intended in its partisan sense. That is, on ordering the inscription of this entry the Athenian assembly admitted the group of Zakynthian exiles to the League and recognized them as one of two sides engaged in a political conflict. But if in ordering the inscription of the entry the Athenians employed the word in the sense more usual in the language of actual politics, their claim was more extreme. They recognized the exiles as the legitimate community of the Zakynthians. The entry inscribed by X, “the demos of the [. .] raians,” appears to echo the Zakynthian entry.

Understanding of the Zakynthian entry clarifies the aims with which Timotheos set sail from Athens in 375. In the previous three years the Athenians and in particular Chabrias had gained adherents among the islands and coastal cities of the Aegean. But now some Zakynthian exiles desired help. So the Athenians and in particular Timotheos saw an opportunity to extend their influence into the northwestern theater. His expedition had spectacular success, winning Kerkyra and many allies.⁵⁵ After the campaign culminating

in the battle of Alyzeia, the Athenians set up a statue of Timotheos.⁵⁶ That was the answer to the statue of Chabrias. Besides making positive gains, the expedition of Timotheos deterred the Spartans from sending a force by sea against Boiotia, and that outcome was advantageous, for relations between Athens and Thebes were growing uneasy.

Toward Realignment of Cities

In or about 375 the Persian king sent envoys to the Greek cities to suggest the conclusion of a treaty of common peace. He was preparing an expedition against Egypt and he wished for peace among the Greeks so that he could recruit troops among them. The Greek cities accepted his good offices and made peace.⁵⁷ The Athenians set up an altar of Eirene and instituted an annual festival of that goddess, to be celebrated on 16. Hekatombaion.⁵⁸ Negotiations must have taken some time. It is credible that after the armed operations of Timotheos and Nikolochos negotiations followed in the winter and the spring, so that the first celebration of the festival at Athens fell about the middle of the summer of 374.⁵⁹

Changes were coming about within the Athenian League. Probably no new names were added to the list on the stele of Aristoteles after 375; at least it is not likely that any of the preserved names was inscribed later than that date. When Athens acquired more allies later, these probably did not become members of the synedrion but entered into a more traditional relationship with Athens. The spaces on the stele could accommodate the names of about fifty-eight states. Literary sources estimate the total at seventy or seventy-five.⁶⁰ These may exaggerate, or they may include allies of Athens who did not become members of the League. At least the Second League had far fewer members than the Delian League of the fifth century.

There is little trace of any change of outlook among the allies of Athens in the late 370s. An inscription of 373/2 records a settlement negotiated by the Athenians and the synedrion with the people of Paros.⁶¹ The settlement was concluded on the last day of the Attic year. Not enough of the text is preserved to indicate the nature of the preceding trouble. Some readers of the inscription have supposed that the Parians had seceded from the League and been induced to return. The hypothesis is possible but by no means necessary. The terms provided in the settlement contrast palpably with the methods the Athenians had adopted in dealing with recalcitrant allies in the fifth century. The jurisdiction of the Parian courts in cases of homicide is upheld. The Parians are guaranteed in their personal security and in possession of their dwellings and their estates of land. Possibly the trouble leading to the settlement was not secession but internal conflict on the island. Yet internal conflict, if not appeased, could lead to secession. In default of evidence on the occurrence or absence of discontent among the allies, general considerations can be invoked. In its earliest years the League had arisen among cities of the Aegean coasts and islands. They may have been dis-

pleased when the operations of Timotheos in 375 and the resumption of hostilities a year or two later diverted resources to the northwest. Yet there is no literary reflection of discontent at this stage; in this respect the new confederacy contrasts with the Delian League. If any friction arose already between maritime allies and Athens, it was presumably neither deep nor widespread.

At the meeting of the synedrion that ratified the settlement with Paros, the issue was put to the vote by a Theban representative. Thebes still behaved as a member of the League. It was not a naval power, whereas the other members were. Soon after the liberation of the Kadmeia, the Thebans had set about restoring a confederation of Boiotian cities. By 374 they could invade Phokis. In response to a Phokian appeal the Spartans sent Kleombrotos with an army by sea across the Corinthian Gulf.⁶² This time the Athenians did not engage in naval activity to deter the Spartans from crossing the gulf. The army of Kleombrotos or part of it was to remain in Phokis until 371.

In his brief report of the conclusion of peace in 374, Xenophon (*Hellenika* 6.2.1) shows that the policies of Thebes and of Athens were beginning to diverge.

The Athenians saw that the Thebans owed their increase in power to Athenian action but were not supplying money to the fleet. They themselves were burdened with financial levies on property and with piratical raids from Aigina and with maintaining posts to guard their own territory. So they wished to be rid of the war. They sent envoys to Lakedaimon and made peace.

The divergence did not lead to any open breach yet.⁶³ Xenophon's words suggest that the Athenians might expect financial contributions to the fleet as early as 374. The question of financial exactions within the League calls for consideration.

At some stage the Athenians took to exacting payments from their allies and called them "contributions" (*syntaxeis*). Theopompos said that they were no different from the tribute exacted in the Delian League, and he attributed the euphemism to Kallistratos. His utterance may have distorted the facts. Some historians have maintained that the practice of levying contributions was introduced at the beginning of the League. Apart from inferential arguments, their evidence is the story that Phokion was sent by Chabrias after the battle of Naxos to the islands to levy contributions, but the source is late and the tradition may have suffered confusion.⁶⁴ Other historians have argued that the Athenians would not be likely to introduce a levy of contributions as early as 378/7, when they undertook in the decree of Aristoteles not to exact "tribute" (*phoros*). This argument may not be decisive, but it has been pointed out that the earliest date for which contributions are attested in a contemporary source is 373.⁶⁵

Some general considerations may not be amiss. There is remarkably little evidence about *syntaxeis* at any stage. In 343/2 Aischines said that they had

amounted to sixty talents a year some time previously. Later Demosthenes said that the *syntaxeis* had yielded forty-five talents at the time of the final war fought against Philip II.⁶⁶ Literary and epigraphic sources show that Mytilene paid contributions in the years 361 and 346.⁶⁷ A decree of 357/6 provides for money raised from *syntaxeis* to be spent "in accordance with the resolutions of the allies."⁶⁸ Otherwise little is heard of the contributions, and in this respect the levy contrasts with the tribute of the Delian League, which is known from contemporary and later literature and many inscribed documents. Indeed, there is no evidence that the requirement of contributions in the Second League was resented as a burden by the allies. Again, several members of the League were very small and may therefore have been unable to furnish naval contingents.⁶⁹

There is no ground to suppose that the levy of contributions in its mature form came into being in a single act, like Athena from the head of Zeus. Instead a hypothesis of the following type is possible. The first cities to join the Second Athenian League were mostly powerful states, such as Chios, Mytilene, Rhodes, and Byzantion. These could afford to man triremes of their own and thus to contribute contingents to a federal fleet. But soon afterward small cities, such as Arethousa and Dion in Euboea, Ikos, and Skiathos, joined the League. Some of them may have acted in response to the example set by powerful neighbors or even under pressure from these. The small cities did not have the manpower to maintain triremes. Their adherence to the League could only be expressed through financial payments. The victory of Chabrias at Naxos induced many more cities, including small cities, to join the new League; how far they acted from admiration and how far from fear is a question that need not be asked. By the middle of the 370s numerous cities had made financial payments, which were voluntary in form and perhaps in fact. Since the payments were voluntary, their relation to local resources would vary from city to city. There was occasion for an Athenian statesman with a talent for finance to reduce the erratic payments to a regular basis. That change was achieved by 373 and so the contributions yielded a predictable annual amount, to which Aischines alluded later. The flippant remark of Theopompos makes it possible to attach a name to the statesman who showed a talent for finance in the 370s.

As noted in the previous section, news of the conclusion of peace in 374 was brought to Timotheos while he was still in the northwest, and during his voyage back to Athens he installed a party of Zakynthian exiles in a fort on their island. This action led to a resumption of hostilities, though on a limited scale. The Zakynthians of the city sent an appeal to Sparta for help, and the Spartans in response sent a fleet of twenty-five triremes under a commander called Aristokrates. About the same time a revolt in Kerkyra led to another appeal for Spartan intervention. The island had been brought on to the Athenian side by Timotheos, but now a disaffected party rebelled and asked for Spartan aid. The Spartans sent a fleet of twenty-two triremes under Alkidias.

The squadrons sailing under Aristokrates and Alkidas were not large. When the two missions failed to provoke any severe reaction from the Athenians, the Spartans decided to exploit their opportunity in the northwest on a far larger scale. Early in 373 they sent out a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty ships under the navarch Mnasippos. He was instructed to concern himself with the northwestern area generally and to give particular attention to Kerkyra. Concentrating his efforts there, he landed his men on the island, ravaged the territory, and began a blockade of the city. A Kerkyraian embassy was sent to Athens, and now the Athenians had to act. They sent Ktesikles with some six hundred light-armed troops and asked their ally, Alketas of the Molossoi, to convey them across the channel between the mainland and Kerkyra. They also commissioned Timotheos to raise a fleet of sixty warships and take it to sea.⁷⁰

Ktesikles made his way into the city of Kerkyra and strengthened the resistance. Timotheos was less fortunate. He found that he could not raise sufficient crews for sixty ships in Athens. So he sailed among the islands of the Aegean, allegedly as far as the coast of Thrace, to raise men, presumably money, and perhaps ships. One cannot tell how much success he had. Doubtless he wished to recover something of the following which his father had won in the islands and which Chabrias had stolen. He had every reason to resent the prestige of Chabrias; the latter had won a victory in a chariot race at the Pythian festival of 374. The instructions given to Timotheos are not recorded; he may not have been told to make haste for Kerkyra. His estimate of strategic needs may have been sound. In the event the Kerkyraians, strengthened by Ktesikles, killed Mnasippos in battle and freed their city from siege before any Athenian fleet arrived. But that was still in the future while Timotheos was sailing the Aegean in the high summer of 373. His enemies in Athens complained that he was wasting the best part of the season instead of sailing for Kerkyra. He was recalled, deposed from command, and put on trial. The command was transferred to Iphikrates.⁷¹

The prosecutors who called Timotheos to account were Iphikrates and Kallistratos. The trial took place early in the winter of 373/2 and created a sensation. Jason, the tyrant of Pherai, and Alketas, king of the Molossoi, came to plead in support of the accused. Timotheos was acquitted, although his treasurer, Antimachos, was condemned and executed. Timotheos recognized the extent of the setback he had suffered; in 372 he withdrew from Athens and entered Persian service.⁷²

Iphikrates set sail for Kerkyra about the beginning of the sailing season of 372. He trained his men during the journey. He was off the coast of Lakonia when he received news that the Kerkyraians had defeated and killed Mnasippos. Continuing his voyage, he subdued the towns of Kephallenia. Hypermenes, the second-in-command to Mnasippos, withdrew to Leukas with the survivors of the Peloponnesian force, when the Athenian fleet approached. After reaching Kerkyra, Iphikrates captured ten triremes sent by Dionysios of Syracuse to aid the Spartans; they had arrived too late. Since the task of saving Kerkyra had been accomplished before he arrived, he had to find

other things to do. He took his hoplites and his light-armed troops to Akarnania to intervene in local disputes. He sailed to Kephallenia and exacted money. For a time he set his sailors to till the soil for the Kerkyraians; commanders in the fourth century sometimes had difficulty in providing for their men.⁷³

Xenophon (*Hellenika* 6.2.39) makes an informative comment on this expedition of Iphikrates:

I esteem this campaign of Iphikrates highly. I also esteem him for bidding the assembly to choose as his colleagues Kallistratos the orator, who was not strongly linked to him, and Chabrias, who was considered a general of the best quality. For if he considered them perceptive in statecraft and therefore wished to take them as advisors, his decision was in my opinion prudent. But if he regarded them as his rivals but was boldly resolved not to be found remiss from negligence or contempt for them, his choice reveals him as a man confident in his own powers.

Since the choice of these two associates called for comment, it follows that the three men had not hitherto been political allies. Xenophon remarked in particular that Kallistratos was not hitherto linked to Iphikrates. There may already have been cooperation, such as is attested later, between Kallistratos and Chabrias. At the beginning of his career Iphikrates had probably attached himself to Konon. But since 386 he had emerged as a fully independent figure. As a self-made man, he was scarcely restrained by hereditary ties. By joining Kallistratos in the attack on Timotheos and by taking Kallistratos and Chabrias with him to Kerkyra, Iphikrates forged an alliance that could dominate Athenian affairs for a few years.

Making Kerkyra his base, Iphikrates maintained his force as well as he could through the winter of 372/1. With his agreement Kallistratos left him in 371 and returned to Athens; Kallistratos undertook to get him either money or peace.⁷⁴ The latter alternative was easier to procure. The hostilities between Athens and Sparta, as resumed in 374, had been limited to the northwestern area. By 371 the two sides had maneuvered one another to a standstill, and the condition reached was much like that immediately preceding the peace of 374. Besides the Athenians had the Thebans to think about.

The growth of Theban power had been portentous. In 375 a relatively small force of Thebans under Pelopidas had defeated a Lakedaimonian army of two morai at Tegyra near Orchomenos. It was not a major engagement, and Orchomenos, the strongest rival of Thebes among the cities of Boiotia, was not brought into the new Boiotian federation until after the battle of Leuktra.⁷⁵ Farsighted people might recognize that the skill of Pelopidas in combining a small force of infantry, the sacred band, with cavalry at Tegyra promised greater achievements in future.

One of the Athenian reasons for making peace with Sparta in 374 was resentment because the Thebans were not contributing to the costs of the federal fleet. Yet the conduct of the Thebans in the Second Athenian League

stands up well to scrutiny. The fleet collected by Timotheos in 373 included a Boiotian contingent.⁷⁶ As already noted, a Theban presided in the synedion on the day in 372 when the terms for Paros were voted. Questions about naval and financial obligations could be settled by negotiation and compromise. Geography was more recalcitrant.

Boiotia consisted of plains drained by two rivers, the Kephisos in its lower course and the Asopos. Both rivers flow from west to east. Orchomenos was the strongest city in northern Boiotia, the area drained by the Kephisos. Thebes lay a little north of the Asopos, and the first goal of Theban ambition was to bring the other towns of southern Boiotia into subjection or federation. The mountain ranges of Kithairon and Parnes divided southern Boiotia from Attica and their slopes sheltered several towns. Only the accidents of history determined whether Plataia, Hysiai, Erythrai, Eleutherai, and further east Oropos should be held politically by Thebes or Athens. There had been intermittent disputes on the border since the sixth century.

The Thebans tried to reassert their claim to Oropos, perhaps a little before 375, but they were deterred by Athenian firmness.⁷⁷ In 373/2 they destroyed Plataia and expelled its citizens. The refugees found asylum at Athens. Once before, early in the Peloponnesian War, the Thebans had attacked, besieged, and destroyed Plataia. On that occasion the survivors had fled to Athens and received Athenian citizenship. The status granted to the Plataian refugees in 373/2 is obscure. The earlier grant of citizenship may have been confirmed with supplementary provisions to allow for developments of the intervening period, when Plataia existed as a city. About the time of the new destruction of Plataia the people of Thespiiai appealed to the Athenians, because the Thebans threatened to disband their city.⁷⁸ By 371 the Athenians could wish to see the Thebans humbled.

In the summer of that year a conference gathered in Sparta to bring about common peace. Kallistratos came with the Athenian envoys. It was known to the negotiating parties that the Spartans had again sent Antalkidas to the Persian king with a request for financial subsidies. Peace was concluded before Antalkidas came back. Thus a conclusion was reached without Persian initiative, although the prospect of Spartan action financed by the king may have facilitated agreement. The terms were much like those of 374. In the earlier year the contracting parties had appointed agents to visit the Greek cities and expel garrisons. The treaty of 371 provided for expelling harmosts. The new treaty, like those of 387/6 and 374, recognized the autonomy of all Greek cities. The real question was, Which entities should be recognized as Greek cities? and authority to answer this question was left tacitly to the Spartan officers, who would receive the oaths of the envoys from the other cities taking part in the treaty.⁷⁹

On the day after the oaths had been sworn at Sparta, the Theban envoys approached Agesilaos and asked him to alter the name "Thebans" to "Boiotians" in the list of those who had sworn. Thus they asked for recognition of the Boiotian confederacy as a sovereign entity, recognition that had been denied in 387/6 and presumably in 374. They were, perhaps, taking a cal-

culated risk; they might estimate that the Spartans and for that matter the Athenians would not imperil the gains of the peace conference for the sake of a single provision.⁸⁰ Moreover they had made preparations for armed resistance. Although opinion among Theban officers was divided, since taking office as boiotarch in the winter of 372/1 Epameinondas had trained his men in novel tactics.⁸¹ But the Spartans too had made preparations. When the Thebans claimed that their oath was the oath of the Boiotians, the Spartans ordered Kleombrotos to march on Thebes with the army which he held in Phokis. The ensuing battle was fought only twenty days after the conclusion of peace. The army Kleombrotos commanded consisted of four morai, that is, two-thirds of the whole infantry of Lakedaimon, and a complement of allies.⁸² Twenty days was not a long enough interval for the Spartans to send so large a force into central Greece. Evidently they had ordered it to Phokis before concluding peace.

The battle was fought at Leuktra, not far from the source of the Asopos. It was a clear victory for the Thebans. The Lakedaimonians lost Kleombrotos and about one thousand men, including four hundred Spartan citizens. The consequence was that Spartan authority north of the isthmus collapsed, but the allies of Sparta within the Peloponnese remained loyal.⁸³

The Reversal of Alliances

The Athenians were surprised and dismayed when they learned the outcome of the battle of Leuktra. The Thebans sent a messenger to announce their victory and ask for military help. The Athenian council heard him out but made no reply to his request and did not even give him the customary invitation to dine at the public expense.⁸⁴ Within a short time the Athenians took a step toward a radical change in their international alignment. They summoned a conference to meet in Athens. The invitation was issued to "as many cities as wished to share in the peace that the king had sent." So the Thebans were not likely to take part; after the battle of Leuktra they were keen to attack the Spartans, and only the intervention of their ally, Jason of Pherai, induced them to make a truce.⁸⁵

The conference that gathered in Athens probably met late in 371. It would take some time for the prospective participants to respond to the invitation, but the spectacular enhancement of Theban power furnished many of them with a reason to act quickly. The conference is known only from the account given by Xenophon,⁸⁶ an account that leaves some questions unanswered but allows important inferences. The oath sworn by the participants said:

I will abide by the treaty that the king sent down and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies. If anyone makes war on any of the cities that have sworn this oath, I will come to the aid of the victim with all my force.

The allusion to "the decrees of the Athenians and their allies" has suggested the Second Athenian League to some readers and has hence been difficult to

interpret. Cities responding to the Athenian invitation of 371 were not inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles and did not become members of the Second League. It is therefore better to suppose that the phrase in the oath of 371 did not refer to the resolutions of the Second League but to decrees the participants in the conference of 371 might make then or in future. This explanation implies that the participants in the conference regarded themselves as allies. They were justified in doing so because of the last clause of the oath, just quoted, the clause of guarantee.⁸⁷ The peace sworn at Sparta twenty days before the battle of Leuktra had had a clause of voluntary guarantee, as it has sometimes been called:

If anyone contravened the provisions, he who wished could come to the aid of the injured cities, but he who did not wish to act should not be required by his oath to fight as an ally of the injured party.⁸⁸

Such a clause of voluntary guarantee scarcely amounted to a guarantee at all. By contrast the peace concluded at Athens some months later had a sting because it included a clause of guarantee. Probably the participants desired a guarantee because they regarded the growth of Theban power with alarm.

It is not clear whether the members of the Second League, apart from Thebes and in addition to Athens, took part in the conference. That they did can be supposed by those who see an allusion to the Second League in the reference of the oath to "the decrees of the Athenians and their allies." But most members of the Second League were maritime and would have little need to fear Theban power, until the Thebans engaged in naval enterprise. No member of the Second League, apart from Athens, is known to have taken any action under the terms sworn at the Athenian conference of 371. It is more important to note the participation of Peloponnesian states. The Eleans declined the oath because they refused to recognize the autonomy of some small communities on their border. The Mantineans swore the oath, and in the next few months, deriving encouragement from the guarantee of autonomy, they set about restoring their city from the villages into which it had been divided since 385.⁸⁹

The crucial question about the conference at Athens concerns Spartan participation. About a year later, when the Thebans and their allies invaded Lakeldaimon, the Spartans and their allies sent envoys to Athens to seek military help. The main argument inducing the Athenians to respond favorably was that they were bound "according to their oaths" to do so.⁹⁰ The only oath that could require the Athenians to aid the Spartans against attack was the clause of guarantee in the Athenian treaty of 371. It follows that Sparta was a party to that treaty. Thus in summoning the conference of 371 and in administering the oath, including the clause of guarantee, the Athenians in effect contracted a defensive alliance with Sparta and with the latter's Peloponnesian allies. In this way the Athenians reversed their alliance of 378 with Thebes against Sparta. Only subsequent events could show whether Athens would follow up its new alignment with armed force, but the diplo-

matic step in the reversal of alliances was taken at the Athenian conference of late 371.

Ensuing events developed with some speed. Encouraged by the reunification of Mantinea, some Tegeans launched a plan for setting up a federation of the Arkadian cities. The consequent friction gave the Spartans occasion to send an army into Arkadia. So the Arkadians sent envoys to Athens to ask for an alliance. The Athenians refused. Thereupon the Arkadians appealed successfully to the Thebans.⁹¹ Since the battle of Leuktra the Thebans had made good use of their time. They had marched on Orchomenos and induced it to join the Boiotian League. They had gained alliances with Phokis, Aitolia, and Lokris. Late in 370, in response to the Arkadian appeal, they invaded the Peloponnese and brought with them allies including forces from Phokis, Euboia, East and West Lokris, Akarnania, Herakleia, and Malis, also some cavalry and light-armed troops from Thessaly.⁹² Within the Peloponnese the host was joined by forces from Arkadia, Argos, and Elis, and was persuaded to invade Lakonia. The Spartans had help from their loyal allies, Phleious, Corinth, Epidauros, and Pellene, in defending their town, but the marauders made their way down the valley of the Eurotas as far as Gytheion, which resisted their assaults for three days.

In this predicament, in the winter of 370/69, the Spartans appealed to Athens for help, and the appeal was reinforced by envoys from Corinth and Phleious. The issue was not whether to make an alliance but whether to send an armed force in accordance with the obligation contracted at the Athenian conference of 371. The outcome was not a foregone conclusion; at first some Athenians were unwilling to send help and preferred to leave the Spartans to face disasters. But the assembly was swayed by the appeal and voted to send Iphikrates with a force. Iphikrates advanced through Corinth into Arkadia. But by the time he arrived, the Arkadians, Argives, and Eleans had withdrawn from Lakonia with their plunder, and the Thebans with their allies from central Greece were making their way home. Iphikrates tried without success to impede their progress through Corinthian territory. As a military operation his expedition achieved nothing, but it began Athenian intervention in the Peloponnese in support of Sparta.⁹³

The Athenian change of sides between Thebes and Sparta prompted some members of the Second League to ask questions. In 369/8 the Mytilenaians sent an embassy to Athens to call for an explanation. The reply, preserved on a fragmentary inscription, was proposed by Kallistratos and assured the Mytilenaians of the high regard in which the Athenians held them. Negotiations continued into the next year, but apparently the explanations and assurances given were satisfactory.⁹⁴ No member is known to have seceded from the League in consequence of the reversal of alliances. Doubtless Thebes ceased to send representatives to the synedrion; it is idle to ask whether there was a formal act of exclusion.

It is proper to ask at this point whether one can name Athenians who advocated and others who opposed the change of international alignment. About thirty years later a pleader in court reminded his audience of the occa-

sion "when you saved the Lakedaimonians because you were persuaded to do so by Kallistratos."⁹⁵ Since the speaker mentioned an armed expedition of the Athenians in the same context, he probably had in mind the dispatch of Iphikrates in the winter of 370/69. Evidently the rapprochement with Sparta was remembered after the death of Kallistratos as the distinctive feature of his policy. His share in bringing about the peace negotiated at Sparta in 371 contributed to this outcome. His ally, Chabrias, may have collaborated with him in getting the new policy adopted. Indeed in the course of 369, when the Thebans sent a second expedition to the Peloponnese, Chabrias commanded some forces sent against them.⁹⁶

Other men who played a leading part in Athenian affairs about the same time can be recognized in the list which Xenophon (*Hellenika* 6.3.2) gives of the Athenian envoys sent to Sparta in 371. Two of the men belonged to families that had achieved distinction long before. Melanopos was the grandson of Laches, who had been prominent in the Peloponnesian War.⁹⁷ Kallias, the hereditary *proxenos* of Sparta, came of a family prominent and wealthy since the time of Kleisthenes or earlier.⁹⁸ Men of such descent are more likely to have been independent leaders than mere associates of Kallistratos or Chabrias.

The most interesting names in the list of envoys are Demostratos and Autokles. Aristophon, the father of Demostratos, had carried in 403/2 a measure declaring illegitimate the children of a male citizen and a female alien.⁹⁹ Yet although he was thus active in 403/2, nothing more is known of Aristophon directly until 363/2, when he was sent as Athenian general to Keos and proposed a decree about the affairs of that island.¹⁰⁰ In Metageitnion 362/1 he carried a decree for sending a fleet to the Hellespont, and the officer who commanded the expedition was Autokles. Both Aristophon and Autokles were prosecuted by Hypereides, and this attack on Autokles probably arose from the expedition of 362/1.¹⁰¹ Autokles may well have been a friend of Aristophon as early as 371, when he served with the son of Aristophon on the embassy to Sparta; at least there is no obstacle to supposing this.

The gap in the record of Aristophon's own activities between 403/2 and 363/2 is curious. Possibly paucity of surviving information is the explanation, but a remark of Aischines (3.138–39) suggests another possibility. Pleading in court in 330, the orator listed men who had served on embassies to Thebes and been well disposed toward the Thebans. One of the names was Aristophon, "who suffered for a very long time under the odium of boiotizing." The phrase implies that Aristophon was in favor of befriending the Boiotians at a time when that policy was not fashionable in Athens. So it is likely that he incurred odium in consequence of the reversal of alliances. Another man named by Aischines in his list of those well disposed to the Thebans was Leodamas. He has been met before (in chapter 1); he was chosen archon for 382/1 but unseated at his scrutiny. In 376 he had opposed the decree granting honors to Chabrias after the battle of Naxos.¹⁰² Little more is known of his career until he prosecuted Kallistratos and Chabrias for the

loss of Oropos in 366. Apparently he was their most bitter enemy, and that may explain why so little is known about him; the prime of his life coincided with the time when his enemies predominated.

A picture, however incomplete, of the Athenian political scene toward 370 begins to emerge. There were several ambitious men and some of them were linked by ties of friendship. Kallistratos and Chabrias had outdistanced their rivals and had taken initiative in bringing Athens into association with Sparta. Some others, such as Melanopos and Kallias, achieved prominence and preserved independence. Yet others, such as Aristophon and his associates, were willing to follow the new policy as far as making peace with Sparta but were reluctant to break with Thebes. There was also Leodamas, the implacable foe of Kallistratos. Timotheos, potentially the most formidable rival to Chabrias and Kallistratos, had entered Persian service in 372. But he was to return within a few years.

4

Destabilization in the North

Within two years after the battle of Leuktra the Athenians had joined Sparta against Thebes, and in the winter of 370/69 they had followed up their new diplomatic commitment by sending an armed force to the Peloponnese. They continued operations in alliance with the Lakedaimonians until 362, when the indecisive battle of Mantinea led to a treaty of common peace. But about the time of their change of alignment the Athenians also began to contemplate new designs for naval operations in the northern Aegean. The circumstances prompting the new initiatives and the degree of success achieved will be the main focus of attention in this chapter. A digression on developments in the western part of the Persian Empire will be needed to explain changes occurring in the straits between Asia and Europe. During the 360s Demosthenes grew to manhood, and it will be proper to consider what incited him to take an interest in politics.

Athenian decisions about the Northern Aegean

Early in 369 the Lakedaimonians and their traditional allies sent envoys to Athens. The consequent gathering was large, since the members of the Second League were represented through their deputies in the synedrion. The assemblage could accordingly be spoken of as a meeting of all the Greeks. As Xenophon's account makes clear, the issue discussed was not whether an alliance should be made between Sparta and Athens but on what terms they should engage in armed collaboration. They were already bound to one another by the clause of guarantee in the treaty made at Athens in 371. The main, though not the sole, question disputed at the meeting in 369 was that of command of operations. The curious solution was adopted that both on land and at sea command should be exchanged between Spartans and Athenians every five days. It is not known whether this cumbersome device was in fact carried out. Certainly an Athenian force under Chabrias was sent to the Peloponnese in 369. It joined the Lakedaimonians and their allies in the

territory of Corinth and tried to hold a line of defense against the Thebans. But the Thebans and their allies broke through the defense and campaigned inconclusively in the northern Peloponnese.¹

The meeting held at Athens in 369 was probably the occasion when the Athenians gained recognition of their claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese. The matter has aroused controversy and deserves review.² The evidence is some statements made by Demosthenes, Aischines, and Hegesippos in the 340s. Their assertions can be summarized thus:

1. The Greeks and the Persian king recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis ([Demosthenes] 7.29; Demosthenes 19.253. Hegesippos at 7.29 speaks of "the Greeks and the king of the Persians"; Demosthenes at 19.253 speaks of "the king and all the Greeks").
2. The king gave a bribe of forty talents to Timagoras and was deceived by him, so that the king declared Amphipolis his friend and ally; but when the king learned that the Athenians had executed Timagoras, he recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis (Demosthenes 19.137).
3. An alliance (*symmachia*) of the Lakedaimonians and the other Greeks met; Amyntas, king of Macedon, sent a voting representative to the gathering and voted to join the other Greeks in helping the Athenians to recover Amphipolis; and this decision was embodied in a resolution of the meeting (Aischines 2.32).
4. The Persian king and all the Greeks recognized the Athenian claim to the Chersonese (Demosthenes 9.16).

Amyntas of Macedon died in 370/69.³ So the meeting where the Greeks recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis cannot have taken place later than that year. In 367 envoys from many Greek states, including Leon and Timagoras from Athens, went to Persia to hear the king's proposals for terms of peace. The terms suggested were unsatisfactory to the Athenians, and when Leon protested, the king's secretary brought him the response that the Athenians could send another mission to discuss the issues further.⁴ From the remark of Demosthenes noted under the second assertion, it appears that part at least of the outcome of the further Athenian mission was Persian recognition of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. It follows that Persian recognition of that claim was granted on a later occasion than its recognition by a meeting of Greek states.

An old view supposed that the Greek meeting that recognized the Athenian claims was the peace conference held at Sparta shortly before the battle of Leuktra. But the sanction in the terms sworn at that meeting was merely a clause of voluntary guarantee, and Aischines' term "alliance" (in the third assertion) does not suit that meeting. An alternative suggested is the conference of 375/4 (thus Hampl). But it is doubtful whether the terms sworn there included a guarantee. A better solution (proposed by Accame) says that the gathering that recognized the Athenian claims was the meeting held at Athens early in 369, when terms of collaboration between Athens and Sparta

were discussed and decided. This solution fits all the indications. Amyntas died in the course of the year 370/69. The time of year when he died is not known and he may have been alive late enough in the year to send his representative to the meeting in Athens. A further consideration suggests that the meeting of 369 was the one that recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis. Iphikrates began operations with a view to recovering Amphipolis in 368 (or perhaps 367) and continued in command for some three years (see appendix 5). If the Athenians had sought and gained recognition of their claim appreciably earlier, one might expect to find evidence of Athenian armed attempts to enforce the claim promptly after recognition.⁵

Another possibility should also be noted. There was a clause of compulsory guarantee in the oaths sworn at the peace conference that met in Athens late in 371. So Aischines may have considered himself free to call that meeting "an alliance," and it may be that meeting which recognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese. If that is true, it may be conjectured that in 370 and 369 the Athenians sent expeditions to assert their claims in the northern Aegean but these expeditions, presumably ineffectual, have escaped mention in the sparse and scattered records. The two meetings, held at Athens late in 371 and early in 369, were separated by an interval of about year and a half. It is of no great moment to determine which of them endorsed the Athenian claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese. In the same period the Athenians were reversing their alignment between Thebes and Sparta. It is credible that they were thinking at the same time about policies to be pursued in the Aegean.

It is, however, important to ask why in 371–369 the Athenians might wish to reassert their rights in the north. Their interest in the Chersonese went back to the sixth century, when Miltiades had led a settlement there. They lost the Chersonese, along with their other possessions overseas, under the peace terms of 404 and they did not regain it under those of 387/6. Only one city of the Chersonese, Elaious, is recorded on the stele of Aristoteles; it was doubtless brought into the League by Chabrias in 375 or perhaps late in 376. The interest of the Athenians in the Chersonese sprang from their concern for communications with the north coast of the Black Sea. The peninsula was well placed for guarding or disrupting the sea route along which the Pontic grain traveled. Yet by 369 the Athenians had survived for many years without controlling the Chersonese.

Again it is not difficult to recognize general reasons why the Athenians might pay attention to Amphipolis. They had founded the colony there in 437/6 after several unsuccessful attempts at the same site. It was well placed on routes leading into Macedon and along the coast of the northern Aegean. For about a dozen years after 437/6 the Athenians derived from Amphipolis payments of money and a supply of timber suitable for building ships.⁶ But in 424/3 Brasidas induced Amphipolis to rise in revolt and the Athenians never recovered it, although they sent out expeditions intermittently for that purpose. When they revived their claim in 371 or 369, they may well have been concerned primarily to secure in Amphipolis the port that gave them

access to Macedonian sources of timber. But one has still to ask why Athenian concern for Amphipolis, as for the Chersonese, became acute toward 369.

Historians have sometimes supposed that the initiative leading to Athenian naval enterprise in the Aegean in the 360s came wholly from the Athenians. Some have noted that the places acquired between 368 and 362 were not inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles, so there was no breach of the provisions of his decree, although the question could still be raised, whether in the 360s the Athenians departed from the spirit in which they had originally launched the League.⁷ But another possibility needs to be considered. Perhaps the reassertion of the claims of the Athenians to Amphipolis and the Chersonese and their consequent armed operations were a response to changes occurring independently in the north and threatening Athenian interests. Three areas call for scrutiny; they are Thessaly, Macedon, and the northwestern frontier of the Persian Empire, where it approached the straits between Asia and Europe.

In Thessaly the assassination of the *tagos*, Jason, in the spring or early summer of 370 was followed in Pherai by the brief rule of his brothers, Polydoros and Polyphron. The Thessalians were now subjected to the influence of Thebes, and they served on the first Theban expedition to the Peloponnese. After Polyphron had killed Polydoros and ruled for a year, Alexander, the son of Polydoros, killed Polyphron in the summer of 369 and had himself chosen *tagos*.⁸ But weakness and tension in Thessaly gave foreign powers a chance to intervene. The Aleuadai of Larissa invited Alexander II of Macedon, and in response he brought troops to Larissa and thence to Krannon. The Thebans were invited by some other Thessalians and sent a force under Pelopidas. He drove the Macedonian garrison from Larissa and went ahead into Macedon. There he brought Alexander II into alliance and reconciled him with Ptolemaios of Aloros. During his return journey Pelopidas held an inconclusive meeting with Alexander of Pherai.⁹

In 368 Pelopidas and Ismenias went on a diplomatic mission into Thessaly. With troops acquired there they continued their journey into Macedon and tried to operate against Ptolemaios, who had killed Alexander II. During their return they were arrested by Alexander of Pherai. He had gained the alliance of the Athenians, who sent him a force under Autokles. So a Theban expedition sent later in 368 was unable to recover the captives. It took a further expedition, sent from Thebes in 367 under Epameinondas, to rescue them.¹⁰

The detail of these developments in Thessaly could not be foreseen early in 369, when envoys from the Lakedaimonians and their allies came to Athens to discuss terms of collaboration. Nor did Amphipolis, to which the Athenians asserted their claim then or shortly before, lie in the immediate vicinity of Thessaly. But the death of Jason destabilized the situation in Thessaly and the Thebans could be expected to intervene. As the Athenians drew toward Sparta and away from Thebes, they had good reason to resist any advance of Theban power into Thessaly, as they did when they sent

Autokles and Alexander of Pherai “was everything” to them.¹¹ If the Thebans gained secure ascendancy in Thessaly, they would be able to bring Thessalian forces, including cavalry and peltasts, further south, as they had done on their first expedition to the Peloponnese. Furthermore developments in Thessaly were linked to those in Macedon. Ever since the days of Alexander I, the Macedonian kings had cultivated friendship with the Aleuadaei. The Athenians would have easy access to Macedon, if they could recover Amphipolis.

In Macedon conditions became unstable about the same time as in Thessaly. If Amyntas of Macedon sent a representative to the meeting at Athens in 369, he was still alive. He died during 370/69 after a relatively long reign of twenty-four years.¹² Possibly he was old at the time of the meeting and his death could be foreseen. In any case Macedon before the reign of Philip II showed far less potential for exercising international power than Thessaly. Instability was frequent in the kingdom, even though it diminished at times, for example, in the later years of Amyntas. When he died, he left a widow, Eurydike, and three sons, Alexander II, Perdikkas, and Philip II. Eurydike had a lover, Ptolemaios of Aloros. Alexander II succeeded his father and ruled for about a year. In the course of that year Pelopidas came to Macedon and mediated an understanding with Ptolemaios. But Ptolemaios killed Alexander in 368/7 and ruled with Eurydike for three years. While they were in control, they were harassed by a pretender, Pausanias, but Iphikrates, whom the Athenians had sent to operate against Amphipolis, responded to an appeal of Eurydike and drove Pausanias out of the kingdom. After Ptolemaios had ruled for three years, Perdikkas assassinated him in 365/4 and ruled for five.¹³

In short, after the death of Amyntas the kingdom of Macedon suffered troubles for many years. The conflicts revealed the fragility that had long afflicted the monarchy. Whatever the state of health of Amyntas early in 369 or even late in 371, prudence required that the Athenians should take thought for their access to Macedon, not least because it was a good source of ship timber. Moreover, the operations of Iphikrates show that, even if Amphipolis were not reduced, a fleet operating near Amphipolis would be well placed to make Athenian power felt in Macedon. Places further east along the coast of the northern Aegean had joined the Athenian League. They included Abdera, Ainos, Samothrake, and probably Thasos. They could surely provide naval bases for sallies into the Thermaic Gulf.

The question of destabilization in the straits depends on developments further afield and requires an excursus.

The Persian Failure in Egypt and Its Consequences

The Persians reduced Evagoras of Salamis to terms in 380, as seen in chapter 2. The king could now concentrate on preparing an expedition against Egypt. The place chosen for mustering forces was Acre in Phoenicia. The

command was entrusted to Pharnabazos, a man of experience and proven loyalty. For a time Tithraustes was with him at Acre. The preparations were lengthy. They may have begun even before 380. Certainly Akoris of Egypt had time to make counterpreparations. He hired Greek troops and he took Chabrias the Athenian into his service as commander. The sole source (Diodoros) insists that Chabrias entered Egyptian service "without the approval of the people" of Athens. The insistence is unnecessary and should therefore arouse suspicion. Perhaps it echoes an Athenian disclaimer, issued when Pharnabazos complained. For in the winter of 380/79 (or before) Pharnabazos sent envoys to the Athenians to ask them to recall Chabrias and send Iphikrates into his service. The Athenians complied.¹⁴

Akoris died in the summer of 380. His son succeeded him but was overthrown after four months. By November 380 Nektanebis had established himself as pharaoh over all Egypt.¹⁵ He began a dynasty that was to rule until the Persian reconquest (343/2). At Acre changes in the command of the Persian forces delayed the preparations further. Datames, who had won the esteem of Artaxerxes II by capturing a Paphlagonian king (chapter 2), was sent to share in the command with Pharnabazos. Later Artaxerxes removed Pharnabazos and entrusted the whole force to Datames. Later still, when Datames was ready to set off, a royal letter arrived ordering him to operate against Aspis, the dynast of Kataonia. Aspis had flouted the king's orders, made raids on neighboring territory, and impeded the transport of valuables bound for the royal treasury. With a small force Datames sailed to Kilikia, led his men swiftly across the Taurus range, captured Aspis alive, and sent him to the king. When he returned to Acre, a kind friend warned him that some courtiers were jealous of his rapid success; if he suffered any setback in Egypt, they would exploit the bad news against him. It did not require much perspicacity to recognize the truth of the warning. Leaving a deputy in command at Acre, Datames retired to his satrapy of Kappadokia. Concerned for his safety, he occupied Paphlagonia and began to entertain thoughts of independence.¹⁶

Pharnabazos resumed command at Acre. In 375/4 Artaxerxes encouraged the Greeks of Europe to make peace because he wished to recruit troops for the expedition against Egypt. When Pharnabazos set off in 373 (or perhaps in 374), he had with him allegedly 20,000 Greeks under Iphikrates, 200,000 other troops, 300 triremes, and 200 triakonteres.¹⁷ He and Iphikrates with 3,000 men sailed out to sea to escape detection and landed on a beach at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. They advanced on a town, which the Egyptians had built to hold that mouth, and they captured it. But a division of opinion arose between the two commanders. Memphis at the head of the Delta was the central position for controlling both the Delta and Upper Egypt. Iphikrates learned from captives that there was no garrison at Memphis, and he advised sailing to seize it promptly, but Pharnabazos insisted on waiting until their whole force could join them. Thereupon Iphikrates asked to be given the Greek forces alone, so that he could advance on Memphis. But Pharnabazos refused him permission out of suspicion that he

might make himself master of Egypt. During the delay the Egyptians put a garrison into Memphis and brought the bulk of their forces to the Mendesian mouth. They inflicted losses on the invaders in a series of engagements. Meanwhile the Nile was rising. So Pharnabazos and his force withdrew from Egypt. Iphikrates feared to be blamed for the failure. He set sail by night in a single boat for Athens. Pharnabazos sent an embassy to Athens to complain of Iphikrates. The Athenians made a courteous reply, asserting that they would punish Iphikrates if they found that he had done wrong, and soon afterward they elected him to command their fleet for an expedition to Kerkyra (chapter 3).

Within a few years after 373 unrest developed among Persian officers in Asia Minor. It grew in scale until it culminated late in the 360s in the movement commonly called the Great Revolt of the Satraps. News of the Persian failure in Egypt may have provoked thoughts of independent action. Moreover, at times it is reasonable to suspect that the pharaoh incited disaffection in Asia Minor and contributed financial or possibly armed support. The mysterious Tachos, who succeeded Glos in command of the fleet that had fought Evagoras, should not be forgotten (end of chapter 2). In 365 another Tachos, the son of Nektanebis and his partner in rule, took part in the settlement reached at Assos between Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, and Ariobarzanes of Hellespontine Phrygia.¹⁸

Probably the first revolt was that of Datames.¹⁹ After his return from Acre to Kappadokia he began to act independently. He occupied Paphlagonia. He set about besieging Sinope but desisted on orders from the king. It is not known what overt act on his part began his revolt. His eldest son, Sysinas, betrayed the plan of Datames to the king, and this may have made Datames hasten his rising. Autophradates of Lydia was sent against him and invaded Kappadokia from the south through the Kilikian passes. In the course of the fighting Mithrobarzanes, the father-in-law of Datames and commander of his cavalry, planned to desert him and timed his treachery to coincide with a confrontation between Datames and the army sent against him. But Datames made a surprise attack on Mithrobarzanes and won a spectacular and famous victory over him and the royalist forces. Finally Autophradates negotiated peace with Datames on somewhat inconclusive terms; Datames undertook to send envoys to Artaxerxes with a view to negotiating definitive peace. Thereupon Autophradates marched against Phrygia. No final treaty of peace with Datames followed, since Artaxerxes proved to be stubborn.²⁰

It is said that Datames, while planning his revolt, concluded a secret agreement with Ariobarzanes.²¹ Reports of secret agreements and of unrealized intentions are always open to doubt. But since Autophradates marched against Phrygia on reaching his armistice with Datames, it is a good conjecture that he desisted prematurely from operations against Datames because Ariobarzanes was beginning to conduct himself in an independent and rebellious manner. The steps Ariobarzanes took toward revolt can be traced with some chronological precision.

In 366 the Athenians sent Timotheos eastward with a fleet and instructed

him to help Ariobarzanes but not to break the treaty with the king.²² Evidently by that time it was known in Athens that Ariobarzanes had adopted an ambiguous policy toward the king, perhaps even that he was in open revolt. In 368 Ariobarzanes had sent Philiskos of Abydos to European Greece with largesse to distribute. Philiskos invited the Greeks to a conference at Delphi with a view to negotiating peace. The Thebans and their allies came, as did the Lakedaimonians, but no agreement was reached, since the Thebans would not abandon Messene to the Lakedaimonians. Philiskos raised a large force of mercenaries with a view to fighting for the Lakedaimonians.²³ Evidently Ariobarzanes was entertaining thoughts of independence as early as 368 and was seeking sympathy and perhaps recruits for his cause. Indeed when he sent Philiskos to Delphi to try to negotiate a cessation of hostilities in Greece, he was doing something that had previously only been done on orders of the king.

Philiskos served Ariobarzanes for many years. In 376 Philiskos and his men at Abydos granted a wreath to Chabrias; it was duly recorded on the monument that the Athenians set up to Chabrias in the agora.²⁴ At an unknown date the Athenians granted citizenship to Ariobarzanes and on his account to Philiskos. The latter at an equally unknown date maintained a force of mercenaries in Perinthos and controlled parts of the coasts of the Hellespont and the Propontis.²⁵ The encroachment of Ariobarzanes through Philiskos on Perinthos and perhaps other places along the European shore of the Propontis probably took place a year or two before the mission of Philiskos to Delphi; Ariobarzanes extended his power on the coasts of the straits before attempting diplomatic display in central Greece.

From a spectacular incident of 365 it appears that Ariobarzanes had seized Sestos. By that year he was acknowledged to be in revolt. Autophrades of Lydia advanced against him on land and besieged him in Assos. Kotys, king of the Odrysians in Thrace, besieged Sestos, and Xenophon, reporting the incident, explains that Sestos was still held by Ariobarzanes. Maussolos of Karia brought a force of a hundred warships to press the siege both at Assos and at Sestos. But Ariobarzanes sought help from Athens and from Sparta. Both cities were willing to assist him against the royalist satraps, because both were displeased at the terms of peace that the king had proposed at Susa in 367 (see next section). So Timotheos led his fleet north from Samos toward the straits and Agesilaos was sent from Sparta on a diplomatic mission. An agreement was reached. Autophrades withdrew from Assos and Kotys withdrew from Sestos. As a reward for his services Timotheos received Sestos and Krithote from Ariobarzanes. Agesilaos, the broker, received large sums for his city from both sides; Tachos, whom the record first mentions at this closing stage, and Maussolos sent Agesilaos home with a magnificent escort.²⁶

The incident is important for more than one reason and will require notice shortly. Autophrades and Maussolos were remarkably willing to put an end to hostilities. It has been suggested that they were already inclining toward the disaffection that culminated in the Great Revolt and they saw

in the presence of Agesilaos an opportunity to secure a source of Greek troops. The participation of Tachos, joint ruler of Egypt with his father, prompts speculations, which have already been voiced. For the present the condition of Sestos calls for remark. It had been held by Ariobarzanes until Kotys tried to wrest it from him by siege. That is, Ariobarzanes had installed officers and troops some time previously, presumably about when Philiskos put troops into Perinthos.

Ariobarzanes had good reason to set about strengthening his position by independent action on the shores of the straits. Artabazos, the son of Pharnabazos, had been growing up at court and would claim his father's satrapy. It is not clear when he came to Asia Minor. Toward 362 Autophradates rose in revolt and put Artabazos under arrest; that may have been his first overt act of disaffection.²⁷ Perhaps when Autophradates advanced on Assos in 365, he already had Artabazos with him; the ostensible—and unrealized—purpose of the expedition may have been to install Artabazos as satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. So one can reconstruct the outlook and behavior of Ariobarzanes about 370. Probably he had already had news of the revolt of Datames and could see that the rebel was not likely to be humiliated. He could expect that within a few years his nephew Artabazos would try to supersede him in Hellespontine Phrygia, whatever he himself did. So it was prudent to try to strengthen his position by occupying towns on the European shore of the straits. He had relatively little to fear from the king, since the failure of 373 in Egypt had demonstrated the weakness of the central power; there was even the possibility that Egyptian warships and Egyptian subsidies might reach the Aegean.

The Athenians may have known little or nothing about the fears and calculations of Ariobarzanes. His overt acts at Sestos and Perinthos were another thing. As long as conditions in the neighborhood of the straits were stable, the Athenians could expect to safeguard the grain route through their possession of Lemnos and Imbros and by the help of allies, who had joined their League. These included several who were near the approach to the Hellespont from the Aegean (Tenedos, Mytilene, Methymna, Abdera, Maroneia, Ainos); they also included Byzantion, Perinthos, and Selymbria on the European shore of the Propontis. But when Ariobarzanes became restive and began to encroach on the European coast of the narrow waters, the Athenians had cause for alarm. To gain approval of their claim to the Chersonese early in 369 or late in 371 was the diplomatic aspect of their response. At most they could hope to acquire cities in the Chersonese in addition to Elaious, which had joined the League. At least they could undertake naval operations in and near the straits without fearing impediments from other Greeks.

Athens as the Ally of Sparta

The change of foreign policy, carried out by the Athenians between 371 and 369, bore on two areas, the European heartland of Greece and the north

coast of the Aegean. In the former area they altered their alignment between Sparta and Thebes. The classic configuration of Greek politics, in which Athens and Sparta had been rivals for first place, had ceased to exist. The outcome of the Corinthian War had taught the Athenians to set limits to their aspirations. In the age of their Second League they were guided by a vision of equilibrium between three or four powers, themselves, Sparta, Thebes, and perhaps Argos.²⁸ For several years after the battle of Leuktra, the threat to equilibrium was posed by the Thebans. With a view to naval operations in the northern Aegean, the Athenians gained panhellenic recognition of their claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese. They undertook the operations in response to novel insecurity in Thessaly, Macedon, and the Hellespontine district. Insecurity could imperil the grain route and attract Theban intervention in Thessaly and even perhaps in the straits.

Kallistratos took the lead in launching the policy of assisting Sparta against Thebes. Iphikrates had allied with Kallistratos and Chabrias in 373. But late in 370, when Iphikrates led his force to Corinth and Arkadia, his generalship incurred severe criticism. When the Thebans were ready to retire from the Peloponnese, Iphikrates set about holding the Oneion in the territory of Corinth against them. Thus he left the best route, that through Kenchreai, open to the enemy, and the Thebans were able to withdraw without having to face any impediment.²⁹ Such failure by Iphikrates is surprising. Whatever the reason for it, Chabrias and Kallistratos may have ceased to value him. A change in his alignment will call for note shortly. In 369, when the Thebans led their second expedition into the Peloponnese, the commander of the Athenian forces sent to resist him was Chabrias, and he inflicted a defeat on the Thebans outside the walls of Corinth.³⁰

Timotheos had withdrawn into Persian service in 372, after suffering political defeat by Kallistratos and Iphikrates. He returned to Athens in time to serve as trierarch in the course of 370/69.³¹ Some time later at a meeting of the assembly, Timotheos threatened with an oath to prosecute Iphikrates on a charge of being an alien. Iphikrates responded afterward by seeking successfully the hand of the daughter of Timotheos for his own eldest son, Menestheus.³² The incident illustrates the power of Timotheos, the son of the victor of Knidos. Iphikrates, a new man to politics, could change his alignment but he needed a powerful friend. The date of his new alliance with Timotheos calls for note. It is attested in a speech of 362 or earlier, and so it used to be assigned to 362. But Iphikrates was not in Athens in 362. He sailed to the north in 368 or 367. In 365, when he ceased to be a general of the Athenians, he entered the employ of Kotys, king of the Odrysians, and stayed in his service until 360/59. Therefore it is likely that Iphikrates gained his new alliance with Timotheos about 369, some time at least between the return of Timotheos to Athens and his own departure for the north.³³ Perhaps Kallistratos and Chabrias discarded Iphikrates because of his poor performance in Corinthian territory in the winter of 370/69, and therefore he was responsive to the pressure Timotheos brought to bear on him soon afterward. As far as can be discerned, Iphikrates remained loyal to Timotheos until the fortunes of both men were ruined in the Social War.

In 369 Chabrias led an Athenian force to assist the allies against the Thebans in the Peloponnese, but thereafter the Athenians directed some of their efforts to the north and the forces they committed to the Peloponnese achieved little. In 368 Dionysios of Syracuse sent a force to assist the allies. The Athenians proposed employing it in Thessaly against the Thebans, but the allies supported the Lakedaimonian request for sending it to Lakonia, and that was done.³⁴ In the same year the Athenians sent a force of their own under Autokles to assist Alexander of Pherai. Autokles helped Alexander to inflict a setback on the Thebans.³⁵ In 366, when Epameinondas prepared to lead a third Theban expedition into the Peloponnese and operate in Achaia, the route through the territory of Corinth was obstructed by forces under a Spartan commander and under an Athenian general, Timomachos, who was related by marriage to Kallistratos. But on instructions from Epameinondas, an Argive commander outwitted Timomachos and the Spartan and captured the hill commanding the route through Kenchreai. The Thebans were able to pass along the route in safety.³⁶

Again in 366 an Athenian force under Chares operated in the northern Peloponnese and was probably based on Corinth. This is the earliest activity securely attested for Chares, who was to play a major part in the events of the next thirty years. His alliance with Aristophon was notorious enough to draw the attention of comic poets; it can be discerned in events of 362 and may go back to the beginning of his career.³⁷ He may have commanded a garrison in Kerkyra in the early 360s.³⁸ In 366 Chares found that the people of Phleious, who were loyal to Sparta, were harassed by Argives from the south and by Sikyonians, who had fortified Thyamia on the northern border of Phleious. Chares helped the Phleisians to convoy supplies from Corinth, to evacuate their noncombatants to Pellene, and promptly afterward to recover Thyamia.³⁹ Such activities, though not unsatisfactory to the Athenians, could have little effect on the outcome of the general war.

By 366 the Thebans too were ceasing to make headway in the Peloponnese. On their first expedition (370/69) they had freed Messenia from the Spartans and made it an independent state.⁴⁰ The effect on the Spartans was permanent; deprived of a major source of wealth, they could no longer influence events outside the Peloponnese and they had to struggle for a long time to preserve their security even within the peninsula. On their second expedition into the Peloponnese (369) the Thebans marched and plundered much as they wished.⁴¹ But the setbacks suffered by the Spartans encouraged the Arkadians, who had first invited the Thebans into the Peloponnese, to act independently of their protectors. Starting late in 369 the Arkadians gained some local successes in collaboration with the Argives. "Consequently the Thebans ceased to be well disposed toward the Arkadians and became resentful toward them."⁴² The Arkadians and the Argives continued operations against the Spartans in 368, until the latter defeated them in the struggle called "the tearless battle."⁴³

The change in the political configuration of the Peloponnese may explain why the Thebans had recourse to diplomacy in 367. In the previous year

Philiskos of Abydos, sent by Ariobarzanes, had summoned a conference to Delphi in hope of bringing about peace, but no agreement had been reached since the Thebans resisted the Spartan demand for Messenia, and Philiskos had had to content himself with raising mercenaries to assist the Lakedaimonians. This occurrence may have suggested to the Thebans the possibility of seeking peace from a Persian source. Moreover in 367 they learned that a Spartan envoy had already reached the king. So they sent Pelopidas to Artaxerxes, and other belligerents sent representatives, including two Athenians, Leon and Timagoras. Pelopidas demonstrated to the king that Spartan power had decreased since the battle of Leuktra and convinced him that the Greek city able to maintain order to the advantage of the Persians was no longer Sparta but Thebes. The preliminary terms proposed by the king said that Messenia should be free from Lakedaimon and the Athenians should recall their warships from the high seas.

As on previous occasions when common peace was mooted, the king did not send Persian forces to order Greek affairs but left the task to his Hellenic proxy. The Thebans made the attempt. They invited representatives of the Greek cities to Thebes. A Persian messenger displayed a document with the royal seal to the assemblage and read its contents aloud. But the deputies refused the Theban demand that they swear to the terms; they said that they had been authorized to listen, not to take an oath. Lykomedes of Mantinea, the moving spirit of Arkadian independence, went so far as to say that the conference ought not to be held in Thebes but where the fighting was. After the Arkadian representatives had left the conference, the Thebans, now desperate to press their diplomatic advantage to a conclusion, sent envoys to the cities to demand the oaths, for they expected that the cities would not have the courage to resist piecemeal. But at Corinth, the first city visited, the citizens retorted that they had no need of oaths involving the king, and other cities made a similar response.⁴⁴

This diplomatic activity was not wholly fruitless for the Thebans. They retained the esteem of Persian kings for many years. In 351/0, for example, Artaxerxes III sent them three hundred talents for the Sacred War.⁴⁵ Within a year or so of the unsuccessful conference, several traditional allies of Sparta, including Corinth, Phleious, and probably Epidauros, made separate treaties of peace with Thebes.⁴⁶ These treaties amounted to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. Yet the great expectations Pelopidas had brought back from Susa had been disappointed. So it is not surprising that in 366 the Thebans had recourse to another armed expedition—their third—into the Peloponnese. Epameinondas led them and their allies into Achaia and brought the Achaians into alliance. But after his departure there was further Theban interference in Achaia in response to Arkadian representations. Some Achaians were exiled, but they returned and brought their cities into enthusiastic alliance with Sparta.⁴⁷

Thus in the course of 366 it became clear that operations in the Peloponnese offered little prospect of advantage to the Athenians or to their Theban enemies. In this situation of frustration the Thebans won a success on

the northern border of Attica and disturbed thereby both the balance of alliances in Greece and the balance of political groupings in Athens. Oropos had been in dispute intermittently between the Athenians and the Thebans. It had easy communications with Euboeia across the Euripos. Late in the winter of 412/11 it had been betrayed to the Boiotians; the traitors in Oropos had help from some men of Eretria, who were also disaffected toward the Athenians.⁴⁸ It was restored to the Athenians some time later, perhaps under the peace of 387/6.⁴⁹ The Athenians might have expected trouble any time after 370, for the Thebans were accompanied on their first expedition into the Peloponnese by "Euboians from all the cities."⁵⁰ In 366 Themison, the tyrant of Eretria, seized Oropos. He professed to support some refugees from the town. Taken by surprise, the Athenians recalled Chares from Thyamia and marched to Oropos with forces superior to those of Themison. But a Theban force also approached Oropos. The Athenians were persuaded to entrust Oropos to the Thebans pending arbitration. In fact the Thebans kept Oropos. Evidently Themison had acted with the knowledge of the Thebans, perhaps even at their instigation.⁵¹

The loss of Oropos did not merely embitter Athenian sentiment toward the Thebans, with whom they were already at war. They also became disappointed in their Peloponnesian allies, for these had rendered them no assistance in the affair. The estrangement of the Athenians from their allies in the Peloponnese became manifest in two diplomatic developments of the ensuing months. First Lykomedes of Mantinea, seeing his opportunity, came to Athens and offered to make an alliance for mutual defense. The Athenians hesitated at first, but they calculated that it was to the advantage of their Lakedaimonian allies, as well as of themselves, that the Arkadians should have no need of Theban protection. So they contracted the alliance offered by the Arkadians. In consequence they were allies of both sides in the warfare that was in progress in the Peloponnese. Since their obligations to both sides were defensive, their diplomatic position was technically tenable. But their change of alignment foreboded a decrease in commitment of Athenian forces to the Peloponnesian theater.

The second development occurred in Corinth. There the citizens learned of a suggestion made in the Athenian assembly "that the generals be instructed to make sure that Corinth should be secure for the community of the Athenians." So the Corinthians replaced Athenian garrisons in their forts with troops of their own. When Chares approached the port of Kenchreai and said that he had come to aid the Corinthians because he had heard of a plot against their city, they thanked him but refused him entry to their harbor. His fleet and the Athenian hoplites who had previously garrisoned the forts were not subjected to any injustice but were sent home.⁵² Thus, coolness arose between Corinth and Athens, and the Corinthians were all the more ready to make their separate treaty of peace with Thebes soon after.

The loss of Oropos led to recriminations in Athens. Kallistratos and Cha-

brias were prosecuted, and the trials were long remembered. Their share in the incident can only be conjectured. Perhaps Chabrias led the Athenian expedition to Oropos. Perhaps Kallistratos proposed the decree dispatching this expedition, or conducted the negotiations with Themison and the Thebans. But no explanation can be built on such guesses. The names of several people involved in the trials are known but are scarcely informative. Philostratos of Kolonos is said to have been the most vehement of the prosecutors of Chabrias⁵³ but he is otherwise unknown. Lykoleon, who is equally unknown, pleaded in defense of Chabrias and reminded the Athenians of the statue they had set up in his honor.⁵⁴ A story preserved in a late source says that Plato pleaded in defense of Chabrias and Hegesippos tried to dissuade him from doing so; something of this may be true.⁵⁵ Another story, first attested in a late source but not wholly incredible, says that the youthful Demosthenes heard the speech delivered by Kallistratos and was so impressed that he decided to study the art of public speaking.⁵⁶

Another name may be more useful toward understanding the trials. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1.1364a19–23) says that Leodamas prosecuted Kallistratos and Chabrias. He summarizes some arguments of the prosecutor. At the trial of Kallistratos Leodamas said that the instigator is more to blame than the man who carries out the deed, but at the trial of Chabrias he said that the executor is more to blame than the instigator. Leodamas is included by Aischines in a list of men who served on embassies to Thebes and befriended the Theban cause.⁵⁷ Kallistratos had associated himself with the policy of saving Lakadaimon from the Thebans. Should one then suppose that the prosecution of Kallistratos and Chabrias by Leodamas in 366 was a battle between a lakonizing party and a boiotizing party? Hardly. It has not been established that a boiotizing party existed, but even if one did, it would scarcely succeed in making itself felt at the moment when the Athenians thought that the Thebans had taken Oropos from them by a trick. The arguments Aristotle reports as employed by Leodamas do not reflect principled opposition to a policy, although the prosecution may have had more to say. Information about the career of Leodamas leads further. He had opposed the decree that granted honors to Chabrias after the battle of Naxos. Surely his activity in 376 and 366 indicates not programmatic divergence from Chabrias and Kallistratos, but personal enmity. Again nothing is known of Leodamas after 366 until 355/4, when he defended the law of Leptines.⁵⁸ If the trials after the loss of Oropos had marked a setback to one policy and advancement for another, surely one might expect the next years to reveal some further success achieved by Leodamas or by others agreeing with him in his supposed policy.

The loss of Oropos caused a shock to the Athenians but not necessarily any redistribution of influence among their leaders. In the study of litigation, as of warfare, it can be important to ask, Who won? At the trials held in 366 Kallistratos and Chabrias were acquitted. It has sometimes been supposed that their stature within Athens was diminished, but there is nothing to show

this, although admittedly the record of Athenian internal affairs for the next four years is scant. The power of Kallistratos was to be challenged later, when Timotheos returned from the north.

Athenian Operations in the Northern Aegean

Between 369 and 357 Athenian operations achieved considerable successes in the northern Aegean theater. Iphikrates came out to the command in 368 or 367. The little that is known of his activities concerns his dealings with Macedon. After the death of Alexander II his mother Eurydike ruled, but the pretender Pausanias invaded Macedon, capturing Anthemous, Therma, and Strepsa. Eurydike appealed to Iphikrates, who was operating near Amphipolis. Iphikrates responded to her appeal and drove out Pausanias, who is not heard of again until 359.⁵⁹

In 366 the Athenians, disappointed by the negotiations of the previous year at Susa, sent Timotheos to sea with instructions to help Ariobarzanes but not to break the treaty with the king. Timotheos fulfilled this ambiguous mission by besieging and capturing Samos from a royal garrison;⁶⁰ the installation of that garrison had contravened the king's peace. In 365 Timotheos sailed north to the Hellespont and took part in the complex negotiation that saved Ariobarzanes from his enemies. Ariobarzanes was besieged in Assos by Autophradates, who may have professed the purpose of replacing him with Artabazos as satrap of Daskylion. At the same time Kotys tried to capture Sestos from the forces of Ariobarzanes by siege, and Maussolos brought a fleet of a hundred ships to blockade both Assos and Sestos. But the conflicting powers were willing to put an end to their differences, and an accommodation was reached through the good offices of Agesilaos. The fleet of Timotheos was the most formidable armed force that came to the support of Ariobarzanes in this incident. Its commander received for the Athenians Sestos and Krithote in the Chersonese as his reward.⁶¹

Thus Timotheos reached the north. About the time of his arrival Iphikrates ceased to be general of the Athenians, probably at the end of the Attic year 366/5, and entered the service of Kotys. It is important to recognize that Kotys was not at the time an enemy of the Athenians and he did not make himself their enemy until 360. In 365 he had tried to wrest Sestos from Ariobarzanes, not from the Athenians who did not hold it. Indeed, the Athenians granted Kotys their citizenship and a gold crown. From 365 until 360 Iphikrates remained in the service of Kotys, but he undertook nothing against the Athenians and the Athenians never called him to account for anything he had done in the service of the Thracian king. When in 360 Kotys attacked places held by the Athenians, Iphikrates deserted him and withdrew to his private fortresses at Antissa and Drys. Until that time Iphikrates was in effect both an officer in the service of Kotys and an Athenian resident at the Thracian court. His private alliance with Timotheos, secured by the marriage of their children, was also still in force.⁶²

Kotys gained benefits from his good understanding with the Athenians. In the fall of 362 Miltokythes, who was in his service probably as treasurer, rose in revolt and sent envoys to the Athenians. He asked them for help and offered them the Chersonese. But according to Demosthenes, the Athenians passed "a decree of such a kind that Miltokythes withdrew in terror, convinced that [the Athenians] did not care for him, and Kotys became master of Hieron Oros and of the treasures."⁶³ Demosthenes may exaggerate, but in the 360s the voice of the Athenians became influential in the Thracian district. The effect is illustrated by events of 360/59. Then at last Kotys broke with the Athenians, captured Sestos, and attacked other positions they held. Within a few months he was dead. The two men of Ainos, Python and Herakleides, who had killed him, received citizenship and gold crowns as their reward from the Athenians. They had studied in Plato's Academy.⁶⁴ One may wonder whether they had been in touch with Athenian naval commanders some time before they assassinated Kotys. It is not possible to ascertain how much success Kotys had had in consolidating the power of the Odrysian monarchy. At least his goodwill may have been advantageous to Athenian operations in the straits.

Further west Timotheos found an obstacle too formidable for him to overcome. Toward 364 the Chalkidian League was restored under Olynthos. Its extent in its restored condition is not known, and it is not known whether Amphipolis became a member of the League or merely allied with it.⁶⁵ In either case the link between Amphipolis and the Chalkidians impeded Athenian designs. Timotheos had help against the Chalkidians from Macedon, where Perdikkas had assassinated Ptolemaios and become king in 365.⁶⁶ But he could achieve little. In the next years he had the prudence to entrust operations against Amphipolis to colleagues whose reputation could suffer instead of his. In 364/3 he sent Alkimachos against Amphipolis. Alkimachos surrendered to some Thracians. In 363/2 Kallisthenes held the command and made a truce with Perdikkas. The Athenians put him on trial, condemned him to death, and executed him.⁶⁷

In the straits Timotheos had spectacular opportunities. Sailing into the Propontis, he received an appeal from the people of Kyzikos, which was under siege, and he came to their aid.⁶⁸ He even received an appeal from a party at Heraklea on the south shore of the Black Sea, since civil strife had broken out there, but he declined to intervene.⁶⁹ Yet the achievements his admirers delighted most to extol were made by Timotheos on the north-western coasts of the Aegean. He secured Methone, Pydna, Poteidaia, Torone, and other places; some said that he had won more than twenty cities.⁷⁰ In 361 the Athenians sent a cleruchy to Poteidaia.⁷¹ The list of gains made by Timotheos was impressive, but the achievement was ephemeral. Between 357 and 354 Philip II captured Amphipolis, Pydna, Poteidaia, and Methone.

Late in the 360s relations among the western satraps of the Persian Empire became clarified. Disaffection had grown among them for several years. Note has already been taken of the revolts of Datames and Ariobar-

zanes. Indeed “disaffection” is a somewhat misleading term. The Persian failure in Egypt in 373 had undermined respect for the central power among the satraps of the northwest. So they became more and more willing to have recourse to arms in their mutual rivalries. When conflict broke out between any two of them, to classify one combatant as “rebel” and the other as “loyal” or “royalist” might be a question of definition. The “revolt” of Ariobarzanes was his attempt to hold the satrapy of Daskylion against Artabazos, the son of its former satrap, Pharnabazos. In 365 Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, besieged Ariobarzanes in Assos but was content with an inconclusive settlement mediated by Agesilaos. Ariobarzanes continued to hold the satrapy of Daskylion. Evidently each of the participants in that many-sided negotiation was looking ahead to securing his own safety and interests; some at least of them wished to have a supply of Greek troops.

The tensions culminated in a struggle which has come to be called The Great Revolt of the Satraps. It may have begun in 362.⁷² The extent and course of the conflict are not clear. The leaders were Ariobarzanes, Mausolos, Autophradates, and Orontes, whom the others chose as commander in chief. There was financial and naval support from Egypt. In the neighborhood of the Hellespont Autophradates arrested Artabazos. But the latter had able men to work for him. Other Persian grandees had taken talented Greeks into their service; Artabazos had married the sister of Memnon and Mentor, two capable men from Rhodes. They hired the services of a captain of mercenaries, Charidemus of Oreos. What else they accomplished is not known. As the revolt came to an end, Autophradates released Artabazos.⁷³ Mausolos continued as ruler of Karia and Autophradates may have retained his satrapy of Lydia. The outcome for Orontes is not known. Ariobarzanes was betrayed by his own son to the king and crucified.⁷⁴ The condition of the western satrapies became stable, and by 360 or even a year earlier Artabazos was firmly in control of Hellespontine Phrygia. He remained there for some years. His presence brought a measure of security to the neighborhood of the straits, a condition that must surely have been welcome to the Athenians.

In the Aegean, however, cause of alarm arose for the Athenians while Timotheos was in the north. In 364 Epameinondas led a Boiotian fleet, reported to number a hundred triremes, to sea. Time and money had been required to build, equip, and man the force. It is an attractive conjecture that the plan had first been mooted in the negotiations at Susa in 367 and that the Persian king supplied the funds. Probably even before the fleet set sail the Thebans opened diplomatic relations with Byzantion, Chios, and Rhodes to ensure it a welcome. As Epameinondas sailed north of Euboea, an Athenian fleet under Laches withdrew rather than confront him. Epameinondas sailed on to Byzantion. There the citizens received him cordially. One of the parties engaged in conflict at Heraklea appealed to Epameinondas for help, but he declined to intervene. He sailed to Chios and then to Rhodes. In each place the islanders welcomed him but refused to pledge themselves to action. So Epameinondas returned home and the Persian sub-

sidies for a Boiotian fleet ceased. The grand design for a maritime coalition had failed. The prospective allies would not court the risk of Athenian reprisals in return for mere assurances from the Thebans.⁷⁵

Yet the naval expedition of Epameinondas may not have been wholly ineffectual. It showed at least that the Athenians were not in indisputable control of the seas, and this new knowledge may have contributed to troubles that arose for them within the next two years in the western Aegean and in the straits. The Athenians were vulnerable in the latter region because of their concern for Pontic grain. As noted in chapter 2, the merchant ships bringing grain from the land north of the Black Sea gathered each year as a single large fleet for safety to sail through the straits; perhaps they were accompanied by some triremes supplied by locally interested powers. The goodwill of Byzantium was crucial for their voyage. In 364 the Byzantines welcomed Epameinondas. They may have seceded from the Athenian League at this point; certainly nothing in their subsequent conduct indicates that they were still members. Late in the summer of 362 the Byzantines, with help from the people of Chalkedon and Kyzikos, held up the grain fleet. The Athenian response was to send warships under Autokles. The Byzantines and the Chalkedonians impeded the grain fleet again late in the summer of 361.⁷⁶

The Athenians met the new danger in the straits by sending a fleet there each year toward the fall or making sure that one was already there on time. Timotheos himself may well have been in the straits in 364 in time to guard the grain fleet. For the next years the names of the commanders who were in the straits late in the summer and something about their activities are known: Ergophilos in 363, Autokles in 362, Timomachos in 361, Theotimos in 360, Kephisodotos probably in 359, Chabrias in 358, Chares in 357 (see appendix 5). Some of these officers were prosecuted after their return to Athens for their alleged mistakes and suffered sentences of varying severity. But presumably they succeeded in the task of protecting the grain fleet; for otherwise greater consequences would be attested. Moreover, by 358 the Athenians had grounds for optimism. They sent Chabrias out with only one trireme; evidently they thought that a single ship would suffice. In the next year Chares negotiated a treaty with Kersebleptes, who now ruled eastern Thrace, and a few years later Demosthenes called this treaty "best and most just."⁷⁷ Although Demosthenes may distort much in his account of Athenian dealings with Thracian kings, there is no reason to doubt that this treaty was satisfactory.

In the western Aegean trouble is attested in the island of Keos, which lay a little beyond the southeastern extremity of Attica. The four cities of Keos had joined the Athenian League and were recorded on the stele of Aristoteles. But the cities rose in revolt. Chabrias was sent there and he brought about a settlement, to which the allied synedrion agreed along with the Athenians. Shortly afterward one of the cities, Ioulis, rebelled again. It was probably on this occasion that Aristophon went to Keos in the unusual capacity of strategos. He was declared a proxenos of Karthaia. He fell under suspicion of avarice and on his return to Athens he was prosecuted but he escaped

condemnation by two votes. He proposed the definitive settlement with Ioulis, a settlement that was made in 363/2 and probably late in the year. So the first revolt is likely to have occurred in 364 or 363 and may have been prompted by the Aegean voyage of Epameinondas.⁷⁸

Thessaly abutted on to the western Aegean. The Athenians had intervened here effectively in 368 by sending a force under Autokles to help Alexander of Pherai, but their influence in Thessaly declined sharply a few years later. In 364 the Thebans sent forces to assist the Thessalian opposition to Alexander. They defeated him in two battles, although Pelopidas was killed in the first. Alexander had to accept terms. He withdrew his garrisons from Magnesia and Phthiotic Achaia. He gave up all claim to the *tageia* and his authority was restricted to Pherai. He made an alliance with the Boiotians on subordinate terms. So two years later, when the Thebans sent their fourth and last expedition to the Peloponnese, Alexander supplied a contingent.⁷⁹

The Theban expedition of 364 brought Alexander into the Boiotian camp. He retained some freedom of action and exercised it against the Athenians. He undertook naval ventures of privateering type. During 362 he seized Tenos and perhaps in the same season he attacked some of the Kyklades. The disturbances in Keos may have given him his opportunity. He even made a brief raid on the Peiraeus, probably in the same year while his occupation of Tenos gave him a base. In 361 he operated further north, making a landing in Peparethos. Both Tenos and Peparethos were members of the Athenian League. When Alexander landed in Peparethos, the Athenians sent a force under Leosthenes to protect its inhabitants. But Alexander made a surprise attack on the Athenian force in the island and defeated it, taking five of its ships and six hundred captives. Leosthenes retreated to Athens, where he was condemned to death and his property confiscated. The command was transferred to Chares but it is not known what operations he undertook. Aristophon prosecuted some of the trierarchs who had served under Leosthenes. Aristophon and his friend Chares were among the ambitious men who were rising now. During 361/0 the Athenians made an alliance with the Thessalian League against Alexander, but they are not known to have sent any armed forces.⁸⁰

By 363 the Thebans had had a great deal of success in driving Athenian influence from central Greece and Thessaly. So it is not surprising to find the Athenians grasping at an opportunity to make themselves felt in the affairs of Delphi and of the Amphiktyonic League, which administered the sanctuary there. An inscription preserves an Athenian decree passed on the thirtieth day of the second prytany of 363/2. On the proposal of a Thessalian representative, the Amphiktyonic League had voted the penalties of exile and confiscation against a man of Delphi, Astykrates, and his companions. So Astykrates and his associates had fled to Athens. The decree declared the Amphiktyonic vote invalid as being contrary to the laws of the Amphiktyones and of the Delphians. It granted citizenship and *ateleia*, freedom from fiscal obligations, to Astykrates. It granted his ten companions *isoteleia*, equal status with citizens in relation to fiscal burdens.⁸¹ Nothing

more is known of this incident or of the participants. Evidently the Athenians sought to foster a group of Delphians who might befriend them. A more fruitful opportunity was to arise at Delphi eight years later.

Athenian Power toward 360

After the loss of Oropos, the Athenians became somewhat reluctant to exert themselves in the Peloponnese. They had more important things to do in the north. But they remained bound to their Peloponnesian allies, and they intervened afresh when a crisis developed in 362. Toward 363 a split had come about in the Arkadian League. Some of its cities adhered to Tegea and the Thebans against the other Arkadians, who were led by Mantinea. The conflict came to a head in 362, when the one side sought Boiotian help, and the Athenians sent Kallistratos on an embassy to Arkadia in preparation for an armed clash. Epameinondas led the Boiotians on their fourth expedition into the Peloponnese and brought with him forces from Euboea and Thessaly. He was joined in the Peloponnese by the Argives and the Messenians as well as his Arkadian allies. On the other side were arrayed men from the other Arkadian cities and from Elis, Achaia, Sparta, and Athens. The two coalitions came into conflict at Mantinea. With pardonable exaggeration Xenophon (*Hellenika* 7.5.26) said that "almost all of Greece" had come together.

The outcome of the battle was indecisive, with both sides claiming victory and acknowledging defeat by seeking a truce to recover their dead.⁸² Afterward the cities negotiated a treaty of common peace, endorsing the autonomy of all Greek states. One of the Greek states recognized was Messenia, and so the Spartans refused to join the peace, but their abstention made little difference beyond keeping open the possibility of skirmishes in the southern Peloponnese.⁸³ The diplomacy and warfare that culminated at the battle of Mantinea had produced a relatively stable system of states. Sixteen years later Isokrates (5.30) was to say that in Greece there were four major powers, Argos, Lakedaimon, Thebes, and Athens, and that the other cities grouped themselves around one or another of these for protection. This situation was reached by the end of 362, and although local conflicts were to be prosecuted, with notable bitterness in central Greece, the general distribution of power was not disturbed until Macedonian intervention dislocated it.

Since 371 the Athenians had adhered to their novel policy of befriending and eventually protecting the Spartans. It is proper to ask what benefits this policy had brought them by 362, when the general war was brought to an end. They had not sought to restore Sparta to its former preeminence among Greek cities, but they had succeeded in putting some restraint on the ambitions of Thebes. By 362 it was clear that the Thebans could only intervene in the Peloponnese at a large cost in men and resources, and that the obstacles were too formidable for them to gain large or lasting influence. Those obstacles included Arkadian aspirations and Athenian resistance.

The Lakonian policy of the Athenians should also be viewed in a longer perspective. About a century earlier Kimon had led an Athenian expedition to help the Spartans against the Messenians at Mount Ithome. When he was dismissed ignominiously, the Athenians repudiated their former ties and allied with Argos, which was at war with Sparta.⁸⁴ The reasons for the change are elusive. A possible explanation is that, both in sending Kimon to Lakodaimon and in allying with Argos, the Athenians pursued the same ultimate goal of extending their influence into the affairs of the Peloponnese. If they entertained such an aim toward 460, they were to have no further opportunity of pursuing it for a long time. At last, when they invited a peace conference to Athens late in 371, the consequences of the conference gave them a chance to intervene in the Peloponnese. Such an aim explains both their exertions in support of Sparta and the alliance they contracted with Arkadia in 366. By fulfilling the obligations of these alliances with armed force, they won the respect of the Peloponnesians. After 362 they did not see fit to send an army to the Peloponnese again, for the local conflicts there no longer threatened to disturb the general balance of power. Those conflicts continued and precipitated at least one appeal by an Arkadian city to Athens.⁸⁵ Since the extant record is scant, one may suppose that there were other appeals of a similar nature. In short, by 362 the Peloponnesians had learned that Athens was a power to reckon with in their affairs, and they did not forget.

The new Lakonian policy, adopted in 371–369, was the policy of the Athenians and should not necessarily be associated with any one group among them to the exclusion of others. But Kallistratos had made himself the leader in its adoption. His personal fortunes suffered disaster in 361, when he was tried and condemned to death. The issue is not known. He may have suffered some diminution of political status in 362, if Timotheos returned then from the north with spectacular achievements to boast about (see appendix 5). Kallistratos withdrew into exile to Methone, whence he conducted negotiations with Timomachos, who was related to him by marriage.⁸⁶ His prospects were not yet hopeless; Timomachos had been elected general for 361/0 and he took over the command in the Hellespont. But Timomachos on his return was prosecuted and withdrew into exile.⁸⁷

While in exile, Kallistratos entered the service of the Macedonians and improved the revenues that Perdikkas received from harbor dues.⁸⁸ Late sources tell of him visiting Thasos and Byzantion and bringing benefits to their citizens.⁸⁹ But any Greek exile was restless and longed for his native city. Kallistratos might entertain hope of rehabilitation because Chabrias, his long-time associate, continued in Athenian service and died a hero's death at the battle of Chios in 356.⁹⁰ Some time, whether before or after that battle, Kallistratos returned to Athens. The Athenians seized him and executed him.⁹¹

In the next generation Kallistratos was remembered as a famous and powerful orator.⁹² Later centuries were not kind to his reputation. They neither praised him nor condemned him but, for the most part, they forgot him. He

was not admitted to the canon of the ten orators. Neither Plutarch nor Nepos wrote his biography. So it is difficult to assess the role he played in Athenian politics or the quality of his genius. One must beware of attributing to him the whole responsibility for the initiatives taken when he was ascendant. Athens had no prime minister, and Kallistratos was never in sole control of policy. Even so it is evident that Kallistratos played a large part in bringing the Second League into being and later in accomplishing the Athenian rapprochement with Sparta. Both undertakings were inspired by a judicious realism, such as characterizes statesmanship of a high order.⁹³ The lesson of realism was to be learned by Demosthenes, who is said to have admired Kallistratos (earlier at note 56).

By 360 the Athenians could be satisfied with their Peloponnesian policy. Their influence in central Greece and Thessaly had become negligible, but elsewhere in the north their prospects were good. Each year a naval commander from Athens protected the grain route through the straits. After the assassination of Kotys, the Odrysian kingdom was divided between three kings. Berisades took the westernmost part of the kingdom and employed Athenodoros as his chief minister. Athenodoros, who took a wife from the royal family, was an Athenian citizen. He served both as minister to the king and as Athenian resident at his court, much as Iphikrates had served in relation to Kotys. When Berisades died after a few years, Athenodoros continued in the service of his sons; he was virtually their regent or guardian.⁹⁴ The central part of the Odrysian kingdom was the share of Amadokos. He had the services of two foreign residents, Simon and Bianor, who contracted ties of marriage with him. The Athenians granted them citizenship. Under their guidance Amadokos cooperated with Berisades in resisting the designs of Kersebleptes, who was the eldest son of Kotys and received the eastern part of the territory; he was apparently the most ambitious and effective of the three kings.⁹⁵ Kersebleptes too had a foreign resident, Charidemos of Oreos, to assist him. The Athenians granted Charidemos their citizenship, probably in 357/6, and a gold crown.⁹⁶

West of Thrace was another banana monarchy, the kingdom of Macedon. In 359 Perdikkas was defeated and killed by the Illyrians. His brother and successor, Philip II, was threatened on all sides by dangers, including foreign enemies, notably the Illyrians and the Paionians, and including pretenders, such as Pausanias who now had the support of a Thracian king,⁹⁷ presumably Berisades. Such at least is the account given by tradition on the accession of Philip. But the dangers may have been exaggerated by a historian who wished to give a romantic portrayal of a king whose diplomatic and strategic brilliance surmounted the dangers with speed. That would surely be the contemporary historian who said that Europe had never produced such a man as Philip.⁹⁸ But even if tradition has exaggerated the dangers confronting Philip, his kingdom had been weak for many years. So the Athenians knew that they need scarcely take the new king more seriously than a figure in a comic opera. There was a pretender, Argaios, for them to support, and to support him they sent a naval squadron commanded by Mantias, a

man who had tried to build a political career on successive marriages to women of two prominent families, but his plans were ruined because his infatuation for his first wife long outlived the divorce.⁹⁹ Mantias disembarked Argaios at Methone, and Argaios set off with his men for Aigeai. But Mantias and his Athenians went no further than Methone, since Philip had demonstrated his virtuous disposition by withdrawing the garrison that Perdikkas had put in Amphipolis. Philip defeated Argaios and let the captives go free. He sent envoys to Athens and concluded a treaty of peace and alliance.¹⁰⁰ He recognized the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, although the Amphipolitans did not.

When Kallistratos was driven into exile, there were several men to compete for prominence in Athens. Among them, Timotheos had the greatest prestige because of the gains he had made in the north. Iphikrates remained his ally; he and his son Menestheus served as colleagues of Timotheos in the Social War. Aristophon was growing old but was still vigorous. He had acquired a younger ally in Chares, who had a long and mostly inglorious career ahead of him as a commander of armed forces. There was also Euboulos. He had been *thesmothetēs* in 370/69, an office rarely attested for statesmen of the fourth century.¹⁰¹ His cousin Hegesileos commanded the Athenian contingent at the battle of Mantinea.¹⁰² Otherwise nothing is heard of Euboulos until the 350s, when he earned respect by his skillful handling of finance. Enmity between him and Aristophon was notorious.¹⁰³

The Youth of Demosthenes

The years from 369 to 359 were an exciting time for a boy to grow to manhood in Athens. Demosthenes was born in 384/3.¹⁰⁴ His father, Demosthenes I, was a wealthy man; his property included a factory for making knives and one for making beds. Demosthenes I had a sister and a brother called Demon, who was probably the older brother. Demosthenes I married Kleoboule, a daughter of Gylon. Philia, the other daughter of Gylon, was given in marriage to Demochares, who will reappear in this story. Late in the Peloponnesian War Gylon was found guilty of betraying Nymphaion to the ruler of the principality of the Crimean Bosphoros; he was condemned to death, but later the sentence was commuted to a fine. He paid off the fine,¹⁰⁵ but this may have taken some time. As long as the fine was outstanding, his son-in-law, Demosthenes I, had an additional reason for keeping his property concealed, as far as possible, and for avoiding publicity. He is not known to have attempted political activity, although he was a friend of Kephisodotos, who is known as general in 360/59.¹⁰⁶

Demosthenes I died in 376/5. He left a widow, his son, Demosthenes II, and a daughter who was two years younger than her brother. The disputes that developed later over the property were to a large extent a conflict between the paternal relatives of Demosthenes II and his maternal relatives. In his will Demosthenes I named three guardians to care for his survivors.

Two of the guardians were his nephews, Aphobos, the son of his sister, and Demophon, the son of his brother, Demon. The third guardian, Therippides, was not a relative. Demosthenes I assigned legacies to the three guardians to induce them to fulfill the trust. His widow was to be given in marriage to Aphobos with a dowry of eighty minai and with the dwelling house. The daughter, when she became old enough, was to be given in marriage to Demophon with a dowry of two talents. Therippides was to have the use of a sum of seventy minai until Demosthenes II came of age.¹⁰⁷

On coming of age Demosthenes II sued his guardians for maladministration of the property. From the speeches he delivered it is not possible to tell with any precision how far they had been remiss in carrying out their tasks. But a suggestive incident occurred after Aphobos had occupied the house of Demosthenes I and had taken property to a value of eighty minai as the widow's dowry. Demochares, who was married to the sister of the widow, remonstrated with Aphobos for failing to provide for the widow's upkeep.¹⁰⁸ This is the first known incident in the quarrel that came to a head later, when Demosthenes came of age. On this early occasion his maternal relatives presented themselves as his protectors against his paternal relatives. One would like to know what Demochares was doing when Demosthenes sued his guardians; did he assist or even instigate the action? His descendants remained loyal to Demosthenes later. His son, Laches, married the sister of the orator. Their son, Demochares II, asked the Athenians in 280/79 to honor the memory of his distinguished uncle.¹⁰⁹

Demosthenes came of age and opened proceedings against his guardians about the beginning of 366/5. The first case came to trial in 364/3.¹¹⁰ The reason for postponement may have been that after enrollment in his deme Demosthenes engaged in two years of military service as *ephēbos*. The *ephēbeia* may have been reformed after the battle of Chaironeia and it is well attested in its later condition, but a chance remark of Aischines shows that it existed even before then.¹¹¹ When the case came to trial, the court found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant, Aphobos, to pay damages in a sum of ten talents.¹¹² But Aphobos devised subterfuges to avoid paying and to embarrass Demosthenes. Litigation continued intermittently for at least two years.¹¹³

From the quarrel Demosthenes acquired two enmities, which were to confront him later in his political career. The first set him against two brothers. One of the brothers, Thrasylochos, was a friend of Aphobos. A few days before the case against Aphobos was due to come to trial, Thrasylochos approached Demosthenes and challenged him to take his (Thrasylochos's) place as joint trierarch or to exchange property. Had Demosthenes agreed to the exchange, Thrasylochos would have acquired Demosthenes' rights against Aphobos and could have put an end to the lawsuit. Instead Demosthenes accepted the burden of the joint trierarchy and paid therefore twenty minai.¹¹⁴ Thrasylochos was the brother of Meidias and Meidias was the friend of Euboulos.¹¹⁵

The other enemy acquired by Demosthenes in the course of the quarrel

was Timokrates. Demosthenes alleges that Timokrates supplied false witnesses to help Aphobos.¹¹⁶ Timokrates also rendered help in a more imaginative way. He had married the daughter of Philonides. Toward the end of 367/6 Aphobos and his friends could foresee that Demosthenes would call him to account. So the daughter of Philonides was taken from Timokrates and restored to her family of origin, which was now headed by her brother, Onetor, their father having died. Onetor promptly gave her in marriage to Aphobos. When judgment was given against Aphobos in 364/3, the woman left him and returned to Onetor. The dowry, which should have accompanied her in her movements, was subject to a complex arrangement. When the woman left Timokrates, he did not refund the dowry to Onetor but acknowledged the debt and undertook to pay interest on it at an agreed rate. When Demosthenes won his case against Aphobos and came to seize the latter's land, Onetor drove him away, saying that the land was his sister's dowry and had reverted to him when her marriage to Aphobos was dissolved.¹¹⁷

Timokrates was a figure of some consequence. He associated with Androtion, when the latter undertook a reform of the sacred treasures in the temples, probably toward 365/4. Androtion and Timokrates continued to collaborate, and in the 350s Demosthenes composed two speeches (22, 24) for their enemies to deliver against them in court. An inscription of 347/6 attests Polyeuktos, the son of Timokrates, in cooperation with Androtion. The durable alliance will call for note in the next chapter.¹¹⁸ Some degree of enmity between Demosthenes and Timokrates continued too. When Demosthenes prepared to prosecute Meidias for assault, one of the men expected to plead in support of Meidias was Timokrates.¹¹⁹

Athenian society was highly political. Associations and disputes of a private nature could have repercussions in public activity. Demosthenes sued his guardians because he believed that they had not fulfilled their trust honestly, but in suing them he began to mark out for himself a political position. By acquiring and defying enemies, a young man showed his mettle. In the proceedings against his guardians Demosthenes also discovered that he had a talent for advocacy. Soon he took to composing forensic speeches as a source of livelihood. Two of the private speeches in the Demosthenic corpus (41, 55) can be assigned to an early stage of his career, about 360, on the basis of stylistic tests. They call for brief notice here, since they throw some light on the intellect of the author.

Speech 41 was delivered in a dispute over the property of Polyeuktos of Thria, a man not otherwise known. He had two daughters but no sons. He gave the elder daughter in marriage to the man who later delivered the extant speech; he will here be called the Speaker. Polyeuktos promised the Speaker a dowry of 4,000 drachmas but delivered only 3,000 drachmas. He gave his younger daughter in marriage to Leokrates. Later he quarreled with Leokrates, took his daughter from him, and gave her in marriage to Spoudias. When Polyeuktos was dying, the Speaker approached him about the 1,000 drachmas still due as part of the dowry. The two men agreed that the dwell-

ing house of Polyeuktos was worth 1,000 drachmas, and Polyeuktos assigned it to the Speaker in his will. Some time after Polyeuktos had died, the Speaker tried to collect rents from the house, but Spoudias prevented him. So the Speaker sued Spoudias. There were also other sums in dispute. The Speaker alleged, for example, that Spoudias had borrowed 1,800 drachmas from the widow of Polyeuktos. Demosthenes in the speech covered all the issues with clarity. Indeed, he made the best of a weak case. In particular he represented the sum received by the Speaker from Polyeuktos as dowry. But an Athenian who had daughters and no sons did not dower his daughters; he adopted men as his sons and heirs and gave his daughters to them in marriage.¹²⁰

Speech 55 was delivered in a case of a different kind. Teisias and Kallippides owned adjacent plots of land on the slope of a mountain. A depression in the ground ran down the slope between the two plots. In dry weather it served as a pathway. In torrential storms water ran down it. Teisias found that the water flowed on to his land and caused damage. So he built a wall to keep the water out. Many years later, after Teisias and Kallippides had died, Kallikles, the son of Kallippides, sued the son of Teisias and alleged that the wall made water flow on to his (Kallikles's) land and cause damage. Demosthenes composed the extant speech for the son of Teisias.

The outcome of the case is not known. Modern ears, not attuned to the sound of a dead language, cannot hope to appreciate in full the qualities Demosthenes cultivated. But one recognizable feature appears in a passage of this speech and later in his work. The son of Teisias argued that the wall was built, not on any public pathway, but on land he owned. He suggested that Kallikles wished him to receive the torrential water on to his own land, conduct it past the boundary with Kallikles' land, and then release it on to the pathway. But, he objected, if he did so, his next neighbor(s) would sue him in the same manner as Kallikles was suing him.

Since I am sued in an action without assessment because the water coming from the pathway flows on to my adversary's land, what in heaven's name will I suffer at the hands of those who will incur loss if water flows from my farm on to theirs? But when I am to receive the water but am not allowed to divert it into the pathway or into the farms, what in the name of the gods is there left for me to do with it, gentlemen of the bench? For surely Kallikles will not compel me to drink it all.¹²¹

Demosthenes had learned the importance of keeping the judges amused. His humor is restrained but can be discerned by an attentive reader. For example, when he defended Phormion against Apollodoros in 352/1 or 350/49, he observed that his client, like his adversary's late father, had displayed in youth a combination of qualities valued highly in the bank that employed him.

In the international market and in financial circles, for the same man to be both devoted to his work and honest is an extraordinary thing.¹²²

Again, in the speech that Demosthenes composed for Diodoros against Timokrates, he reminded the judges that one ought to be slow to change the laws, and he digressed to offer them an example to follow. In Lokroi, he explained, anyone wishing to change a law had to stand with a noose around his neck while uttering his proposal. In the course of more than two hundred years, he continued, only one change had been made. For there had been a law that, if one man knocked out the eye of another man, the victim could knock out one eye of the aggressor. But one day a man who had the usual number of functioning eyes threatened to knock out the eye of a man who had only one. So the man thus threatened proposed an amendment of the law to his fellow citizens, and the amendment was adopted.¹²³

One more incident is known from the early career of Demosthenes, and it shows him on the fringe of political activity. In 360/59 he was trierarch of one of the ten ships sent under Kephisodotos to the straits. The squadron probably set sail about the spring of 359. It was to operate against Charidemos, the minister of Kersebleptes. The squadron anchored at Perinthos. But Charidemos attacked the men while they were taking their morning meal. The survivors embarked afresh, sailed to Alopekonnos on the western shore of the Chersonese, and besieged the town. Charidemos came to its aid. At last Kephisodotos negotiated a treaty with Charidemos. He and his squadron returned to Athens when they had been at sea seven months. The Athenians repudiated the treaty. Kephisodotos was prosecuted and found guilty. The prosecution demanded the penalty of death, but instead the court imposed a fine of five talents.¹²⁴

Twenty-nine years later Aischines, arguing in court against Demosthenes, said that the latter's father had been a friend of Kephisodotos, that the general had sailed on the ship for which Demosthenes was trierarch, and that the prosecutor of Kephisodotos was Demosthenes.¹²⁵ The last of these assertions has often and rightly been doubted on account of the date and circumstances when it was made. Possibly Demosthenes was called as a witness at the trial, not necessarily as a witness for the prosecution. But it is credible that Kephisodotos had been a friend of the elder Demosthenes and sailed on the younger Demosthenes' ship. These facts help to explain an incident occurring when the squadron was almost ready to sail. In the hope of preparing the expedition quickly, the Athenians had passed a decree imposing penalties on any trierarchs who should prove dilatory and offering a crown as a reward for the one who made his trireme ready first. More than one trierarch appeared before the council to claim the crown. One of them was supported by Kephisodotos. The speech which that claimant delivered is preserved in the Demosthenic corpus and there is no good reason to doubt that the claimant was Demosthenes.¹²⁶

The speech throws a modest light on the aspirations of its author. He says of his adversaries:

Again, they behave as if they did not participate in an open commonwealth, which allows anyone the right of speaking, but could arrogate that right to

themselves like a private priesthood. So if someone speaks out among you in a just cause, they make a great to do and call him bold. They are so obtuse that they suppose that they will be considered perfect gentlemen all their lives, if they call someone who has spoken once shameless. (51.19)

Surely these are the words of a man who had spoken once in public and had met with a somewhat unfavorable reception.

The speech indicates thus that Demosthenes had made an unsuccessful attempt at political speaking before 359. This fact may be reflected in the late tradition which said that, when Demosthenes first addressed the assembly, people interrupted him and laughed at him.¹²⁷ It is proper to ask whether he had made his attempt in association with any of his seniors. He had not attached himself to Aristophon, for the speech mentions the latter in a correct but distant manner.¹²⁸ It would be wiser to call to mind the man whose defense speech after the loss of Oropos is said to have aroused the admiration of Demosthenes. The latter's extant speeches have infrequent but respectful references to Kallistratos.¹²⁹

5

Before and After the Social War

In the course of the 350s two developments altered the degree of power exercised by the Athenians in the Aegean area. One of these was the revolt of some of their major allies. The other was the growth in the power of Philip II, as he consolidated his inherited kingdom and intervened repeatedly in Thessaly and Thrace. The fortunate preservation of several Athenian speeches from this period makes it possible to assess the state of opinion in the city, survey many of the political leaders, and observe the unsuccessful efforts of Demosthenes to attain prominence.

The Expedition to Euboia

In the summer of 357 danger and opportunity confronted the Athenians in Euboia. Strife had arisen within the cities of the island and one side had sought help from the Thebans. Armed help was sent from Thebes and ships were supplied by Tisiphonos of Pherai. In Thessaly the situation had changed shortly before. Alexander of Pherai had been assassinated by his wife's three brothers at her instigation. The eldest of the brothers, Tisiphonos, ruled with the concurrence of the other two. The new regime proclaimed an end to the tyranny and was thus able at first to gain a welcome in some degree from the Thessalians. Although it did not unite them, at least the acute tension that had divided Thessaly in the time of Alexander was at an end.¹ So by the summer of 357 the Athenians had to face the prospect of a Theban ascendancy prevailing in Thessaly and extending into Euboia; most of central and northern Greece was about to become a preserve for the enemies of Athens.

Timotheos, now the most prestigious man in Athens, urged his fellow citizens to act vigorously and promptly. Volunteers, including Demosthenes, undertook the expense of the trierarchy for the planned expedition to Euboia. The expedition set off within five days or, according to another version, within three days of the arrival in Athens of the news of the Theban

intervention. Moreover, within thirty days the Athenian force of ships and infantry outmaneuvered the Thebans, so that the latter made a treaty and withdrew.²

An inscribed decree on Athenian relations with Karystos gives part of the settlement consequent on the expedition and belongs to the Attic year 357/6. The expedition itself, or at least its beginning, may have been undertaken late in 358/7.³ It shows that the Athenians could act quickly and efficiently to repel a strategic threat in the neighborhood of Attica. It is not easy to say precisely how the operation altered the political situation in Euboea. Euboian forces had followed the Thebans on their first expedition to the Peloponnese and again in the campaign that culminated in the battle of Mantinea. But in 357 it was the Thebans, not the Athenians, who sent forces into the island first. Presumably the Euboians had become restive under Theban ascendancy. Their behavior in the 340s shows that there was a desire among them for independence of external patrons and for bringing into being a federation of their cities. In consequence of the expedition of 357 the Athenians had no anxieties until new troubles arose in Euboea in 348.

Yet to say that in 357 Euboea was brought under Athenian influence might be too facile. Athenian spokesmen described the outcome differently. A few years later Demosthenes (16.14) remarked: "Recently our city saved the Euboians." Long afterward, Aischines (3.85) expressed a similar view in more wordy fashion. The Athenians, he said, had suffered many injuries at the hands of Mnesarchos of Chalkis and Themison of Eretria; the latter had deprived them of Oropos when a state of peace was in force. But when the Thebans crossed to Euboea with the intention of enslaving its cities, the Athenians forgot the injuries they had suffered and sent forces promptly to aid the Euboians. In consequence of the operation, Aischines continued, the Athenians became masters of Euboea and restored the cities and the constitutions to those who had entrusted these to them. It would be easy to dismiss the self-congratulatory language of the two orators and insist that the Athenians became masters of Euboea. But agreement between two men of such divergent temperament, agreement voiced over an interval of more than twenty years, may deserve some respect. In the situation of 357, it was in the interests of the Athenians to foster Euboian desires for independence; the obstacle to that desire came from Thebes.

The Social War

In 357/6 some members of the Athenian League, notably Chios and Rhodes, seceded and thus began a struggle called the Social War.⁴ They were joined by Kos, which is not known to have been a member of the League, although it is probably to be restored among the entries no longer legible on the obverse of the stele of Aristoteles. They were also joined by Byzantion, which may have seceded successfully from the League in 364, when Epameinondas conducted his naval expedition. Diodoros writes as if the war

began promptly after the Athenian expedition to Euboia, and this close sequence may gain some support from the movements of Chares. Demosthenes says (15.15) that the reason why the Rhodians went to war was that they were jealous because the Athenians were recovering their own. The allusion can best be explained as referring to the Chersonese. For elsewhere Demosthenes says:

We made the expedition to Euboia, and Chares had come bringing the mercenaries, and you sent him as general with full powers to sail to the Chersonese. So Charidemos in the presence of Athenodoros and the kings concluded anew a treaty with Chares, the treaty that is best and most just. (23.173)

These words imply that the expedition to Euboia was followed promptly by the dispatch of Chares to the Hellespont and his conclusion of a treaty under which Charidemos and his master, Kersebleptes, desisted from impending Athenian ambitions in the Chersonese.

The course of the Social War is known in outline. Chares was given command of sixty warships and he sailed against Chios. The enemy confronting him there included forces from Byzantion, Rhodes, Kos, and Maussolos, the dynast of Karia, as well as the Chians. Chares was defeated at Chios, probably in the spring of 356, and Chabrias, fighting now as a private soldier, was killed in the naval engagement.⁵ About this time or earlier the Athenians took precautions to secure some of the lesser islands of the Aegean. Inscriptions attest a garrison in Andros and a governor at Arkesine, one of the three towns of Amorgos.⁶ Later, perhaps toward the beginning of the Attic year 356/5, reinforcements numbering sixty more ships were sent out to join Chares; they were commanded by Timotheos, his ally Iphikrates, and the latter's son Menestheus. Meanwhile, the enemy plundered Lemnos and Imbros. They advanced on Samos, ravaged its territory, and settled down to besiege the city. They also made raids on other islands and exacted money for the expenses of warfare. The combined Athenian fleet sailed toward Byzantion. This maneuver made the enemy raise the siege of Samos and sail toward the Hellespont. So the Athenians returned from the straits and confronted the enemy off Embata in the territory of Erythrai. A gale sprang up, but Chares insisted on fighting a battle against the advice of Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Menestheus. He was defeated and sent a letter to Athens blaming his three colleagues; they were deposed and recalled, and later they were tried.⁷

After the battle of Embata Chares still had a force under his command. An opportunity to employ it arose from a curious development on the Asiatic mainland. In the 360s the troubles among the satraps of Asia Minor had arisen in part from the efforts of Artabazos, the son of Pharnabazos, to take the satrapy of Daskylion, which had been his father's long before. When the Great Revolt came to an end, Artabazos was secure in Hellespontine Phrygia. Some years later the new king, Artaxerxes III Ochus, sent an order, which is known only from the account given by a scholiast. According to

that source the king ordered the satraps of the coastal region to dismiss their mercenary forces. They obeyed, and the unemployed troops to the number of ten thousand entered the service of Chares. Artabazos was in revolt and invited Chares into the king's land. The men, needing supplies, compelled Chares to accept the invitation. He took his force to the mainland and defeated a royalist force of more than twenty thousand, commanded by Tithraustes. Then Chares wrote to the Athenians and said that his victory was sister to that won at Marathon.⁸

The details in this story suggest that the scholiast drew on good information. Diodoros confirms that Chares defeated the royalist forces and therefore received from Artabazos a large sum of money, with which he was able to pay his men. The difficulty of interpretation in the story arises from the king's order to dismiss mercenary forces. "Mercenary" without further specification cannot be understood, since soldiers are hardly ever willing to fight without pay. The royal order would appear to have been the reason why Artabazos rebelled, but one cannot tell precisely what the order said, what the king's purpose was, or why Artabazos resisted.

The king recognized that Chares and his force were enabling Artabazos to hold out against him. So he sent envoys to Athens to complain of Chares; news was put abroad to the effect that the king was preparing three hundred ships for the purpose of helping the enemies of the Athenians against them. In the context of 355 "the enemies of the Athenians" may have meant the Thebans as well as the islanders who had rebelled. The Athenians, whose finances had been depleted by the Social War, yielded to the royal remonstrance and made peace with those of their former allies who were in revolt.⁹

The incident of Artabazos had a further repercussion, worthy of note. The king may well have been preparing a large fleet, for in 351/0 he made an unsuccessful attempt on Egypt. At least he did not send his fleet to help the enemies of the Athenians. The disappointment felt by those enemies explains why the Thebans listened favorably to an appeal of Artabazos for help. In the winter of 354/3 or spring of 353 they sent a force of five thousand under Pammenes to join Artabazos. Pammenes, serving Artabazos, defeated the royalist forces in two battles.¹⁰ The ensuing developments in Asia Minor are not recorded, but their outcome can be discovered. Within a few years Artabazos fled and found refuge with Philip of Macedon.¹¹ Presumably the Thebans had recalled Pammenes. Within a few years too the Thebans asked Artaxerxes for financial assistance in their war against the Phokians; Artaxerxes sent them three hundred talents.¹² Doubtless in sending Pammenes to help Artabazos the Thebans had not sought to put an end to their friendship with the king, which they had enjoyed since 367; their purpose was merely to put pressure on their friend, and in this they were successful.

The Persian king's complaint to the Athenians brought about an end to the Social War. Perhaps a further consequence of the royal remonstrance can be discerned. For explanation is required for a minor international incident, occurring about the time when the war came to an end. The Athenians

sent Androtion, Glauketes, and Melanopos as envoys to Maussolos of Karia. The trireme conveying them fell in with a merchant ship, which was carrying valuables originating from Naukratis. The men of the Athenian trireme seized the valuables and brought them to Athens. The owners of the valuables appealed to the city of Athens to restore them, but the answer given by the assembly of the Athenians was that there was no state of peace between Athens and the community of the owners at the time, and so the valuables were confiscated.¹³ This incident is likely to have occurred in 355 or 354. Disputes arising from the confiscated valuables were still in progress in 353/2, and the mission of Androtion and his colleagues to Maussolos may well have had to do with the negotiations concluding the Social War. Egypt was one of the places from which the Athenians imported grain, and it was normally in the interests of the Athenians to protect merchants who had cargoes originating from Naukratis. But at the time when the Social War came to an end, Egypt was still in revolt from the Persians, and the king was contemplating and surely preparing the expedition that he launched against Egypt in 351/0. Perhaps the seizure of the Naukratitic valuables by Androtion and his colleagues was no casual act of piracy; perhaps the king, on complaining about Chares, insisted that the Athenians perform an act of violence to dissociate themselves from the Egyptian rebels, whom he wished to subdue.

Although the course of the Social War is tolerably clear, both its causes and its immediate consequences are elusive. A view now venerable among historians supposes that the cities that seceded from the League in 357 had been antagonized by Athenian acts of imperialism. The Athenians, it is suggested, had diverged from the generous principles embodied in the decree of Aristoteles and had reverted to the practices that had made them hated in the fifth century. On this view the foundation of a cleruchy in Samos in 365 is regarded as a turning point, and the proposal to found that cleruchy is known to have provoked controversy in Athens.¹⁴ But this view of the development or rather moral degeneration of the Second Athenian League has not stood up to scrutiny. The cleruchy founded in Samos was probably not a major displacement of population. The Samians had been granted Athenian citizenship at the end of the Peloponnesian War. If some Samian leaders, being committed to the Athenian cause, were expelled from their island during the Spartan ascendancy in the Aegean, they doubtless found a refuge in Athens. Some of them, or their descendants, could be restored in 365, and Samians who had committed themselves to the Persian cause were expelled then, so that they or their descendants could be restored in 322. The foundation of a cleruchy in 365 was a reorganization with a change in the internal balance of politics. That is, the cleruchs were themselves Samians who had been Athenian citizens ever since the end of the Peloponnesian War.¹⁵ Again, the Athenians sent a cleruchy to Poteidaia in 362/1, but it was sent at the invitation of the Poteidaians.¹⁶ Athenian garrisons and officers were stationed in some cities of the League during the Social War, but these measures should be understood not as reflecting self-assertion by the Athenians

but as a response to the conditions of warfare.¹⁷ Indeed Androtion, who was stationed at the city of Arkesine on Amorgos, was thanked and honored by its citizens for his generosity.

Moreover the thesis of a resurgence of Athenian imperialism is undermined by the absence of evidence for Athenian acts of oppression in the place where one would expect to find such acts recorded. That place is the speech of Isokrates, *On the Peace*. Its dramatic date is the occasion at the end of the Social War when the Athenians were deliberating about concluding peace. Isokrates (8.16, cf. 25–27) maintains that the Athenians ought to make peace not only with Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantion, but with all mankind. He argues that in the past their policies were mistaken and disastrous because they sought to rule at sea. This indeed is the main thesis of the speech. But all the examples he gives of mistaken policies are drawn from the fifth century. Thus he says that the Athenians displayed at the Dionysia the tribute paid by the allies; he mentions the expedition to Sicily, the expedition to Egypt, and other disasters. He goes on to reinforce his thesis by adding that, once the Lakedaimonians had achieved rule at sea, it destroyed them. But he does not mention any mistakes of Athenian policy or disasters occurring between the foundation of the Second League and the outbreak of the Social War. Surely if Athens had committed imperialist outrages in that period, Isokrates would have had reason to specify them.¹⁸

The causes of the Social War should be sought not in Athenian policy but elsewhere. Within a few years after the end of the war Maussolos of Karia and Artemisia, his wife and successor, extended their power into Rhodes and Kos. They put garrisons in the cities of Rhodes and had their opponents there exiled. Maussolos had supplied forces that fought at the battle of Chios. Addressing the Athenian assembly in 351/0, Demosthenes said that Maussolos had brought about the Social War. The orator may have simplified a complex situation. There may have been more factors than can now be discerned. But it should be recognized that the ambitions of Maussolos were a major factor in the war. Since Artaxerxes III Ochus had confirmed tranquillity among the western satraps, Maussolos had no opportunity of enlarging his power on land. So he turned to the islands. He was given to more independent action than most vassals of the king.¹⁹

The result of the Social War is somewhat difficult to estimate. No record of the terms of peace has survived. Doubtless the Athenians had to acknowledge the independence of Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantion. The last of these was free to expand on the shores of the Propontis. Within a few years the Byzantines seized Chalkedon and brought Selymbria, which had been a member of the Athenian League, into a relation of partial union with Byzantion.²⁰ The Second Athenian League continued to exist after the end of the Social War, and its synedrion had a voice in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of peace with Philip II in 346. But the only major power still adhering to it after 355 was the cities of Lesbos.

Yet perhaps more can be said about Athenian dealings with Byzantion. In 362 and again in 361 the Byzantines had impeded the sailing of the mer-

chant fleet that bore grain through the straits. The Athenian response had been to send squadrons of warships to the straits each year for several years. The last of this series of expeditions was led by Chares in 357 and he achieved a satisfactory treaty with Kersebleptes. In 356 Chares sailed toward Byzantion and thereby made the enemy desist from besieging Samos. No doubt the mission of Chares in 356 served also to protect the grain fleet. After 356 expeditions of this kind are not recorded, and the argument from silence has some force, since Demosthenes in speech 23 has much to say about operations in the straits. In 353/2 Chares captured Sestos and the Athenians sent a cleruchy to the Chersonese.²¹ Late in 352 (Maimakterion) news came that Philip was at Heraion Teichos near the Propontis and the Athenians voted to send a fleet of forty warships. But when the further news came that Philip had fallen ill, the Athenians gave up trying to dispatch that squadron. They waited ten months and then sent Charidemus with ten ships (Boedromion 351/0). It is likely that Charidemus stayed in the Hellespont with his ten ships until he was ordered to Olynthos in spring 348.²² The failure to dispatch the expedition voted late in 352 shows that the Athenians no longer had any fear of the Byzantines. Indeed the operations in the Chersonese in 353/2 and the dispatch of Charidemus in 351 were designed to protect Athenian interests, not against Byzantion but against the new danger posed by Philip. In view of the policies pursued by the Athenians in the Hellespont after 356, it is proper to suppose that the treaty concluding the Social War had a clause whereby the Byzantines undertook not to obstruct the annual grain fleet.

The Phokian Alliance, Amphipolis

While the Social War was in progress, changes affecting the security of the Athenians occurred in central Greece and in the north. In the former theater the Thebans had gained paramount influence in the council of the Amphiktyones, which supervised the sanctuary at Delphi. The Thebans used Amphiktyonic procedure against the Phokians, their neighbors on the northwest. The Phokians were charged with tilling sacred land and condemned to pay a heavy fine. Unable to pay, they seized the sanctuary at Delphi about the spring or early summer of 355. Local hostilities began and at the fall meeting of the Amphiktyonic council the Thebans gained a declaration of war against the Phokians. The allies of the Thebans included the Lokrians, the Thessalians, and some communities on the borders of Thessaly.

The Phokians also had allies, including Sparta. Moreover they sent to Athens, probably in the fall or winter of 355/4, and sought an alliance. The Athenians voted it on the proposal of Hegesippos, a man who was coming to prominence with his brother, Hegesandros.²³ To understand the Athenian reasons for this alliance, one must forget what happened afterward. In 355 the Athenians did not know that the Phokians would lose the war nine years

later. The question of sacrilege was likely to be raised, since the right to control the temple of Apollo was at stake, but one could not foresee which claim to the temple would be shown by the outcome of the war to be invalid; consequently one could not tell in advance which side was guilty of sacrilege.²⁴ Generally people ally with a belligerent because they expect him to win. In 363 the Athenians had welcomed a party of Delphians, who had fallen out with the majority of the Amphiktyonic council (see chapter 4 at note 81). Nothing had come of that attempt to resist the growth of Theban influence among the Amphiktyones. The offer of the Phokian alliance in 355 must have been most welcome to the Athenians. Although an armed force sent by the Athenians to Thermopylai in 352 (see further at note 85) had decisive effect, no continuous commitment of Athenian resources was needed; for as the event proved, the Phokians were strong enough to check the Thebans, whom the Athenians hated most among their enemies, for many years.

In the north Philip laid siege to Amphipolis in 357 and captured it. During the siege or perhaps shortly before it began, two envoys from Amphipolis, Hierax and Stratokles, came to Athens and offered to entrust their city to the Athenians. They arrived promptly after the Athenians returned from their expedition to Euboea.²⁵ It follows that Philip carried out the siege about the time when the outbreak of the Social War preoccupied the Athenians. It should not necessarily be assumed that the Athenians would have taken action at Amphipolis, if they had not been thus preoccupied. About four years previously Perdikkas had put a garrison in Amphipolis, but Philip had removed it (see chapter 4 at note 100). During the siege Philip sent a letter to the Athenians. Some years later Athenian orators said that in the letter Philip undertook to hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians, once he had captured it.²⁶ The orators may have read a more precise commitment into the letter than actually stood there. No doubt Philip expressed favorable intentions.

The siege of Amphipolis prompted more diplomatic activity. The Chalkidian federation with its seat at Olynthos sent an embassy to Athens. The Athenian reply, though not recorded, was reserved. Some Athenians thought that they ought to wait and see whether the Olynthians went to war against Philip.²⁷ About seven years previously the Chalkidian League had impeded Athenian designs on Amphipolis, and Timotheos had even had Macedonian help against the Chalkidians (see chapter 4 at notes 65 and 66).

There were more rumors and perhaps more diplomacy in connection with the siege of Amphipolis. In 349/8 Demosthenes (2.6–7) mentioned the Olynthian embassy of 357 and added:

Philip conciliated you by alleging that he would hand over Amphipolis and by concocting the famous secret that everybody was talking about.

The “secret,” which was no secret, aroused the interest of commentators on the Demosthenic speeches. They quoted in explanation a few sentences of Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 30). These say that someone, whose name is

not preserved, sent Antiphon and Charidemos as envoys to Philip; that Antiphon and Charidemos urged Philip in secret to allow Amphipolis to the Athenians and receive Pydna in exchange; and that the envoys of the Athenians reported the proposed exchange to the Athenian council in a secret session.

On the basis of these statements of Demosthenes and Theopompos, historians used to believe that a secret agreement was reached for the exchange of Amphipolis and Pydna. That belief has since been refuted.²⁸ Literary statements of unrealized intentions, including secret agreements not carried out, should always be doubted, since they are easy to invent, and although the Athenian council could meet in secret session, an agreement binding the city required a vote of the assembly. But the fragment of Theopompos preserves information not otherwise known. It mentions an Athenian embassy. Moreover, although it says that Antiphon and Charidemos were sent to Philip, it does not say who sent them. Recent historians have supposed that the Athenians sent them. On this view Charidemos the envoy was not Charidemos of Oreos, who was in the service of Kersebleptes, but another man, otherwise unknown like Antiphon. Alternatively it is possible that Charidemos the envoy was Charidemos of Oreos, and he and the unknown Antiphon were sent by Kersebleptes to Philip during the siege of Amphipolis. Kersebleptes with Charidemos had recently concluded with Chares the treaty that was to regulate his relations with Athens for some time. If this reading of Theopompos is right, the powers entering into negotiations in consequence of Philip's advance on Amphipolis included Athens, the Chalkidian League, and Kersebleptes. Philip's movements were becoming important to many people.

Promptly after capturing Amphipolis Philip seized Pydna.²⁹ Then at the latest the Athenians declared war, the justification for warfare being the capture of Amphipolis. More than a dozen years later Aischines said repeatedly that the issue over which the Athenians had gone to war was Amphipolis. Demosthenes said so only once and that in a speech in which he deterred the Athenians from defying Philip.³⁰ By the time when the orators made these utterances, the issues at stake between the Athenians and the Macedonians had grown; to insist still that the war was for Amphipolis was to minimize the conflict.

It remains to ask, How serious was the harm done to Athenian interests by Philip's capture of Amphipolis? The professed Athenian desire to recover Amphipolis can easily be dismissed as a mere quest for empty prestige. The Athenians had not held Amphipolis since 424/3, yet they had survived and sometimes they had flourished. Even so, Athenian resentment toward Philip over Amphipolis may have been prompted by considerations more material than prestige. Amphipolis stood on the route leading up the valley of the Strymon to the best source of timber for building ships. The Athenians continued to build ships after 424/3. Surely they imported some, perhaps much, of the timber from Macedon and brought some, perhaps much, of it past Amphipolis. A *modus vivendi* must have been reached while Amphipolis was independent. If so, dealing with a Macedonian Amphipolis after 357

may well have been different from dealing with an independent Amphipolis before. Some have supposed that, while the Athenians were at war with Philip II and while they were ill disposed toward Alexander III even without warfare, they were cut off from the Macedonian source of ship timber.³¹ In default of evidence the supposition is reasonable but not necessarily true. Neither Philip nor Alexander wished to challenge the Athenians at sea. The export of timber must have brought economic advantage to Macedon. After 357 Philip and other Macedonian grandees controlled both the source of the timber and the route along which it was conveyed to the Aegean; they could sell the timber and charge tolls on the traffic. Conjecturally the Athenians paid in silver. Some Macedonians grew very rich.³²

Shortly after capturing Amphipolis, Philip achieved an alliance with the Chalkidians of Olynthos. He yielded Anthemous to them and he undertook to capture Poteidaia and hand it over to them. Probably in the first half of 356 he set about besieging Poteidaia. The Athenians voted an expedition to relieve Poteidaia but they acted too late. Philip captured the town and let the captive Athenians go free; evidently he had no desire to provoke the Athenians unnecessarily. He sold the other survivors into slavery and gave the site to the Olynthians in accordance with his undertaking.³³ In the course of the summer of 356 Philip was confronted by a coalition of three kingdoms. Their kings were Grabos of Illyria, Lypeios of Paionia, and Ketrporis and his brothers who had succeeded to western Thrace on the death of their father, Berisades. On the eleventh day of the first prytany of 356/5, the Athenians concluded an alliance with the three kingdoms. But the Athenians did not follow up the alliance with armed action. Grabos was defeated by Parmenion, Ketrporis and probably Lypeios were reduced by Philip to vassal status.³⁴ In 355 before the end of the year Philip advanced against Methone. He besieged it and it surrendered in the course of 354. The inhabitants negotiated terms so that they could withdraw and each of them could take one cloak.³⁵

Pydna, Poteidaia, and Methone had been captured for the Athenians by Timotheos, while he was operating in the north. Philip won these towns between 357 and 354, and the Athenians did nothing to stop him beyond voting too late an expedition for Poteidaia. Philip's interest in these three places is obvious; they gave him access to the sea. The diversion of Athenian resources into the Social War may account for the failure to act effectively. But it is not clear that any compelling interest of the Athenians required them to hold the three places, and consequently Philip's capture of them was not necessarily a serious loss to Athens. It was more portentous that during 356 Philip seized Krenides and renamed it Philippoi, for it ensured him a good supply of precious metals.³⁶ But that was no concern of the Athenians. Their interests required defense of the route through Thermopylai into central Greece and maintenance of security in the Hellespont and Propontis. At the end of 354 Philip had not approached either of these places and it could not be foreseen that he would approach them in future.

A comparison between the international weight exercised by the Atheni-

nians at the beginning of 357 and at the end of 354 does not allow a simple conclusion. On the one hand the Social War deprived them of most of the more powerful members of the Second League, and Philip's capture of Amphipolis made their access to the Macedonian interior precarious. On the other hand, the other places he had taken from them, Pydna, Poteidaia, and Methone, had probably had little political value for them. Moreover against these losses the Athenians could reckon two gains nearer to Attica. First, they had won predominance in Euboea. They had presented themselves there as liberators, perhaps with success. If they exercised diplomatic skill, they could hope to be liked by the Euboians. Second, they had accepted the alliance with Phokis. During 354 the Thebans and their allies defeated the Phokians at Neon in East Lokris. In the rout Philomelos, who had led the Phokians to seize Delphi, threw himself from a cliff and was killed. After the battle the Thebans took their forces home. They may have thought that the war was virtually over and that they could spare troops under Pammenes to assist Artabazos. But any such Theban expectations were mistaken. The Phokians rallied under a new leader, Onomarchos, and caused great embarrassment to their neighbors in the next two years.³⁷ For the Athenians, the Thebans were still the primary enemy, and the Athenian position against them improved from 357 to 354.

Internal Politics: Trials and Pamphleteers

The Athenian failure at the battle of Embata prompted a political trial of major importance. Chares sent the Athenians a letter complaining of his three colleagues. So Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Menestheus were prosecuted. The case probably came to trial in 354/3. The prosecutor was Aristophon. Iphikrates and Menestheus were acquitted. Timotheos was condemned to a fine of a hundred talents. He withdrew into exile to Chalkis and he died there soon afterward.³⁸ It was an unfortunate end for the son of Konon. Like many sons of distinguished fathers, he had not quite lived up to the reputation he inherited. In the 370s he had tried to compete with the rising fame of Chabrias, but he suffered a large setback in 373, when he was put on trial, and in 372 he withdrew into Persian service. After his return a few years later he recovered influence rapidly. When he exercised command in the Aegean from 366 onward, his most lasting and valuable gains for the Athenians were Samos and Sestos. When he came home from the north, his successes entitled him to greater respect than any other living Athenian. In 357 it was he who urged the Athenians to act promptly in Euboea. One cannot point to any mistake in his career. Yet the man who liberated Samos from the Persians did not translate his opportunity among his fellow citizens into a lasting ascendancy.

The prosecutor of Timotheos and his colleagues—or the leading figure among the prosecutors, if there were more than one—was Aristophon. Already elderly and an ally of Chares, Aristophon was making himself felt

increasingly in the years of the Social War; late in 355 he proposed honors for a man who had dared the Macedonian blockade and carried goods into Methone. He was still active in 342/1.³⁹ The position he attained in the aftermath of the Social War was prominent but not predominant. When he prosecuted the three generals of Embata, two of them were acquitted. The greatest obstacle to Aristophon now was his enmity toward his younger rival, Euboulos. Before considering the latter's activities, it will be proper to look into the mood of the Athenians at the end of the Social War.

Addressing the Athenians in 341/0, Demosthenes (10.37) said that at a time "not long ago" the annual revenues had been as low as 130 talents. The time to which he refers is probably the end of the Social War. About then the Athenians passed three measures that, though not likely to raise much revenue, reflect an outlook of fiscal anxiety. A decree was passed authorizing Androtion to exact arrears of *eisphora*. According to a critic, the amount due totaled only 14 talents and Androtion succeeded in recovering 7 talents.⁴⁰ Another decree was passed on the proposal of Aristophon to set up a commission of inquiry that should receive information about sacred or public money withheld.⁴¹ Leptines had a law passed canceling grants to individual persons of exemption from liturgies and forbidding such grants in future. Exemption had sometimes been granted from the festival liturgies but not from the trierarchy or the *proeisphora*.⁴² The festivals were the responsibility not of the city of Athens but of smaller associations within it, such as *phylai* and *demes*. So the law of Leptines did not affect the revenues of the city, but it illustrates the same temper of severity and alarm as the decrees of Androtion and Aristophon. There may have been political friendship between Aristophon and Leptines. For when the law of Leptines was challenged in court, one of the men chosen to defend it was Aristophon.⁴³ But the three measures were not the distinctive policy of a single group of men. For one of the unfortunate people from whom Androtion exacted arrears was Leptines.⁴⁴ It appears that the measures emanated from more than one group of politicians and reflected an attitude widespread among the Athenians.

More can be learned about Athenian attitudes from some preserved works which were composed or supposedly composed about 355. About that time Xenophon, now a very old man, wrote the treatise called *Revenues*.⁴⁵ The work begins by stressing the natural wealth and good situation of Athens. It recommends reforms to improve the economy, and some of these reforms were adopted. For example, Xenophon recommends steps encouraging aliens to settle in Attica as metics; the steps should include grants to desirable aliens of the right to own immovable property. The epigraphic record suggests that this right was granted much more frequently after the Social War than before.⁴⁶ Again Xenophon recommends encouraging long-distance traders (*emporoi*) by building hostels at the harbors and by providing speedy justice. Buildings in the place of commerce were indeed built,⁴⁷ and the procedure for settling merchants' suits within a month was introduced; it is first attested in 343/2 in language implying that it had been invented within the reign of Philip II.⁴⁸ The source of wealth on which Xen-

ophon relies most in the *Revenues* is the silver mines and he delights in calculating hypothetical proceeds of expansion. In fact there was some increase in the exploitation of the Attic mines after the Social War.⁴⁹

In short, some of Xenophon's recommendations were feasible and were carried out. It does not follow that the measures were carried out because he recommended them. Moreover, it should not necessarily be inferred that the policies he recommended characterized one group of statesmen in contrast with others. Xenophon did not have an original or distinctive mind. Since he recommended measures of economic reform at the end of the Social War, it should be inferred that those proposals were known widely and were advocated by many Athenians. The fact that some of the proposals were carried out confirms the inference but says nothing about alignments among Athenian statesmen. Similar considerations apply to Xenophon's observation (*Revenues* 5.1–13) that peace is needed for prosperity. An aspiration for peace is likely to be widespread in a city that has lost a recent war. But an aspiration is not a policy. Toward preserving a state of peace Xenophon has nothing more substantial to suggest than the creation of a board of "Guardians of Peace" (*eirēnophylakes*, 5.1).

Two speeches of Isokrates, *Areopagitikos* and *On the Peace*, purport to belong in conditions occurring about the time of the Social War. The former scolds the Athenians for current defects in the constitution, although it recognizes that their present condition is not hopeless; the rule of the Thirty was worse. The speech praises the constitution as it was at an earlier time, when allegedly the Council of the Areopagos exercised censorial supervision over the private lives of the citizens. This speech has often been dated to the end of the Social War, because its ideas harmonize with those of the speech *On the Peace*. The two speeches are indeed complementary. The one deals with the internal condition of the Athenians and the other with their foreign policy. Yet questions of date, setting, and purpose are not easy to resolve, as will become apparent when the speech *On the Peace* is considered. For the present let it be noted that the *Areopagitikos* says in its opening sentences that Athens is not in danger but at peace, that it possesses more than two hundred triremes, and that it has many allies willing to come to its aid and even more who pay contributions and do as they are told. Surely this language fits the condition of Athens shortly before the outbreak of the Social War far better than that at its end. Yet later in the speech (7.81) the orator says that the king has voiced his contempt for the Athenians in the letters he has sent them; could the allusion be to the royal letter complaining of the help rendered to Artabazos by Chares?⁵⁰

The speech *On the Peace* appears to state its dramatic context with clarity at the opening. The Athenian assembly has met to consider a question of peace or war (8.1–2). Somewhat later the speaker says that the Athenians ought to make peace, not only with Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantion, but with all mankind (8.16). The main thesis of the speech is that the Athenians ought not to strive after hegemony at sea; that aspiration, according to the speaker, has brought about all their misfortunes. Thus the speech purports to be

delivered when the assembly met to conclude peace at the end of the Social War. Yet the end of the speech points to a different context (8.145):

Although this thesis contains material for many excellent speeches, both the magnitude of the topic and the multitude of my years require me to cease speaking. I urge and exhort those who are younger and nearer to their prime to compose for oral and written delivery works in which they will direct the greatest cities and those which habitually cause the others trouble into the path of moral and just behavior. For when Greece enjoys prosperity, the affairs of *philosophoi* improve too.

In the diction of Isokrates, *philosophia* has a recognizable meaning. It is his word for the rhetorical education he provided in his school.⁵¹ At the end of *On the Peace*, the Athenian assembly has been forgotten. Instead Isokrates, the senior philosophos, tells young philosophoi the theme on which they should compose rhetorical works.

Isokrates allowed the dramatic context, for which he composed the speech *On the Peace*, to become obscure. The reader of this speech may become still more uneasy on comparing it with another work by the same author, the *Archidamos*. This professes to be delivered by the Spartan king of that name to dissuade his fellow citizens from surrendering their claim to Messene with a view to making peace. Its belligerence contrasts with the pacifism of *On the Peace*. The contrast can be discerned in the treatment of specific topics in the two works. Each professes to diverge from the trend current in the supposed audience. Each cites the ancestors of the audience as an example to follow (6.16–24; 8.37–44). The one speech exhorts its audience to recover “rule” (*archē*), the other says that they ought to abandon it (6.82; 8.64). The one speech insists that the pursuit of justice should be preferred to the pursuit of advantage (6.34–38); the other says that only a just policy can bring advantage (8.30–35). The suspicion arises that Isokrates composed the *Archidamos* and the speech *On the Peace* as a rhetorical display to present the opposing sides on the general theme of war or peace.⁵²

Against the thesis that *On the Peace* was an epideictic exercise, it has been urged that the speech concerns itself with Athenian affairs at a time when they aroused the author’s disapproval. Timotheos, the pupil of whom he was most willing to boast, had been disgraced.⁵³ It must be admitted that *On the Peace* bears some relation to the condition of the Athenians at the end of the Social War and that it is complementary to the *Areopagitikos*; the ideas presented in the two works belong together. But the speech *On the Peace* is also complementary by contrast to the *Archidamos*; the opposition both in their general theses and in treatment of particular topics shows that the author thought out the two works together. So the question should be not whether *On the Peace* bears any relation to the condition of Athens in 355–354, but how distant that relation was.

The main burden of *On the Peace* consists in decrying the aspiration for naval power. Isokrates maintains that that aspiration led the Athenians into crimes and misfortunes in the Delian League, and that the same aspiration

led the Spartans into crimes and misfortunes after the Peloponnesian War. But as noted already, he does not illustrate his thesis with any crimes or misfortunes of the Athenians from the period of their Second League. Although he places the speech in the dramatic context of the deliberations on ending the Social War, he keeps his distance from the realities of that situation. The speech shows that the Athenians wished to make peace, something that scarcely requires proof beyond the fact that they did make peace. But the speech does not prove that there existed a "war party," that is, a significant body of opinion that wished to continue fighting. Many professorial historians have treated the writings of Isokrates with great sympathy, and one of them has admitted the reason. Isokrates gave up a career as an advocate to become a professor.⁵⁴

The works composed by Xenophon and Isokrates do not furnish adequate grounds for supposing that in Athens at the end of the Social War there were two major bodies of opinion, divided by the choice between warlike and pacific policies. It is more likely that opinion was relatively uniform. The outcome of the war had been disappointing, public finances were low, and the city had little choice of policy. There is, as it happens, good evidence for the existence of a multitude of individual statesmen and groups, who competed with one another within the limits the current situation set to the formulation of policy. These men and their groupings require attention next.

Internal Politics: Statesmen

When Aristophon brought about the conviction of Timotheos on charges arising from the battle of Embata, this was the greatest success of his career, as far as known. He made his voice heard in 346, when he spoke unsuccessfully against concluding peace with Philip.⁵⁵ Indeed he was still alive, active, and linked to his friend Chares in 342/1.⁵⁶ Rarely has so long and so respected a career achieved so little. Within a short time after the end of the Social War his standing was overshadowed by that of his enemy, Euboulos.

The latter rose to prominence after the Social War by improving the finances of the state and the economy of the community. By 346 the annual revenue had risen to nearly four hundred talents and it continued to improve.⁵⁷ The specific steps of reform he undertook have for the most part escaped record. He may well have initiated the measures noted in connection with the recommendations of Xenophon. In 330, when he was dead, he was remembered in connection with the office in charge of the theoric fund. As the name indicates, money from this fund enabled citizens to attend festivals. Although the office was collegiate by the 320s, it may have been held at first by one man each year. Reelection was probably allowed. The fund and the office controlling it were probably brought into being soon after the end of the Social War, perhaps in two or more stages which Euboulos brought to completion. The officer in charge of the theoric fund came to handle large revenues and he carried out tasks far beyond distributing

money for festivals. The tasks performed included improving the dockyards, building the naval arsenal, constructing roads, and improving the battlements of the fortifications.⁵⁸ Measures were taken safeguarding some source or sources of revenue for the theoric fund. Speaking before the assembly in 349/8, Demosthenes said that these measures impeded the Athenians from engaging in armed enterprises. Apparently the restrictions were an impediment to some possible ventures abroad, but armed expeditions were sent out within the period when Euboulos was ascendant (for example to Thermopylai in 352, to the straits in 351, to Olynthos and Euboa in 349/8). The matter is obscure.⁵⁹

The foreign policy of Euboulos will require attention in connection with events of 352, 349/8, and 347/6. Some of his friends can be named. One of them was Meidias, a wealthy man. Demosthenes engaged in a bitter quarrel with him but reached a settlement. The antagonism, which had gone on for a long time, came to a head when Meidias struck Demosthenes in public at the Dionysia, probably the celebration in spring 348.⁶⁰ Hegesileos, the cousin of Euboulos, was general as early as 362 (see chapter 4 at note 102). Aischines associated with Euboulos closely, joining him in an attempt to bring Greek cities together for common action toward Philip in 347/6; when Aischines was prosecuted in 343/2, Euboulos was one of the men pleading in his support.⁶¹

There is less certainty about other possible associates of Euboulos. Three names call for consideration. Phokion, like Euboulos, pleaded in support of Aischines in 343/2. In 348 he operated in Euboa on a venture that involved Meidias and Hegesileos. Evidently he could cooperate with associates of Euboulos. But in 348 he expelled Ploutarchos, the tyrant of Eretria, whom Euboulos and Meidias had sought to support. Moreover, he had risen to some prominence before Euboulos became influential and in association with a man of a different stamp. He had begun his career as an adherent of Chabrias. He served with distinction at the battle of Naxos. Straight after the battle Chabrias sent him to visit some of the islands. In 366, during the crisis over the loss of Oropos, Phokion urged the Athenians not to fight the Boiotians but to submit the issue to arbitration. Perhaps Chabrias and Kallistratos were held accountable for the agreement whereby Oropos was entrusted to the Thebans pending arbitration, and Phokion urged the Athenians to abide by that agreement. After the death of Chabrias Phokion became guardian of his son, Ktesippos. He survived until 318 and was general forty-five times. Probably he was building up a following of his own about the time of the Social War. His ancient biographers, Nepos and Plutarch, concentrated on his last years, and so his adherents are known mainly as men who were executed with him in 318 or fled to escape execution. But some of them had already been his friends for a long time. Nikokles, for example, who was executed, was already described by Phokion as his close friend in 335, and Kallimedon, who escaped, was a descendant of Agyrrhios, the uncle of Kallistratos.⁶²

Second, Diophantos of Sphettos has been associated with Euboulos by

some historians because a scholiast says that much money was distributed in the theoric category, some by Diophantos and some by Euboulos.⁶³ It is indeed possible that the theoric fund came into being in several steps, the first being taken by Diophantos. But the scholiast's remark does not establish that he and Euboulos were associates; they may even have been rivals. Diophantos was remembered later as a man of great influence.⁶⁴ Early in the 360s he had associated with Kallistratos. In 369/8, when the people of Mytilene were puzzled at the change in Athenian policy toward Sparta, explanations were furnished by Kallistratos, but the negotiations with Mytilene continued into 368/7 and Diophantos took part in them. Likewise in 368/7 he proposed a decree according honors to a Spartan.⁶⁵ Somehow he survived the disaster that overtook Kallistratos. After that he is likely to have been a leading figure in his own right rather than a mere associate of Euboulos.

The most suggestive of the three names to be considered is Nausikles. He proposed Aischines for the embassy sent to negotiate peace with Philip in 347/6 and, like Euboulos, he pleaded for Aischines in 343/2. But so did Phokion. In 352 Nausikles commanded the force sent by the Athenians to guard Thermopylai against the expected advance of Philip. It was an important venture, carried out while Euboulos was influential. It was successful, and Diophantos proposed the consequent decree for sacrifices of thanks.⁶⁶ But in view of the probable independence of Phokion and Diophantos, these indications do not suffice for supposing that Nausikles was an associate of Euboulos.

Toward the end of the Social War, other groups besides those of Aristophon and Euboulos were becoming prominent. There were, for example, the brothers Hegesandros and Hegesippos. Hegesandros, who was probably the older brother, was treasurer to Timomachos on a naval venture, probably before 361/0, Timomachos being related by marriage to Kallistratos. He was treasurer of Athena in 361/0.⁶⁷ Some time he attacked Aristophon, perhaps on one of the seventy-five suits for proposing illegal decrees that Aristophon faced in the course of his career.⁶⁸ In the early summer of 356 he proposed a decree for choosing an officer to command the garrison in Andros and for exacting payments from the islands to support that garrison.⁶⁹ Nothing is heard of him after 345. The other brother, Hegesippos, proposed concluding the Athenian alliance with Phokis in 355/4 (see note 23). Some time he proposed a decree for punishing men who had attacked Eretria; different dates have been suggested for it, the most probably being 348.⁷⁰ In the late 340s Hegesippos was to achieve a place of the first prominence among people leading the Athenians in diplomatic resistance to Philip. In the 350s the two brothers were taking the first steps toward a distinguished career.

Yet another group, whose activity spans the Social War, can be named. This consisted of Androtion and his associates. As noted (at note 13), Androtion, Glauketes, and Melanopos had been sent as envoys to Mausso-

los in 355 or 354. Nothing more of interest can be said about Glauketes. Melanopos was the grandson of Laches, who had been one of the commanders of Athenian forces in the Peloponnesian War.⁷¹ It may be worth remarking that a female relative, probably a daughter or a sister, of Melanopos was given in marriage to Diophantos of Sphettos, and the latter named one of his sons Melanopos.⁷² In the middle of the fourth century Androtion, like Melanopos, was one of the few leading Athenians who could boast ancestors prominent in the Peloponnesian War. His father, Andron, had taken part as one of the Four Hundred in the revolution of 411. When the Four Hundred were overthrown, Andron survived and proposed the decree for trying Archeptolemos, Onomakles, and Antiphon.⁷³ Neither the good descent of Androtion and Melanopos nor their common service on the embassy to Maussolos need show that they were political allies, although the embarrassments arising from the embassy were likely to draw them together.

Androtion was a member of the council of five hundred in 356/5. When he was on trial in the next year, the prosecutor said that he had belonged to a small group that had collaborated to influence the council. The others were specified as "Philippos, Antigenes, the second secretary, and some others."⁷⁴ Nothing more is known of these men, and the prosecutor's assertion may be tendentious, but at least it suggests that Androtion had more than one associate. There remains a friend of Androtion whose collaboration with him is well attested. That is Timokrates. In 365/4 or shortly before, Androtion had had himself commissioned to reform the sacred vessels made of precious metals and carried in processions; they were to be melted down and cast afresh. Timokrates assisted him in this.⁷⁵ About the end of the Social War, when Androtion was authorized to collect arrears of eisphora, Timokrates assisted him again.⁷⁶

Further, as will be remembered, the trireme carrying Androtion, Glauketes, and Melanopos to Maussolos in 355 or 354 captured valuables that originated from Naukratis. When a commission of inquiry was set up under the decree of Aristophon to trace sacred and public money, information was brought to the commission that the Naukratitic cargo, valued at nine and a half talents, was withheld by the two trierarchs of the ship. When the assembly deliberated on this matter, Androtion, Glauketes, and Melanopos declared that they themselves, not the trierarchs, had possession of the valuables. In subsequent proceedings the three former envoys found themselves threatened with a double fine and they said that they could repay the simple amount only. So early in 353/2 Timokrates carried a law postponing the threat of imprisonment, if the debtors could offer sureties. The measure was stated in fully general terms and may have been intended as a permanent reform, not merely a partisan alleviation for Androtion and his colleagues. For the measure is similar in spirit to another law, which Timokrates had carried a few years before; this instituted a procedure to ensure that persons prosecuted by eisangelia to the council should not be held indefi-

nately but brought to trial before a court within thirty days after arrest.⁷⁷ Even so, the measure proposed by Timokrates in 353/2 brought benefit to Androtion.

More light on the relationship between the two men is thrown by a decree of 347/6. It proposed honors for the three sons of Leukon, who had ruled the kingdom of the Crimean Bosphoros. The Athenians took care to keep on good terms with the dynasty ruling there because of the grain they imported from the kingdom. The decree honoring the three sons was proposed by Androtion, but by an oversight he named only two of them. Polyeuktos carried an amendment adding the third. Polyeuktos was the son of Timokrates.⁷⁸ In short, the record linking Timokrates and his son to Androtion extends over a period of nearly twenty years. Their collaboration may have continued longer. The attested record should give pause to those who favor an atomistic view of the Athenian political scene. Friendships between Athenian statesmen could last a long time.

Philip in Thessaly and Thrace

As shown in the preceding section, a multitude of mutually independent political groups can be discerned in Athens about the time of the Social War. There may have been others in addition to those for which evidence has survived. Euboulos is spoken of with greater respect than his contemporaries because of his success in financial policy. He may have become the leading man in Athens for a time, but this does not imply that he initiated all the measures taken by his fellow citizens in the late 350s. Athens had no minister-president. Moreover although Euboulos achieved distinctive success with measures to improve the economy and the revenues, no differences of policy can be discerned between the rival groups. Indeed policy was dictated by the situation. The need for peace and economic recovery could not be denied. The writings of Isokrates and the more practical treatise of Xenophon show that these needs were recognized.

Within a few years of the end of the Social War, the advance of Macedonian power in Thessaly and Thrace was to threaten Athenian security. So attention must now be given to some steps Philip took to win friends and influence people in those two areas. In Thessaly since the death of Jason the rulers of Pherai had been ambitious but not powerful enough to assert themselves over the other cities. So there was rivalry with varying fortunes between Pherai and the cities of the Thessalian League, which had been restored probably by Pelopidas in 369.⁷⁹ Among the cities of the League, Larissa was the preserve of the Aleuadai, who had long been allies of the Macedonian dynasty. Philip as king probably made his first visit to Larissa some time in 358, after his major victory over Bardylis of the Illyrians.⁸⁰ Although he doubtless had a bodyguard, there is no reason to suppose that he brought any large force. The visit may have been essentially diplomatic; Philip encouraged the Aleuadai in their resistance to the ambitions of the

rulers of Pherai. Since he had lately become king of Macedon, he recognized a need to assure his Thessalian friends that he would continue the friendship.

By the summer of 355, when Philip next intervened in Thessaly, the balance of forces had changed. On the one hand Macedon had begun to reveal its latent strength. As already noted, Philip had captured Amphipolis in 357 and Pydna promptly afterward. In the course of 356 he had captured Poteidaia and given the site to the Olynthians. He had seized Krenides and renamed it Philippoi; henceforth he had a good supply of gold and silver from the mines in its neighborhood. In the same season of 356 the Macedonians had withstood successfully the combined attacks of the kings of Illyria, Paionia, and western Thrace; indeed, Philip had begun his encroachment on Thrace by reducing Ketriporis to vassal status. On the other hand changes had taken place in Thessaly. Late in 358 or early in 357 Alexander of Pherai was assassinated by the three brothers of his wife. The brothers, led by the eldest among them, Tisiphonos, took control. On the joint rule of the brothers Diodoros says:

At first as tyrannicides they were received with great acclaim. But later they changed their policy, won over the mercenaries with payments, and showed themselves as tyrants. They killed many of their opponents, they secured a considerable army, and they held the city by force. The people who were called the Aleuadai among the Thessalians and enjoyed wide fame because of their good lineage opposed the tyrants. By themselves they did not have sufficient force, and so they secured Philip, the king of the Macedonians, as an ally. Philip returned to Thessaly. He overcame the tyrants by warfare and restored freedom to the cities. Thus he showed great goodwill toward the Thessalians.

Diodoros is imprecise on the duration of these events. It is reasonable to suppose that the period of harmony in Thessaly lasted well into 356. The expedition of Philip in response to the appeal of the Aleuadai may have taken place in the first half of 355 or in the summer of that year. Before the end of 355 Philip began the difficult siege of Methone, but he is not known to have been occupied in the preceding part of the year. Diodoros is also imprecise about the nature of the events themselves. Although he says that Philip "overcame the tyrants by warfare," Lykophron and Peitholaos, the brothers of Tisiphonos, continued to rule in Pherai.⁸¹

Thus by 355 Philip was strong enough to venture with an army into Thessaly, but he was not yet able to overcome finally the tyrants of Pherai. His major achievement of 354 was the capture of Methone, and toward the spring of 353 he was active in Thrace (see subsequent discussion). Later in 353, in response to a Thessalian invitation, Philip brought an army to Thessaly to operate against the tyrants of Pherai. The latter sought help from Phokis. Onomarchos had been leader of the Phokians since the death of Philomelos at the battle of Neon in 354. Now he sent his brother Phayllos with a force of seven thousand to help the Pheraians. But Philip defeated Phayllos and drove him from Thessaly. Thereupon Onomarchos brought his whole force to Thessaly. He defeated Philip and the Thessalians in two battles and

inflicted heavy losses. Philip had to retire to Macedon. But in 352 he came to Thessaly with a large force and attacked the tyrants of Pherai. At their invitation Onomarchos brought in an army against Philip and the other Thessalians. The issue was decided in an engagement that has come to be called the battle of the Crocus Field. Philip and his Thessalian allies defeated Onomarchos, who lost his life, and they killed many Phokians.⁸²

After the battle the brothers Lykophron and Peitholaos, the surviving tyrants of Pherai, surrendered to Philip. They were allowed to leave with their mercenaries and they joined the Phokians. It was probably now that Philip was chosen archon of the Thessalian League. Henceforth he was master in Thessaly, although he carried out reorganizations in the 340s.⁸³ In this manner Philip extended his power southward so as to approach central Greece. The Athenians recognized this advance as a threat to their interests. They acted with forethought. At the battle of the Crocus Field, some Phokians fled from the rout and swam out to the ships they saw in the Gulf of Pagasai; for according to the sole extant source for the incident, "Chares happened to be sailing past with many triremes."⁸⁴ It is not likely that his presence was accidental, but he accomplished nothing more than to save some fugitives.

More effective Athenian action followed shortly. After overthrowing the tyranny at Pherai, capturing Pagasai, and arranging the affairs of Thessaly to his liking, Philip advanced toward Thermopylai. His immediate aim was to fight against the Phokians, but if he once won control of the defile, there was no place to stop him in central Greece. But at Thermopylai he found his path blocked by five thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry, sent from Athens under the command of Nausikles.⁸⁵ This force had probably come by sea, because a force sent by the Athenians with a similar mission in 346 took the naval route. The defile at Thermopylai was narrow and could be held by a small number of men against an enemy coming from the north, provided that there were reinforcements to relieve the defenders. The Athenian force was adequate. Philip made no attempt on Thermopylai but retired to Macedon. Nausikles had accomplished his mission, and at Athens sacrifices of thanksgiving were offered on the proposal of Diophantos (see earlier at note 66).

In Thrace likewise Philip was able to extend his power by a series of steps. As will be remembered, the Odrysian kingdom had been divided into three parts when Kotys was killed in 360/59. Berisades took western Thrace as his share. He had as his adviser Athenodoros, an Athenian citizen allied to him by marriage. During Philip's first year of rule, Berisades at first supported Pausanias as pretender to Macedon, but Philip bought off Berisades with gifts. By 356 Berisades had died and been succeeded by his sons, of whom Ketriporis was the chief. In 356 Philip reduced the kingdom of western Thrace to vassal status. Ketriporis was still king in 352 and perhaps a good deal later.⁸⁶ Evidently he caused Philip no trouble after 356. Athenodoros remained as adviser at the court of Ketriporis. He was still there in 352 and perhaps later. In 358 he had organized the resistance of Berisades and Ama-

dokos to the ambitions of Kersebleptes, and in 357 he was present when Chares achieved with Kersebleptes a treaty satisfactory to the Athenians.⁸⁷ As Athenian resident at the court of Ketriporis, Athenodoros could be expected to play a role similar to that which Iphikrates had played at the court of Kotys from 365 until 360; he served his Thracian master and protected the interests of the Athenians at the same time. Since Athenodoros continued in the service of Ketriporis after the latter had become a vassal of Philip, it follows that no clash of interests was recognized in western Thrace between Philip and the Athenians.

Intervention by Philip in Thrace is next attested for the winter of 354/3 or spring of 353. This time Philip advanced into central Thrace, the kingdom of Amadokos. The main information comes from a remark of Demosthenes in a forensic speech of 352/1:

When Philip came to Maroneia, Kersebleptes sent Apollonides to him and gave pledges to him and to Pammenes. Indeed if Amadokos, who controlled the territory, had not forbidden Philip to encroach, there would have been nothing to save you from finding yourselves at war with the people of Kardia and with Kersebleptes. To prove the truth of what I say take the letter of Chares.

A late source says that Philip ravaged the land of Abdera and Maroneia, and when he was returning with an army and a fleet, Chares with twenty ships lay in wait at Neapolis, but the Macedonian fleet escaped his vigilance by a stratagem.⁸⁸ This additional information shows that Philip was not engaged in a purely diplomatic mission when he reached Maroneia; he had armed forces with him, although they may not have been large.

Demosthenes tells of a conference at Maroneia. Philip, Amadokos, and Pammenes of Thebes were present, and Kersebleptes of eastern Thrace sent a representative. Difficulty confronts any attempt to interpret the remark of Demosthenes, because in this speech he misrepresents Kersebleptes and his adviser, Charidemos, as persistent enemies of Athens. In fact there was no friction between Kersebleptes and the Athenians after the treaty concluded in 357, and they drew closer in 353/2. In the remark quoted, Demosthenes suggests that in the conference at Maroneia Philip and Kersebleptes threatened to collaborate against Athenian interests in the Chersonese, to which Kardia commanded the approach, but Philip was frustrated by the resistance of Amadokos. If one discounts the bias of the speech, the remark attests a diplomatic conference which is not known to have brought about any decision, concluded a treaty, or prompted armed action. The presence of Pammenes is suggestive. Philip was about to fight against the Phokians in Thessaly, and the Thebans were engaged in a bitter war against the Phokians. It does not follow that Philip had to ally with Thebes, but he could well desire a meeting and an exchange of views with a Theban spokesman. His dealings with Amadokos and with the representative of Kersebleptes at Maroneia may have been similar in spirit. By his journey to Maroneia, Philip opened

relations with princes whom he might hope to accept later as associates or vassals. He brought an army and some warships but he had no desire to engage in armed conflict; he withdrew in response to the remonstrance of Amadokos, and that remonstrance may not have been so abrupt in tone as Demosthenes suggests. Philip was content with a show of force and a parley.

The Athenians, however, were acutely sensitive to the security of the Chersonese. In 353/2 Chares captured Sestos and the Athenians sent cleruchs to the peninsula. The cleruchy was installed with the concurrence of Kersebleptes.⁸⁹

Philip was preoccupied with Thessalian affairs in the rest of 353 and the first half of 352. He was checked at Thermopylai toward the middle of summer.⁹⁰ He turned his attention promptly to Thrace; indeed, a few years later Demosthenes remarked on the speed with which Philip moved from one theater of operations to the other.⁹¹ An opportunity arose in Thrace because war had broken out between Kersebleptes on the one side and the cities of Byzantion and Perinthos on the other, and Amadokos had joined in the war on the side of the Greek cities. This Amadokos may have been a new king, bearing the same name as his father. If so, he was not inhibited by such resistance as the earlier king had shown to Philip at Maroneia. Arriving in Thrace, Philip intervened against Kersebleptes. He compelled Kersebleptes to yield the land that was in dispute between him and his enemies. Kersebleptes further entrusted his son as a hostage to Philip.⁹² Amadokos the younger doubtless accepted the status of a vassal. He is not known to have caused any trouble to Philip.

On this campaign Philip reached and besieged Heraion Teichos, which was on or near the coast of the Propontis and not far from Perinthos. The news that Heraion Teichos was under siege reached the Athenians in Maimakterion of 352/1. After much discussion the Athenians voted to send a fleet of forty triremes, to conscript citizens up to the age of forty-five years, and to levy an eisphora of sixty talents. To dispatch such a fleet in winter would have been difficult. The fleet was not dispatched, for better news arrived soon. It said variously that Philip was ill or dead. Presumably he was ill, for he abandoned the siege of Heraion Teichos and returned to Macedon about the winter. In Boedromion of 351/0 the Athenians sent Charidemos to the straits with ten ships and five talents but without a complement of soldiers.⁹³ His force was sufficient to meet local emergencies and send news of greater dangers in good time.

By the end of 352 the Athenians could be satisfied with the defensive policy they were pursuing toward Philip. The two areas where Macedonian policy might threaten them were central Greece and the straits. When Philip approached Thermopylai, the defile leading to central Greece, in the summer of 352, the Athenians sent Nausikles with a force, which checked him effectively. Later in the year, when Philip reached Heraion Teichos, they voted the dispatch of an adequate force. They did not need to send it because Philip fell ill and gave up his immediate designs. The Athenians were

restricting themselves in foreign policy to defending their vital interests. Some have attributed this restricted policy to Euboulos, but the attribution depends on the insoluble question of his relation to Nausikles. In any case the policy was the policy of the Athenians, whoever the spokesman may have been.

Recognizing the potential for confrontation between Philip and the Athenians in 352, some historians have inquired into Philip's intentions.⁹⁴ That question cannot be answered and it is of no great moment. The relations of states are determined more by their location, power, and resources than by the ephemeral designs of mortal statesmen. The Macedonians were expanding for reasons that cannot be discerned. No doubt the population was increasing; moreover, it was increasing within a political structure that, however rudimentary, channeled the growth into military outlets. The Athenians responded in a manner characteristic of a sated power. They adopted a policy of "Maginot Line" type. They restricted their foreign commitments to defending the positions where their survival could be endangered. But confronted with a dynamic power, a sated power is at a disadvantage. Every Maginot Line can be turned because, sooner rather than later, something happens that the defender has not foreseen. Something the Athenians had not foreseen happened in Phokis in 346.

The estimate of Philip which the Athenians entertained about 352 is revealed by some utterances of a rising politician. The forensic speech *Against Aristokrates*, composed by Demosthenes (23) and delivered in 352/1, mentions Philip several times. The speaker remarks in passing that the Athenians would gladly kill Philip's friends and Philip himself (23.109). He holds up the Olynthians as an example to the Athenians; although Philip captured Poteidaia by a great effort and gave it to the Olynthians, they distrust him so much that they have opened friendly relations with Athens and they talk of making an alliance (23.107-9). Philip is faithless. While he was besieging Amphipolis, he said that he intended to hand it over to the Athenians, but when he had captured it, he took Poteidaia from them too (23.116). But Philip is also foolish. He took Amphipolis from the Athenians and made friends with the Thessalians, who are not reliable, but it would have been in his interests to continue the friendship of his ancestors with the Athenians (23.111-12). The Athenians now believe that Philip is as great an enemy as they have, but when their forces had been sent in support of Argaios, Philip made friendly approaches to them (23.121). In sum the references in this speech portray Philip as an enemy but a distant enemy; he is not a threat impinging directly on the needs or the security of the Athenians.

The same attitude appears in a speech delivered by Demosthenes a year later in the assembly; arguing for intervention in Rhodes, he said (15.24):

I see that some of you are given to despising Philip as not worth attention, while you fear the Persian king as a powerful enemy of any whom he chooses to oppose. But if we decline to resist the one because he is insignificant and we

yield everything to the other because he is dangerous, who shall we resist, gentlemen of Athens?

Although Philip is recognized as an enemy, the implication is that the Athenians can please themselves whether to take action against him. In these two speeches the references to Philip are not parts of the main thesis argued by Demosthenes but are incidental. So the attitude expressed toward Philip was evidently one that he could take for granted among his fellow citizens at the time.

Demosthenes in His Early Public Speeches

Several speeches that Demosthenes composed between 355 and 350 have been preserved. Some were intended for public trials and others for delivery in the assembly. By means of these speeches Demosthenes at last made himself felt in public life after his unsuccessful attempt of the late 360s. The collective impression these speeches make on the reader is that Demosthenes, now about thirty years old, had to work very hard. The speeches call for review in turn.

In 356/5 Leptines proposed a law concerning festival (or agonistic) liturgies and exemptions. These liturgies may have numbered about a hundred in normal years and more in years of the Greater Panathenaia.⁹⁵ The festivals were celebrated not by the city itself but by smaller units such as phylai and demes, and so the festival liturgies benefited these units, not the civic funds.⁹⁶ The Athenians had granted specific persons exemption from the festival liturgies as a favor or reward. The bill of Leptines canceled current exemptions and forbade future grants of exemption; it allowed only the exemptions to the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton.⁹⁷

The bill was passed by a board of lawgivers (nomothetai). Several people set about challenging it by a *graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai*. But there was a delay, perhaps because one of the challengers, Bathippos, died. A year passed, and so the law of Leptines became part of the current body of law (*nomoi keimenoi*). This meant that the proper procedure for quashing the law was no longer a *graphe* before a *dikasterion* but *nomothesia* before a body of lawgivers. The difference was not great, since in either procedure the decision would be taken by a panel of 501 men drawn from the 6,000 who were qualified to serve as *dikastai*. The important difference concerned the liability of Leptines. The *thesmothetai*, who had the task of bringing the case into court, worked out a solution. The case would be heard by a *dikasterion* and an adverse vote would quash the law of Leptines, but he himself would not be liable and advocates (*syndikoi*) should be elected to defend the law.⁹⁸

It is not clear how many people still took part in challenging the law of Leptines, when the case came to trial in 355/4. The Byzantine hypotheses to the extant speech *Against Leptines* (20) name several participants but may not be reliable. Apsephion, the son of the deceased Bathippos, was pres-

ent, for the speech says so (20.144). Since the extant speech contains plentiful material, it has been inferred reasonably that this speaker bore the main burden of proving the case; any other speech delivered in the same cause cannot have been long or important.⁹⁹ An ancient tradition says that the speaker of the extant speech was Demosthenes himself.¹⁰⁰ If true, this tradition would explain the opening of the speech:

Gentlemen of the bench, I have agreed to join in this case to the best of my ability, mainly because I think that it is to the advantage of the city that the law should be quashed, but also for the sake of the son of Chabrias.

Chabrias, on whose merits the speech expatiates (20.75–84), had received a hereditary grant of exemption. He had been the ally of Kallistratos, a man whose memory Demosthenes respected.

The outcome of the trial is not known. Demosthenes argued his case forcefully, but there is no reason to suppose that he was successful. In the same year of 355/4 Demosthenes composed the speech for a certain Diodoros to deliver against Androtion.¹⁰¹ The latter had been councillor in 356/5 and at the end of the year he had proposed the customary decree granting the council a crown. But the council had not built the number of triremes required by law. So in the new year two men, Euktemon and Diodoros, made this deficiency their ground for prosecuting Androtion by a *graphe paranomon*. When the case came to trial, Euktemon spoke first. He and Diodoros each told of private feuds they were pursuing against Androtion. Diodoros said that Androtion had tried to cast discredit on him by charging Diodoros's uncle with impiety in associating with Diodoros after Diodoros had allegedly committed patricide (22.1–3). After arguing insistently about the crown granted to the council and about the importance of building ships, Diodoros devoted the later part of the speech to denouncing Androtion's other acts of policy, his exaction of arrears of *eisphora* and his reform of the sacred vessels carried in processions. Evidently the prosecution was inspired by personal and political hatred toward Androtion and his associates; the issue concerning the crown for the council was a mere opportunity.

Androtion was acquitted, but the feud continued. In 355 or 354 Androtion served with Glauketes and Melanopos on an embassy to Maussolos. The trireme carrying them captured some valuables originating from Naukratis (see previous discussion at note 77). The man who laid information against the two trierarchs for withholding the valuables was Euktemon. Androtion and his two colleagues replied in the assembly that they themselves were in possession of the valuables. So Euktemon proposed a decree, that the Athenians should demand the valuables from the two trierarchs but these should be allowed to pass the demand on to the men in possession. This decree was passed. Androtion and his colleagues brought a *graphe paranomon* against the decree, but the court upheld the decree. The three former envoys were willing to pay the simple sum but were threatened with the prospect of a double fine. So in the first month of 353/2 Timokrates had a

law passed to meet their wishes. Thereupon Euktemon and Diodoros prosecuted Timokrates by a *graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai*.¹⁰²

On this occasion, as two years before, the speech Demosthenes composed for Diodoros argued the case with care and acumen. The verdict of the trial is not recorded. The outcome cannot have been disastrous for Timokrates. He and Androtion continued to be active in public affairs. The two extant speeches, *Against Androtion* (22) and *Against Timokrates* (24), were composed by Demosthenes not strictly in any cause of his own but for Diodoros to deliver. Likewise, when Euktemon faced the *graphe paranomon* of Androtion, the speech for his successful defense was composed by Demosthenes.¹⁰³ Yet the role of Demosthenes was not merely that of a hired advocate. He had already come into conflict with Timokrates when he sued his guardians. For a man bent on political activity it may have been advantageous to cultivate a feud; in doing so he displayed his courage.

In 354/3, that is in the year between the speeches *Against Androtion* and *Against Timokrates*, Demosthenes delivered *On the Symmories* (14), the earliest of the extant speeches he made in the assembly. The sole information about the occasion is to be drawn from the speech itself. There was alarm in Athens because of a rumor that the Persian king was preparing to attack the Greeks, but there was no immediate or certain danger. At the meeting of the assembly, those speaking before Demosthenes had adopted a heroic tone, praising the ancestors of the present Athenians and urging immediate military action. Demosthenes on the other hand advised caution; the Athenians should do nothing provocative but should improve their preparations for meeting the Persians or any other enemy. He included in his speech a proposal for a reform of the trierarchic symmories; he took evident delight in arithmetical calculations about ships and contributors.

Apart from this speech, nothing else attests a rumor of a Persian plan against Greece for 354/3. Some have suggested an earlier context for the speech, for example in 356/5 in the deliberations leading Athens to ally through Chares with Artabazos.¹⁰⁴ But the service of Chares under Artabazos need not have brought about an alliance of Artabazos under Athens, and even if such an alliance was concluded, there was no need for a rumor of an impending Persian attack to provoke it. Dionysios of Halikarnassos assigns the speech *On the Symmories* to 354/3, and a diplomatic context can be found for the rumor leading to the debate. It was suggested previously (at note 10) that toward the winter or spring of 354/3 the Thebans became disappointed because the king's naval preparations were not directed against their Greek enemies and they sent Pammenes with five thousand men for Artabazos in order to put pressure on their royal friend. Rumor can easily transform a threat into the supposed realization of its aim. So it is easy to believe that sometime in 354/3 the Athenians received an empty rumor that the king was preparing to attack them.

Speaking before the assembly in 351/0, Demosthenes (15.6) boasted of the stand he had taken in 354/3. He said that, when the Athenians had been deliberating on matters concerning the king, he had been the first and almost

the only speaker to advise them to restrict themselves to prudent preparations. The main purpose of the speech *On the Symmories* was to dissuade the Athenians from taking provocative action. The policy of prudence, advocated in the speech, was the obvious one to follow. As Demosthenes complained later, it took little to persuade the Athenians to do nothing. One need not begrudge him the boast made three years later that they had followed his advice. The speech *On the Symmories* also recommended a reform of the trierarchic symmories. There is no reason to think that this was adopted. It was not likely to be adopted. In 358/7 a law, proposed by Periandros, had extended the burden of the trierarchy to twelve hundred men and grouped them in twenty symmories.¹⁰⁵ A reform was not likely to be adopted in 354/3, since the new scheme had not been in force long enough to be assessed. Admittedly in 340 Demosthenes reformed the trierarchy, but on different lines. Perhaps his proposal of 354/3 on the trierarchy was not intended seriously. His aim in the speech of that year was to make himself known by giving advice on foreign policy that none could gainsay.

In the next year he spoke again on foreign policy in the assembly, and this time he took a more distinctive position. Sparta had not adhered to the common peace of 362/1, and hostilities continued intermittently between the Spartans and the Arkadian federation, which had its seat at Megalopolis. In 353/2 the Arkadians sent envoys to Athens to seek an alliance against Sparta, and the Spartans sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from making such an alliance. Demosthenes delivered the speech *For the Megalopolitans* (16) in favor of accepting the alliance offered by the Arkadians. He alludes in the speech (16.11–12) to his opponents in the debate without naming them; possibly they were headed by Diophantos of Sphettos, who had been instrumental in bringing about the Athenian rapprochement with Sparta early in the 360s (see earlier at note 65). The cause advocated in the speech amounted to a significant departure from established policy. Since 369 the Athenians had befriended the Spartans and opposed the Thebans; their bitterness toward Thebes was increased by the loss of Oropos. But as the speech indicates, the Arkadians who sought an alliance with Athens in 353/2 were known to have the sympathy of Thebes.

Demosthenes had to argue his case with care. Indeed, the speech reveals two lasting features of his thought on public affairs. One of them is realism. He remarks:

One must always ascertain and uphold the just cause, but one must also make sure at the same time that that cause is advantageous. (16.10 fin.)

His main argument for agreeing to the Megalopolitan request for alliance rests on a calculation of forces. If the Athenians do not grant the request, either Megalopolis will be overcome by the Spartans or it will be saved by the Thebans (16.30–31). If Sparta overcomes Megalopolis, Sparta will become too powerful for Athenian safety (16.4–5, 22) and will attack Mesene, which the Athenians are bound by an oath of alliance to defend (16.8–

9, 20). If on the other hand Megalopolis is saved by the Thebans from the Spartan threat, the Thebans will become dangerously powerful (16.5, 30). The other abiding feature of Demosthenic thought that appears in this speech is his sympathy for the weaker party in the dispute, for he believed that the Arkadians were the weaker party. In this feature Demosthenes was in harmony with the dominant tradition of Athenian policy. Nearly forty years before, Andokides (3.28) had upbraided the Athenians for their habit of befriending weak states against strong.

Demosthenes did not succeed in persuading his fellow citizens to assist the Arkadians. The latter had allies within the Peloponnese, notably Argos, Sikyon, and Messene, and they gained valuable help from Thebes. The Spartans on the other side gained help from Phokis, and fighting continued indecisively.¹⁰⁶ The Athenians took no part in these operations. That is not surprising, for by 353/2 they had been loyal to their Spartan connection for many years. Thus the recommendation made by Demosthenes was distinctive. On the other hand the Athenians had had reservations about Spartan behavior. Disappointed in their Peloponnesian allies after the loss of Oropos, the Athenians had made a defensive alliance with the Arkadian federation,¹⁰⁷ and about the beginning of the Third Sacred War the Messenians, finding their Theban friends preoccupied in central Greece, gained a promise of Athenian protection against Spartan attack.¹⁰⁸ The advice Demosthenes gave the Athenian assembly in 353/2 did not win the approval of a majority, but it was not markedly divergent from the current principles of Athenian policy.

The reader may detect a growth in the maturity of the orator as he passes from the speech *On the Symmories* to that *For the Megalopolitans*. The speech *Against Aristokrates*, which Demosthenes composed for a public trial in 352/1, reveals more. This speech is much concerned with Charidemos. The latter was a captain of mercenaries and originated from Oreos. He served under Iphikrates for some three years in the northern command.¹⁰⁹ Later he entered the employ of Kotys. When Kotys died, Charidemos became chief minister and virtual regent to Kersebleptes. He received Athenian citizenship.¹¹⁰ By 353/2 Kersebleptes recognized that Macedonian expansion would threaten his kingdom (see the discussion at notes 88–89). He entered into negotiations with the Athenians. Aristomachos of Alopeke, serving as envoy for Kersebleptes and Charidemos, assured the assembly that it was not in the interests of the Thracian king to encroach on the Chersonese.¹¹¹ Aristokrates proposed a decree granting special protection to Charidemos; it provided that anyone who killed him should be *agōgimos* from the territory of the allies of Athens, and any city sheltering the assassin should be excluded from the relationship created by a treaty of peace.¹¹² The proposal of Aristokrates was passed by the council as a *probouleuma*, but before the assembly could vote on it, it was challenged by a *graphe paranomon*. The case came to trial in 352/1, and Demosthenes composed the extant speech for the prosecution.

Most of the speech divides itself readily into two parts: an argument about

legality (23.22–99) and one about expediency (23.100–86). The former argument is developed with a high degree of juristic sophistication. Demosthenes reviews many of the current laws on homicide and elicits from them an underlying principle—that on apprehending a person suspected of homicide one must not punish him oneself but bring him to court. He maintains that the decree of Aristokrates contravenes this principle.¹¹³ The other argument shows a masterly command of the recent history of the Thracian kingdom. Demosthenes sets out to convince his audience that Charidemos and Kersebleptes are faithless and hostile to Athens.

Yet the argument about legality is flawed. Demosthenes launches into it without pausing to state the meaning of the word *agogimos*. Perhaps he could assume that the listeners knew what the word meant. Perhaps he did not wish to remind them. For in the middle of the argument he betrays the truth. After mentioning involuntary homicide, he says¹¹⁴:

In consequence of your decree anyone to whom an involuntary killer has been surrendered can, if he wishes, take him off by force to the fatherland of the victim.

The decree of Aristokrates did not allow immediate execution of a captive suspected of killing Charidemos; it provided that he should be sent to Athens for trial. The other argument of the Demosthenic speech, the argument from expediency, is also mistaken. Although the orator tried to show that Kersebleptes and Charidemos were bent on harming the Athenians, they had respected the treaty negotiated by Chares in 357, and in 353/2, according to Diodoros,¹¹⁵

Kersebleptes, on account of his antagonism toward Philip and his friendship toward the Athenians, entrusted the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia to them, and the demos sent cleruchs to the cities.

In the speech *Against Aristokrates* Demosthenes presents himself as a good advocate with a bad case. It is not wholly clear that he was a hired advocate. The man who prosecuted Aristokrates, the man for whom the speech was composed, is named by Dionysios of Halikarnassos as Euthykles.¹¹⁶ Yet the speaker, narrating the adventures of Charidemos, employs pronouns of the first-person plural when he tells of the fleet that Kephisodotos led to the straits in 360/59 (23.165–67). Evidently the man who delivered the speech in court in 352/1 had sailed with Kephisodotos in 360/59; one might conjecture that he was one of the trierarchs. One of the ten trierarchs who sailed with Kephisodotos in 360/59 was Demosthenes. Could it be that the name of Euthykles sprang from the error of some Hellenistic scholar, and the man who prosecuted Aristokrates was Demosthenes?

The verdict reached in the trial is not known. It had no direct effect on the proposal of Aristokrates. For the prosecutor indicted the proposal in 353/2, when it had been passed by the council but not yet presented to the assembly for voting. By opening proceedings the prosecutor had the measure sus-

pended, and as a mere probouleuma it lost its force when the new year began.¹¹⁷ Even if the court acquitted Aristokrates, it does not follow that a new bill in similar terms was proposed. But Charidemos continued in the service of the Athenians; he operated in northern waters in 351 and 349/8.

Probably in 352/1 Demosthenes delivered the speech customarily called the *First Philippic* (4) before the assembly. Dionysios of Halikarnassos indicates that date after a fashion, but his information is somewhat ambivalent. For although he gives that date for the speech, he also treats the later part of the extant work, starting at 4.30, as a separate speech and he assigns this to 347/6. Discussion of the date and occasion of the speech has produced acute observations and need not be continued. There is no strong objection to saying that the whole work is a single speech and was delivered in 352/1. Moreover the speech (4.14) mentions an expedition currently under consideration. Charidemos sailed to the straits with ten ships in Boedromion of 351/0 and the assembly did not provide him with a force of citizens as crews; he had to recruit men himself. So it has been conjectured that the debate where the speech was spoken was held toward the end of 352/1 and resolved on dispatching the expedition of Charidemos, but sailing was delayed until Boedromion by the etesian winds and by the need to recruit crews. This conjecture gives force to the insistence of the speech on the need for citizens to serve in person.¹¹⁸

Yet there is something more to be said. In spite of its allusion to an expedition under consideration, the speech is distressingly vague. After justifying himself for being the first to speak (4.1), Demosthenes exhorts the Athenians to be willing to act with vigor (4.2–12). He asks for a favorable hearing (4.13–15) and then comes to his proposals (4.16–22). The Athenians, he says, ought to prepare two forces. One would be held in reserve for swift dispatch, if news came of sallies by Philip to Thermopylai or the Chersonese or Olynthos or elsewhere; it would consist of fifty triremes to be manned by citizens and accompanied by some cavalry transports. The other force, consisting of two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, should be sent out with ten swift triremes to harass Philip constantly. A quarter of the men should be citizens. Demosthenes expatiates on the need for citizens within the force (4.23–27). He calculates the cost of his second force (4.28–29) and introduces an account of a source of funding. That account has not been preserved; the manuscripts of the speech offer a mere heading in its place. Demosthenes devoted the remainder of the speech (4.30–51, the part that Dionysios treats as a separate speech of 347/6) to pointing out the merits of his proposed mode of fighting Philip in comparison with the policies pursued hitherto. The speech is vague in that the proposal for two forces is not tied to any immediate situation; it would have been equally appropriate or inappropriate at any time when Athens was at war with Philip. Likewise the speech disappoints the reader when it fails to state the source of funding for the expensive force that was intended to harass Philip constantly. Can it be that the extant speech, though perhaps incorporating material presented to the assembly in 352/1, has been revised drastically by its author for written

circulation and in that process allusions to the immediate situation have been excised?

At least the unsatisfactory character of the speech, apparent if one tries to determine its occasion with precision, accounts for the uncertainties that modern readers have voiced about its date. Moreover, although the speech asserts a need for vigorous action, it is not imbued with the earnestness of the later *Philippics*. Demosthenes opened the speech with an apology for being the first to speak. This was the tone of a junior man in politics. He was not yet sure of himself, since he was not yet sure of his mission. He was to discover his mission in 346. Meanwhile in 352/1 he treated the Macedonian issue adequately perhaps, as he might treat other issues.

Indeed in the next year he spoke in the assembly with equal eloquence on another issue, when he delivered the speech *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* (15). Since the Social War, Maussolos had intervened in Rhodes by helping his partisans and expelling his opponents, and he had installed garrisons in the cities of the island. He died in 353/2 but his widow, Artemisia, continued his policy. Now the exiles appealed to Athens for help and Demosthenes spoke in their support. He seized the occasion to utter clever arguments against his Athenian rivals. For example, he pointed out the inconsistency of those who urged the Athenians to oppose the Persian king in Egypt but expressed fear and respect for Persian power in Rhodes. The first attempt of Artaxerxes III Ochus to recover Egypt was in progress at or about the time of this speech and was unsuccessful.¹¹⁹ Again, Demosthenes noted that some Athenians refused to act against Philip, because he was insignificant, or against the Persian king, because he was powerful; who, then, were the Athenians to oppose (15.24; see the end of the previous section)? Thus Philip, the subject of a whole speech in the previous year, merited only a passing reference now.

The recommendation Demosthenes made in the speech was “to restore the people [*dēmos*] of the Rhodians” (15.28). The speech had at its heart a diatribe against *oligarchiai* as contrasted with *dēmokratiai* or *dēmoi* (15.17–18). As the orator explained, the Athenians could fight wars against democracies because of particular grievances, such as disputes about boundaries or parcels of land, but they fought oligarchies for the sake of the constitution and of freedom. It would be more to the advantage of the Athenians for all other Greeks to be democracies at war against them than oligarchies linked to them by friendship. For one could make peace with free men, but even the friendship of oligarchic regimes was dangerous. The reader of the speech should not be surprised when Demosthenes proceeds at once to add that oligarchy has spread until it controls almost the whole of mankind (15.19).

These melodramatic utterances did not help Athenian listeners to understand issues. They should warn modern readers that the words *oligarchia* and *demokratia* or *demos* could be empty of meaning. The Rhodian exiles, who appealed to the Athenians to restore them, called themselves “the people [*dēmos*].” But the whole community cannot have gone into exile, leaving Karian garrisons to rule a deserted island.¹²⁰ Filled with passion, the

speech *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* was deficient in realism. Although it favored restoring the exiles, it did not propose an armed expedition or an estimate of forces or a source of funds for that purpose. In its later part the speech scored points against miscellaneous Athenian politicians; it observed that some would rather find fault with their own city than defend its policy (15.25), and it asserted that some Athenians betrayed the city's interests for bribes (15.31–33). Perhaps when Demosthenes delivered the speech his main aim was to enhance his prominence by distinguishing himself from other orators.

To attain a distinctive profile was doubtless the first step toward winning the respect of the assembly. The extant speeches show that between 355 and 350 Demosthenes went some way toward making himself known to his fellow citizens. Yet on the whole the speeches suggest discouragement. At the end of 350 Demosthenes could look back on at least five years of hard work and frustration. Admittedly in public trials his defense of Euktemon had been successful. He may indeed have succeeded in his attack on Aristokrates, but even if he did, the career of Charidemos was not impeded. The prosecution of Androtion had failed, and probably those of Leptines and Timokrates had failed too. In the assembly Demosthenes had spoken on the winning side in 354/3, when he urged that the Athenians should take no provocative action against the Persians, but that was an easy cause to plead. The reform of the trierarchy, which Demosthenes professed to advocate, was not undertaken. In 353/2 the Athenians did not agree to ally with the Arkadians. In 352/1 they did not establish either of the forces proposed by Demosthenes for fighting Philip, and when Charidemos sailed to the straits, they did not order citizens to serve under him. Finally in 351/0 they took no steps to restore the Rhodian exiles. Demosthenes may have succeeded in making himself known to his fellow citizens, but in these early years of his public career he had very few successes to record.

The record of public failure is especially striking in comparison with a signal success that Demosthenes won in a private lawsuit in these years. The dispute concerned property left by the banker, Pasion. During 371/0 Pasion leased the bank to his freedman and trusted cashier, Phormion.¹²¹ The assets of the bank included fifty talents, which had been issued as loans to borrowers. Of this sum thirty-nine talents were the *aphormē* or capital owned by Pasion. The remaining eleven talents consisted of deposits put in the bank by its customers. The borrowers, who had received the eleven talents as loans, had pledged immovable property as security. When the lease began, Phormion had not received Athenian citizenship. As a metic he might have difficulty in distraining on immovable property, if the borrowers failed to repay the eleven talents. So a clause of the lease said that Pasion owed the bank eleven talents. Consequently, if the depositors demanded repayment of any part of their eleven talents, Phormion could claim the money from Pasion, and Pasion could recover the money from the borrowers, by distraining on their property if necessary.¹²²

Pasion died in 370/69. He left two sons. The elder, Apollodoros, was

twenty-four years old. The younger, Pasikles, was a minor, and by the will of Pasion Phormion became one of his guardians. The will also assigned Pasion's widow, Archippe, in marriage to Phormion.¹²³ When Pasikles came of age, probably at the beginning of 362/1, the two brothers terminated the lease of the bank to Phormion, and in this settlement Apollodoros renounced all claims against Phormion.¹²⁴

Archippe bore Phormion two sons. She died late in the winter of 361/0. She had brought a large dowry with her to Phormion and she preferred the sons of her second marriage to those of her first. Shortly before dying she gave a present of two thousand drachmas to the two little girls, who were the sole children of Apollodoros. Evidently she tried thus to placate Apollodoros and she wished the greater part of her dowry to pass to the sons whom she had born to Phormion. But promptly after her death Apollodoros opened legal proceedings against Phormion; he demanded a larger share of his mother's dowry. The case was submitted to arbitration and Phormion agreed to the recommendation of the arbitrators, that each of the four sons should receive a quarter of the dowry. So Phormion paid a further sum of three thousand drachmas to Apollodoros.¹²⁵ On this occasion Apollodoros again renounced all his claims against Phormion.¹²⁶

In 352/1 (or possibly 350/49) Apollodoros opened an action against Phormion.¹²⁷ At the termination of the lease of the bank, Phormion had retained eleven talents as payment of Pasion's debt.¹²⁸ Now Apollodoros declared that this sum was part of the *aphorme* or capital owned by the bank. He demanded that Phormion should refund to him eleven talents and the interest on that sum from the eight years when Phormion had had charge of the bank; so he demanded twenty talents in all. Phormion responded with a plea of the type called *paragraphe*; he said that, for a statutory reason, namely because Apollodoros had renounced his claims in a previous settlement, the plea now made by Apollodoros was not admissible to judgment.¹²⁹ *Paragraphe* had the consequence that the court had to hear arguments on the question, whether the plaintiff's plea was inadmissible, and it had to decide that question. There would be a further hearing on the truth of the plaintiff's original plea, if and only if the first hearing decided that that plea was admissible. The immediate effect of *paragraphe* was that the original defendant spoke first, for he set out to show that the plaintiff's plea was not admissible. *Paragraphe* was employed frequently in the course of the fourth century. Possibly Phormion had recourse to *paragraphe* on the advice of the experienced advocate who composed the speech in his cause. Phormion himself spoke Attic with a foreign accent.¹³⁰ When the case opened in court, he had to speak in his own behalf, however briefly, but in accordance with Athenian custom he stood down and allowed a friend to deliver the main speech for him.

That speech was composed by Demosthenes. Possibly it was delivered by Demosthenes,¹³¹ but the identity of the man who spoke it does not matter. The speech *For Phormion* (36) was a masterpiece of forensic oratory. It set out the elaborate antecedents of the case with the clarity for which Attic

prose has become famous. It pointed out that Apollodoros had renounced his claims against Phormion on two previous occasions and therefore the present plea of Apollodoros was not admissible. It explained the character of Pasion's debt of eleven talents. The court found for Phormion,¹³² although that was not the end of disputes between him and Apollodoros.

A litigant who has lost his case can sometimes seek a remedy by lodging a charge of perjury against one of his adversary's witnesses. Apollodoros brought an action for false testimony against Stephanos, who had served as a witness for Phormion in the case. In the consequent trial of Stephanos, Apollodoros had a poor case but treated it with skill. He cast doubt on the authenticity of Pasion's will and of the lease of the bank to Phormion. But he could not say much to impugn the evidence that he had previously renounced his claims against Phormion.¹³³ It is not surprising that his speech was composed with skill. He hired Demosthenes to compose it. Later, when Aischines had become the enemy of Demosthenes, he criticized the latter for furnishing speeches to both sides in the same quarrel.¹³⁴ The criticism, to be made at all, must have been likely to evoke some response from the audience, but the Athenians apparently did not regard the practice of Demosthenes as a serious impropriety. Litigants continued to hire his services as a writer of speeches.¹³⁵ Comparisons with the practice of law in modern times should be eschewed. A speech writer was not an expert in the law, bound to protect the interests of his client; his task was merely to help the latter in composing a persuasive speech.

In his early years Demosthenes doubtless served in more cases than are known. The record of the extant speeches, though incomplete, suggests that he was highly effective in private lawsuits. Yet he turned from advocacy to politics, and he persisted in politics in spite of frustrations. His father had died when he was only seven years old. So his mother, Kleoboule, must have played a large part in his upbringing.¹³⁶ One may wonder whether she evoked in him the determination to excel in spite of obstacles. At least the choice of politics suggests that Demosthenes developed a strong sense of mission. The next chapter will tell how he discovered what his mission was.

6

War and Peace in the North

There was a state of war between Philip II and Athens from 357, when the king seized Amphipolis. But armed operations were mostly conducted at a safe distance from Athens and from places where the Athenians recognized that their vital interests were at stake. By sending cleruchs to the Chersonese in 353/2 and by dispatching Nausikles with a force to Thermopylai in the same year, they convinced themselves that they could maintain their security, even in an emergency. The outbreak of war between Philip and Olynthos in 349 gave them a new opportunity and they rose to meet it. The destruction of Olynthos shocked them but posed no threat to their own city. By 347 they could recognize that their war against Philip did not offer them any prospect of success; it would be better to acknowledge their losses and make peace. But in 346 Philip took advantage of developments in Phokis to seize control of Thermopylai and of the route into central Greece. His success transformed the geopolitical situation for the Athenians. The change in their condition is reflected in the deeds and utterances of Demosthenes. These developments will be the subject of this chapter.

The Olynthian War Begun

In 349, probably about the middle of the summer or a little later, Olynthian envoys came to Athens. The relations between the Chalkidian federation, headed by Olynthos, and Philip of Macedon had deteriorated since 357, when they had made an alliance. By 352/1 the Olynthians, alarmed at the growing power of Macedon, had concluded a treaty of peace with Athens and were talking about following it up with an alliance. Philip responded about the winter of 352/1 with a military demonstration into Chalkidian territory.¹ In 349 Philip led an army into the land of the federation and set about winning cities by intimidation or siege. But he insisted that he was not at war with Olynthos itself and he kept up this pretense until sometime in 348, when he was only eight kilometers from the city.² The Olynthians, how-

ever, were not deceived; they sent envoys to Athens in 349 to ask for an alliance and material help.

It was to be expected that the Athenians would conclude an alliance. By the middle of the fourth century they were scarcely capable of declining an offer of alliance; one may call to mind as an illustration the ineffectual alliance they had concluded with the kings of Illyria, Paionia, and western Thrace in 356. But in 349 they were not content with a mere gesture toward the Olynthians. A fleet of thirty triremes was, it seems, already at sea under Chares, probably in the north. This was ordered to Olynthos. In addition they sent two thousand peltasts and they called for volunteers to provide more ships. In this way a further squadron of eight triremes was raised. Its dispatch may have been delayed until the etesian winds subsided toward the middle of September.³

The debate on the appeal of the Olynthian envoys was probably the occasion when Demosthenes delivered the *First Olynthiac* (1). The text indicates that several others had already spoken in the debate (1.16). Apart from exhorting the Athenians to seize the opportunity and act with vigor, the speech recommended equipping two forces (1.17–18). One of them should be sent to Chalkidike to preserve the cities for the Olynthians, and the other, comprising triremes as well as troops, should harass Macedon. This was the same advice as Demosthenes had given with more detail in the *First Philippic* two years before. The main novelty of the *First Olynthiac* was a guarded allusion to the theoric fund. Demosthenes assured his fellow citizens that the money available was adequate for armed expeditions, if they would desist from taking it at festivals (1.19–20).

Two other speeches of Demosthenes on the Olynthian War are preserved. The *Second Olynthiac* (2), like the *First*, opens in a hopeful manner; fortune has created an opportunity for the Athenians by bringing about warfare between Philip and Olynthos. Much of the speech (2.5–21) is an attempt to show that in spite of appearances Philip is really weak. It concludes (2.22–31) with an elaborate exhortation to the Athenians to act vigorously. Thus it is even less specific in its recommendations than the *First Olynthiac*.

A possible allusion in the *Second Olynthiac* may, if genuine, indicate a precise context. Demosthenes says that the Athenians have been at war with Philip for a long time, and he complains that they have allowed this long time to pass while they have been “delaying, hoping for others to take action, blaming one another, holding trials, entertaining hopes again, doing much the same as now” (2.25). The scholiast explained the remark about holding trials as an allusion to Chares. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 3.1411a6–9) reports:

When Chares was eager to render his accounts for the Olynthian War, Kephisodotos complained that he was putting a stranglehold on the demos by trying to render his accounts.

Chares commanded the first force sent by the Athenians to help the Olynthians in 349/8, but later in the year, about the spring, Charidemus led a

further force to their aid and won some successes (see further at note 15). Perhaps, then, Chares was recalled toward the spring and Demosthenes alludes in the speech to some attempt to try him. But this reconstruction is patently insecure. The remark of Kephisodotos, cited by Aristotle, may have been made sometime in 348/7, after Olynthos had fallen, and the phrase of Demosthenes, "holding trials," need not allude to any one trial.

The *Third Olynthiac* was probably delivered somewhat later than the *First* and the *Second*. Whereas those two speeches had welcomed the current opportunity, the new speech is pessimistic, especially in its opening, where it insists that the Athenians can no longer talk of punishing Philip but only of saving themselves and their allies (3.1–3). For the most part the *Third Olynthiac*, like its two predecessors, is a general exhortation to the Athenians to act with vigor. Possibly all three speeches were delivered early in 349/8 with no long intervals between them. Yet some features can be explained readily by supposing that the *Third Olynthiac* was delivered a good deal later in the year. The first two of the three speeches tell of recalcitrance toward Philip in Thessaly. Allegedly the Thessalians had voted to demand that he restore Pagasai to them, they had prevented him from fortifying Magnesia (or voted to discuss Magnesia), and they would not let him continue to enjoy the revenues of their harbors and markets. Possibly the Thessalian news reaching Demosthenes was exaggerated, but Philip had trouble to deal with in Thessaly, for he interrupted his operations in Chalkidike by making an expedition to Pherai.⁴ The *Third Olynthiac* says nothing about Thessaly. Perhaps it was delivered after Philip had suppressed opposition there. But this indication is insecure; in the *Third Olynthiac* Demosthenes was under no obligation to give an up-to-date account of Thessalian developments.

Again, some readers have attached significance to a change in the tone of Demosthenic references to the theoric fund. In the *First Olynthiac* (1.19–20) Demosthenes alludes to the fund in cautious language. He alludes to it again in the *Third Olynthiac* (3.10–13), but his phrasing is longer and still more circumspect; he suggests that the Athenians should call a board of nomothetai into being. So perhaps this speech was delivered after Apollodoros had proposed diverting funds to military purposes and had been tried and condemned. Apollodoros made his proposal when the Athenians were considering operations in Euboia as well as Olynthos, that is, about the spring of 348.⁵ But this argument for assigning the *Third Olynthiac* to a late date in the Attic year is inconclusive.

To the historian the three speeches are disappointing because they do not delineate their contexts with any precision. There is even room for doubt about the order in which they were delivered. In the manuscripts their order is 1, 2, 3 (if one may designate them by their now current numbers), and the scholiast says at the beginning of speech 2 that Caecilius gave them this order. But Dionysios of Halikarnassos gave them the order 2, 3, 1. Some modern readers have argued for the order 2, 1, 3.⁶ The uncertainty arises because the three speeches are relatively vague; they do not come to grips with the detail of an immediate situation. In this they differ markedly from

the speech *On the Peace* (5) and the speeches delivered later by Demosthenes in the assembly. In 330, when Aischines gave a critical review of the public life of Demosthenes, he began with the steps taken by his rival in 348–346 to bring about peace with Philip (3.54, 62). At the time of the Olynthian War Demosthenes was still trying to make his way on to the public scene.

Another Expedition to Euboea

Late in the winter of 349/8 the Athenians received an appeal from Eretria in Euboea for armed help. A change had taken place in the internal condition of that city. In 352/1 Demosthenes (23.123–24) had named several men who, being influential in their native lands, protected the interests of the Athenians and could therefore hope for gratitude; they included Menestratos in Eretria and Phayllos in Phokis. Menestratos was evidently a leading man, or the leading man, in his city; whether he is to be called “tyrant” is perhaps a question of point of view. He has never been heard of since. The appeal received in Athens early in 348 came from a certain Ploutarchos, who was challenged by a rival in Eretria, Kleitarchos. Details cannot be discerned, but evidently Ploutarchos had come to power recently and he was not securely in control. Kleitarchos had been in exile but had returned. The influence of the Athenians had predominated in Euboea since 357; the island was important to them both for commerce and for security. But in 348 the assembly had to decide whether to rely on Ploutarchos against his rivals.⁷

There was discussion in the assembly. Rather more than two years later Demosthenes (5.5) said that he had been the first and only orator to speak against sending help to Ploutarchos. The utterance was wisdom after the event, and so it may distort the fact. But the fact it distorts is likely to have been some difference of opinion in the debate. There can scarcely have been opposition to taking action of some kind in Euboea. Probably the question was, who was the right man for the Athenians to support in Eretria, Ploutarchos or someone else. It is easy to identify a group of Athenians who favored Ploutarchos. Meidias was his *xenos* and a friend of Euboulos.⁸ The favor of Euboulos and his friends does not exclude the collaboration of other groups.

The Athenians sent Phokion with a sizable force to Euboea about the beginning of Anthesterion. On reaching the island he found a more difficult situation than had been expected. One obstacle was symbolized by Kallias of Chalkis. This man's father, Mnesarchos, had been highly influential in his city. Kallias inherited the confidence of his fellow citizens. Enough is known of his activities later in the 340s to reveal him as the spokesman for a policy of “Euboea for the Euboians.” As time passed, this policy was to win the loyalty of the islanders and bring about eventually a federation of their cities. In 348 Kallias sent his brother, Taurosthenes, to Phalaikos, the commander of the Phokians. Taurosthenes returned with a body of Phokian troops.⁹

The other difficulty that Phokion had to deal with was Ploutarchos. The

two men proved unable to cooperate, although it is not possible to tell whether the reasons were personal or political. When Phokion reached Tamynai with the combined force to oppose Kallias and Taurosthenes, Ploutarchos made a premature attack on the enemy. He was routed, and when the enemy in pursuit reached the ramparts, Phokion had to fight. He won a difficult battle. Soon afterward he decided that Ploutarchos was as undesirable in politics as in the field and expelled him from Eretria. But Ploutarchos remained at large, and after Phokion had left the island, he captured an Athenian commander, Molossos, and held him and his men to ransom. The Athenians paid him fifty talents.¹⁰

Hegesileos, the cousin of Euboulos, also commanded some Athenian forces in Euboia during 348. Indeed the relationship of the commands exercised by Molossos and Hegesileos to that of Phokion, whether they were his colleagues or his successors, is not clear. Hegesileos was put on trial on a charge of joining Ploutarchos in deceiving the people of Athens. He was found guilty, but Euboulos pleaded for sympathy when the penalty was assessed.¹¹ The outcome of the expedition to Euboia, though perhaps not disastrous, was on the whole harmful to Athenian interests. Euboian envoys came to Athens to conclude peace in the summer of 348, shortly before the Olympic festival.¹² Ploutarchos did not return to Eretria. Conflicts continued in that city, as Kleitarchos tried to consolidate his ascendancy.¹³ The man who emerged most creditably from the Euboian troubles of 348 was Kallias. As far as is known, he was secure in Chalkis. But he had several years of labor ahead of him, as he tried to reconcile suspicious neighbors to the Euboian federation of which he dreamed. Eventually he would find the Athenians better disposed to his plans than Philip or the Thebans.¹⁴ But in 348 that development lay in the inscrutable future. For the time being, the setback to Athenian interests in Euboia must surely have diminished the standing of Euboulos and his friends in Athens.

The Olynthian War Ended

While the Athenians concerned themselves with Euboia, Philip continued his operations in Chalkidike. About the spring of 348 the Olynthians sent a second appeal for help to Athens. In response the Athenians ordered Charidemos, who held command in the Hellespont, to Chalkidike. He had probably been in the Hellespont since 351, when he was sent there with ten ships. The force he commanded in Chalkidike comprised eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts, and 150 cavalry. The eighteen triremes may be the ten Charidemos brought from the Hellespont and the eight supplied by volunteers for the previous expedition to Olynthos. The cavalry probably included some cavalry sent on from the operations in Euboia; if this identification is correct, it indicates approximately the time of year of this expedition. Charidemos joined forces with the Olynthians. Together they raided Pallene and Bottiaia. Thus the Olynthians were raiding territory which they had held

until Philip seized it. He had not yet advanced on Olynthos itself to besiege it, but he was not far away.¹⁵

During the summer Philip took Torone and Mekyberna, which were betrayed to him. At last, when he was only eight kilometers from the city of the Olynthians, he gave up the pretense of being at peace with them. He defeated them in two battles and set about besieging their city. The Olynthians sent a third appeal to Athens for help and asked for citizen troops as well as mercenaries. So the Athenians dispatched a further force of seventeen triremes, two thousand citizen hoplites, and three hundred citizen cavalry. They gave the command to Chares. But the expedition was impeded by unfavorable weather, probably the etesian winds. By the time it arrived in the late summer or fall Philip had captured Olynthos.¹⁶ Philip proceeded to plunder and destroy the city, so that it ceased to exist, and he sold the survivors into slavery. Among those who sympathized with the victims there were recriminations. People said that Lasthenes and Euthykrates, two citizens of Olynthos, had accepted Philip's bribes some time before, undermined the resistance to him, and betrayed the city. The Athenians passed a decree condemning those who had betrayed Olynthos.¹⁷

It is difficult to identify the Athenian leaders who spoke for the policies pursued toward Olynthos in 349/8. In the *Third Olynthiac* (3.27–32) Demosthenes denounces the current politicians, contrasting them with the great men of the fifth century, and he mentions the public works which Euboulos promoted. It has been inferred that Euboulos and his friends brought about the three expeditions of limited scale; supposedly they controlled Athenian policy from the end of the Social War until 346.¹⁸ But Athens did not have anything resembling the cabinet or administration of a modern state. The treatment of Ploutarchos, the friend of Meidias, by Phokion shows that policy was not monolithic. The expeditions to Olynthos were commanded by Chares, the friend of Aristophon, and by Charidemos; there is nothing to indicate that Euboulos had confidence in either of them. In the *Third Olynthiac* (3.10) Demosthenes said that all Athenians agreed that they should send help to Olynthos, the question being how. It is better to attribute the Olynthian policy of the Athenians, with its limitations, to the citizens as a whole than to hold any one group responsible.

Assessment of that policy is not easy. If one discounts the thirty triremes already in the north under Chares and the ten in the Hellespont under Charidemos, there remain eight supplied by volunteers and seventeen sent on the third expedition. That is, the total of ships sent to sea specifically for Olynthos was only twenty-five. On this view the effort was not large. In the *First Olynthiac* Demosthenes called for a much larger effort, reiterating the proposal he had made in the *First Philippic* for two forces. Compliance with his proposal would have been expensive and of uncertain outcome. Philip had the advantage of geographical proximity to Chalkidike. The past record of relations between Athens and Olynthos did not suggest that Olynthos would be a reliable ally, if it could be saved.

Yet despite the complaints and exhortations of Demosthenes, one cannot

dismiss the Athenian commitment to Olynthos as small. The thirty triremes held by Chares in the north and the ten commanded by Charidemos in the Hellespont were sent to the theater of operations. So the total of Athenian triremes employed in the Olynthian War was sixty-five. The paper strength of a trireme was two hundred men; the actual strength will have been rather less. If one adds up the ships, the cavalry, the hoplites, and the peltasts sent by the Athenians, the total force that they supplied to protect Olynthos was large. To have committed more forces would have been disastrously expensive and the prospect of success would have been poor. Philip had easier access to Chalkidike and he had far greater resources.

The hard fact remains that the Athenian attempt to save Olynthos failed. The failure had a lesson for other Greek cities. Henceforth a city exposed to Macedonian attack would be wise not to rely on Athens for protection. About a year after the fall of Olynthos Euboulos launched a scheme for bringing into being a coalition of Greek cities, which should conduct operations against Philip jointly (see further at notes 71–74). The failure of the scheme should cause no surprise. In the last analysis the conflict between Philip and the Athenians was between a dynamic power and a sated power. One may sympathize with the efforts of the sated power to resist—for example, with the Athenian efforts to save Olynthos. Indeed, it is not easy—it may even be somewhat presumptuous—to say what else could have been done. But the outcome of the conflict could almost be predicted.

Peace with Philip

In their outcome the expeditions sent by the Athenians to Olynthos and Euboia brought setbacks to politicians of some groups and advantages to none. Hegesileos was tried and condemned, although the penalty imposed may not have been severe. There was an attempt to prosecute Chares, whether after the first or the third expedition to Olynthos. Disarray among politicians is reflected in a quarrel that was exacerbated at the Dionysia of 348. Demosthenes had volunteered to equip and prepare a chorus of male flautists for his *phylē*, Pandionis, to compete at the festival. Meidias, according to Demosthenes, obstructed him in various ways during the period of preparation. The quarrel was of long standing. When Demosthenes had set about suing Aphobos in 364/3, Thrasylochos, the brother of Meidias, had challenged Demosthenes to undertake a joint trierarchy or exchange property. When finally the festival of the Dionysia was celebrated in the spring of 348, Meidias went up to Demosthenes in the theater and struck him in the face.¹⁹

Modern judgments on the personalities reflected in this incident have varied. “Meidias was one of the wealthiest Athenians, an arrogant man, who never showed himself on the street without a troop of servants.”²⁰ “It no doubt caused general satisfaction when in 348 before a theatre audience he [Demosthenes] was punched in the face by an exasperated supporter of

Eubulus."²¹ Had the supporters of Euboulos become so unsure of their ascendancy that they were exasperated at the criticisms voiced by Demosthenes? Or were they so secure that they presumed to treat him in a high-handed way? After the Dionysia the assembly met to consider business arising from the festival, and Demosthenes gained a vote of the people recognizing that he had a *prima facie* case against Meidias. Legal proceedings in Athens could be delayed. More than a year passed before Demosthenes agreed to a settlement; Meidias paid him three thousand drachmas.²²

A political opportunity came to Demosthenes in the summer of 348. It arose in consequence of Macedonian tentatives toward negotiations. First the envoys who had come from Euboia to negotiate peace brought a message that Philip too would like to make peace with the Athenians. Then, during the Olympic truce, an Athenian, Phrynon, was captured by Macedonian privateers, and after he had been released for ransom and come home, he persuaded the Athenians to send Ktesiphon with him to Philip in hope of recovering the ransom. Ktesiphon on his return reported that Philip would like to make peace with Athens. So a decree was passed on the proposal of Philokrates to invite Philip to send a herald and envoys to Athens with a view to peace. A certain Lykinos indicted this decree as contrary to the laws. When the case came to trial, Demosthenes defended Philokrates and won his case. Lykinos gained less than a fifth of the votes.²³

That was the greatest success Demosthenes had achieved in a political trial so far. But the opportunity that had been opened to him was closed soon afterward. Philip captured and destroyed Olynthos. The Athenians were horrified and so for a time they had no further desire to negotiate peace with him. Something more, but not much, is known of public activity by Demosthenes in 348/7. He may have applied himself during much of the year to private practice in the courts. His speech *Against Boiotos concerning the Name* (39) was composed in this year. It arose from the lengthy dispute between the three sons whom two women had born to Mantias. They had divided most of the property equally when their father died, but they had set aside the dwelling house to meet their disputed claims arising from the dowries of their mothers. Each of the older sons said that the father had given him the name of their grandfather, Mantitheos. Now one sued the other and asserted the sole right to that name. Probably his aim was to prejudice the outcome of the dispute about the dowries. Demosthenes composed the speech for the plaintiff. The latter lost the lawsuit. Both brothers continued to appear under the name Mantitheos in official documents. The plaintiff's case was weak, but there was no defect in the speech he delivered.²⁴

Consequences of the fall of Olynthos compelled the Athenians to negotiate with Philip, even if they did not at first negotiate about peace. The captives included some Athenians. The relatives of two of these, Iatrokles and Eueratos, appealed to the assembly for help and the appeal was supported by Philokrates and Demosthenes. So the assembly sent Aristodemos the actor on a mission to Philip. When he came back, he delayed making his report to the council for about a year. Presumably he was waiting for Athe-

nian indignation at the destruction of Olynthos to subside. In the meantime Iatrokles was released by Philip without ransom and on his return he made it known that Philip professed to be well disposed toward the Athenians.²⁵

When the Attic year 347/6 began, one of the members of the new council of five hundred was Demosthenes. Many years later Aischines said that Demosthenes had not been chosen by lot in the normal way but had bought a seat in order to collaborate with Philokrates. It could happen that a deme did not have enough volunteers to fill its seats in the council and invited an outsider to one of its places.²⁶ Possibly Demosthenes gained his conciliar seat in this way. Frustration had not deterred his political ambitions and he made good use of his new opportunity. Another councillor, Demokrates, proposed summoning Aristodemos to make his report. Aristodemos appeared before the council and the assembly; he said that Philip was well disposed toward the Athenians and desired an alliance as well as a treaty of peace. Demosthenes proposed granting a crown to Aristodemos. Thereupon, on the motion of Philokrates, the assembly elected ten envoys to travel to Philip and discuss terms of peace with him. Soon afterward Demosthenes carried a decree of the council for sending other envoys to the cities where Aristodemos had engagements and asking them to release him.²⁷

The first embassy, as it is conveniently called, was accompanied by an eleventh envoy, Aglaokreon of Tenedos, whom the Athenians had chosen from among their allies. Most of the ten Athenians can be named with confidence. The eldest was Ktesiphon. There were also Aristodemos, Derkylos, Iatrokles, Kimon, and Philokrates. The youngest but one was Aischines, who was proposed for the embassy by Nausikles. The youngest of all was Demosthenes, who was proposed by Philokrates.²⁸ Athenian envoys were not chosen by lot but elected; in selecting a man for an embassy, his fellow citizens proclaimed their confidence in him. When Demosthenes was chosen to the first embassy, he attained a degree of prestige he had not enjoyed before.

The first embassy set off from Athens early in Anthesterion.²⁹ It traveled to Oreos and crossed thence to the neighborhood of Halos in Thessaly. Halos was usually dependent on Pharsalos but was now in revolt and was being besieged by Macedonian troops under Parmenion. The embassy continued through Pagasai and Larissa to Pella. There Philip received it in audience and later entertained it at dinner. He was preparing to lead an army into Thrace and he undertook not to encroach on the Chersonese while negotiations were in progress. This undertaking amounted to a general armistice between Philip and the Athenians; fighting between them had long ceased. There was little room for effective argument about the terms on which peace would be made. The principle was to be *uti possidetis*; that is, the Athenians would recognize Philip's acquisition of Amphipolis, the issue on which they had been at war with him.³⁰

When the first embassy returned to Athens, it reported to the council and presented a letter from Philip. The letter asked for conclusion of an alliance as well as peace and offered large but unspecified benefits. Doubtless the

main news was that Philip would shortly send envoys to Athens. On the motion of Demosthenes, the council passed a decree granting the ten envoys customary honors—garlands of olive branches and an invitation to dine in the prytaneion on the next day.³¹ This meeting of the council may have been the occasion when Demosthenes also carried a decree that scheduled a meeting of the assembly for 8. Elaphebolion and looked ahead to the possibility that Philip's envoys might arrive by then.³²

The assembly met next, perhaps on 8. Elaphebolion, to hear the envoys make their reports in turn. A resolution of the allied synedrion was read; it suggested that two meetings of the assembly should be held to deliberate about peace but it committed the allies in advance to accept whatever the Athenians decided. On the motion of Demosthenes, decrees were passed by the assembly: these granted a safe-conduct to Philip's herald and envoys and scheduled meetings of the assembly for 18. and 19. Elaphebolion to deliberate about concluding peace and alliance with Philip. Promptly afterward, also on the motion of Demosthenes, the council passed a decree setting aside seats for Philip's envoys at the Dionysia, which would be celebrated from 9. through 13. Elaphebolion.³³ It is to be noted that many of the decrees for the routine business of negotiations were proposed by Demosthenes. Evidently he was seizing the opportunity of prominence brought by his membership in the council and his service on the embassy.

When the assembly met on 18. Elaphebolion, there was at least one other item of business, apart from relations with Philip. For a decree had been passed requiring the Athenians to determine on that day how they would repay a debt they owed to the dynasts of the Crimean Bosporos.³⁴ But doubtless most of the meeting was devoted to the Macedonian question. Two days had been set aside for the debate, so that opinions could be expressed fully at the first meeting and decisions postponed until the second.³⁵ The envoys of Philip were not present at the meeting of 18. Elaphebolion but at that of the next day.³⁶ Evidently the Athenians wished to determine their own desires independently on the first day. The envoys of Philip, present on the second day, were Antipater, Parmenion, and probably Eurylochos.³⁷

A new resolution of the allies was read to the assembly on 18. Elaphebolion. It proposed that there should be deliberation about peace and that there should be a clause allowing any Greek state to join the peace in the three months following its conclusion.³⁸ Aischines and Demosthenes each spoke in favor of the resolution of the allies. Indeed it was said later that all who spoke on 18. Elaphebolion favored that resolution, and although that statement was made many years later, it is credible.³⁹ There was not much to argue about. For there was no room for doubting that the treaty of peace, if concluded, would endorse the principle *uti possidetis* or that it would comprise the members of the allied synedrion. The attempt to open the peace for three months to other Greek states was pious; some may have thought it feasible.

On 19. Elaphebolion Philip's envoys were invited to the meeting of the assembly and they were questioned. They demanded that Athens should

make an alliance with Philip as well as peace, but it is not clear whether this demand had material consequences. They also insisted that the peace should embrace only Athens and the members of the allied synedrion. They refused to make any undertaking concerning allies of Athens who were not members of the synedrion. This refusal was ominous for Kersebleptes, Halos, and Phokis.⁴⁰ Each of them needs to be considered here.

While the discussions were in progress, Philip was advancing in Thrace against Kersebleptes. Indeed the Thracian king's son was held at Philip's court, probably since 352/1, and was seen there by the first embassy.⁴¹ The Athenians could have little hope of protecting Kersebleptes in 346, and they had little need to do so, since Philip had undertaken not to encroach on the Chersonese. He insisted that the Greek city of Kardias, immediately outside the Chersonese, was his ally and should therefore be included with his other allies in the peace.⁴² It would have been unrealistic to object. Halos in Thessaly was still under siege on 19. Elaphebolion.⁴³ The Athenians had lately discovered that it was an ally of theirs, but there can have been little hope of saving it. With Phokis they had contracted an alliance at the beginning of the Third Sacred War. They had held Thermopylai against Philip successfully in 352. The Phokians were making good progress against the Boiotians in the later stages of the Sacred War. They held three cities of Boiotia: Orchomenos (since 353), Koroneia (since 352), and Korsiai. Toward 347 they made raids into Boiotia and carried out successful skirmishes. The Thebans asked Philip for help and he sent them a force, but it was not large. It is not clear how this force reached central Greece, as Philip did not yet control Thermopylai; it may have traveled through Euboia. Thus encouraged, the Boiotians invaded Phokis and won a minor victory at Abai, but they could make little headway.⁴⁴

On 19. Elaphebolion the Athenians did not know what policy Philip would adopt toward the war between the Phokians and the Thebans. This uncertainty was probably their most serious cause for alarm. (On the political and strategic condition of the Phokians, see the following section.) But unless they agreed to the terms of peace that were acceptable to Philip and were proposed as a decree by Philokrates, they would have to take extreme measures. As Euboulos said, if they did not vote for the motion, they would have to march to the Peiraieus, levy an eisphora and divert the revenues of the theoric fund to military purposes.⁴⁵ Aischines made a speech, arguing that caution should be preferred to imitation of heroic ancestors and that nothing could be gained by hoping for help from other Greek cities.⁴⁶ Demosthenes too spoke in favor of voting for peace on the proposed terms.⁴⁷ As far as is known, the only Athenian who spoke against the motion was the elderly Aristophon. He said that the Athenians ought not to yield Amphipolis for the sake of peace, for they had the largest city in Greece, the greatest number of allies, three hundred triremes, and a revenue of nearly four hundred talents.⁴⁸

The decree of Philokrates, as passed, provided for peace and alliance. The party on the one side was Philip and his allies; the party on the other was

Athens and the members of the allied synedrion. The decree required the Athenians and their allies to take the oath. It also provided for sending an embassy to Macedon to exact the oaths from Philip and his allies. The envoys were given additional instructions, for example, to negotiate about captives.⁴⁹ The men chosen to the second embassy were the same as those who had served on the first.⁵⁰

The assembly met again on 25. Elaphebolion. Demosthenes happened to be among the officers presiding for the day and to have the task of putting proposals to the vote. Kritoboulos of Lampsakos had arrived as envoy from Kersebleptes. He asked for Kersebleptes to be included as an ally of Athens in the treaty. A motion to this effect was made by one Aleximachos but it evidently failed. Instead the assembly passed a decree, on the motion of Philokrates, that the members of the allied synedrion should swear the oath to Philip's envoys on the same day. That was done.⁵¹

The second embassy did not hasten its departure from Athens. There was no need to do so; Philip was known to be operating in Thrace and he had undertaken not to encroach on the Chersonese. On 3. Mounichion the council, on the motion of Demosthenes, passed a decree bidding the envoys set off.⁵² Apparently they did so soon afterward. They joined the Athenian general Proxenos at Oreos, where he held a naval squadron, and he conducted them by sea for the next stage of their journey. They reached Pella twenty-three days after leaving Athens. At Pella they waited another twenty-seven days before Philip arrived from Thrace.⁵³

On his Thracian campaign of 346 Philip captured several places of strategic value, including Serrion and Doriskos on the north coast of the Aegean and Ganos on the coast of the Propontis. The limit he set to his advance was Hieron Oros, an evidently strong position that he seized near Ganos.⁵⁴ Kersebleptes survived until 342 but his kingdom was much diminished. For his return to Pella, Philip had invited thither envoys from several Greek states, including Lakadaimon, Thebes, Chalkis, and Thessaly.⁵⁵ When the Athenian envoys in turn addressed Philip, the envoys from the other cities were present and listened. In this respect the gathering resembled a general peace conference, but there was no suggestion of negotiating a multilateral agreement. Indeed for the Athenians there was no new agreement to be negotiated. The issues between them and Philip had been determined in the treaty accepted by the Athenians as a decree on 19. Elaphebolion. Nonetheless, there was excitement among the many envoys gathered at Pella. For Philip was preparing to lead an army southward toward Thermopylai. The question of the hour was, What settlement would he impose in the Sacred War? Philip kept his intentions to himself. That was not difficult. Pella was full of rumors, as each group of envoys anticipated the fulfillment of its own wishes or fears.⁵⁶

At Pella Philip swore the oath to the peace of Philokrates.⁵⁷ He kept the Athenian envoys with him, as he set off on his journey southward, and they received the oaths of his allies near Pherai.⁵⁸ It was reasonable that the oath should be taken there, since the Thessalians were the most formidable of his

allies. The Athenian embassy returned to Athens and made its report to the council on 13. Skirophorion. Now for the first time Demosthenes voiced reproaches against Aischines. The council passed a probouleuma to bring the business of the embassy before the assembly, but this decree of the council did not include the customary words of praise for the envoys or any invitation to them to dine in the prytaneion.⁵⁹

The assembly met on 16. Skirophorion and each of the envoys spoke. Aischines voiced the hopes that he had entertained in Pella, that in settling the Sacred War Philip would besiege Thebes, restore Thespias and Plataia, and make the Thebans pay the costs of the war; he even hinted that Philip would restore Oropos to the Athenians.⁶⁰ Demosthenes tried to express doubt of these expectations, but Aischines and Philokrates rose on either side of him and shouted him down. Philokrates exclaimed: "It is no wonder, gentlemen of Athens, if Demosthenes and I think different things. He drinks water but I drink wine." The assembly laughed.⁶¹ A letter the envoys had brought from Philip was read. He said that he had sworn an oath and those of his allies who were with him had done so; he would send representatives of his other allies to Athens. The letter also said that Philip had kept the Athenian envoys with him so that they could mediate between Halos and Pharsalos. Philip further invited the Athenians by a letter, probably the same letter, to march out in full force in order to take part in a just settlement of the Sacred War.⁶² In response the assembly passed a decree on the motion of Philokrates. This extended the peace and alliance to Philip's descendants. It anticipated that the Phokians would hand over the Delphic sanctuary to the Amphiktyonic League and offered to send Athenian forces if they did not. Probably the same measure told the ten Athenian envoys to travel on a third embassy. This time they were to go to central Greece and take part in the Amphiktyonic meeting, which was expected to bring the Sacred War to an end.⁶³

The composition of the third embassy was much the same as that of the first and second. But at the meeting of the assembly Demosthenes excused himself from serving. Stephanos is attested as envoy this time; he may have been chosen to replace Demosthenes. Aischines, alleging ill health, sent his brother, his nephew, and his physician to the council to get himself excused.⁶⁴ The reason why Demosthenes and Aischines wished to stay in Athens can be discerned. When Demosthenes set about rendering his accounts to the public auditors (*logistai*) for his service on the second embassy, Aischines tried to prevent him. Aischines was not successful. Demosthenes rendered his accounts. So Aischines had to render his accounts for his service on the second embassy, and at this point Demosthenes formally entered an accusation against him.⁶⁵

The third embassy set off some days after 16. Skirophorion. Its route took it through Chalkis. Meanwhile changes were happening in central Greece. Philip had already reached Thermopylai on 13. Skirophorion. The Phokians surrendered to him on 23. Skirophorion. On 27. Skirophorion the Athenian assembly met in the Peiraieus, but Derkylos, a member of the third embassy, arrived with a report. He had turned back at Chalkis with news about

Phokis.⁶⁶ The precise content of his report is not clear. Telling of it some years later, Demosthenes employs vague phrases: "Philip had entrusted all affairs to the Thebans" (19.60); "The Phokians had perished" (19.125). In fact Philip entrusted settlement of the Sacred War to the Amphiktyonic League, and the third Athenian embassy received new instructions and proceeded to attend the meeting of the League in time for the definitive settlement.⁶⁷ But the news brought by Derkylos on 27. Skirophorion was sufficiently clear to alarm the Athenians. On the motion of Kallisthenes, they voted to bring their women, their children, and their equipment out of the fields to places of safety, to put their fortresses in a state of defense, to fortify the Peiraieus, and to celebrate the Herakleia in the city.⁶⁸

The Politics of Making Peace

The narrative of the preceding section prompts two questions. One is for the biographer: why did Demosthenes attack Aischines when the second embassy returned? The other is for the historian: what was at stake for the Athenians during the negotiations? The sources of information are the speeches delivered by Demosthenes and Aischines in court, when Aischines was tried in 343/2 and when Ktesiphon was tried in 330/29. No general rule can be laid down for believing one of these informants instead of the other; each assertion of putative fact must be scrutinized on its own merits. It is easy to recognize some principles of criticism. Statements accompanied by precise dates are less likely to be fictitious than imprecise assertions. Some dates—for example, for Athenian decrees—could be verified from public records. Again, if an orator, pleading in court, calls testimony to his allegation, he is more likely to be right than a contradictory assertion, for which his adversary calls no testimony (see note 59).

One must further be on the watch for a type of distortion which does not necessarily extend to simple falsification of fact. Aischines and Demosthenes were the youngest and therefore the least important members of the embassies sent to Philip. They may have exaggerated their own importance and they may have been sincere in doing so. More generally, one should not necessarily assume that all the things they talked about in court had material consequences for the negotiations. For example, in 343/2 Aischines (2.64, 67–68) said that on 19. Elaphebolion 347/6 Demosthenes drafted a proposal in the same terms as that of Philokrates, showed it to a fellow citizen, Amynor, and asked him whether he should propose it. In Athenian custom, an amendment to a proposed decree usually began by endorsing the main proposal in its other respects and proceeded to specify divergence. The proposal of Demosthenes may have begun in this standard manner. He decided not to offer his amendment and so it had no effect.

Another principle of criticism deserves to be stated. If an orator alleges that something happened in private so that there were few or no witnesses and he does not call witnesses, his statement should be doubted. But if he

asserts or implies something on a subject that was a matter of common knowledge among his audience or could easily be verified by them, he should be believed.⁶⁹ Application of this principle can be illustrated from the account Aischines gives of the behavior of Demosthenes on the first embassy, when Philip received the envoys in audience. He says that on the outward journey Demosthenes had boasted to his colleagues of the fine speech he would make (2.21). But, Aischines continues, when Philip listened to the envoys and the turn of Demosthenes to speak came last, as he was the youngest, he began in an obscure and timid way but lapsed into silence. Philip encouraged him to go on, and Demosthenes tried again but promptly fell silent (2.34–35). When the envoys withdrew from the hall of audience, Demosthenes, according to Aischines, upbraided Aischines for making a provocative speech to Philip and asked: “Do you have confidence on account of the fifty ships which have been voted but will never be manned? You have so antagonized Philip and made such a speech as is not likely to bring peace out of war but war out of peace without even exchange of heralds” (2.36–37).

Much of this account provides putative information about things that happened in private, if they happened at all. Therefore much of the account should be doubted. The account is not adequate reason for supposing that Demosthenes boasted on the outward journey of the speech he would make, that he broke down when it was his turn to address Philip,⁷⁰ or that he upbraided Aischines after the audience. But the account also presupposes something that deserves more serious regard. The alleged reproach of Demosthenes to Aischines implies that a squadron of fifty ships had been voted by the Athenians as a check to Philip but had not sailed when the first embassy set off from Athens. That was matter of common knowledge, and the squadron will require attention later.

Toward answering the historical and biographical questions historians have proceeded in two directions. One of these concerns a policy launched by Euboulos with the help of Aischines. The other has to do with developments in Phokis. At a meeting of the assembly Aischines presented information sent to him from Arkadia to the effect that Philip was gaining influence in the Peloponnese. Thereupon a decree was passed on the motion of Euboulos for sending Athenian envoys to the Greek cities in general with an invitation to send representatives to a conference at Athens. One of the envoys elected under the decree was Aischines. He went to Arkadia and on his return he reported that he had addressed the federal assembly, called the ten thousand, in Megalopolis. He said that the Arkadians would welcome a strong Athenian lead against Philip. He added that during his journey back he had met Atrestidas with some thirty Olynthian captives, women and children given him by Philip, and he urged the Athenians to send envoys to Arkadia to complain about those Arkadians who favored Philip’s cause; he held out hopes that the Arkadians would then condemn such men.⁷¹

The business of the congress planned in the decree of Euboulos is stated once as “to fight jointly against Philip, if necessary, and to share in the peace,

if that should prove advantageous.” Elsewhere the proposed congress is described more allusively as directed “against Philip” or as intended to deliberate “about the war against Philip.”⁷² Probably the fuller statement is right. Toward discovering the date when Euboulos proposed his decree, one may start from an altercation between Demosthenes and Aischines in 343/2. Demosthenes said that on 19. Elaphebolion 346 Aischines had made a shameless speech in the presence of the envoys whom the Athenians had invited from the Greek cities. Aischines retorted that the Athenians bearing the invitation to the Greeks had not yet returned by 19. Elaphebolion. In support of his assertion Aischines cited the first resolution of the allied synedrion (the resolution read to the Athenians on 8. Elaphebolion); this recommended that two meetings of the assembly should be held when the Athenian envoys bearing the invitation to the Greeks should have returned.⁷³

Clearly Aischines has the better of this argument with Demosthenes. But one of the Athenian envoys sent to the Greeks under the decree of Euboulos had returned long before 19. Elaphebolion. That one was Aischines. Since he was free to go to Macedon on the first embassy early in Anthesterion, the decree of Euboulos cannot have been passed later than the middle of Gamelion. It is more difficult to discover an earliest possible date for the decree of Euboulos. The first resolution of the allied synedrion and the altercation between Demosthenes and Aischines, discussed in the preceding paragraph, suggest that it would have been reasonable to hope for Greek envoys to reach Athens by the middle of Elaphebolion. The second resolution of the allied synedrion (the one read to the Athenians on 18. Elaphebolion) proposed that Greek states should be allowed to join the peace in an ensuing period of three months. Since three months was apparently a reasonable interval for Greeks to respond to an Athenian invitation, it has been suggested that the decree of Euboulos was passed not more than three months before the middle of Elaphebolion, that is, not before the middle of Posideon.

This argument has been offered tentatively.⁷⁴ The time that envoys to the Greek states could take on a journey, and furthermore the time the Athenians might wait hopefully for a favorable response, could be long. In 330/29 Demosthenes, referring to the time when the Athenians concluded the peace, said that their embassies to the Greeks had been sent out “long before.”⁷⁵ The assertion was tendentious, unsupported, and incompatible with what the same orator had said in 343/2, but it may not have been absurd. Possibly the decree of Euboulos was passed as early as the fall or even the summer of 347; its sponsors waited a long time for answers and tried to imagine that distance and the difficulties of travel in winter accounted for the delay. For the important fact about the decree of Euboulos is that there was no positive response to the Athenian invitation. Few Greek cities, if any, were willing in 347/6 to rely on the Athenians, or on a coalition led by the Athenians, for protection against Macedon. This lack of response to the Athenian invitation was not surprising after the fall of Olynthos. The policy pursued by the Athenians toward Olynthos in 349/8 may have been defen-

sible or even statesmanlike. But that was not the question facing Greek cities. In 347/6 a city receiving the Athenian invitation had to ask whether it could provide better for its own survival by allying with Athens or by cultivating good relations with Philip. The policy embodied in the decree of Euboulos had no chance of success. It is of interest solely because it is echoed in the second resolution of the allied synedrion, which wanted the treaty of peace thrown open to other Greeks for three months, and perhaps in some later negotiations with Philip (see chapter 7, *Epanorthōsis*).

Developments in Phokis were more dramatic and decisive. A revolution took place among the Phokians in 347 at a time that cannot and need not be determined precisely. Phalaikos, who was said to have stolen sacred valuables, was deposed from command of the armed forces. The Phokians elected three generals, Deinokrates, Kallias, and Sophanes. They also held an inquiry into the sacred valuables and imposed criminal penalties.⁷⁶ The change had effects on the relations of the Phokians with their allies. They could expect that Philip and the Thessalians would try to march into central Greece. They needed assistance to hold the three forts commanding Thermopylai, namely Alponos, Thronion, and Nikaia, against him. So they sent envoys to Athens with an offer to entrust the three forts to the Athenians. Consequently the Athenians voted a decree: fifty triremes were to be manned, citizens up to the age of forty were to be conscripted, and Proxenos the general was to command the expedition and receive the three forts from the Phokians. But the expectations the Athenians attached to this expedition were disappointed. A counterrevolution took place in Phokis. Phalaikos recovered control. When Proxenos approached him by sending two messengers, he refused to hand over the forts to the Athenians. The Phokians had likewise requested a force under Archidamos of Sparta, but Phalaikos rebuffed him too.⁷⁷

Rejected by the Phokians, Proxenos took up a position at Oreos, where the second Athenian embassy to Philip met him. A chance remark of Demosthenes shows that Proxenos still had his fifty ships with him.⁷⁸ To keep fifty ships at sea was a serious expense. Late in 352 the Athenians had voted to send forty ships to the Hellespont, but they had abandoned that undertaking when they heard that Philip was ill or dead.⁷⁹ Since Proxenos held fifty triremes at Oreos at the time of the second embassy, one should beware of overestimating the length of time that they had been there.

Recounting the approach of the Phokians to Athens and the subsequent rebuff to Proxenos, Aischines provides a clue to the date of the incident. He says that when Phalaikos and his associates refused to hand over the forts, they also rejected the Athenian offer of the sacred truce for the Eleusinian Mysteries. So on a day when the Athenian assembly was deliberating about peace with Philip, it received a letter from Proxenos, telling of the Phokian refusal to hand over the forts, and a report that the Phokians alone among the Greeks had refused the sacred truce. Aischines refers to the Lesser Mysteries of the spring, not the Greater Mysteries of the fall.⁸⁰ The truce for the Lesser Mysteries began on 15. Gamelion, continued through Anthesterion,

and ended on 10. Elaphebolion.⁸¹ It is likely that the Lesser Mysteries, like the Greater, were celebrated about the middle of the period of the truce. So some have supposed that the officers offering the sacred truce went to distant places first. Proceeding on their journey, they reached Phokis at the end of Gamelion. There the truce was refused. News of the refusal then reached Athens early in Anthesterion. That was the time when the Athenians decided to send the first embassy to Philip. So, it is suggested, news of the rebuff to Proxenos brought about a change in Athenian policy. Immediately before, the Athenians had hoped to bring into being a coalition of Greek states against Philip. Now they discovered that they could not garrison Thermopylai, the position for resisting a Macedonian advance into central Greece, and so they set about negotiating peace with Philip.⁸²

This reconstruction contains an element of conjecture, as its proponents recognize. Probably there was a customary day when the council and eventually the assembly considered business arising from the Mysteries, including matters bearing on the truce.⁸³ An inscription of 367/6 shows that the people of Trichonion in Aitolia had seized the officers announcing the truce for the Greater Mysteries, and the Athenians deliberated about this occurrence in the third prytany of the year.⁸⁴ The truce for the Greater Mysteries began on 15. Metageitnion, continued through Boedromion, and ended on 10. Pyanopsion. The uncertainties of the Athenian calendar forbid any precise equation of the third prytany of 367/6 with dates reckoned by Athenian months. But the third prytany embraced the last part of the truce and a period following its expiry. If this analogy is applied to the occurrence of 347/6, the assembly that received the letter from Proxenos and deliberated about the Phokian rejection of the sacred truce met in the last part of the truce or some little time after its expiry; that is, it met in the later part of Anthesterion or in the early or middle part of Elaphebolion. Thus that meeting, which received the alarming news from Proxenos, would take place about a month later than was maintained in the reconstruction outlined in the preceding paragraph.

A decisive indication in favor of this later date for the rebuff to Proxenos is to be drawn from the account given by Aischines of the first embassy to Philip. As observed already, that account may be fictitious in many features, but it should be believed in what it presupposes as matter of common knowledge. That is, when the first embassy set off from Athens for Macedon early in Anthesterion, Proxenos had not yet sailed on his expedition. Therefore he had not yet been rebuffed by Phalaikos.⁸⁵

Consequently it is possible to reconstruct developments in a way that answers the historical and biographical questions posed at the beginning of this section. In 347 the revolution in Phokis deposed Phalaikos and entrusted command to Deinokrates and his colleagues. About the winter of 347/6 the Phokians sent envoys to Athens and perhaps to Sparta. They could guess that Philip would try to make his way into central Greece. He had sent a small force to help the Boiotians in 347 (as discussed at note 44).

So the Phokians desired help from their allies to hold Thermopylai against Philip, as in 352. The Athenians accepted the Phokian invitation. They told Proxenos to lead out an expedition of fifty triremes and a complement of citizen troops; his instructions were to receive Nikaia and the other two forts from the Phokians and garrison them. Possibly a position in the northern part of Euboia was envisaged as an anchorage for the bulk of the ships from the start, as in 480. With these expectations the Athenians could respond favorably to the suggestions that Philip had sent indirectly toward concluding peace. Realistic men among them might foresee that they would have to give up their claim to Amphipolis. Renunciation would hurt their pride but only their pride. By concluding peace they could rid themselves of a nuisance. Philip had lately resumed naval harassment by making raids on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.⁸⁶ The war in the north was troublesome to the Athenians, but as long as they could hold the forts commanding Thermopylai, their security was not threatened. In this state of mind the Athenians voted to send the first embassy to Philip, and the envoys set off in the early part of Anthesterion. The expedition of Proxenos had been voted but had not yet sailed.

The first embassy acquitted itself adequately, not that its task was difficult. Philip was about to direct his attention not to central Greece but to Thrace, and he undertook not to encroach on the Chersonese. The embassy returned to Athens early in Elaphebolion and meetings of the assembly were held on 8., 18., and 19. of that month. Meanwhile Proxenos had sailed to the northern waters of Euboia and had sent two messengers to Phokis.⁸⁷ But Phalaikos had recovered command in Phokis and he refused to hand over the forts near Thermopylai to the Athenians. Proxenos took up a position at Oreos with his fifty ships to await developments and reported his rebuff in a letter to the Athenians. The rebuff occurred while the first embassy was away or soon after its return. The letter of Proxenos was read to the assembly at the meeting that considered business arising from the Lesser Mysteries and the sacred truce. The same meeting is described as deliberating "about the peace" with Philip.⁸⁸ It may have been any of several meetings held not later than 19. Elaphebolion but not necessarily much earlier.

The news sent by Proxenos altered the strategic situation for the Athenians. The question of the magnitude of the alteration could not be answered in Elaphebolion. Pessimists might fear that Phalaikos would align himself with Philip, that Philip would lead an army into central Greece, and that he would settle the Sacred War in a manner favorable to the Boiotians. Others could point out that Philip was concentrating his attention on Thrace; his plans for central Greece, if he had any, could not be discerned. It had to be recognized that Phalaikos and the Phokians would not be able to hold Thermopylai without allies; that much could be inferred from the earlier Phokian offer of the forts to the Athenians. Since the rebuff to Proxenos, the Athenians were no longer secure against an enemy coming from the north. So on 19. Elaphebolion they could not bargain with Philip's envoys. They

accepted terms that said nothing about the future of Phokis; that question, though vital to the Athenians, was not strictly at issue between them and Philip.

The second embassy traveled slowly. There was no need for haste, since Philip was away in Thrace. At Pella there were envoys gathered from many Greek cities, and Philip on his return from Thrace prepared to lead an army into central Greece. Optimists might still hope that he would impose a settlement conformable to the wishes of the Athenians. Aischines expressed such hopes on 16. Skirophorion, when the envoys made their report to the assembly. Demosthenes tried to express realistic doubts but was shouted down. The assembly instructed the third embassy to travel to central Greece with a view to meeting Philip and the Amphiktyonic League. One could not expect the envoys to achieve much. At Chalkis the envoys paused and sent Derkylos back to Athens. He addressed the assembly in the Peiraieus on 27. Skirophorion. His message said that Philip was imposing a settlement favorable to the Boiotians and disastrous for the Phokians, although the precise steps already taken cannot be discerned now. In alarm the Athenians passed the decree of Kallisthenes for putting their territory in a state of defense.

Phalaikos had surrendered to Philip at Nikaia. By the terms he and his men were spared and allowed to withdraw to the Peloponnese, where they sought new employers. The other Phokians surrendered to Philip, apparently without making conditions. Philip decided that a meeting of the Amphiktyonic council should be summoned to draw up terms for Phokis. The members likely to carry weight in the Amphiktyonic League at this point were Thebes and Thessaly.⁸⁹ It is not clear how much of this outcome of the Sacred War was already known in Athens on 27. Skirophorion. At least the Athenians had to recognize the essential change in the distribution of power in central Greece, and they had to abandon the hopes that Aischines had voiced as recently as 16. Skirophorion.

Demosthenes meanwhile took thought for his own political survival. Ever since 348 he had associated himself with steps toward concluding peace with Philip. He had defended Philokrates against the indictment of Lykinos, he had been proposed by Philokrates for the first embassy, and, when that embassy returned to Athens, he had proposed decrees for facilitating negotiations and holding meetings of the assembly. But while he was serving on the second embassy, he recognized two things. First, he saw that, since Phalaikos had rejected Athenian help and Philip was preparing an expedition into central Greece, the Macedonian king was no longer a mere irritant to the Athenians but was undermining their security. Second, Demosthenes learned that he must dissociate himself from his own recent past. Admittedly the ten Athenian envoys sent to Macedon were not to blame for the decision taken by Phalaikos and the opportunity this offered to Philip. But the Athenians were likely to look for scapegoats for their discomfiture. As the youngest and least respected member of the embassy Demosthenes was vulnerable. He could best divert the anger of his fellow citizens by accusing

a fellow envoy. He chose the next youngest. Promptly after the return of the second embassy, he gave notice of indictment of Aischines. Proceedings were delayed, as sometimes happened in political cases. When the case came to trial in 343/2, Aischines was acquitted. Whether Demosthenes had hoped for a different verdict is a question that cannot be answered and is perhaps of no great moment. In prosecuting Aischines, Demosthenes sought to save himself from being prosecuted.⁹⁰ He achieved this purpose.

Philip in Central Greece

When the assembly met in the Peiraieus on 27. Skirophorion, it received a new letter from Philip, inviting the Athenians to take part in the planned gathering in central Greece. So the assembly told the envoys to continue on their journey to Philip and the Amphiktyones. This mission is sometimes called the fourth embassy. Demosthenes excused himself again, but Aischines went as envoy this time.⁹¹

The Amphiktyonic council, meeting at Delphi, imposed terms on Phokis. The cities of the Phokians were destroyed; henceforth they were to live in villages, each of no more than fifty houses. They were forbidden to have weapons or horses. They were to refund the treasures of the sanctuary by semiannual payments of thirty talents. In fact a postponement was brought about by ways unknown and the first payment was made in the fall of 343. The two votes hitherto exercised by the Phokians in the Amphiktyonic League were transferred to Philip and his descendants.⁹² When the terms had been drawn up, the victors held a celebration. Envoys from many Greek states were present; they are said to have numbered no less than two hundred.⁹³

The members of the fourth Athenian embassy took part in this celebration shortly before their return to Athens.⁹⁴ But the Athenians seized an opportunity to make their displeasure known. Promptly after the celebration of victory the Pythian festival was held with Philip presiding, and the Athenians did not send the customary deputation of sacred officers.⁹⁵ So the Thessalians and Philip sent envoys to ask the Athenians to recognize Philip's membership in the Amphiktyony. A few years later Demosthenes said that on this occasion Aischines alone spoke for granting Philip's demand, that the assembly shouted him down, and that Aischines said that there were many who shouted but few who would serve on a campaign when needed.⁹⁶

This later statement of Demosthenes was highly misleading, even though it may not have been strictly a falsehood. For a speech of Demosthenes, *On the Peace* (5), is extant; it was delivered while the Amphiktyonic council was still in session in 346 (5.14). The main thrust of the speech is directed against those who would risk renewal of war over a trivial issue or, as Demosthenes said in the concluding sentence, "concerning the shadow in Delphi" (5.25). Perhaps Demosthenes could believe that he had not advised granting Phi-

lip's demand, as Aischines had done. Perhaps a formula was devised, so that in effect the Athenians recognized Philip as a member of the Amphiktyony but at the same time they saved face.

In the development of the mind and character of Demosthenes, this speech reveals much. He still had to advertise himself. He told the Athenians at length how frequently he had been right in the advice he had given them before (5.4–10). But the main part of the speech was close argumentation about the immediate predicament (5.13–23). The peace, the orator admitted, was not good, but the Athenians should avoid breaking it now that they had lost the military advantages they had held formerly. Above all they should avoid provoking their different enemies to combine against them in an Amphiktyonic war. For different grounds motivated their various adversaries. The Argives, Messenians, Megalopolitans, and some other Peloponnesians hated them for their good relations with Lakedaimon. The Thebans hated them for sheltering Boiotian refugees, the Thessalians for sheltering Phokian fugitives, and Philip for objecting to his membership in the Amphiktyony. The Phokians had suffered because the Thebans, Philip, and the Thessalians had combined against them in spite of divergent interests. So the Athenians must avoid uniting their enemies against them.

The speech is the work of a mature statesman. It has nothing in common with the vague exhortations and generalized reproaches of the *Olynthiacs* or of the *First Philippic*. It stands in a line of development from the speech *For the Megalopolitans* (16), for that too offered a careful inquiry into the prospects of international conflicts. But the speech *On the Peace* has a novel sense of immediacy. The Athenians were confronting a more urgent predicament.

Peace without Security

After the Pythian festival Philip retired to Macedon with his army. He entrusted the task of garrisoning Nikaia to the Thessalians.⁹⁷ Either he had confidence in their loyalty to him or he dominated them already so effectively that they would not gainsay him in future. He had made many gains in 346 and the most valuable of these was military access to central Greece.

The Athenians had in consequence lost security on land.⁹⁸ They could no longer check Philip at Thermopylai, as they had done in 352, and they were now exposed to Macedonian attack. So it is proper to pause and ask what, if anything, they had gained by voting for the decree of Philokrates on 19. Elaphebolion. It is important to recognize the difference between an international treaty and a contract between private persons. When a private contract is made, there is a court to enforce and interpret it. Reasons may arise for modifying the obligations the contract creates or even for freeing a party wholly from his obligations, but the court determines whether the reasons are adequate, and the court is a third party with no direct interest in the con-

tract. When an international treaty is made, there is no court to interpret or enforce it.

Greek cities were deterred by scruples from breaking treaties of peace. In 451 the Spartans and the Argives concluded peace for thirty years. In the spring of 421 one of the Spartan reasons for putting an end to their war with Athens was that their treaty with Argos was about to expire and the Argives were not willing to renew it on terms the Spartans would accept.⁹⁹ But reasons could arise for departing from a treaty of peace or alliance, and the interested party judged the adequacy of the reasons for itself. The members of the Peloponnesian League swore to abide by decisions of a majority at a federal congress "unless there was an impediment from the side of gods or heroes." In 421 the Corinthians decided that there was such an impediment and refused to join the peace made by the League with Athens.¹⁰⁰ In 446/5 the Spartans agreed to keep the peace with the Athenians for thirty years. When fourteen years and some months had passed, they went to war. They tried to furnish justificatory reasons and they continued to be troubled by scruples, but they fought.¹⁰¹

An international treaty is not an instrument creating obligations but a provisional declaration of intent. Once the peace of Philokrates was concluded, the Athenians knew that for the time being Philip would not invade their territory, or harass their overseas possessions such as Lemnos, Imbros, or Skyros, or encroach on the Chersonese. In 340, when he ordered his troops to march through the Chersonese, he sent a justificatory letter to Athens.¹⁰² Whether his justification was adequate is a question that should be postponed until the Last Judgment. Concealed within every international *Rechtsfrage* there is a *Machtfrage*. For the Athenians after 346 the question of power arose at Thermopylai. The question was not whether to uphold the peace of Philokrates or abandon it, whether to negotiate additional terms, whether to cultivate relations with Macedon. The question was whether Philip or for that matter his Thessalian allies could be dislodged from Nikaia. Until 346 the Athenians had relied on their alliance with Phokis and their consequent ability to check Philip at Thermopylai. But an occurrence they had not foreseen, the surrender of Phalaikos, nullified their calculation. After 346 it remained possible that something unforeseen by Philip might deprive him of command of the route into central Greece. Demosthenes and his fellow citizens had to wait seven years.

7

The Athenians Frustrated

In 346 unexpected changes shattered Athenian security, when Philip gained control of Thermopylai and entrusted Nikaia to a Thessalian garrison. In 339 another change, likewise unforeseen, put a temporary end to Philip's mastery of the route into central Greece. In the intervening years the Athenians feared and resented Macedonian power; they considered themselves threatened directly and they could do little against the threat, although they launched diplomatic initiatives of many kinds. Through the survival of Demosthenic and other speeches the state of opinion in Athens is better documented than for any other period of similar length. The evidence deserves to be approached without presuppositions. That will be the task of this chapter.

Macedon in 346

The historian contemplating the intrusion of Philip II into the affairs of the Greek states has to recognize a paradox. Before 359 Macedon was weak and had been for a long time, so that ambitious Greek cities, including Thebes and Athens, could intrude into the affairs of the kingdom. By 346 Macedon was strong; the impression Philip had already made on many Greek cities was evident when they sent envoys to Pella in the summer to confer with him toward a settlement of central Greece, and within two years cities as far away as the Peloponnese desired his help. The nature of the transformation of Macedon has for the most part escaped record. Those who, following Theopompos, attribute the change to The Great Man in History¹ fail to answer the historical question. For even if one follows them, one must still ask how the shaman worked his wonders.

Yet although the historical question admits no adequate answer, some of its aspects can be delineated. One of them was internal. Macedon consisted of two parts. Lower Macedon was the territory watered by the lower courses of the Axios and the Haliakmon, and this was the home of the dynasty from

which Philip sprang. Upper Macedon was several districts in the mountains of the interior, notably Lynkestis, Orestis, and Elimiotis. There were local dynasties in these districts and before 359 they often behaved independently. To say that they were brought to obedience whenever a strong king ruled in Lower Macedon is tautologous. Nothing is heard of Upper Macedonian separatism in the reign of Philip. But separatism cast a shadow over the path of Alexander in Asia. The men with whom he came into conflict included Alexander of Lynkestis and Harpalos of Elimiotis.²

Beyond Upper Macedon there were extensive nations, Paionians in the north, Thracians to the east, and Illyrians to the west and northwest. The Paionians were the least formidable of these. They are not known to have caused trouble after Philip subdued Lyppeios in 356. The Illyrians were a series of nations, each ruled by its own king. Likewise in Thrace there were many independent peoples. The Odrysians were capable of becoming a major power, and it was fortunate for Philip that they were divided since the death of Kotys. It is perhaps artificial to distinguish "external" threats, coming from beyond the borders of Macedon, from "internal" threats arising from dynastic disputes and separatism. Threats of these two kinds could easily combine. In Philip's first year, the king of western Thrace supported the pretender Pausanias against him. Before Philip became king, the neighbors of Macedon showed as little regard for any boundaries as he himself did thereafter.

Something, but not much, can be said about steps Philip took to strengthen his kingship. There was military reorganization, beginning early in the reign. The word *pezhetairoi* occurs for the first time in a speech of 349/8; its meaning continues to be disputed.³ Military success could impress internal rivals as well as defeating external enemies. By winning a large victory over Bardylis of the Illyrian Dardanians in 358, Philip protected parts of Upper Macedon—or made their dynasts respect him.⁴ But sentiments of gratitude and even of fear can diminish, as time passes. To preserve his kingship, Philip needed to win repeated victories in Illyria and Thrace. It is only possible to specify one policy designed by Philip to keep ambitious or recalcitrant Macedonians in order. He required leading men of his kingdom to send their sons in boyhood to sojourn as pages at his court.⁵

One may guess that there were other measures to strengthen the royal authority, although one cannot tell their nature. At least one must beware of taking the security of Philip's rule for granted. He inherited a kingdom with a strong tradition of turbulence. As he surely recognized, the price of autocracy is eternal vigilance. The need to preserve his rule must be borne in mind in assessing his position in 346. Some historians have noted that he did not inflict harm on the Athenians, that he insisted on an alliance with them as well as peace, and that he conducted negotiations with them intermittently until his departure for Thrace in 342. To explain this policy, they have supposed that in 346 Philip already looked ahead to invading the Persian Empire, and so he needed the cooperation of the Athenian fleet.⁶ Those who draw this inference overlook the fact that Philip did not know how long

or how short a time he had still to live. Surely he recognized in 346 that he had many dangers to face and that he had plenty to do in Macedon, Thrace, and Illyria. It was his habit to go into battle himself. To look further afield, for example into Asia, would have been unrealistic.

His conciliatory behavior toward Athens is easy to explain. A wise man refrains from provoking more hostility, when he has already aroused enough. Athens was the richest of the Greek cities and the largest in population. Admittedly Demosthenes (in the *First Philippic* and the *First Olynthiac*) may have exaggerated the effects that Athenians could achieve by sea-borne raids on Macedon. But such raids could at least be an irritation. In 340 Philip complained to the Athenians about acts of privateering committed by Kallias, "the general from among you."⁷ An irritation might become irksome, if it occurred at a time when Philip had other embarrassments to face, as he had in 340. Perhaps Philip had not forgotten that in the first months of his reign the Athenians had conducted a pretender to Methone and he had had to buy them off by withdrawing his deceased brother's garrison from Amphipolis.

Something may perhaps be inferred about the weaknesses of Macedon from the policy of internal colonization, carried out by Philip soon after he returned from central Greece in 346. Justin (8.5.7–8.6.2), the sole source, says that Philip transplanted "nations and cities at his whim" but does not give names. The historian expatiates, mostly in conventional terms, on the misery this policy caused, but he adds a detail that is not likely to have been invented; people kept silence in their distress, "for they feared that tears might be taken for truculence." The motives Justin hints at for the policy are credible: "Philip stationed some nations on the borders against enemies. He set others in distant places. He distributed prisoners of war to enlarge the population of cities. Thus out of many tribes and peoples he brought into being a single kingdom and a single nation." Doubtless the prestigious success that Philip had won in Greece in 346 cowed possible leaders of opposition in Macedon, at least for a time. So he was able to carry out forcibly a policy that evidently provoked a great deal of resentment. From Justin's indication of motives it is to be inferred that hitherto some of the frontiers had been weakly defended, outlying parts of the kingdom had been sparsely settled, and some cities were underpopulated. Surely it would take time for Philip's changes to take effect, however forcefully they may have been carried out. A novel sense of national unity might well emerge in the course of a generation, as different Macedonians became accustomed to their new dwellings.

In short one must beware of overestimating the security of Philip in the north. The need to consolidate and protect the kingdom accounts for the campaign he led into Illyria in 345.⁸ This time he probably reduced the Dardanians to dependent status and fought successfully against the Ardiaians of the coast. The campaign was difficult for Philip and his officers. Didymos reports that 150 of his Companions were wounded, Hippostratos the son of

Amyntas was killed, and Philip himself suffered a serious wound in his right calf. Such news might arouse different sentiments in different Greeks.

Alignments in Athens

In studying how the Athenians dealt with Philip, historians have often supposed that they divided into two parties, anti-Macedonian and pro-Macedonian. Even a scrupulous attempt to trace strictly personal groupings among Athenians of the fourth century has assumed that after 355 politicians were divided into two programmatic parties of these kinds.⁹ A recent and sophisticated version of this theory distinguishes between a "war-party" and "the advocates of peace with Philip." The former, it is suggested, looked for a favorable opportunity to renew war, but the other party wished to continue and develop the peace settlement of 346.¹⁰

It is easy to find members for the supposed war party. Patently Demosthenes resented the settlement of 346, and the fortunate preservation of speech 5, *On the Peace*, shows that he did not wish to fight at any moment but waited for a good opportunity. Hegesippos can be classified in the war party because he delivered speech 7, *On Halonnesos*. In 342/1 Demosthenes (9.72) listed men who had gone as envoys to the Peloponnese in the previous year to agitate against Philip; they were Demosthenes himself, "that excellent fellow Polyeuktos," Hegesippos, Kleitomachos, and Lykourgos. But there are more candidates for membership in the supposed war party. Defending Ktesiphon against Aischines in 330, Demosthenes (18.70, 75) named men who had proposed decrees for measures against Philip, and he had the decrees read out to support his assertions. The names he gave were Euboulos, Aristophon, Diopeithes, Hegesippos, Philokrates, and Kephisophon. Some of these names will cause no surprise. Diopeithes led additional cleruchs to the Chersonese in 343/2 and proceeded to harass Macedonian positions in Thrace, and Aristophon should be associated with his old friend Chares. But the name of Euboulos should give pause to those who seek to classify Athenian politicians on programmatic lines. Ever since Schaefer they have attributed a peace system of one kind or another to Euboulos, but the plain testimony of Demosthenes, supported with a decree, is against them.

It is more difficult to find members for the party of "the advocates of peace with Philip." Phokion was remembered later for remarks advising caution. But he commanded effectively against Macedonian interests at Megara in 343 and Eretria in 341 and against Philip at Byzantion in 340. Once he had reached maturity he was not an adherent of any group but his own man.¹¹ The candidate most favored nowadays for classification as pro-Macedonian or as an advocate of peace is Aischines, but his preserved utterances leave his modern admirers in the lurch. Pleading in his own defense in 343/2, he did not claim credit for a policy of peace with Macedon but argued (2.56):

You find that the collaboration in negotiating peace was not between me and Philokrates but between Demosthenes and Philokrates.

Possibly some will say that in the tense atmosphere of 343/2, after Philokrates had been condemned, Aischines had to hide his true sentiments. But he was under no such compulsion in 330, when he prosecuted Ktesiphon. The policy with which supposedly Aischines had disagreed, the policy of fighting Philip once a good opportunity arose, had failed decisively at Chaironeia. Surely the trial of Ktesiphon gave Aischines an opportunity to say: "I told you so." Yet in the speech *Against Ktesiphon* he does not say that he had advocated a contrasting policy toward Macedon all along. On the contrary he again reproaches Demosthenes for his share in bringing about the peace of Philokrates (3.58–78) and speaks contemptuously of his adversary's anti-Macedonian professions: "Demosthenes, who now pretends to hate Alexander, as he formerly pretended to hate Philip, and accuses me of friendship with Alexander . . ." (3.66).

To portray Demosthenes and Aischines as counterpoised spokesmen of rival policies is to overlook a contrast in temperament between them. The experiences of 346 taught Demosthenes the task to which he had to devote his life; pursuing it, he became for a few years the leading man in Athens. Aischines never appears in his speeches as a man with a mission. He had a more agreeable voice than Demosthenes, and he valued the privilege of abstaining from political activity; Demosthenes tried to make this abstention into a reproach.¹² The character of Aischines is laid bare by his last public utterance before his departure from Athens. Concluding his indictment of Ktesiphon, he invoked an idiosyncratic collection of gods (3.260): "O Earth and Sun and Virtue and Sagacity and Education." Demosthenes, whatever his faults, was not a culture snob.

Demosthenes was capable of misrepresentation. The speeches he delivered to the assembly in the years from 346 to 341 said a good deal in general terms about those Athenian leaders who diverged from him. He elaborated on two themes. One was the promises allegedly made on behalf of Philip by Athenian envoys during the negotiations of 346. Demosthenes first broached this theme in the speech *On the Peace*. He said that when the second embassy returned, some people promised that Thespiiai and Plataia would be restored, that Philip would save the Phokians and divide up the city of Thebes, that the Athenians would get Oropos, and that Euboia would be returned to them in exchange for Amphipolis (5.10). Two years later Demosthenes enlarged his allegations, distinguishing two sets of promises (6.28–30). He said that the Athenians ought to call to account first those who had brought the promises that had induced the assembly to vote for the treaty of peace. He did not state the content of these promises but proceeded to the second set of promises, delivered on the return of the second embassy, promises that Philip would fortify Thespiiai and Plataia, that he would humble the Thebans, that he would build a canal across the Chersonese at his own expense, and that he would restore Euboia and Oropos to the Athenians

in return for Amphipolis. At the trial of Aischines in 343/2, the allegation of promises made on the return of the second embassy was duly asserted by the prosecution (19.20–23; cf. 74, 102, 112, 220, 325) and answered by the defense (Aischines 2.119–120; cf. 136–37). The acquittal of Aischines deprived the allegation of its force. In 341 Demosthenes still said that in 346 most Athenians had asserted that Philip's march southward would bring no benefit to the Thebans (9.11), but after 343 he gave up talking about the "promises." It is easy to discern the truth behind the story of "promises"; after the second embassy returned in 346, there was reason for alarm in Athens, as Philip was expected in central Greece; fear can prompt empty hopes.

The other theme on which Demosthenes dwelt in speeches delivered to the assembly during the period of formal peace was bribery. In the speech *On the Peace*, when he was arguing against prompt resumption of warfare, he had little occasion to allege corruption; he contented himself with saying that his advice was good because he did not accept bribes (5.12). Sometimes in addressing the assembly, Demosthenes was content with brief allusions to the bribes supposedly accepted by his adversaries (6.19, 32, 34), but in harangues of 341 he expatiated on the topic at length (9.9, 36–46, 53–54; 10.59, 63, 66, 68, 75). Historians have often dismissed such allegations. It is reasonable to do so. For it is notoriously difficult to define a bribe. In all ages negotiations of every kind, political, commercial, or academic, can be accompanied by exchange of gifts. The difficulty is to define the point at which a gift ceases to be innocent. But people who rightly dismiss Demosthenic allegations of corruption have been misled by those allegations into supposing that his rivals among Athenian statesmen advocated a more accommodating policy toward Philip. No such inference follows. One of the standard tricks of political oratory is to pretend that those who disagree with one's means of achieving the acknowledged national goal are opposed to the goal itself. Demosthenes does not usually say what measures his opponents advocated. Instead he has utterances that imply agreement among the Athenians on the goal of resisting Philip—for example, "Everyone would admit, even if they do not do so explicitly, that we ought to say and do what will make him [Philip] desist from his arrogance and make amends" (9.1), and "Wherever there has been need to discuss questions of justice, we have never been worsted or found to be at fault, but in argument we prevail over everyone every time and we win" (10.2). Such assertions, implying unanimity on the goal of resisting Philip, occur in the very speeches where Demosthenes contrives to say most about corruption. Surely they deserve at least as much belief as his attempts to pretend that his critics diverged from the goal.

In short, the literature springing from the assembly and the courts does not provide adequate evidence of the existence of a pro-Macedonian party or of a party of advocates of peace with Philip. The question will call for further note in connection with the negotiations of 344–342 between Athens and Macedon. Meanwhile, literature of another kind requires attention. It

was written by men who made a profession of teaching young adults. In 346, after the Athenians had voted the peace of Philokrates but before the Sacred War was brought to an end, Isokrates composed a work in the form of a speech, entitled *Philippos*, and sent it to Philip. It gave Philip advice in flattering but straightforward terms. He should reconcile the four leading cities of Greece—Argos, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens—for then the lesser cities would join in concord (5.30); having accomplished this, he should lead an expedition into Asia against the Persian Empire (5.16, 83–88), and even if he did not subdue it all, he should at least conquer it as far as the line from Sinope to Kilikia (5.120). Against the possible objection that it might be difficult to reconcile the four leading cities, Isokrates pointed out that even greater tasks had been accomplished by Alkibiades, Konon, Dionysios I of Syracuse, and King Kyros (5.57–67).

If this work is read at its face value, the audacity of its fantasies takes the reader's breath away. One may well wonder what Philip thought about it.¹³ But perhaps the *Philippos* should not be taken at its face value. Interpretation of the work has made progress since readers have pointed out what it does not say.¹⁴ It does not look ahead to an organization of the type that Philip set up among the cities of Greece after the war of Chaironeia. It does not advise or expect any further extension of Macedonian influence in Greece; on the contrary, it assumes that the current status of the Greek cities will not be changed. Possibly Isokrates wrote the *Philippos* in the hope of deflecting the addressee's ambitions from Greece to Asia. At least the treatise does not envisage any positive role for Philip in Greek affairs, beyond that of the honest broker who is to reconcile irreconcilables. So it does not afford evidence of sentiment in favor of any closer accommodation between Philip and Athens.

In 345 or 344 Isokrates sent Philip an epistle, which is preserved as the second among the author's letters. The occasion was the news of the wound that Philip had suffered during his Illyrian campaign.¹⁵ Isokrates exhorted him not to risk his life in battle. The advice was otiose. Philip enjoyed fighting,¹⁶ and Isokratean periods would not deter a man who continued to risk his life in battle after losing an eye and suffering a wound in the calf. Later Demosthenes (18.67) waxed eloquent about the injuries Philip had suffered in pursuit of glory. His response to the news of the wound incurred in Illyria in 345 was probably different from that of Isokrates. But the latter's epistle goes no further in content than the *Philippos*. He urges Philip to befriend Athens, and he insists that it will be both advantageous and prestigious for Philip to win the good will of the Greeks (epistle 2.14–24). He does not envisage a more active role for Philip in Greek affairs. He advises Philip to disregard the critics who turn the assembled Athenians against him:

Your behavior would be strange, if you blamed our demos for being readily persuaded by those who slander you, but at the same time you showed trust toward those who practice that art. (epistle 2.15)

In these words Isokrates admitted that the assembly heeded Philip's adversaries. He himself did not speak for any sizable body of Athenian opinion.

The *Philippos* of Isokrates became known in Athens. Speusippos, the nephew of Plato and his successor as head of the Academy, wrote a letter to Philip in 343/2 to counteract its effect.¹⁷ As he explained, when the *Philippos* was read in a discussion group at the Academy, Antipatros of Magnesia, the bearer of the letter of Speusippos to Philip, had complained that Isokrates omitted good deeds performed by the Macedonian dynasty to the Greeks. Herakles, the ancestor of the dynasty, had become an Athenian citizen by adoption, and so Isokrates ought to have shown Philip the regard due to a fellow citizen. He ought to have rebutted the calumnies that some people disseminated against Philip. It was ridiculous to pretend that Philip had made war on Olynthos. His energies had been fully occupied with other wars at the time. The letter of Speusippos cited exploits of Herakles to justify Philip's territorial acquisitions and complained of Theopompos, who was at the Macedonian court and had spoken ill of Plato. Speusippos assured Philip that Antipatros had composed a better history to read to him than Theopompos.

The letter of Speusippos is perhaps the most disagreeable writing in the preserved corpus of ancient Greek literature.¹⁸ The power-worshipping intellectual, who writes under such titles as *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, is evidently not a novelty of the twentieth century. Nothing as base as the utterances of Speusippos can be found in the speeches of Demosthenes, Aischines, Hypereides, Lykourgos, or Deinarchos. Compared with academic politics, the politics of the Pnyx was a nice, clean game.

Writings of Demosthenes, Aischines, and others have been surveyed in this section and have not afforded grounds for supposing that after 346 there was among the assembled Athenians a pro-Macedonian party or a party of advocates of peace with Philip. On the contrary it is better to believe Demosthenes when he said to the judges in 343/2: "In public all of you and the whole demos find fault with all aspects of the peace" (19.132). Moreover the geopolitical situation is itself an indication of the outlook to be expected among the Athenians. Since Philip had gained access to central Greece through Thermopylai, their territory and their city were no longer secure. Even if they started from the peace of Philokrates and engaged in further negotiation with Philip, they could not hope to make progress toward security, since neither Phokis nor Thermopylai had been an issue in their negotiations. After 346 the Athenians were trapped in a predicament of frustration. One would therefore expect them to express the outlook that is indeed expressed in the speeches of Demosthenes. From time to time specific differences might arise on questions of method, for example, whether to continue Diopetthes in the Chersonese or send out another general in his place.¹⁹ But above such details Demosthenes emerged, soon after 346, as the spokesman not of a party but of his city. The steps that brought him to ascendancy are to be traced next.

Athenian Internal Affairs, 346/5

In 346/5 the Athenians had other things to think about apart from Philip. On the proposal of a certain Demophilos they ordered a scrutiny in each deme of the list of members;²⁰ for membership in a deme established title to citizenship, and it was suspected that some people had gained enrollment to which they were not entitled. Men who were rejected by their deme at the new scrutiny took their case to a court; the *dikastai* heard the challenge and the defense, and decided the issue finally by vote. Demosthenes composed a speech (57) in defense of one of the men who were challenged in court.

It is not difficult to discern general reasons that might give rise to the need for a scrutiny. A child was entitled to citizenship if both his parents were citizens, and there were two occasions in the life of the young Athenian when his claim was scrutinized. First, when the father presented his son to his *phratry*, there was opportunity for challenge; the members of the *phratry* took an oath and voted on the question, whether the son was indeed the child of the professed parents. Later, when the child was in his eighteenth year, the father presented him to his deme; the *demesen* voted on whether the boy had reached the required age and whether he was the son of citizen parents. Enrollment in the register of the deme, the second step, was decisive, but the first step, admission to membership in the *phratry*, could create a prejudice in favor of the candidate.²¹ Challenge to a candidate depended on the presence and courage of an interested party. Isaios (6.21–24) tells of an illustrative case. Euktemon had children by his wife, who was a citizen, and by a concubine, who was a *metic*. When he presented a son of the concubine to his *phratry*, Philoktemon, the son of Euktemon and his wife, opposed admission of the candidate, since Philoktemon did not wish his own share in the inheritance to be diminished. But Euktemon threatened to marry another woman of citizen status and produce children by her. Philoktemon, fearing in consequence to find his share in the inheritance diminished without any recourse, agreed to a compromise, which was mediated by friends of the family. The sons of the concubine should receive only a limited part of the inheritance and Philoktemon desisted from opposing their admission to the *phratry*.

In this manner the son of a citizen father and an alien mother could gain inclusion among citizens in spite of imperfect descent. The general purpose of the scrutiny ordered in the demes in 346/5 was doubtless to exclude men who had gained admission by corrupt or intimidatory methods. But it is not possible to discover the immediate circumstances that led the Athenians to order the scrutiny precisely in that year. Such scrutinies were rare.²²

On the attitude held by the Athenians toward Philip in the winter of 346/5 something can be learned from the trial of Timarchos. This man had joined Demosthenes in making the complaint against Aischines on the return of the second embassy. Aischines countered with a charge against Timarchos: "that he speaks in the assembly although he has prostituted him-

self and wasted his paternal inheritance" (1.154). The case came to trial in the winter.²³ If the preserved speech of Aischines is a reliable guide to what he said in court, he devoted much of his time to explaining why he should not be required to offer evidence of prostitution (1.71–93). He may have been better able to substantiate his other allegation, that Timarchos had wasted his patrimony. The result of the case was that Timarchos was declared to have lost civic rights (*atimos*).²⁴ Indeed, it is not clear whether he defended himself or let judgment go against him by default. Not much can be affirmed about the political career of Timarchos. Aischines says that he had been councillor in 361/0 and had associated with Hegesandros about that time (1.56–57, 109–112). It is of passing interest that Timarchos was councillor again in 347/6 (1.80), in the same year as Demosthenes. At the trial it was expected that Demosthenes would speak for the defense (1.119) and try to divert attention to Philip and Phokis (1.166, 173–176).

At the time of the trial Philip had sent the Athenians a message worded in favorable terms (1.169). Perhaps this message should be associated with the mission of Eukleides. At a time somewhat later than the second embassy, the Athenians sent Eukleides to negotiate with Philip with a view to getting the protection of the peace of Philokrates extended to Kersebleptes; Philip refused to comply with that request.²⁵ But Aischines was impressed by the tenor of Philip's message (1.169):

I praise Philip now for the auspicious character of his words. If he proves in his deeds toward us to be the same man as he is now in his promises, he will make it safe and easy to praise him.

Likewise, inveighing against Demosthenes in the same speech, Aischines complained that his adversary would turn the judges against him "by dragging in my public speeches and finding fault with the peace Philokrates and I brought about" (1.174). In these words Aischines came as near as any Athenian statesman ever came to boasting of the peace of Philokrates. He still attached his hopes to the courtesies Philip had shown to the Athenians on the second embassy.

By the spring of 345 Demosthenes, on the other hand, had surmounted a crisis in his own political fortunes with remarkable success. Some two years previously he had tried to make his way at last into leading circles by joining in the steps toward negotiating peace with Philip. He gained election to the embassy, a position of some prestige, on the proposal of Philokrates. When Philip's advance into central Greece turned the peace settlement into a horror for the Athenians, Demosthenes had to extricate himself. He achieved this by indicting Aischines. The trial of Timarchos delayed proceedings. Indeed, the case against Aischines was not heard until 343/2. Perhaps Demosthenes did not try to expedite it. The indictment had served his purpose for the time being. In 344 he was to be chosen to an embassy to some Peloponnesians. In short, when he emerged from the hazards of 346, he was one of the leading men among the Athenians. No doubt he owed something

to political skill and something to Fortune, a deity whom he was to praise many years later.²⁶ But a further factor may help to account for the relatively sudden rise of Demosthenes to prominence. The alarming experiences of the first half of 346 brought him to political maturity. The compact and down-to-earth argumentation of the speech *On the Peace* reveals a quality that is new in the harangues that Demosthenes delivered to the assembly. One may call it shrewdness, one may call it wisdom. Perhaps his fellow citizens recognized it.

Epanorthōsis: Putting Things Right

Whatever Philip's intentions, and whatever his preoccupations in the north, he was drawn after 345 to intervene in Greek affairs. One consideration was a mere desire to preserve what he had already achieved. In 344 he led a force into Thessaly, advanced on the fortifications of Pherai, and captured the city. He installed Macedonian troops there and perhaps in some other Thessalian towns.²⁷ It has been reasonably conjectured that Pherai had refused to supply troops for the Illyrian expedition of 345.²⁸ Soon after the intervention, Demosthenes described the regime Philip maintained in Thessaly as a "dekadarchy." The word has been much discussed; probably it is not the name for a form of government but a term of contempt for a clique and alludes to the dekarchies set up by Lysander at the end of the Peloponnesian War.²⁹

Another factor tended to extend Macedonian interests further afield. Greek cities were addicted to mutual disputes. By 345 Philip was able to render military or financial help; now that he had access to central Greece, he could even send men across the Gulf of Corinth by ship. Cities might invite his intervention against their rivals. In a similar manner Greek rivalries fostered Roman intervention in the second century. In the *Philippos*, Isokrates (5.30–31) said that there were four Greek cities, each strong enough to attract a following; they were Argos, Lakedaimon, Thebes, and Athens. It is somewhat surprising to find Argos in this list, for traditionally it had not been nearly so effective as the others. But Peloponnesian warfare of the 360s had been inconclusive in its results, and so there was lasting alliance between Argos, Messene, and some Arkadians against Sparta. The coalition could achieve no more than to withstand Spartan ambitions, and even so it sometimes found the power of Sparta alarming. The Spartans still claimed Messene.

In 344 Philip sent troops and money to Argos and Messene for operations against Sparta; rumor added that he would come in person.³⁰ Alarmed at this, the Athenians sent envoys, including Demosthenes, to the Messenians and the Argives to try to deter them from accepting Macedonian help. Demosthenes addressed the Messenians and urged them to distrust Philip. He held up to them the examples of Olynthos and Thessaly; each of these had received benefits at first from Philip's friendship, but later Olynthos had

been destroyed and the Thessalians were subjected to a narrow regime subservient to Macedon. His speech was well received in Messene, but he had no confidence that the Messenians would reject Philip's offer of friendship (6.19–26).

This embassy of Demosthenes is known from the speech (6) which he delivered in Athens soon after his return. That speech throws light on the diplomatic configuration. A foreign embassy was present in Athens; for in the course of the speech (6.28) Demosthenes says that he will propose a reply, but the proposal has not been preserved in the extant text. It is not clear where the foreign embassy came from. Libanios in the *Hypothesis* to the speech says that envoys had come from Philip and from Argos and Messene. But the language in which he says this shows that he was drawing inferences partly from the speech and partly from works on the history of Greece in the time of Philip. A Macedonian embassy certainly came to Athens during 344/3 but probably later in the year. The content of the speech is rather against the supposition that envoys were present from Macedon or from Messene and Argos. Dionysios says in the *First Letter to Ammaeus* (10) that envoys were present "from the Peloponnese." He may have drawn on a good tradition (see appendix 1), but one wishes that he had said which Peloponnesian cities the envoys came from. It is difficult to improve on the conjecture that the envoys present in Athens at the time of speech 6 came from Sparta.³¹ The situation in the Peloponnese would then be much like that of 353/2, with a different policy espoused by Demosthenes. That is, the antagonism between the Spartans and their enemies was again becoming acute in 344. The Messenians and the Argives gained help from a new friend, Philip, and the Spartans sought help from their old friends, the Athenians. Nothing more is known about the crisis of 344. Presumably Philip on the one side and the Athenians on the other were content to restore by different means the stalemate that had usually prevailed in the southern Peloponnese since 362.

In the same speech Demosthenes expressed twice a notion that was to figure prominently in diplomacy for some time. In the introductory part of the speech he says:

If even now it suffices for you to voice the more just arguments, that is easy and the task does not require any effort. But if one ought to seek means for *putting right* the present predicament and ensuring that it does not as a whole become more extreme without your notice, with in consequence the emergence of a mass of power against which we cannot even contend, then our right way to deliberate is not the way we have followed hitherto, but all who speak and you who listen must prefer policies that are good and promise safety to those that are easy and agreeable. (6.4–5)

Again toward the end of the speech Demosthenes casts suspicion on his rivals and says:

I am very much afraid that, while the envoys [of 346] keep silence about the terms on which they accepted bribes, those who try to *put right* some of the

things lost through the fault of those envoys may incur your wrath. For I know that some people mostly vent their rage not on those who are to blame but on those who are most easy to reach. (6.34)

Both passages talk of *epanorthōsis*, "putting things right." In the later passage the thing to be put right is the peace of Philokrates; in the earlier it is the whole predicament of the Athenians, in which that peace was a factor. From the speech one might suppose that by 344 Athenian spokesmen were uttering the word *epanorthosis* as a slogan, and further reason for supposing this will appear shortly.

Other embassies came to Athens during 344/3. Early in the year the Persian king sent an embassy. He was preparing an expedition to reconquer Egypt, and indeed he carried out the attempt successfully in the winter of 343/2. In preparation he sent envoys to many Greek cities. In response the Thebans sent him one thousand hoplites, the Argives sent him three thousand troops, and the Greeks of the Asiatic coast sent him six thousand. From the Athenians he asked nothing more than neutrality, or as his envoys put it, he demanded that the Athenians should show toward him the friendship they had shown to his ancestors. The Athenians replied in a brusque manner; they would preserve the friendship, if the king did not attack the cities of Greece. This response amounted to an assurance of neutrality for the reconquest of Egypt. Didymos found the tone of the reply unduly arrogant.³² A reason for Athenian displeasure toward Persia will become apparent shortly.

Later in the year, perhaps in the spring of 343, Philip sent an embassy led by Python of Byzantion and accompanied by envoys from Philip's allies.³³ Python addressed the assembly and made a good impression.³⁴ The content of his message was in essence simple: Philip was willing to entertain proposals for "putting right" the peace of Philokrates. Philip had evidently heard that the truculent Athenians kept talking about *epanorthosis*. He answered with an offer that challenged them to play their best cards. At the same time in undertaking to listen to proposals he did not commit himself to making any material concession. "Better jaw-jaw than war-war" is a device favored by those statesmen who do not wish to face difficulties.

The Athenians replied by playing their best cards. They proposed two amendments to the peace of Philokrates and embodied these in a decree.³⁵ One amendment tried to expand that instrument into a treaty of common peace. Those Greeks who were not parties to the peace of Philokrates should be declared free and autonomous, and all participants in the peace thus enlarged should undertake to come to one another's aid against any armed attack. The other proposed amendment called in question the basis of the peace of Philokrates. That treaty conceded to each side what it held at the conclusion of hostilities, but the amendment required that each side should have its own—that is, each side should have what rightfully belonged to it. In Greek thought conquest did not extinguish a prior right to territory.³⁶ In

principle the two proposals were equally unexceptionable. They amounted to an answer as clever as the offer that had provoked it. The Athenians succeeded in unmasking Philip; he was willing to talk, but he was not willing to talk about any material concessions on his part. He would not consider surrendering such places as Amphipolis, Pydna, Poteidaia, or Methone, places where his conquest did not extinguish Athenian rights. The Athenians sent Hegesippos and others as envoys to convey their reply to Philip. His response, though not recorded precisely, was unfavorable; he expelled from Macedon the poet Xenokleides, who had given the Athenian envoys hospitality.³⁷

Many historians have taken a different view of the Athenian response to the embassy of Python. They have attributed the clever answer not to the Athenians but to the supposed anti-Macedonian party among the Athenians. Assuming that there were pro- and anti-Macedonian parties in Athens, they have seen in the brusque answer of the Athenians to the Persian embassy a success of the pro-Macedonians; supposedly Persia and Macedon were already headed for enmity, and the Athenians had to choose between them. On this view the favorable reception accorded by the assembly to Python continued the prevalence of the pro-Macedonians, "But if, from the floor as it were, the party attacked by Python were able to carry an important amendment by working on the people's ancient senseless desire for Amphipolis, the sudden change in the influence of the Demosthenes group is explained."³⁸

Those who adhere to this view have a low opinion of the Athenian demos. They think that the Athenians were not only foolish but also inconsistent. In the summer of 344, the Athenians sent Demosthenes to Messene and Argos to deter those cities from adhering to Philip; so far Athenian policy was hostile to Macedon. But supposedly the Athenians gave an offensive reply to the Persian envoys and thus showed their preference for Macedon in the conflict of the monarchies, which could—allegedly—be foreseen. Yet when Python brought a Macedonian offer of negotiations, the same Athenians let themselves be tricked into rebuffing Philip's rapprochement. Such folly is incredible in a city whose survival could be threatened by the power controlling Thermopylai.

The theory here criticized springs from two assumptions. One is that the leading men of Athens were divided between pro- and anti-Macedonians (or a "war party" and "the advocates of peace"). A curious dearth of evidence in support of this assumption was already noted. The only incident that can be cited from the years of peace to illustrate the supposed existence of two such parties is the diplomacy of 344–343. But interpretation of that diplomacy in terms of the two supposed parties leads to the paradoxes recognized in the previous paragraph. The other assumption is that hostility between Macedon and Persia could already be foreseen in 344/3, and so the Athenians had to choose between them. This view was probably first propounded by Anaximenes (see note 33). It cannot be strictly refuted. But the historian

who knows what happened afterward must often be on his guard against retrojecting later results, including later hostilities, into earlier situations. The probabilities on the Persian side deserve consideration.

In 344 the Great King sent envoys to the Greek cities, as he was preparing for a difficult campaign against Egypt. He hoped for men from some cities and neutrality from others. He would be inconvenienced if Athenian ships helped the Egyptians. By 344 Philip exercised power within Greece. His dynasty considered itself Greek, even though Demosthenes expressed doubts.³⁹ Indeed a few years later Philip probably alluded to the brusque reply of the Athenians to the Persians, when he wrote:

Before he [the Persian] captured Egypt and Phoenicia, you voted to invite me and all the other Greeks against him, if he took any innovatory action. (12.6)

Probably the Athenian resolution did not refer to Philip specifically but said "all the Greeks"; Philip recognized himself within that category. As a matter of power Philip was within the Greek area by 344. The Great King surely cared more for realities of power than for hereditary distinctions among the Yavan. When he sent his envoys to tour the shores of the Aegean, he would surely be likely in the situation of 344 to tell them to call in Pella and offer greetings. Courtesies would be exchanged. Philip had no reason to offend the king of kings; he may have felt honored when visitors came from so distinguished a master.

Thus one might well invent such an exchange of courtesies, if there were no evidence. As it happens, there is evidence, although it is poor. After the battle of Issos there were negotiations between Alexander and Dareios. The Persian king sent Alexander a letter. The historical accounts of Alexander give the text of the letter, but they give it in more than one version. In the course of one of the versions, Dareios tells Alexander that there was "friendship and alliance" between Philip and Artaxerxes.⁴⁰ If Dareios wrote that, he was making much out of something small. The most likely time for the small thing to happen was 344.

In short, the Athenians made a discourteous reply to Artaxerxes and a skillfully provocative response to Philip at a time when the interests of the two monarchs did not come into conflict, at a time indeed when they were likely to open friendly relations. The behavior of the Athenians was neither foolish nor inconsistent. Their predicament was unfortunate.

Indirect Clashes between Athens and Macedon 343–342

The embassies of Python and Hegesippos had no positive result beyond clarifying the lines of contention between Athens and Philip. The growth of the Macedonian's influence in Greece brought further clarification. In Elis internal strife became acute toward 343. One side gained financial help from Philip. The constitution was subverted, mercenaries were hired, and a mas-

sacre took place.⁴¹ Philip had gone no further than sending money, but the outcome was that Elis was held by local men loyal to him.

His intervention at Eretria in 343 was more substantial and more likely to alarm the Athenians because of proximity. Kleitarchos, who had opposed Ploutarchos before the latter's overthrow in 348, had since become the leading man in the city, but he had enemies. Internal strife became acute, the opponents of Kleitarchos were driven out, and they seized the harbor town of Porthmos. But Kleitarchos gained Macedonian help. Philip, professing to be the ally of the Eretrians, sent Hipponikos with one thousand men. Hipponikos destroyed the fortifications of Porthmos, thus reuniting the harbor with the city. He entrusted control to Kleitarchos and two others.⁴² In Oreos, too, strife became acute, the leading rivals being Philistides and Euphraios. During 343 Euphraios tried to prosecute Philistides on a charge of treason. But Philistides and his friends rallied the populace against Euphraios and threw him into prison, where he was to languish for a year. It was said later that at this stage Philistides already had financial help from Philip, but there was no more substantial intervention from Macedon until 342. When Aischines was on trial in 343/2, it was rumored in Athens that Philip had designs on Geraistos, the promontory in the south of Euboea.⁴³

Athenian security could be threatened even more directly from Megara than from Euboea, but the outcome of developments there in 343 was different. Two ambitious men, Perillos and Ptoiodoros, sought to rise through the friendship of Philip. Returning from a visit to Macedon, Perillos was put on trial, but the influence of Ptoiodoros gained his acquittal. Perillos went back to Philip and shortly afterward, while Ptoiodoros attended to affairs in the city, Perillos approached with an armed force. Troops were also expected from Philip's Boiotian allies. But the Megarian opponents of Perillos and Ptoiodoros sent an appeal in haste and in secret to Athens. The messengers approached Phokion, a singularly efficient officer. Phokion addressed the assembly early in the day and persuaded it to vote an expedition. He levied a force and led it to Megara promptly. He was welcomed there, he fortified the harbor town of Nisaia, and he built "long walls" connecting it to the city.⁴⁴

Alarming news reached Athens repeatedly in the course of 343. So it is not surprising that the Athenians attacked men whom they associated with the peace of Philokrates. Hypereides prosecuted Philokrates. The procedure was *eisangelia*, which began with a complaint to the council or the assembly. It was probably while the issue was before the assembly that Demosthenes said that the other nine envoys were equally culpable. Philokrates did not stay for the trial but withdrew into exile and was condemned in absence to death.⁴⁵ Less is known about the trial of Proxenos. He was prosecuted and condemned, but evidently to a fine, for he survived in Athens.⁴⁶ The case against Aischines, awaited since 346, came to trial in 343/2, probably in the fall of the year. Those pleading in his support were highly respected statesmen, Euboulos, Phokion, and Nausikles.⁴⁷ Aischines' outlook had changed somewhat since 346/5; he now insisted that the peace was the work not of

himself and Philokrates but of Philokrates and Demosthenes (2.56). He was acquitted by only thirty votes.⁴⁸ This outcome should not have been disagreeable to Demosthenes. He himself had escaped being called to account for the misfortunes associated with the peace of Philokrates. Besides the Athenians were growing more realistic. Even though Aischines may have had no alternative policy to offer, the weakness of character that relied on Philip's affable words to the second embassy could be dangerous. After the trial of Aischines the Athenians are not known to have put trust in empty hopes again until the time of Alexander's successors.

The Athenians were not the only people to become concerned at the extension of Philip's influence into Euboia. Kallias, the leading man in Chalkis, was bent on launching a federation of Euboian cities. During the 340s he sought the endorsement of Philip and of the Thebans in turn, but he fell out with each of them; indeed they set about preparing a joint expedition against him. So he sent an embassy to Athens; it probably arrived in the later part of 343, soon after the trial of Aischines. The Athenians responded by contracting a defensive alliance and giving their blessing to the scheme for a Euboian federation.⁴⁹ Nothing more is heard of the joint expedition planned against Kallias; evidently Philip and the Thebans were not willing to fight the Athenians and the Chalkidians together in Euboia. The condition in Oreos and Eretria was unclear and unstable. By the end of 343 the Athenians could gain some encouragement in their resistance to Philip, when they looked back on recent dealings with Megara and Chalkis.

Operations carried out by Philip in the winter of 343/2, perhaps early in 342, provoked further resistance. He led a force into the kingdom of the Molossoi in Epeiros and deposed the king, Arybbas. In his place Philip installed another member of the Molossian dynasty, Alexander, the brother of Philip's wife, Olympias. Arybbas escaped and was welcomed in Athens.⁵⁰ From Epeiros Philip marched southward into the district called Kassopia, subdued its three (or four) cities and entrusted them to Alexander.⁵¹ These were Greek cities and claimed to be colonies of Elis, but they were small. But Philip had greater ambitions. From Kassopia he marched eastward against Ambrakia, an important colony of Corinth.⁵²

The Athenian response was military and diplomatic. They sent troops to Akarnania on the southern shore of the Gulf of Ambrakia.⁵³ They sent envoys to the Peloponnese to urge collaboration against Philip. The men recorded as serving on this embassy were Demosthenes, Polyektos, Hegesippos, Kleitomachos, and Lykourgos. The journey of Demosthenes took him also to Akarnania and Ambrakia. Kallias of Chalkis traveled to the Peloponnese about the same time as the Athenians and with the same purpose.⁵⁴

A year later Demosthenes (9.72) said that these embassies had deterred Philip successfully, so that he did not attack Ambrakia or advance on the Peloponnese. The claim is credible. The force Philip had brought through the mountains to Epeiros was probably not large, possibly not much more than an expanded bodyguard, since he was operating in winter. A siege of

Ambrakia would have been difficult, since the defense could receive reinforcements by sea. It is another question, whether the embassies sent to the Peloponnesians and beyond brought the Athenians any more lasting gain. There was a good deal of diplomatic activity in Athens in the early months of 342. Demosthenes and Kallias proposed plans for an alliance to embrace some Peloponnesian states and a Euboian federation; a conference was scheduled for 16. Anthesterion. An Athenian embassy was sent to Eretria, for there was hope of bringing that city and Oreos into the coalition.⁵⁵

The results of this activity were disappointing. The conference scheduled for 16. Anthesterion may not have met at all; even if it did, nothing came of the coalition that it was to inaugurate. The Athenian embassy to Eretria was rebuffed. Before the end of 343/2 Athens contracted alliances with the Achaians, those of the Arkadians who adhered to Mantinea, Argos, Megalopolis, and Messene; an alliance embracing Athens, Messene, and some others was ratified by an Athenian decree early in the tenth prytany of the year.⁵⁶ But in the war of Chaironeia most of these states remained neutral. Of them only the Achaians fought against Philip and they had a reason of their own. Probably during his expedition to Epeiros and Kassopia, Philip had won the friendship of the Aitolians by undertaking with an oath to take Naupaktos from the Achaians and give it to them.⁵⁷ The behavior of Argos, Megalopolis, and Messene in 342 is of some interest. They had collaborated in resistance to Sparta since the 360s. In 344 Argos and Messene invited and received Macedonian help. One may wonder why they joined the alliance against Philip in 342, but not much can be gained by conjecture.

Philip returned from the west to Macedon in time to leave for Thrace about the middle of the summer of 342.⁵⁸ His observations of the past six months had shown him where he had most prospect of making headway against his enemies in Greece. In Eretria Kleitarchos was well disposed toward him but insecure. Philip sent a force under Eurylochos to assist Kleitarchos against his local enemies. Shortly afterward, whether before or after Philip's departure for Thrace, Parmenion led a further armed expedition to Eretria and disposed finally of the resistance. Probably on the same campaign Parmenion advanced on Oreos and ensured control to Philistides. The latter's enemy, Euphraios, killed himself in prison. Thus, before the summer of 342 was over, Philip "established two tyrants in Euboia, one as a fortified bulwark opposite Attica and the other against Skiathos."⁵⁹

Within the first half of 342, Philip also engaged in diplomatic dealings with the Athenians. Their last communication had been the embassy of Hegesippos. Now he sent envoys to them with a letter. It has not been preserved, but something of its content can be reconstructed from the speech ([Demosthenes] 7) that Hegesippos delivered in rebuttal, when the letter was read to the assembly. The letter began by making accusations against those Athenian orators who spoke against Philip. It proceeded to discuss a series of disputed issues, making proposals on some and asserting Philip's view against the Athenians on others. For example, the small island of Halonnesos between Lemnos and Skyros had belonged to the Athenians. It had

been captured by pirates but taken from them by Philip. Now, rather than recognizing the right of the Athenians to the island, he offered to give it to them or submit the issue to arbitration. He also offered to submit to arbitration the question of the places that he had taken in Thrace in 346. He disagreed with the Athenians about the boundary of the Chersonese and suggested that they should accept arbitration on their dispute with Kardias, the city that stood at the entrance to the Chersonese and was allied to him. On some issues he expressed good intentions. He wished to join the Athenians in policing the seas against piracy, and he was willing to negotiate agreements for trial of disputes that might arise in trade between Athenians and Macedonians. He said that he had restored the captives taken during his war with Athens. He dealt with the two Athenian proposals for amending the peace of Philokrates; he insisted that Amphipolis was his, but he recognized merit in the proposal for enlarging the peace to include other Greeks.

The speech Hegesippos delivered against this letter makes a disagreeable impression on the modern reader. Hegesippos finds fault with each item in Philip's letter, sometimes in a petty manner. Philip should not give Halonnesos to the Athenians but restore it to them. Demosthenes joined Hegesippos in insisting on this distinction.⁶⁰ Hegesippos asserted that the territory of Kardias belonged to the Athenians. He admitted that Kallippos had proposed a decree that recognized it as belonging to the Kardians. But he added that he himself had prosecuted the decree as illegal. Yet he had to admit that the prosecution had failed. Where Philip expressed apparently fair offers, Hegesippos attributed devious motives to him. If Philip was willing to make agreements for trial of commercial disputes, that was a trick to gain Athenian recognition of his annexation of Poteidaia. If Philip expressed himself willing to join in policing the seas, he was trying to diminish the prestige of the Athenians by making them admit that they could not do the task themselves.

The arguments offered by Hegesippos are legalistic and tiresome. But the accidents that have determined the preservation of texts written in 342 have been kinder to Philip than to Hegesippos. The latter answered Philip's epistle point by point. It follows that the epistle set out Philip's contentions point by point. That Philip too could delight in disputation is evident from the letter which he wrote about two years later and which is preserved more or less as [Demosthenes] 12. Some of the issues of 342 were difficult, but on others Philip could have been generous without losing face. Had he wished to be free of the dispute over Halonnesos, he could have "restored" it to the Athenians, as they wished, but he insisted on "giving" it to them.

The letter, as far as it can be reconstructed, and the speech of Hegesippos furnish no more reason for attributing amicable intentions to Philip than to Hegesippos. One may wonder why Philip wrote it at a time when he was intervening or planning to intervene by force at Eretria and Oreos. Hegesippos answers this question (7.1): the letter made accusations against Athenian orators who spoke against Philip. It was an attempt to divide Athenian opinion and thereby weaken the spirit of resistance. Consequently Hegesippos

alludes scathingly at several points in the speech to some Athenians who were allegedly willing to put a good construction on Philip's words (7.17, 23, 34, 45). Philip wished to foster or bring into being a body of opinion favorable to him among the Athenians. That may well have been his aim a year or so before, when he sent Python to say that he was willing to entertain proposals for amending the peace of Philokrates. Hegesippos and Demosthenes tried to prevent the emergence of a body of opinion favorable to Philip by insisting that any such Athenians were traitors and corrupt. There is no reason to think that Philip had any success in his psychological warfare against the Athenians. At least, if any Athenians in the assembly (as distinct from the schools of Isokrates and Speusippos) regarded Philip with sympathy, they were too few and too weak to have any effect on policy.

Philip in Thrace

Before leaving for Thrace in 342 Philip took precautions to ensure the stability of Macedon and of the kingdom's influence further south. Antipater was to be left in actual control with Parmenion to assist him.⁶¹ Philip carried out some reorganization of Thessaly. The Athenians had sent Demosthenes as envoy to Thessaly, doubtless while Philip was advancing into Epeiros early in 342, and there may have been other Athenian embassies to Thessaly about the same time.⁶² After his return from the west, Philip restored in Thessaly the traditional organization by tetrarchies.⁶³ This was probably also the occasion when he altered the garrison at Nikaia. In 346 he had entrusted that fort to the Thessalians. Now he replaced their troops with a Macedonian garrison.⁶⁴

In 342 Philip took precautions against risks, for he intended to conduct a lengthy series of operations in the east. One cannot tell how long he expected the operations to last; as a good strategist, he had probably not made rigid plans in advance but was ready to adapt his activities to his successes and to the obstacles that might impede him. But there was one risk against which he could not take precautions. Macedonian kings were not noted for longevity. In spite of the advice given by Isokrates in the second letter, Philip continued to expose himself in battle; that was what his officers and men expected of him. When at last he returned to Macedon in 339, he was lame; he had been wounded in his right thigh as he was making his way homeward through the land of the Triballoi.⁶⁵ That he reached Macedon alive was good luck or bad luck according to one's point of view. To understand the behavior of Greeks in his absence, one must recognize that they did not know that he would succeed in coming back. That outcome may have seemed less and less likely, as Philip's absence grew more protracted and news came of reverses which he suffered.

His early operations went well. His pretext for attacking the Thracian kingdoms was that he was protecting the Greek cities of the straits from the encroachment of Kersebleptes. During 342 and 341 he overthrew the latter

and Teres, the son of Amadokos.⁶⁶ For the Athenians his march brought him dangerously near to the Chersonese. They had taken precautions in good time. They had sent an additional party of cleruchs under the command of Diopeithes in 343/2.⁶⁷ Diopeithes was a man with a taste for adventure. After reaching the Chersonese he raised a force of troops. The Athenians had not given him any money for this purpose, but he compelled merchant ships to put in to shore and he exacted tolls from them; by the summer of 341 it was expected that he would levy requisitions (currently called *eunoiai* or “offerings of good will”) from cities on the Asiatic coast, such as Chios and Erythrai.⁶⁸

Consequently the condition of Kardia became increasingly delicate. This town stood near the isthmus that linked the Chersonese to the mainland. The Athenians said that it was part of the Chersonese and therefore theirs. The Kardiens denied this.⁶⁹ Philip had been an ally of the Kardiens since before the peace of Philokrates was concluded, or at least he said so in 340.⁷⁰ Furthermore there was an ambitious man of Kardia called Apollonides, who may have seen advantage for his city and himself in consorting with local kings. In 353 he had been in the service of Kersebleptes and had represented him at Maroneia. Later he worked for Philip, and the Macedonian rewarded him with a large estate of land at the approach to the Chersonese.⁷¹ If more were known about him, it might be easier to understand the relations between Kardia, Philip, and Athens.

Probably the incident bringing tension to a head was a demand by Diopeithes that the Kardiens should accept some of his cleruchs; the Kardiens refused. So Diopeithes began armed activities against them. The Kardiens asked Philip for help, and he sent a message to Athens to suggest submitting the dispute to arbitration. The Athenians disregarded this suggestion, and Philip sent an armed force into Kardia to protect the city. But Diopeithes could retaliate; while Philip was in the interior fighting against one of the Odrysian kings, Diopeithes made a raid on the Thracian coast, which was now held by Macedon. Before Philip came back to the coast, Diopeithes retreated to the Chersonese. He was confident that Philip would not pursue him into the Chersonese, which was acknowledged to be Athenian territory; the confidence of Diopeithes is a measure of Philip's respect for the sea power of the Athenians.⁷²

Philip sent the Athenians a letter in which he complained that Diopeithes had contravened the peace. In the consequent debate, Demosthenes delivered the speech *On Those in the Chersonese* (8). The speech defends Diopeithes against the allegations of his critics. It insists that the Athenians do not have a choice between keeping the peace and going to war, for Philip has long been committing acts of aggression against them. Demosthenes does not say much about the real alternatives open to the Athenians at the time of the debate. They can hardly have considered abandoning the Chersonese. But at one point (8.28) the speech mentions a suggestion that had evidently been made in the debate; the Athenians might recall Diopeithes and send out another general to replace him. The result of the debate is not recorded.

In 341/0 Chares held command of Athenian forces on the coast of Thrace.⁷³ There is no way of telling whether Diopeithes continued in command in 341/0 as a colleague of Chares or was replaced by him. In view of the latter possibility, it is worth noting that some little time previously some Thasian exiles had found refuge with Philip and had been restored to their island by Chares.⁷⁴ Possibly in 341 Chares was *persona minus ingrata* with Philip.

Some readers have remarked on the confident stand taken by Demosthenes in this speech. "He seems surprisingly unafraid of the risk of immediate war, if Athens shows herself intransigent."⁷⁵ The reason can perhaps be detected. Twice in the course of the speech (8.2, 35) Demosthenes says that Philip has been away in Thrace for ten months. The longer his absence, the greater the hope entertained that he would not come back. A month or two after this speech was delivered the Athenians took action at two places in accordance with their confidence. Toward the middle of the summer Athenian forces commanded by Kephisophon together with men from Chalkis and Megara freed Oreos from its tyrant, Philistides. Shortly afterward Athenian forces under Phokion made their way to Eretria and freed it from its tyrant, Kleitarchos. Kallias of Chalkis realized at last his dream of a federation of Euboea; a combined force from the cities of the island was to fight at Chaironeia.⁷⁶ Antipater and Parmenion took no counteraction in Euboea. Their inaction is impressive because Kallias proceeded to engage in acts of privateering in the Gulf of Pagasai.⁷⁷ Presumably the instructions given them by their master did not allow them much freedom of initiative.

Meanwhile Philip continued to send messages to Athens. The occasion of the *Third Philippic*, delivered before the end of 342/1, was a letter in which Philip asserted that he was not at war with Athens (9.16–17, 27). The situation at the time of this speech was much like that at the time of speech 8 but somewhat more advanced. In the earlier speech Demosthenes had considered the possibility of a Macedonian attack on Byzantion in strictly hypothetical language:

If he waits for the etesian winds, marches on Byzantion, and besieges it, do you suppose in the first place that the Byzantines will persist in the same foolishness as at present instead of appealing to you and asking you to come to their aid? (8.14)

In speech 9, on the other hand, Demosthenes was categorical:

Has he not marched on Ambrakia and Leukas, which belong to the Corinthians? Has he not sworn to hand over Naupaktos, the property of the Achaians, to the Aitolians? Has he not taken Echinus from the Thebans, and is he not advancing now against the Byzantines, his allies? (9.34)

The assertion that Philip's march was directed against the Byzantines was prophetic. Philip advanced on Byzantion about a year later. Correspondingly the speech said that current deliberation was about the Chersonese and Byzantion and that it was not enough:

I differ from the others who advise you, gentlemen of Athens. For I do not think that we should now take thought about the Chersonese or even about Byzantion, but we should join in defending these and make sure that they suffer no harm, but we should deliberate about all the Greeks, since they are in great danger. (9.19–20)

Although speech 9 said that the condition of Athens could scarcely be worse if all Athenians had set out to make it as bad as possible (9.1), the confident stance of speech 8 was maintained and confirmed. The speech opened by saying that all agreed that Philip ought to be resisted. The speech urged the Athenians to send money to their men in the Chersonese and do anything else that these required (9.73). Moreover it advised the Athenians to send out embassies for collaboration to the Peloponnese, Rhodes, Chios, and the Persian king (9.71). The speaker had no doubt that collaboration would be forthcoming. He concluded by stating his conviction that conditions could still be “put right” (9.76, an echo of the slogan of *epanorthosis*). Envoys including Hypereides were sent to Chios and Rhodes about this time, and although no alliances were concluded, these two cities helped the Byzantines when Philip besieged them in 340.⁷⁸

The *Fourth Philippic* (10) was probably delivered early in 341/0. No precise occasion can be discovered, but the situation was much the same as at the time of speech 9. Demosthenes repeated his assertion that Philip’s advance was directed against Byzantion (10.68). The speech marks some growth in the orator’s ideas or in the extent to which he thought fit to reveal them. He had changed his mind in the course of eight years about the theoric fund, although he spoke of it in somewhat evasive language (10.35–45). He had no objection now to theoric distributions and he urged concord between rich and poor. A more significant novelty of speech 10 is its discussion of relations with the Persian king. In speech 9 Demosthenes had included that potentate briefly among the powers to whom the Athenians ought to send envoys. Now he reiterated the suggestion at greater length (10.31–34). He tried to dispel the conventional prejudice against collaboration with the Persians. Moreover, he stated two reasons why a request for Persian help was likely to succeed. They are of some interest:

In the first place, the people in whom the king has confidence and whom he considers his benefactors, those very people hate Philip and are at war against him. Again, the man who forges and knows all of Philip’s plans against the king has been seized. So the king will learn of all those activities, not from our accusations—he might suspect us of speaking in our own interest—but from the very man who carries them out and organizes them, so that the report will be credible. The only thing left for your envoys to say will be the thing the king would most gladly hear, that there should be joint retaliation against the power who injures us both and that Philip will be far more formidable to the king if he is free to attack us first. For if we are left on our own and something happens to us, he will then march without fear against the king. (10.31–33)

Perhaps Artaxerxes III would have smiled, if he had heard the speculations uttered in a city-state on the fringe of the civilized world. He might also have been amused, if he had lived to read the historical constructions that have sometimes been put on the words of Demosthenes. The latter distinguished in the passage quoted between two groups of people: some benefactors of the king and a man who had been arrested. It will be convenient to consider them in the opposite order.

As Didymos saw (4.59–6.62; see appendix 2 on speeches 8, 9, and 10), the man who had been arrested and sent to the king was Hermias, dynast of Atarneus. He was tortured but he refused to give information and he was killed. Demosthenes had said that Hermias would betray Philip's plans to Artaxerxes. It is proper to ask how Demosthenes knew that Hermias knew of Macedonian plans, when the Persian king had still to learn of them. Answers suggested by historians include one of the curiosities of scholarship: "Demosthenes' spies had informed him of a secret military agreement between Philip and Hermias of Atarneus, who had his residence on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont as the reigning vassal of Persia."⁷⁹ A more cautious theory notes that Philip invited Aristotle, the son-in-law of Hermias, as tutor to Alexander in 342 and suggests that Hermias used the philosopher to convey to Philip political messages, to which Philip responded favorably.⁸⁰ But conjectures of this kind are unnecessary to explain the misfortunes of Hermias. Mentor of Rhodes had received an extensive command over western Asia Minor as a reward for his services in the reconquest of Egypt. He found Hermias to be in revolt. Perhaps Hermias had behaved independently, perhaps he was an overmighty subject, perhaps Mentor distrusted him or considered him an obstacle to his own authority. Mentor marched against Hermias, enticed him to a conference by offering to intercede for him with the king, and seized him. Mentor thus acquired his captive's signet ring and sent officers with duly sealed documents to take over the cities loyal to Hermias.⁸¹ When Demosthenes composed the *Fourth Philippic*, he knew nothing more than the fact of the arrest. He embroidered this fact with a fiction of Macedonian plans. Modern historians have been more imaginative.

Demosthenes in the passage quoted mentioned also some benefactors of the Persian king and said that they hated Philip and were at war against him. The reference must be to Mentor and his companions. Their fortunes are of some importance toward understanding relations between Persia and Macedonia. Mentor had a brother, Memnon, and a sister, who was given in marriage to Artabazos, the son of Pharnabazos. Late in the 360s the two brothers helped Artabazos to recover his father's satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia (see chapter 4 at note 73). But by 355 Artabazos was in revolt against the new king, Artaxerxes III. He gained troops under Chares of Athens and later under Pammenes of Thebes, but these sources of assistance proved to be temporary. Soon after 353 he fled and found refuge with Philip of Macedon (see chapter 5 at notes 8–11). He was accompanied by Memnon; probably

Mentor too was with him at first. Some years later Mentor had an opportunity to repair the fortunes of the family. When the cities of Phoenicia joined Egypt in revolt and an attack by Artaxerxes was expected, Mentor conducted a force of four thousand Greek troops to Sidon to help its king, Tennes. But when the royal army drew near in 343, Tennes and Mentor betrayed the city to Artaxerxes. In this way Mentor won the Persian king's esteem. Advancing on Egypt in the ensuing winter, Artaxerxes divided his Greek forces into three parts and entrusted one of them to Mentor. The latter won still greater esteem from the king during the campaign. Promptly afterward Artaxerxes gave Mentor an extensive command in Asia Minor with authority to subdue rebels. This meant in effect that Mentor could decide which local dynasts he regarded as disaffected; Hermias suffered in consequence. Moreover, even before marching against Hermias, Mentor persuaded Artaxerxes to invite Artabazos and Memnon back from Philip's court. So they returned with their retinue to Asia Minor. Artabazos and the sister of Mentor brought with them their children, eleven sons and ten daughters. Mentor was delighted at being blessed with so many nephews and promoted them to military offices.⁸²

In the *Fourth Philippic* Demosthenes said that those whom the Persian king recognized as his benefactors, that is Mentor and his relatives, hated Philip and were at war with him. No act of hostility is known before 340. Memnon and Artabazos had recently been Philip's guests for many years. The remark of Demosthenes may have been an exaggeration, or anticipation like his assertion that Philip was marching against Byzantion. In 340, when Philip besieged Perinthos, "the satraps on the coast" on orders from Artaxerxes helped the Perinthians by sending them troops, money, supplies, and munitions.⁸³ The names of the coastal satraps are not recorded. Surely they included Mentor. Perhaps he inspired the policy of aiding Perinthos in 340. At least such a policy could hardly have been carried out against the opposition of Mentor, after he had received an extensive command on the northwest frontier and entrenched himself by promoting his relatives.

Demosthenes exaggerated in 341 when he said that those whom the Persian king recognized as his benefactors were at war against Philip. Indeed when Memnon and Artabazos returned to Asia Minor, they probably left a member of their family, also called Memnon, at the Macedonian court, for he appears later as Alexander's commander in Thrace.⁸⁴ But in 341 Mentor may already have been perturbed at Philip's eastward advance toward the straits. The coasts where Asia and Europe face one another were politically sensitive. Any change in the distribution of power around the Propontis and the Hellespont would draw the attention of a senior commander in western Asia Minor, if he had a sense of responsibility or at least a desire to survive. Yet more is to be learned from the travels of Artabazos and his relatives. A Persian grandee could lose royal favor, be declared contumacious, and even flee into exile. But hostilities did not always have to be pursued to extremes. An accommodation could be reached; a temporary rebel could be restored to honored status. The same applies to relations between the king of kings

and his royal vassals. An accommodation had been reached with Evagoras of Salamis in 380, even though the fighting had been severe. Mentor may have distrusted Philip in 341, and the coastal satraps sent help to Perinthos in 340, but there did not have to be inveterate hostility between Persians and Macedonians. There is no evidence of Persian help for Byzantion, when Philip besieged it in 340. No one knew in 341 that Alexander would conquer the Persian Empire.

In the *Third* and *Fourth Philippics* Demosthenes advised the Athenians to send an embassy to the Persian king. An embassy was sent within a matter of months.⁸⁵ Some time the king sent a letter rebuffing an Athenian request. The inimitable language of Aischines is worth quoting:

Not long before Alexander crossed to Asia the king of the Persians sent the demos a very arrogant and barbarian letter, in which he expressed himself in a most uncultured manner and wrote at the end: "I will not give you gold. Do not ask me for any. You will not get any." (3.238)

One may wonder whether Aischines has exaggerated the vigor of the king's language. It is more to the point to wonder whether the unfavorable response was rendered to the embassy of 341/0 or to some later request. At least the Athenian embassy of 341/0 had no material outcome, but this did not mean that Persian policy was set irrevocably on a course opposed to Athenian interests. Kings can respond to novel developments in a more nuanced manner than popular regimes.

Demosthenes and the Areopagos

With the three speeches delivered to the assembly in the summer of 341 (8, 9, 10), Demosthenes reached the height of his influence. Questions of composition and transmission are especially difficult for these speeches (see appendix 2). At least it is clear that he now presented himself to the Athenians as a master of statesmanship. The deferential and apologetic tone, with which he had begun some of his early speeches (notably 4.1, 15.1), was a thing of the past. He proposed the expeditions to Oreos and Eretria in 341. After these cities had been liberated, the Athenians voted a crown to Demosthenes on the proposal of Aristonikos, and the award was announced in the theater at the Dionysia in the spring of 340.⁸⁶ For a few years the history of Athens and the biography of Demosthenes were to coincide.

It will not be amiss to consider here some incidents in which the name of Demosthenes is linked to the Council of the Areopagos. Demosthenes carried a decree that empowered that Council to initiate proceedings against anyone suspected of breaking the laws. Consequently several suspects were arrested and suffered various punishments; probably one of them underwent only a term of imprisonment, but some were put to death.⁸⁷ The most notorious of the victims was Antiphon. He had been excluded from the list

of citizens, when it was revised. He approached Philip and allegedly promised to burn the Athenian dockyards. Demosthenes found him in hiding in the Peiraieus and brought him before the assembly. But Aischines objected that Demosthenes had carried out the arrest illegally by entering a private house without a decree authorizing him to do so. Consequently the assembly let Antiphon go. But the Council of the Areopagos sought him out and put him before the Athenians again. This time he was tortured and killed.⁸⁸

The initiative of the Areopagite Council was not restricted to criminal matters. Some time after the execution of Antiphon the Athenians chose Aischines to represent them before the Delphic Amphiktyony in a dispute that had arisen about control of the sanctuary at Delos. But the assembly granted some authority in the matter to the Council of the Areopagos. That Council annulled the election of Aischines and chose Hypereides to plead instead.⁸⁹

Much is obscure about these occurrences. They brought a lasting addition to Athenian legal procedure. A lawsuit in Athens proceeded in two stages. At the first the parties presented themselves usually to an executive officer—for example, to one of the nine archons—for a preliminary investigation. At the second stage, a *dikasterion* met under the chairmanship of the same officer, heard the speeches of the parties, and decided the issue by vote. The distinctive feature of the new procedure was that the first stage was a hearing before the Council of the Areopagos. If that Council found reason to suspect the defendant, it sent the case on to a *dikasterion* for decision. This procedure was called *apophasis* or “declaration”; the Council “declared” the names of the people whom it suspected. In 324/3 this procedure was adopted when some Athenians fell under suspicion of accepting bribes from Harpalos. A papyrus published in 1968 illustrates the procedure further. It preserves part of a speech of Hypereides in defense of Chairephilos, a dealer in salt fish. The Council had issued a “declaration” naming Chairephilos. Hypereides also mentioned a decree of the assembly, which stated charges, and he argued that Chairephilos was not guilty under these charges. Apparently, as in 324/3, the first step had been a decree of the assembly inviting the Council to investigate.⁹⁰

The procedure of *apophasis* may have come into being with modifications through more than one incident. The earliest recorded step was a decree of Demosthenes authorizing the Council of the Areopagos to initiate proceedings against people suspected of breaking the laws. Dates between 346 and 343 have been suggested for this decree, but the reasons are not compelling.⁹¹ A date in or after 340 might be preferred because extraordinary measures against single persons and Antiphon’s promise to burn the dockyards would be more likely to occur after war was resumed between Athens and Philip. A further consideration suggests a date scarcely before 341 for the decree of Demosthenes. The latter in proposing his decree evidently thought that he could rely on the Areopagite Council to exercise its new authority on lines of which he himself would approve. He cannot have packed the Council with his sympathizers, for it consisted of all who had held any of the nine

archonships and the archons were chosen by lot. Evidently his record of statesmanship had won the sympathy of an effective majority of the Council. In other words, his decree accords with the eminence he had attained in Athens by 341 and continued to hold for a few years.⁹² In 337/6 his enemies were to express displeasure at the Areopagos.

The Peace of Philokrates Abrogated

For the summer of 340 Philip planned to attack Perinthos and Byzantion. These cities had hitherto been his allies, although relations had begun to deteriorate.⁹³ If he mastered Byzantion, he would hold a position adjacent to the sea route that brought grain to many Greek states. Subjugation of Perinthos would be a step toward advancing on Byzantion. Perinthos stood on a promontory on the European shore of the Propontis. To attack the town it was not enough for Philip to bring an army against it; he also had to have ships operating in the Propontis. Chares held a force of Athenian ships in the straits.⁹⁴ So Philip needed to bring warships from the Aegean through the Hellespont. But as they sailed through the Hellespont, they could be attacked by the Athenian cleruchs and troops in the Chersonese, especially if they put in for water.

To protect his fleet, Philip led his army or part of it into the Chersonese. To defend this indefensible breach of the peace of Philokrates he sent the Athenians a letter, which has been preserved.⁹⁵ It was composed with skill. It narrated a multitude of grievances and made its proper business, the march into the Chersonese (12.16), into thin meat within a thick sandwich. No Athenian response is known. Philip asserted that he had marched his men into the Chersonese and marched them out again without inflicting any harm. That may well be true; it was not in Philip's interests to engage in hostilities in the Chersonese. Chares likewise inflicted no harm.

Philip began besieging Perinthos about the middle of the summer.⁹⁶ He made a great effort, employing siege engines of the latest style. But the city stood on a hill and was well fortified. Besides the Perinthians had friends. The Byzantines sent them men, missiles, and catapults. The satraps on the coast of Asia Minor, receiving written instructions from Artaxerxes, sent troops, money, food, missiles, and other necessities into Perinthos (see earlier at note 83). Evidently Philip was not able to maintain a complete blockade; the deficiencies are likely to have been naval.

After a time Philip left part, reportedly half, of his forces to continue the siege of Perinthos and led the rest against Byzantion.⁹⁷ On the way he detached a contingent to invest Selymbria, a smaller town whence his communications might otherwise be threatened.⁹⁸ The situation near the Bosphoros became complicated. The Byzantines had been allies of Philip and some of them may have wished to return to that condition. But they had committed themselves against Philip by sending help on a large scale to Perinthos. Yet by doing so they had diminished their own resources for resisting

a siege. Chares was in the neighborhood and could bring them reinforcements, but he had a bad reputation. The Byzantines refused to admit him to their city.⁹⁹ Perhaps Persian reinforcements could be expected, as at Perinthos. The Persians are not known to have sent any help to Byzantion. But about the time when the siege began there were Persian officers on the Asiatic shore not far away; they were watching developments.

The situation grew still more complicated when the annual fleet of merchant ships, bringing grain across the Black Sea, gathered at Hieron on the Asiatic shore with a view to sailing in convoy through the straits. Chares was there to escort it. But Chares went away to confer with the Persian officers. In his absence Philip sent ships to try to seize the grain fleet, but his ships were driven off. So he took a force to the Asiatic shore, led them to Hieron, and captured the grain fleet by attacking it from the land as it rode at anchor. The total number of ships captured was 230. Philip kept those bound for his enemies to a number of 180 and let the others go. By selling the spoil he realized seven hundred talents.¹⁰⁰

Philip sent the Athenians yet another letter. Part of its last sentence has survived. He said that they had begun the quarrel and he would resist them in a just cause.¹⁰¹ The Athenian assembly listened to the letter and voted on the proposal of Demosthenes to take down the stele bearing the peace and alliance of Philokrates, to man warships, and to prosecute the war with vigor.¹⁰² They sent Phokion and Kephisophon with reinforcements to the straits. Leon, one of the chief men of Byzantion, had made acquaintance with Phokion in Plato's Academy and had confidence in him. The Byzantines admitted Phokion and his men to their city.¹⁰³

The historian has to contemplate events after they have happened, and so he cannot experience the surprise they cause to contemporaries. The actual response of the Athenians to Philip's seizure of the grain fleet was not at all what a contemporary might have expected. In 404 and 387 the Athenians had yielded to their enemies, when these gained control of the route bringing grain through the straits. So in 340, when Philip seized the grain fleet, one might have expected the Athenians to seek an accommodation with him in a subservient manner. It would be fruitless to ask what Philip hoped to achieve in seizing the grain ships. Possibly he was interested only in the immediate advantage, a valuable prize with food for his men. But these considerations lead to a question that needs to be asked. What did the Athenians have to eat in the winter of 340/39? In 355/4 Demosthenes (20.31) had remarked that the Athenians drew half of their imports of grain from the Pontic area. No doubt "half" was an approximation, and the other "half" may have come from more than one source. One of the richest sources of grain around the coasts of the Mediterranean was Egypt. An interest in that source of supply may explain the policies of the Athenians toward the actual rulers of Egypt, whether they were rebels or vassals of the Persian king. Artaxerxes had recovered Egypt in 343/2. The possibility should be entertained that the king who had ordered satraps to assist Perinthos increased the sup-

ply of Egyptian grain to Athens in 340/39 to facilitate Athenian resistance to Philip.

In the summer of 341 Demosthenes had said to the Athenians:

Gentlemen of Athens, the present predicament is hazardous for everyone in my opinion, but no people in the world are in greater danger than you. Not only does Philip direct his plots most against you, but also you have adopted a posture of inactivity. If, on seeing the multitude of goods and the plentiful supplies in the market, you let yourselves be beguiled as if the city were not exposed to any threat, your judgment of the situation is neither sound nor right. For such criteria might serve for determining whether a market or a festal concourse has been well or inadequately prepared. But a city that is recognized by the man constantly bent on ruling the Greeks as the sole obstacle and champion of universal liberty should not be estimated by asking whether its supply of consumer goods is adequate. Instead one must inquire on behalf of the city whether it can rely on the loyalty of its allies and whether it is well equipped with the means of warfare. (10.49–50; cf. 69)

About a year later the seizure of the grain fleet at Hieron delivered blunt proof that Demosthenes had been right. Even though other sources of grain may have made good the deficiency in a matter of months or even weeks, there must have been an economic shock to many Athenians. This fact helps to explain a reform of the trierarchy, carried into law by Demosthenes in 340, probably soon after the outbreak of war.¹⁰⁴ In 358/7 the law of Perian-dros had made the twelve hundred richest Athenians liable for the trierarchy and had organized them in contribution groups, so that the burden would be spread.¹⁰⁵ The law of Demosthenes restricted the burden to the three hundred richest men. Thus it brought relief to the remaining nine hundred, the people who may have been most sensitive to the economic shock caused by Philip at Hieron. The law was indicted in court but upheld.

Philip's presence on the European shore of the Propontis caused alarm to other cities as well as Athens. More varied interests came into play in the maritime route between the Aegean and the Black Sea than in any equal area of the known world. Help was sent to Byzantion from the Chians, the Koans, the Rhodians "and some others of the Greeks," according to Diodoros; the others included the Tenedians.¹⁰⁶ Those named are reminiscent of the coalition that had opposed Athens in the Social War. Although the terms ending that war are not recorded, evidently an understanding was reached, explicitly or tacitly, to satisfy many maritime cities that had interests in the straits. In 340 Philip threatened that understanding.

Philip could not capture Byzantion. One cannot tell how long into the winter of 340/39 he continued the siege, but after some time he desisted. As he withdrew, he led his army again through the Chersonese, probably to protect his fleet as he had done in the summer, but this time he ravaged the territory of the cities.¹⁰⁷ His experiences of 340 had disappointed him. He had made enormous efforts at Perinthos and Byzantion but he had not suc-

ceeded. He did not yet return to Macedon. Instead he marched northward against Atheas, the king of the Skythians dwelling south of the lower Danube. This campaign was successful. Atheas was killed, and Philip captured many women and children and large herds of animals.¹⁰⁸ But this success could not restore his prestige in Greek eyes. It was easier to fight Skythians than to face hoplites or to besiege walled cities.

Disturbances in Central Greece

While Philip was away among the Skythians, the Thebans expelled his garrison from Nikaia at Thermopylai and installed a garrison of their own.¹⁰⁹ This fact first became known in 1904 through the discovery and publication of the papyrus bearing part of Didymos's commentary on Demosthenes. Bearing this accident of discovery in mind, the historian should not be dismayed if other important events of 339 remain unknown. He has to confess to ignorance on the state of Theban opinion that led to the seizure of Nikaia. Since extant evidence is largely Athenian in its point of view, one inclines to suppose that Philip had favored the Thebans ever since 346 or earlier. Evidently by 339 the Thebans thought otherwise.

It is proper to pause and notice places of interest to the Thebans well to the north of Boiotia. According to Aischines, Philip had taken Nikaia from them and given it to the Thessalians. The statement is surprising. In 346 Philip received Nikaia from Phalaikos and gave it to the Thessalians. An attractive explanation supposes that the Thebans had taken and garrisoned Nikaia in the 360s, when they sent armies into Thessaly.¹¹⁰ Echinon on the southern coast of Thessaly was still further from Thebes, yet in 341 Demosthenes said that Philip had taken it from the Thebans. The same explanation may apply; perhaps the Thebans had installed a garrison in Echinon in the days when they could send forces into Thessaly.¹¹¹ The next chapter will notice another place that may have attracted Theban attention near the head of the Gulf of Malis.

Much can be said about the diplomatic configuration of central Greece at the time when the Thebans drove the Macedonian garrison from Nikaia. The council of the Amphiktyonic League gathered at a meeting or *pylaia* each spring and each fall. It consisted of twenty-four *hieromnemes*, each casting one vote. Each member state of the League chose some *pylagorai* to accompany its hieromnemon(es). Strange things began to happen at the spring *pylaia* of 339 (or possibly at the fall *pylaia* of 340). The story was told in court by Aischines and Demosthenes in 330. One can reconstruct a coherent account by allowing for exaggerations and distortions; the omissions of the two orators are more troublesome.¹¹²

When the representatives gathered at Delphi, the hieromnemon of the Athenians was Diognetos and their *pylagorai* were Meidias, Thrasykles, and Aischines. But Diognetos and Meidias fell sick of a fever. So Aischines had opportunity to speak for the Athenians in place of Diognetos. At a meeting

of the council, a man of Amphissa in West Lokris objected to the participation of the Athenians. He recalled that they had been allies of the Phokians in the Sacred War and he made other reproaches. Thereupon it occurred to Aischines that the Amphissians had encroached on the plain of Kirrha, land sacred to Apollo; they had tilled it and built upon it. He launched into an impassioned denunciation of the Amphissians. In fact the boundary of the sacred land was not clear; this may often have been true of land dedicated to deities.¹¹³

The day was well advanced when Aischines spoke. The council adjourned and the altercation might have been at an end. But a herald appeared in public and made a proclamation: all adult men of Delphi, both slave and free, were to report with spades and mattocks early on the next day (the second day), and the hieromnemones and pylagorai were to accompany them; any city whose representatives did not come would be excluded from the sanctuary and accursed. In Greek practice a herald was a mere mouthpiece; he only acted when a responsible officer had given him instructions. The identity of the officer who gave this herald instructions may appear shortly.

On the second day the company gathered and made its way down the slope into the plain of Kirrha. They set fire to the buildings there and began demolishing the installations of the harbor. But the men of Amphissa came to protect their property; they put the attackers to flight and captured some of the hieromnemones.¹¹⁴ There again the quarrel might have come to an end. But on the third day the officer presiding at this *pylaia*, Kottiphos of Pharsalos, called an "assembly" (*ekklēsia*) of the Amphiktyones—that is, a meeting to be attended not only by the hieromnemones and the pylagorai but by all who had come to offer sacrifice or consult the god. At this somewhat irregular gathering much was said against the Amphissians and a vote was taken to summon the hieromnemones with instructions from their cities to an extraordinary meeting, to be held on a fixed day before the time when the next *pylaia* was due. That meeting should decide what punishment to inflict on Amphissa.

Kottiphos and Kolosimmos had been the Thessalian hieromnemones ever since 346.¹¹⁵ When Aischines told his story to an Athenian court in 330, he began by alleging a reason for his denunciation of the Amphissians. He said that, when he and his Athenian colleagues reached Delphi, they were told "by those who wished to show goodwill to our city" that the Amphissians, being subservient to the Thebans, were bringing in a resolution for subjecting the Athenians to a fine of fifty talents; the complaint was that the Athenians had dedicated some gold shields at the new temple before it was consecrated and had inscribed them as "spoils taken by the Athenians from the Medes and the Thebans, when these fought against the Greeks." Replying to the court in 330, Demosthenes disposed of this allegation easily; no summons had been issued to the Athenians to answer any charge. Aischines did not say that the Amphissians voiced their charge about the dedication at the meeting of the council; he would have the court believe that his promptitude in denouncing the Amphissians prevented them.¹¹⁶ Aischines said

that he was warned of Amphissian intentions "by those who wished to show goodwill to our city." That was the language of a man who did not wish to admit that he had been duped. Demosthenes did not identify the men who had duped Aischines. He would surely have done so, if they had been Philip's agents, for his thesis was that at Delphi Aischines conducted himself as Philip's hireling.¹¹⁷ The proper conjecture is that "those who wished to show goodwill to our city" were Kottiphos and his associates, for Kottiphos took prompt action to ensure that the altercation begun by Aischines did not die its natural death.

Thebes sent no representatives to the extraordinary meeting of the Amphiktyony. The Thebans had long been allies of the Lokrians. They had no desire to join in activities directed against Amphissa; they may rather have hoped to protect the town. Likewise the Athenians passed a decree, on the motion of Demosthenes, that their hieromnemon and their pylagorai should take part in regular meetings but should not join with "those assembled there." Words were chosen with care to avoid recognizing the extraordinary meeting as anything that it might profess to be.¹¹⁸ Even if one of the Athenians had been beguiled, they had no desire collectively to further the plans of Kottiphos. The extraordinary meeting gathered, ordered an armed expedition against Amphissa, and chose Kottiphos to command it. Kottiphos marched on Amphissa but imposed moderate terms. The Amphissians were to pay a fine, they exiled some of their citizens, and they recalled others hitherto in exile. But by the fall of 339 the fine had not been paid, the men recalled had been exiled again, and the recent exiles had been restored. Moreover Philip had returned to Macedon. The fall pylaia authorized a further expedition against Amphissa and offered the command to Philip.

Pleading in 330, Demosthenes said that Philip had intended this outcome and that he had bribed Aischines to bring about the dispute with Amphissa. Modern historians have mostly accepted half of this thesis and rejected the other half. They have not believed that Aischines was bribed, but they have supposed that Philip brought about the whole series of events ending with his nomination to the command. Yet they have diverged on distribution of roles. Some have thought that Philip's agents set the Amphissians to plan their complaint against Athens and incited Aischines to attack them. Others have supposed that Philip's agents incited the Amphissians but Aischines acted on his own initiative. Yet others have believed that Macedonian agents duped Aischines but they leave the question of Amphissian motivation open. Such theories pay an unintended compliment to the eloquence of Demosthenes. They are also an inference from consequences to causes. The inference is highly implausible. Philip was about one thousand kilometers away from Delphi. He did not have wireless telegraphy. He could not direct the behavior of any supposed agents in a complicated dispute. He may not have cared what happened in central Greece, while he was far away. But if he did care, he probably wished conditions to remain quiet.¹¹⁹

To understand the way the dispute at Delphi developed one must remember that Philip had been away from Macedon since 342. He was risking his

life in distant lands. Moreover, he had suffered major setbacks in 340. These suggested that he was not a match for Greek warfare and they had diminished his prestige, an important matter to Greeks. The dispute arising in the Amphiktyonic council can best be understood on the assumption that the participants did not take Philip into their calculations. Since he was no longer to be reckoned with, traditional rivalries, especially that between Thessaly and Thebes, could revive. Kottiphos tried to gain advantage by instigating and pursuing an attack on Amphissa. The Lokrians had long been allies of Thebes.

The Thebans seized Nikaia and installed their garrison while Philip was among the Skythians. One cannot discover the precise relation of date between this and the various steps in the quarrel over Amphissa. Aischines says that the extraordinary meeting of the Amphiktyonic council took place while Philip was among the Skythians. The accuracy of Aischines has been doubted,¹²⁰ rightly or wrongly. The precise sequence is not crucial. When the Thebans seized Nikaia, the forces against which they could expect to hold Thermopylai were not Macedonian but Thessalian. In fact Philip came back to Macedon alive. But in consequence of the Theban action, he no longer held the route into central Greece, which he had won in 346.

8

The Athenians Defeated

The opportunity for which the Athenians had waited since 346 came in 339, when the Thebans expelled the Macedonian garrison from Nikaia. But as this chapter will show, Philip won the ensuing war and it was a fair fight. In consequence of his victory, he could install garrisons at places where they would check ambitious cities. Later, during the lifetime of Alexander, the Athenians refrained from overt action against Macedon. They were building up their resources and training their men. On his return from India Alexander carried out actions that provoked acute tension among his senior officers. The Athenians might begin to hope for a new opportunity. The death of Alexander prompted the outbreak of the Lamian War, but again the Athenians and their allies were defeated in a fair fight.

Philip's March Into Greece

Late in 339 Philip wished to bring an army southward from Macedon through Thessaly, then round the head of the Gulf of Malis, and thus into central Greece. The Thebans could check him at Thermopylai because they had put a garrison in Nikaia. The strategic problem for Philip was not unlike that which had confronted Xerxes in 480. Xerxes had outflanked Thermopylai by a hazardous maneuver. He had sent a picked force by night along a path over Mount Oita; this force had descended to the east of Thermopylai and taken the defenders in the rear. But after destroying the force of Leonidas, Xerxes did not lead his army from the head of the Malian Gulf eastward through Thermopylai. Instead, he took his men southward through the land of Trachis into Doris and thence into Phokis.¹ For two reasons he could not have followed this route before overcoming the defense of Thermopylai. First, had he done so, the defenders of Thermopylai could have cut his communications with Thessaly. Second, until he had forced the pass of Thermopylai, he had to reckon with possible resistance in the mountainous ter-

ritory of Phokis and even perhaps in Doris, although in the event the people of Doris medized.

Thus in addition to Thermopylai the route through Trachis could have strategic value. It received due attention during and after the Peloponnesian War. In 426, at the invitation of the Trachinians, the Lakedaimonians sent a colony which took over the town of Trachis and renamed it Herakleia. The site was eight kilometers west of Thermopylai.² Although the colony did not flourish, it was of some value to Sparta. In 424 Brasidas set off from Herakleia for his march across Thessaly.³ In 395 Lysander made it his base for his advance to Haliartos.⁴ Ismenias as Theban commander captured Herakleia in the following winter.⁵ Sparta recovered it in the peace settlement of 387/6.⁶ Straight after the battle of Leuktra, Jason of Pherai came south into Boiotia and negotiated a truce between the Boiotians and the survivors of the defeated army; during his return journey northward, he dismantled Herakleia.⁷ Rather more than a year later the men of Herakleia accompanied the Thebans on their first expedition into the Peloponnese.⁸ Reasons were given previously (chapter 7 at notes 110 and 111) for supposing that the Thebans installed garrisons in Nikaia and Echinon in the 360s, when they sent armies repeatedly into Thessaly. If that is right, they would be likely to put a garrison in Herakleia at the same time.

Philip's strategic problem in 339 differed in one respect from that which Xerxes had confronted in 480. Philip had more prospect of conciliating the Phokians. In 346 the latter had been divided into villages and they had been required to pay an indemnity in annual installments of sixty talents. But the payments did not begin until the fall of 343. In 343/2 and 342/1 four semestrial payments at thirty talents were made. Starting in the spring of 340, the burden was reduced to a single annual payment of thirty talents, and these payments continued for several years. But in one of the two years, 339/8 and 338/7, no payment was made. During the armed operations of 338, the two sides may have competed for the favor of the Phokians by letting them restore cities. The record is not clear in detail, but Philip had something to offer the Phokians.⁹

Late in 339 Philip led an army southward from Thessaly through the land of Trachis at the head of the Gulf of Malis. He continued into Doris and occupied one of its townships, Kytinion. From there he marched eastward down the valley of the river Kephisos and he occupied the Phokian town of Elateia.¹⁰ Consequently the Theban position at Nikaia, guarding Thermopylai, became ineffectual. Some historians have remarked on the boldness of Philip in taking this route; he caused surprise to his enemies.¹¹ Moreover, his march could have been checked near the head of the Malian Gulf by a garrison in Herakleia. The Thebans, though not openly at war with Philip, had expelled his troops from Nikaia; they could expect retaliation. The Athenians were at war with him and had no security, if the route to Kytinion and Elateia was open. Historians have accused the Thebans and the Athenians of improvidence for failing to garrison Herakleia.¹² The accusation

should be directed primarily to the Thebans, who were nearer to the northern routes, and it may be just or it may not. There are two possibilities. Either the Thebans, mindful of their Thessalian expeditions of the 360s, put a garrison in Herakleia in 339 and Philip overcame it by a stratagem, or the Thebans left the Trachinian route into Doris open. In other words, either the Thebans were wise or they were foolish. Perhaps a future discovery of papyrus will show.

The War of Chaironeia

The news of Philip's occupation of Elateia caused consternation in Athens. He could no longer be checked at the approach to central Greece. The alarm felt by the Athenians is described in a moving passage of the speech of Demosthenes, *On the Crown* (18.169–72). But even before that news came, the Athenians were making preparations for armed action. Early in 339/8, on the proposal of Demosthenes, they suspended work on the dockyards and the arsenal and they decreed that the large revenues, hitherto assigned to the theoric fund, should be directed to military purposes. Philochoros reports this before telling of Philip's seizure of Elateia; his order of events should be believed.¹³ The Athenian decree about the revenues must have been passed about the time when the Thebans expelled the Macedonian garrison from Nikaia; it may have been passed in response to the prospects which that Theban action offered.

After receiving the news about Elateia, the Athenians, on the motion of Demosthenes, sent him as leader of an embassy to seek an alliance with the Thebans. The military situation invited this response,¹⁴ but to propose it required vision and courage, as there had long been antagonism between Athens and Thebes. Demosthenes and his colleagues found that envoys from Philip and his allies (the Thessalians, Ainianians, Aitolians, Dolopians, and Phthiotians) had already reached Thebes with proposals that the Thebans should join them in attacking Athens or at least let them march through Boiotia.¹⁵ The Thebans were still in appearance allied to Philip, and so it could not be predicted that they would reject his proposal. Demosthenes persuaded them to do so and to ally with Athens. Again, the situation invited the Thebans to take this decision; their seizure of Nikaia in the preceding summer shows that they had become acutely dissatisfied with the treatment they had had from Philip and with the advance of his power in Greece. But it took diplomatic skill to persuade them to ally with Athens.

Demosthenes offered the Thebans good terms. The Athenians recognized the Boiotian League and would come to the aid of the Thebans, if any city seceded from it. Athens was to bear two-thirds of the cost of operations on land and Thebes was to bear one-third of the cost. This distribution of the financial burden was probably reasonable in view of the relative wealth of the two powers. It was also reasonable that the Thebans should have command of armed operations, since there was every ground to expect that the

war would be fought in Boiotia. Something may have been said about command of naval operations and their eventual cost, but there was little prospect of any such eventuality.¹⁶ Demosthenes surely saw that there was nothing to gain from quibbling about terms. A war was to be fought, and its operations would dictate the amount of blood and money to be expended.

The military history of the war and of the final battle fought at Chaironeia on 7. Metageitnion 338/7 has been reconstructed with patience and care from scanty and scattered sources.¹⁷ That task need not be repeated here. What calls for attention is the distribution of states and power on each side. As already noted, when Philip approached Elateia he could make offers to the Phokians. For the winter the main force of Boiotians and Athenians occupied a good defensive position at Parapotamioi in Phokis near the Boiotian border. They too had something to offer the Phokians. Probably the two sides competed for Phokian allegiance, different Phokians fought on each side, and in the outcome some Phokian towns were restored.¹⁸ When Philip sent his embassy to Thebes after seizing Elateia, he demanded that the Thebans should hand over Nikaia to the Lokrians.¹⁹ Thus he sought the goodwill of the East Lokrians, whose strategic position was more significant than their armed power. Disappointed in Thebes, Philip sent embassies to his friends in the Peloponnese, whom he had cultivated ever since 344, but these preferred to remain neutral in the war.²⁰ In the spring of 338 he marched toward Amphissa and overcame by a stratagem the force stationed by the Athenians and the Thebans to hold the route against him. He took Amphissa but treated it with moderation, exiling some leaders but allowing the city to survive.²¹ Thus Philip conciliated the Lokrians and put an end to the dispute from which the Sacred War had arisen. Probably about the same time, Philip took Naupaktos from the Achaians and gave it to the Aitolians. In doing so he fulfilled an undertaking that he had made to the Aitolians in 342.²²

The Athenians and the Thebans likewise sought allies. Promptly after concluding their own alliance they sent envoys to many parts of Greece.²³ The consequent coalition, whose forces fought at Chaironeia, included the Euboians, the Achaians, the Megarians, the Corinthians, the Leukadians and the Kerkyraians.²⁴ Although the names in this list are not numerous, most of the allies were strong powers. In land forces, the Boiotians headed by Thebes were probably the strongest of the Greek states. They had shown themselves in this character at Leuktra. They had suffered reverses during the Third Sacred War, but these are largely to be explained by the financial resources of Delphi, on which the Phokians drew to hire troops. Since 346 Boiotia had had time to recover. Athens may have been somewhat less powerful in citizen troops than Boiotia, but the difference need not have been large. Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 3.5.2) said that the Athenians were as numerous as the Boiotians, a casual estimate, no doubt, but it cannot have been wildly wrong. Athens was doubtless the strongest of the allies in financial resources, which could be translated into mercenaries. The coalition as a whole is said to have raised fifteen thousand foot and two thousand cavalry, apart from citizen forces.²⁵ That the Euboians responded favorably to

the Athenian and Theban embassies of 339/8 is not surprising; the Athenians had liberated Oreos and Eretria in 341, and so Kallias of Chalkis had been able to launch a new Euboian League. Its armed forces may have been considerable. The same may be true of the Achaians. Philip offended them by depriving them of Naupaktos. Their ambition to hold a strategically valuable position on the north shore of the gulf may be some indication of their military power. The adhesion of the Corinthians to the coalition of 338 shows that they had not forgotten how Philip had advanced on Ambrakia in 343/2. Since the Peloponnesian War, Corinth was no longer a major power in Greek affairs, but it brought Leukas and Kerkyra with it into the coalition. Among the allies who fought Philip at Chaironeia the only one not likely to have supplied a large force of armed men is Megara.

The size of the forces engaged at Chaironeia cannot be determined with precision. Philip is said to have had more than thirty thousand infantry and not less than two thousand cavalry.²⁶ The source for these figures does not inspire confidence, but inaccurate statistics are better than no statistics. Modern estimates suggest that the forces opposing Philip were superior in numbers but not by much.²⁷ The two sides were almost evenly matched and the outcome of the battle could not be predicted. Philip's victory may have been due to superiority in equipment or discipline or generalship; one cannot assess the respective roles of these different factors. But the lesson to be learned from the battle was clear, at least for the Athenians. The allies opposing Philip at Chaironeia were as strong a coalition as one could hope to bring together from the Greek states south of Thessaly. The Macedonians with their allies proved themselves superior to that coalition. Therefore, however many allies the Athenians might muster in Greece, it would be foolish to challenge the might of Macedon, as long as the Macedonians remained united. This consideration set limits to Athenian policy for the rest of the lifetime of Demosthenes.

The Peace Settlement

Tradition told a colorful story of Philip's dealings with Athens after the battle of Chaironeia. While he was carousing after the victory, one of the Athenian captives, Demades, told him that his mirth was unseemly. Impressed by the bold remark, Philip sent Demades to Athens with an offer. The Athenians responded by sending Demades and two others, Phokion and Aischines, as envoys to negotiate. Hence Philip granted relatively favorable terms to the Athenians but imposed severe terms on the Thebans.²⁸

The story may be true. Some have attributed Philip's mild treatment of Athens to his supposed admiration for the current center of Greek cultural achievement. That hypothesis may likewise be true. Against it one can urge that Philip never went to Athens. Yet neither did Winckelmann. In any case there were military reasons to deter Philip from trying to impose humiliating terms on Athens. When the news of the defeat arrived, the Athenians passed

measures to meet the emergency. The noncombatants were brought within the walls and the generals were authorized to man the forts as they thought fit.²⁹ Men aged more than fifty years were called out for service.³⁰ On the motion of Demosthenes decrees were carried concerning garrisons, ditches, and the expense of walls and for keeping the able-bodied men under arms and setting the rest of the population to work.³¹ The assembly entrusted defense of Attica to Charidemus, but the Areopagite Council brought it about that this decision was quashed and defense was entrusted to Phokion.³² The assembly commissioned Demosthenes to safeguard the supply of grain and he put to sea for this purpose.³³ Athens and the Peiraeus were well fortified. If Philip tried to overcome the city by siege and storm, he might succeed, as he had done at Olynthos, or he might fail, as at Perinthos and Byzantion. Naval superiority gave the Athenians a prospect of maintaining their supplies against a blockade, and the possibility of Persian aid could not be calculated. If Philip attacked Athens, he would at least be delayed for many months. It was more prudent to offer acceptable terms.

Philip restored the Athenian captives taken at Chaironeia without ransom. Antipater and Alexander accompanied the corpses of the fallen to Athens as a mark of honor.³⁴ The Second Athenian League was dissolved.³⁵ Athens kept Samos, Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, and its administration of Delos.³⁶ But probably the Athenians lost the Chersonese; although explicit evidence is lacking, there is no indication to link them to the Chersonese after 338. On the other hand, Philip took Oropos from the Thebans and assigned it to Athens.³⁷ Athens retained its independence and it is not clear whether its alliance of 346 was renewed, but at an early stage, perhaps as early as the conclusion of the bilateral treaty of peace, the Athenians voted to join the multilateral organization that Philip was about to launch, even though Phokion advised them to wait and discover the terms.³⁸

Geography and political history gave the Thebans a strategically weaker position than the Athenians. Their city was not on the coast, and Philip could exploit the discontent that some other cities of Boiotia entertained toward them. The terms he imposed were severe. He exacted a ransom for Theban captives and corpses taken at Chaironeia. He executed some leading Thebans and drove others into exile. He restored some Thebans who had been in exile, and from these he set up a body of three hundred men to exercise political and judicial authority.³⁹ He installed a Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia.⁴⁰ He assigned Oropos to Athens, and he restored the cities of Orchomenos, Plataia, and Thespiiai.⁴¹ From the existence of boiotarchs⁴² in 335 it has been inferred that Philip did not disband the Boiotian League. The inference is reasonable, though not certain, but the restoration of Orchomenos, Plataia, and Thespiiai altered the distribution of power within the League.

Philip concluded treaties individually with many cities, including doubtless all those that had fought against him at Chaironeia. Evidence is scanty, for example, on the cities of Euboia. It is not clear whether the Euboian League survived. The fact that a league of Euboian cities existed early in the

third century⁴³ does not reveal their condition under Philip's settlement. It is more to the point to observe that Kallias of Chalkis survived and was on good terms with Olympias a few years later.⁴⁴ In general Philip may have been willing to grant relatively mild terms to many cities. For he did not have time for lengthy military operations, since he was hastening to other things. Late in 338 he led his forces into the Peloponnese; he was intent on bringing benefits to the cities that had befriended him in the previous half-dozen years. He invaded and devastated Lakonia. He detached border districts from Lakedaimon and assigned them to Argos, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Messene.⁴⁵

Thereafter in the course of 338/7, Philip set up an organization which is often called the League of Corinth. It was not a league; in a speech of 331 ([Demosthenes] 17) the participants are referred to not as allies but as "those who take part in the peace." Its juridical nature has been discussed adequately elsewhere.⁴⁶ It was a multilateral agreement for maintaining common peace with additional provisions. There was to be a synedrion, meeting at least once a year, and there were "officers in charge of the common defense." In addition to the *Rechtsfrage*, the inquiry into the nature of the agreement, considerations of power have to be recognized. They concern garrisons and mobile forces.

Long afterward Philip V called Corinth, Chalkis, and Demetrias "the fetters of Greece."⁴⁷ In the third century Macedonian kings tried to maintain garrisons in the citadels of these three places. The one crucial for control of Greece was Corinth; the other two secured Macedonian communications with it. Philip II put a garrison in Corinth.⁴⁸ Whether he installed a garrison in Chalkis is not clear.⁴⁹ Since he held a garrison in Thebes and was sure of the Thessalians, his communications by land with Corinth were secure. He also installed a garrison in Ambrakia. Promptly after his death the Ambrakiotēs expelled it, and Alexander acquiesced in this outcome.⁵⁰ Possibly both Philip's installation of the garrison and Alexander's consent to its expulsion were determined by their relations with the kingdom of Epeiros, not by their policies toward Greek cities. In general the garrisons Philip is known to have stationed in Greek cities were not numerous but they were well placed.

The members of the so-called League of Corinth (for which no better name has been found) were assessed to provide armed contingents in proportion to their resources. Philip was declared *hēgemōn* with command of the armed forces. He had resolved to invade Asia Minor. Why he wished to do so can only be conjectured. Those who recognize in him a brilliant opportunist will call to mind the embarrassment that the coastal satraps had caused him at Perinthos. Perhaps his aim was to clarify relations on the coasts of the straits and of the eastern Aegean, where many interests came into contact. Whatever Philip's motives may have been, the synedrion of the League, meeting in Corinth, duly declared war on Persia because the Persians had plundered Greek temples in 480–479.⁵¹ It is difficult not to smile on reading this justification for the war. The benefits of the projected war

were not going to accrue to Greek temples. The organization Philip had brought into being was not the realization of any panhellenic idea. It had two purposes. One was to enable the Macedonian king to draw on Greek resources of manpower. When Alexander crossed to Asia, the land forces he levied from Greece south of Thessaly were remarkably small, but the Greek fleet at his disposal was large.⁵² The other purpose was to hinder any Greek disturbances that might embarrass the Macedonians.

In Athens the defeat and the terms of peace produced mixed sentiments. The war effort had embraced the whole body of citizens. There are no good grounds for supposing that the Athenians were divided on the question of resisting Philip after he seized the grain fleet at Hieron. Phokion is said to have uttered a characteristically skeptical remark during the months of the land campaign that ended at Chaironeia, but his doubts bore on choice of strategy, not on policy.⁵³ After the battle the Athenians had to recognize that their policy had failed. If by the treaty of peace they lost the Chersonese, as seems likely, they also had to recognize that any future chance to resist the Macedonians would depend on finding sources of grain outside the Pontic district. Disappointment could lead to recrimination. On the other hand, the Athenians might have the breadth of vision to acknowledge that the policy that had failed had been endorsed by them all.

Demosthenes had associated himself closely with the declaration and prosecution of the war. His standing became ambivalent. On the one hand, the assembly committed itself to him and to his policies when it chose him to deliver the funeral speech on those who had fallen at Chaironeia; Aischines had been suggested for this function but was passed over.⁵⁴ On the other hand, in 337/6 a law was passed about the Council of the Areopagos. Little is known about the proposer, Eukrates. The law imposed penalties on any member of the Council who should go up to the Council after a tyranny had been established. The law was in principle impossible to enforce. So it can best be understood as an indirect censure on recent activities of the Areopagite Council and on any person or persons who had prompted those activities. Since 340 or thereabouts, the Council of the Areopagos had been active to a novel degree, and its activity had been authorized by a decree of Demosthenes.⁵⁵

The ambiguity with which his fellow citizens regarded Demosthenes is illustrated well by a further incident of 337/6. Ktesiphon proposed that a crown be awarded to Demosthenes in recognition of his services to the city and that this honor be announced in the theater at the Dionysia. The proposal was passed, but Aischines indicted it as contrary to the laws. His action was strange. Crowns had been voted to Demosthenes in similar terms in 341/0 and in 339/8. On the latter occasion a certain Diondas had indicted the proposer, Demomeles, but had won less than a fifth of the votes at the trial. The conduct of Aischines after he entered his indictment was even stranger. He let the matter rest and it did not come to trial until 330/29. His reasons can only be guessed.⁵⁶

Alexander Takes Control

In the summer of 336 Philip gave his daughter, Kleopatra, in marriage to King Alexander of Epeiros, the brother of Olympias. The festivities were held at Aigeai. As Philip entered the theater, where a large crowd had gathered, he was assassinated by Pausanias, a member of his bodyguard.⁵⁷ Other members of the bodyguard struck down Pausanias as he tried to escape. Since his testimony is lacking, there is room for speculation. Three theories are now held: that Pausanias acted alone; that he was the agent of Antipater, who brought about the succession of Alexander and opposed the people with whom Philip had lately associated; and that Pausanias, who originated from Orestis, acted for the men of Upper Macedon against families of Lower Macedon.⁵⁸ All three theories are plausible. It follows that by 336 there were many people who desired Philip's death. Even if Pausanias had failed in his attempt, Philip would not have been likely to survive for long.

Expectation of life was far lower in the fourth century than now. People were aware of the hazards of mortality. These gave the Athenians grounds for hope and help to explain their inconsistent behavior. When Philip was preparing to celebrate the marriage of his daughter, they voted him a crown and decreed that, if anyone killed Philip and fled to Athens, the assassin should be extradited.⁵⁹ When they learned of the assassination, they voted a crown to Pausanias and held a sacrifice to celebrate the good news.⁶⁰ Demosthenes, whose daughter had been dead only seven days, appeared in public wearing a white cloak and on his head a garland.⁶¹ The inconsistency of Athenian behavior was due to the ambivalence of their diplomatic condition. Since the defeat at Chaironeia it would have been imprudent for the Athenians to attempt resistance, as long as Macedonian resources of power were directed to a single purpose. But the assassination of Philip suggested for a short time the possibility of divergence among the Macedonians.

There were velleities of resistance in other cities. The Aitolians voted to restore exiles to Akarnania. The Thebans voted to expel the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia and not to grant the title of hegemon to Alexander. The most serious step was taken by the Ambrakiotes; they expelled the Macedonian garrison from their city. But Alexander came south in 336. He called a meeting of the Thessalian League and it voted him his father's office of archon. At Thermopylai he called together the Amphiktyonic Council, and it expressed itself in favor of recognizing him as hegemon of the Greeks. When he reached Boiotia and encamped near the Kadmeia, the Athenians voted to bring their property in from the fields and put the walls in a state of defense. They sent an embassy to placate Alexander. Demosthenes, serving as one of the envoys, turned back at Mount Kithairon. His action was not necessarily a result of fear; his absence made it easier for Alexander to give the envoys a favorable reply. At Corinth Alexander summoned the synedrion of the so-called League into session. It voted him the office of

hegemon with authority to fight the Persians and renewed its obligation to provide contingents for the war.⁶²

A better opportunity to resist the Macedonians seemed about to arise in 335. Alexander led an expedition far north into Thrace and then into Illyria. A rumor that he had been killed among the Illyrians spread through much of Greece. The Thebans, who had suffered most in the settlement imposed after Chaironeia, rose in revolt and besieged the Kadmeia. They sent envoys to Athens in hope of alliance. It is credible, as reported, that Demosthenes supplied weapons privately to Thebes. One may be more skeptical about the report that the Athenians voted to send help but sent no forces and waited for the outcome. Certainly they did not send forces. The report of a vote not carried out should invite the doubts properly attached to unrealized intentions. The defeat at Chaironeia had shown that it was prudent to wait for signs of internal collapse among the Macedonians before challenging them. The Thebans sent envoys likewise to Arkadia, Argos, and Elis. The most substantial response came from Arkadia. A force set off from there and reached the isthmus of Corinth but could not go further. There were stirrings of sympathy for the Thebans as far away as Aitolia.⁶³

Alexander marched in haste from Illyria to Boiotia. He attacked Thebes, captured it by storm, and let his men sack it. Those joining him in the attack included Boiotians from Thespiiai, Plataia, and Orchomenos. He entrusted to the syndedrion of the League of Corinth the task of drawing up terms for Thebes. Consequently the city was destroyed and its territory was distributed among the allies of Alexander. The women, the children, and the male survivors were sold into slavery. The sale of the captives is said to have realized 440 talents. Any Thebans who escaped to other Greek cities were to be extradited. The Macedonian garrison remained on the Kadmeia.⁶⁴ Patently its task was no longer to watch the Thebans.

The Athenians had been prudent when they did not join the Thebans in revolt. Cities that had shown sympathy for Thebes, or could be suspected of such sympathy, set about placating the victor. The Arkadians, for example, condemned to death those who had persuaded them to march out in support of the Thebans. The Athenians sent an embassy of ten men to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from Thrace and Illyria and on his success in punishing the Thebans for their revolt. In reply Alexander demanded that the Athenians surrender eight, nine, or ten of their men, whom he named. The Athenian assembly deliberated on this demand and passed a decree on the motion of Demades: an embassy should be sent to ask Alexander to give up his demand and the Athenians undertook to punish the named men, if they were found to deserve punishment. The embassy, which Demades headed, was also instructed to ask Alexander to let the Athenians provide a refuge for Theban fugitives. Alexander granted the Athenian requests but insisted that Athens should exile Charidemos.⁶⁵ That was done. Charidemos went into the service of Dareios III of Persia, but within two years he quarreled with his new comrades and Dareios had him put to death.⁶⁶

No elaborate explanation need be sought for Alexander's inconsistency in demanding the surrender of leading Athenians and then rescinding his demand, or in letting Athens provide an asylum for Theban fugitives after the synedrion of the League had ordered their extradition. Men sometimes act inconsequentially in the aftermath of victory. On capturing Frankfurt-am-Main in 1866, the victorious Prussians required the citizens to pay them a sum of twenty five million guilders and in response to remonstrance extended to three days the period in which they were to make the payment. But the payment was never made. Queen Augusta persuaded King William I to relent.⁶⁷ More interest attaches to the names of those whose surrender Alexander at first demanded. The list has been transmitted in various forms. Plutarch says that Idomeneus and Douris gave ten names but "the most numerous and respected of historians" gave a list of eight, which he proceeds to reproduce. But probably two of Plutarch's names are intrusions from a list of those later suspected of taking bribes from Harpalos. Arrian gives nine names, and a confused note in the *Suda* gives eleven, the last being an obvious error.⁶⁸ A probable list of nine names can be reconstructed in the following way.

1. Five names (Demosthenes, Lykourgos, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Charidemus) are given in all three sources.
2. Three names (Hypereides, Chares, Diotimos) are given by Arrian and the *Suda*. Two of them may have been excluded from Plutarch's list by the two intrusive names there.
3. Moirokles is given by Arrian and Plutarch but not in the *Suda*.⁶⁹

Some of these men, such as Chares, Hypereides, Demosthenes, and Charidemus, had been active in Athenian affairs for a long time. Polyeuktos and Lykourgos had served with Demosthenes on the embassy to the Peloponnese in 343/2.⁷⁰ Of the other three men, enough, though no more than enough, is known to say that they had embarked on respectable careers in politics. Ephialtes had served as envoy to the Persian king in 340 and allegedly brought back money to distribute among leading Athenians.⁷¹ He must have left Athens not long after Alexander demanded his extradition. In 334 he fought with distinction against Alexander at the siege of Halikarnassos and was killed.⁷² Diotimos had been honored with a crown for giving the state a consignment of shields in the summer of Chaironeia, and in 334/3 further honors were voted to him on the motion of Lykourgos.⁷³ Moirokles remained active for many years after 335 and was mentioned among those suspected of accepting bribes from Harpalos.⁷⁴

Something, though not much, can be said about personal alignments among these men. Many years later, after Lykourgos had died, Moirokles brought it about that his children were imprisoned.⁷⁵ Yet both Lykourgos and Moirokles were demanded by Alexander in 335. Again, at an early stage in his career Moirokles was sued by Euboulos on business concerning the mines.⁷⁶ Yet Diotimos early in his own career had assisted Meidias,⁷⁷ the

friend of Euboulos. Evidently the men demanded by Alexander in 335 had personal affinities and antagonisms that drew them in different directions. When Alexander dictated his list, he did not single out men of any one group; he named prominent Athenians indiscriminately.

The Rising of Agis III

For the Athenians, the destruction of Thebes reinforced the lesson of Chaironeia. Prospects for armed resistance were poor as long as Alexander retained control of his Macedonians. The king knew that he was not liked in Athens. Admittedly after his victory on the river Granikos he sent three hundred Persian panoplies to Athens for dedication to Athena.⁷⁸ But in addition to this ceremonial carrot he wielded real sticks. After capturing Miletos he disbanded most of his fleet but kept the Athenian contingent in service, and at Gordion in the following winter he refused the request of an Athenian embassy for the release of captives whom he had taken at the river Granikos and sent to Macedon.⁷⁹ Thus he held Athenian hostages while he was securing the shores of the eastern Mediterranean. At last in the spring of 331, when he returned from Egypt to Tyre, he granted the request of a new Athenian embassy for the release of the captives taken on the river Granikos.⁸⁰

When Alexander disbanded his fleet in 334, he took a large risk. He knew that he was inferior at sea to the forces the Persians could send to the Aegean; his plan was to deprive those forces of their bases by capturing the Mediterranean coasts of the Persian Empire. The Persian high command saw and exploited their opportunity. A large fleet, including contingents from the cities of Phoenicia and Cyprus, was sent to operate in the Aegean. Dareios III gave the command to Memnon of Rhodes. The plan was to secure major islands in the eastern Aegean and then take the war into Macedon and Greece. Memnon won Chios and besieged Mytilene. When he died there of disease, he was succeeded by his nephew, Pharnabazos. Mytilene yielded and made terms. Some time later but before the end of 333 Pharnabazos proceeded to secure Tenedos.⁸¹

These naval operations aroused the attention of the Spartans and the Athenians. Each of these cities sent envoys to Dareios in 333. The Spartan envoy, Euthykses, bore the same name as the envoy sent from Sparta to Susa in 337. The Athenian envoy was Iphikrates, a son of the famous Iphikrates; the father had served the Persians in their attempt in Egypt in 373. Late in 333, after Alexander had defeated Dareios at Issos, Parmenion advanced promptly to Damascus and captured the Greek envoys there.⁸² The Spartans and the Athenians had chosen their envoys to Dareios with care.

Spartan policy was inspired by Agis III, who had been king since 338. A singularly capable statesman, he saw that his prospects for fighting the Macedonians depended on a plentiful supply of mercenaries and this in turn depended on the money he could get from his Persian ally. But while he was

conferring with Pharnabazos at Siphnos, news came of the battle of Issos. In the following months, while Alexander was besieging Tyre, first the Phoenician and then the Cypriote contingents sailed away eastward to make their peace with the Macedonian. Thus the fleet of Pharnabazos disintegrated.⁸³

Lacking naval support, Agis had to modify his plans and delay his challenge to Antipater. He took into his service eight thousand mercenaries, who had fought for Dareios at Issos and made their escape in good order. He went to Crete, captured most of its cities, and thereby increased his force.⁸⁴ That operation consumed most of 332. In the spring of 331 Agis launched his revolt. The opportunity was good because a certain Memnon, whom Alexander had left in charge of Thrace, rose in revolt at the same time. One may suspect that Memnon and Agis had coordinated their activities to embarrass Antipater.⁸⁵ In the early months of the rising, Agis won impressive successes. He defeated a Macedonian force commanded by one Korragos. He won to his cause the Eleans, the Achaian League except Pellene, and the Arkadians except Megalopolis.⁸⁶ But the development in Thrace took a course unfavorable to Agis. Antipater reached an accommodation with Memnon whereby the latter continued in his command. Antipater was consequently free to lead his whole field army southward from Macedon to the Peloponnese. He brought the enemy to battle at Megalopolis. Agis was defeated and killed.⁸⁷ Antipater entrusted to the synedrion at Corinth the task of drawing up terms for Sparta, and the synedrion in turn referred the question to Alexander.⁸⁸ The main material result was that Sparta at last became a member of the so-called League of Corinth. It was probably in the course of these negotiations with Alexander that the Spartans tried to placate him by voting him divine honors.⁸⁹

The Athenians took no overt action during the rising of Agis. A remark of Demades is preserved to the effect that some funds should not be diverted to a naval purpose, since he was planning to distribute them at fifty drachmas per man during the Choes.⁹⁰ That festival belonged to Anthesterion. It follows that in the winter of 332/1 the Athenians deliberated about the preparations for the rising. Speech 17 in the Demosthenic corpus was delivered by an unknown orator at the time of the rising. It tried to show that the Macedonians had broken the current terms of peace. The merits of the speaker's argument can be discussed.⁹¹ He did not inquire into the feasibility of armed action. Moreover, he fell short of proposing warfare. At the end of the speech he said that, if the Athenians wished, he would propose going to war against those who had broken the treaty of peace. It is not known what Demosthenes did during the rising of Agis. Prosecuting Ktesiphon a year later, Aischines said that Demosthenes made strange speeches, whirled around on the speaker's platform, and professed to have brought the Lakonians together and to have persuaded the Thessalians and Perrhaebians to secede.⁹² This utterance of Aischines may be distortion or invention; it is certainly not informative. The most likely conclusion is that Demosthenes did little or nothing, as is indeed asserted by Deinarchos (1.35).

Recent historians have thought that the Athenians and in particular

Demosthenes ought to have done more. Some have thought that Demosthenes was displeased because the Spartans had not joined the coalition that fought Philip at Chaironeia ("Politically, Sparta's failure to join Demosthenes' alliance had only one serious consequence: it offended Demosthenes"). So he did not wish the Athenians to join Agis in 331 ("It is largely Athens that is to blame for the failure of the war, and within Athens Demosthenes—the only man who might have carried the people with him").⁹³ Others have thought that Greek opposition to the Macedonians could take advantage of Persian warfare in either of two ways. Agis, on the one hand, recognized that the naval conflict in the Aegean would be decisive for the Greeks; so he tried to collaborate with the Persian fleet. But Demosthenes, it is suggested, preferred to wait until Dareios had checked or defeated Alexander. On this view it was clear by 330 that Demosthenes had made the wrong choice. "The Persian Empire was ended; the great revolt of Agis was over. No obstacle remained to Macedonian domination without end. With Thebes gone, and Sparta gone, and the heart of Greece crushed, what future in mid 330 could an Athenian see? And what had he, Demosthenes, done to aid the last great struggle? Nothing, and worse than nothing. He had seen to it that nothing was done."⁹⁴

Geography suggests a less recondite explanation for Athenian inaction in 331. If the Macedonian garrison stationed in the Kadmeia were to march on Athens, the journey was relatively short and the territory to be covered was not difficult. But if the Macedonian garrison stationed at Corinth were to march on Sparta, it would have a far longer route and it would have to cross the Arkadian highlands.

The Athenians at Peace

Several disconnected items of information are preserved about the activities of Demosthenes in the long period from the battle of Chaironeia until the arrival of Hárpalos in 324. Late in 338/7 he proposed a decree, which was passed, for the phylai to elect commissioners to improve the fortifications; he was chosen as commissioner by his phyle and he gave a hundred minai toward the work.⁹⁵ Promptly after the battle of Chaironeia he was elected to ensure the supply of grain.⁹⁶ In 337/6 he was commissioner of the theoric fund.⁹⁷ In 330 he delivered speech 18 in defense of Ktesiphon against Aischines. Some time during the shortage of grain, which afflicted many Greek states from 330 to 326, Demosthenes was chosen to take charge of a fund for ensuring the supply.⁹⁸

Yet in 330, when Demosthenes and Aischines came into conflict at the trial of Ktesiphon and the former's career was scrutinized, remarkably little was said about activities carried out by Demosthenes since 338. Aischines devoted only a short passage of his speech (3.159–67) to the career of Demosthenes since Chaironeia and what he found to say was relatively trivial. Demosthenes in reply mentioned the emergency measures he had car-

ried straight after the defeat (18.248–50) and said that he had been chosen to deliver the funeral speech on those who had fallen at Chaironeia (18.285–88), but he said nothing about the ensuing years, beyond some generalizations about the unhappy fortune afflicting mankind (18.253, 270). Some⁹⁹ have tried to explain the relative silence of the two orators on events shortly before 330 by supposing that there were grounds for shame. The policy of Demosthenes, it is suggested, had proved to be culpably mistaken; in particular he had let slip the opportunity offered by the rising of Agis. This suggestion might account for the silence of Demosthenes, but it does not explain why Aischines had so little to say about the last years before the trial of Ktesiphon. If the policy of Demosthenes toward the rising of Agis had been such a blunder as his modern critics believe, surely Aischines could have said something more devastating than that Demosthenes had made strange speeches in 331 and had whirled around on the speaker's platform (3.166–67).

Extant sources say comparatively little about the activities of Demosthenes in the years of peace, and this relative silence becomes more paradoxical when one notes that Demosthenes was highly respected by his fellow citizens at this time. They had voted crowns to him three times (see earlier at note 56). When the case against Ktesiphon for proposing the third crown came to trial in 330/29, Aischines did not carry even a fifth of the votes, and so he withdrew into exile.¹⁰⁰ To explain why little is known of what Demosthenes was doing during the reign of Alexander, the best hypothesis is that he was not doing much. It is not extravagant to suppose that he had learned the diplomatic and strategic lesson of Chaironeia. He more than any other single man had brought together the coalition that confronted Philip in that battle, and it was as formidable a coalition as one could hope to gather from Greek states. After its defeat a further possibility for success in armed resistance could only arise if the Macedonians became divided. Such a prospect first began to appear in the last year of Alexander's life. Meanwhile, Demosthenes waited in relative inactivity. For safety he sent Aristion, a friend whom he had known since the latter's early youth, to stay with Hephaistion, the close associate of Alexander.¹⁰¹

Other men active in Athens in the time of Alexander can be named, and with several of them Demosthenes had friendship or at least a cooperative relationship. Demades, like Demosthenes, had a Macedonian friend, namely Antipater.¹⁰² Demades had become prominent suddenly through conducting the negotiations with Philip after the battle of Chaironeia. In 335 his diplomacy had saved the lives of Demosthenes and of other Athenians whose surrender Alexander had demanded. Plutarch (*Demosthenes* 8.7) says that Demades often spoke impromptu in support of Demosthenes. Both men belonged to the same deme and a family relationship has been conjectured because of the names of the known relatives of each.¹⁰³ Demades served as treasurer of the stratiotic fund in 334/3 and collaborated in the policy of financial retrenchment that is associated with the name of Lykourgos.¹⁰⁴

Another Athenian who had a friend at the Macedonian court was Phokion. His friend was Alexander.¹⁰⁵ In 335 he was a colleague of Demades on the embassy that induced Alexander to give up his demand for the surrender of some Athenians.¹⁰⁶ In 336/5 he was a member of the council of five hundred.¹⁰⁷ He is reported to have been strategos forty-five times,¹⁰⁸ so he must have held office in most of the years of Alexander's lifetime. He is credited with many political remarks advising caution, for example, on the news of Alexander's death.¹⁰⁹ The character emerging from these remarks is uniform and credible. Phokion is likely to have been fully in agreement with the policy of waiting for a good opportunity before acting.

Two other men, influential in Athens during the reign of Alexander, had first become prominent toward 343, when the Athenians were finding ways to express their recalcitrance toward the settlement of 346. Hypereides had prosecuted Philokrates (see chapter 7 at note 45), and Lykourgos had been one of the envoys sent to the Peloponnese early in 342 (see chapter 7 at note 54). Hypereides proposed some emergency measures promptly after the defeat at Chaironeia.¹¹⁰ In consequence of the accidents of survival of papyrus, he is better attested as an advocate and a writer of speeches than as an initiator of public policy. But he moved in political circles. By his own admission he was a friend of Demosthenes until the scandal concerning Harpalos.¹¹¹ He was probably also a friend of Lykourgos. The latter's children were attacked after their father's death. Hypereides defended them and a short passage from his speech is preserved:

What will people say when they pass by his tomb? This man lived an upright life. When put in charge of administration of finance, he discovered sources of revenue, he built the theater, the odeion, and the dockyards, he constructed triremes and harbors. Our city inflicted disgrace on him and imprisoned his children. (fragment 118)

These remarks are of value toward reconstructing the activities of Lykourgos. In 307/6 Stratokles proposed successfully a decree honoring his memory.¹¹² The text recounted the services of the honorand and said that he had been "treasurer of the public income for three penteterids." The learned author of the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, preserved in the works of Plutarch, was evidently taken aback at the asserted iteration of office in contravention of Athenian principles. He suggested an explanation: "He [Lykourgos] was himself chosen for the first term, and afterward he put forward the name of some of his friends and himself carried out the administration" (841c). A puzzle arose in 1890–1891 with the discovery and publication of the Aristotelian treatise, *The Constitution of the Athenians*. The author (43.1) tells of officers elected for the regular administration and holding office from Panathenaia to Panathenaia. He specifies the treasurer of the stratiotic fund, the commissioners of the theoric fund, and the officer in charge of the fountains. But he does not mention any officer in charge of financial administration or income as a whole, such as the decree of Stratokles assumes. An

explanation offered for his silence supposes that the treatise was written from the laws but the office held by Lykourgos may have been created by decree.¹¹³ This explanation saves the evidential phenomena at the cost of making the Athenians disregard their distinction between laws and decrees for many years. Difficulties also arise in the attempt to state the years when Lykourgos controlled the finances. If the penteterids that Stratokles referred to began and ended in years when the Greater Panathenaia was celebrated, Lykourgos was in power from 338/7 until 326/5. But if the office held by Lykourgos was created in the course of reorganization after Chaironeia, his first year in office cannot have been earlier than 337/6.¹¹⁴ Moreover it has become increasingly clear that tenure of a financial office "from Panathenaia to Panathenaia" does not mean that the term was four years but that annual tenure began on 28. Hekatombaion.¹¹⁵

This cluster of puzzles can be solved by a single hypothesis. Perhaps Stratokles, proposing to honor the memory of Lykourgos some eighteen years after his death, exaggerated the services performed by the honorand and distorted the office or offices he had held. When the decree was proposed, it would have been petty and churlish to quibble over details in the preamble. Conceivably quibbles were voiced in the assembly; the vote of a majority in a mass meeting does not guarantee historical accuracy. To understand the ascendancy that Lykourgos gained in finance, one should call to mind the pattern set by Euboulos many years before. As Aischines (3.25) explained in 330, because of the confidence the Athenians put in Euboulos, commissioners of the theoric fund exercised in practice the functions of other financial officers and built dockyards, the arsenal, and roads; "they almost carried out the whole financial administration of the city." By the time when Aischines spoke, the law of Hegemon had reduced the powers of the theoric commissioners. In 339/8 large revenues had been assigned to military purposes (see earlier at note 13). Possibly Lykourgos held office as treasurer of the stratiotic fund for a year. Possibly he held more than one office in more than one year. Doubtless the confidence he earned among the Athenians enabled him to exercise ascendancy over financial administration for many years, as Euboulos had done before.

The earliest and best information on the ascendancy of Lykourgos is the remark cited from Hypereides previously. When Hypereides says that Lykourgos was "put in charge of the administration of finance," this does not necessarily indicate any one office and it does not exclude the possibility that Lykourgos held different offices in different years. Hypereides attests that Lykourgos discovered new sources of revenue, mentions his work in building (theater, odeion, dockyards), and remarks on his construction of triremes and harbors. It will be remembered that work on the dockyards had been begun by Euboulos but suspended early in 339/8 amid preparations for war. In his building policy and generally in his policy of retrenchment Lykourgos resumed and continued the work of his predecessors.

To reconstruct the work of Lykourgos, one may also draw with caution on the statements in the decree of Stratokles, even though these may be exag-

gerated. Stratokles says that Lykourgos completed work on the dockyards, the arsenal, and the theater and built the Panathenaic stadium and the gymnasium at the Lykeion. When Stratokles says that Lykourgos distributed from the common revenue a total of 18,900 talents, some doubt may be entertained. No doubt Lykourgos was instrumental in handling a large sum in the twelve years of his ascendancy. Much the same can be said about the allegations that he carried up plentiful weapons and fifty thousand missiles to the acropolis, and that he built or repaired four hundred triremes. Stratokles is most valuable when he says that Lykourgos prepared for Athena golden statues of Victory, processional vessels of gold and silver, and golden ornaments for no less than a hundred young women carrying ceremonial baskets. There is epigraphic evidence for some of this work. An inscription preserves in part a law proposed by Lykourgos for reorganizing the financial resources of public cults and refashioning sacred vessels.¹¹⁶ The policy followed in making Victories and other sacred objects of gold and silver for Athena is reminiscent of that pursued in the time of Perikles. Wealth was set aside and stored, so that it would not be consumed in casual expenditure but the Athenians could draw on it in an emergency or major undertaking, such as war.

The decree of Stratokles may well be most misleading in what it omits. Stratokles did not set out to write a history of public finance in the age of Lykourgos; he was content to state reasons for honoring the deceased statesman. He had no need to mention any part other men may have played in the policy of retrenchment. Patient and ingenious reconstruction of a fragmentary inscription has revealed the name of one such man. It is Demades, treasurer of the stratiotic fund in 334/3 and involved somehow in making golden Victories (see note 104). There may have been others.

Accidents in the preservation of speeches assign a perhaps excessive place to recriminations in any hasty picture formed of Athens in the time of Alexander. In 331/0 Lykourgos charged Leokrates with treason because he had left Athens by sea straight after the defeat at Chaironeia. Leokrates was acquitted by equal votes.¹¹⁷ But since the speech of Lykourgos is preserved and he is recorded as a stern prosecutor on other occasions, it is easier to remember him in that capacity than as an agile financier. In 330/29 the case of Aischines against Ktesiphon came to court. Both the speech of Aischines and the reply of Demosthenes are preserved. The speeches are valuable as historical sources for earlier events and for the outlook of the Athenians at the time when they were delivered. But a historian can only guess why ever since the days of the Roman Empire philologists have favored this speech of Demosthenes as material for instructing the young. There were admittedly recriminations in Athens during the years of peace, but other things were happening too. Epikrates carried a law about epheboi and was rewarded with a bronze statue. The ephebeia had existed in some form when Aischines was young and may be very old, but the rigorous character it exhibited in the 320s was probably the consequence of a recent reform.¹¹⁸ The purpose was to train young men for military service. By 324 the Athenians had a

body of men of good discipline and morale. They also had reserves of wealth and munitions sufficient for war, if dissension among the Macedonians should provide an opportunity.

Alexander Provokes and Survives Crisis

In the winter of 325/4 Alexander reached Susa on his return from India. He set about terrorizing his satraps and senior officers. Many were deposed, some were executed. Alexander had begun these activities while he was making his way through Karmania.¹¹⁹ Such activities could bring about armed conflict among Macedonians. No doubt much news and many rumors reached Athens, but the Athenians were cautious. In the first half of 324 a step was taken, not by the Athenians, but by Leosthenes, a private citizen of Athens. He probably served as trierarch in the course of 325/4.¹²⁰ The action he took concerned mercenaries.

Many mercenaries made their way to European Greece from further east in 324. There was in the first place a band of some three thousand former troops whom Alexander had settled in Baktria. Early in 325 they rose in revolt because they wished to return to Greece. Somehow they made their way westward and arrived in Greece.¹²¹ Then early in 324 Alexander issued an order to his satraps to disband their mercenaries. The order was doubtless intended to weaken the satraps. It is curiously similar to that issued by Artaxerxes III to the coastal satraps about 356 (see chapter 5 at note 8). Consequently a great many troops were dismissed. They wandered plundering in Asia and made their way toward Greece.¹²² The man recorded to have conveyed the mercenaries of these various origins across the sea to Europe was Leosthenes.¹²³ The place where the mercenaries gathered in hope of settlement or employment was Tainaron, the southern promontory of Lakonia. With them there came some surviving Persian satraps and other officers, and these brought money as well as troops of their own. The mixed band at Tainaron chose Leosthenes as their commander.¹²⁴

Alexander had his own solution to the problem of the unemployed mercenaries. He sent Nikanor to read out a decree at the Olympic festival in the high summer of 324. The decree ordered Greek cities to restore their exiles. The mercenaries originated from Greek cities and were now in exile. Some had been exiled as alleged opponents of Alexander in the course of internal strife, some had served under Darcios III before joining the forces of Alexander. When Nikanor read out the decree at Olympia, allegedly more than twenty thousand exiles were present to hear it. So its content must have been made known before; there was no reason for keeping it secret until the festival.¹²⁵

The decree about exiles was of particular concern to the Aitolians and the Athenians. The latter had held Samos as a cleruchy since 365 and they sent officers there regularly¹²⁶ (see chapter 5 at note 15). If exiles or their descendants were to be restored in 324, there would be social dislocation and strife.

For similar, though less well attested, reasons, the Aitolians were concerned for their possession of Oiniadai.¹²⁷ In response to Alexander's decree about exiles, the best course for Greek cities was to negotiate in hope of creating delay. The Athenians sent Demosthenes to approach Nikanor at Olympia.¹²⁸ Attempts were made to placate Alexander with votes of honors. About the fall of 324 the Athenians declared him a god and many other cities did so too. In the assembly Demosthenes said that Alexander could be the son of Zeus and of Poseidon too, if he wished. Whether Alexander wished to be recognized as a god is perhaps an insoluble question. Certainly many Greeks, who had heard of his visit to the temple of Ammon in 331, thought that he would like to be a god. The Greek envoys bringing announcements of honors did not reach Alexander until 323, when he was at Babylon. The purpose of the honors was to gain time.¹²⁹

The fortunes of two other Macedonians, apart from Alexander, came to be of interest to the Athenians during 324. One of them was Antipater. Alexander, deposing other satraps and officers, decided to supersede him. He commissioned Krateros to lead ten thousand discharged veterans back to Macedon and to overthrow Antipater. The latter, who was in fear for his life, sent his son, Kassandros, to Alexander to negotiate.¹³⁰ He also opened negotiations with the Aitolians.¹³¹ It is not known whether he opened negotiations with the Athenians. It was in his interests to do so, and the silence of the scanty sources does not furnish an argument against supposing that he did.

The other Macedonian of concern to the Athenians in 324 was Harpalos. In 330 Alexander, setting off in pursuit of Dareios, had left Harpalos at Babylon to take charge of the treasury and had entrusted to him six thousand Macedonian infantry with some cavalry and light-armed troops.¹³² During the years of the shortage of grain in Greece, Harpalos sent a large quantity of grain to the Athenians, and they rewarded him with their citizenship.¹³³ Early in 324, when Alexander was making his way back from India and had begun disgracing senior officers but was still far from Babylon, Harpalos fled westward, taking with him a large sum of money and an army of six thousand men. Crossing from Asia by sea, he approached Attica, but the Athenians refused to admit him.¹³⁴ Evidently they objected to his army; they could scarcely refuse to admit a citizen. So Harpalos took his army to Tainaron, left it there, and came as a suppliant to Athens. This time he was admitted. But soon the Athenians received two demands for his extradition. The one demand came from Antipater and Olympias, the other from Philoxenos, who acted on behalf of Alexander. The assembly met. The Athenians did not wish to surrender a citizen who had arrived as a suppliant. On the other hand, they did not wish to incur danger both from Antipater and from Alexander by sheltering Harpalos. During the debate Harpalos was asked what sum he had brought with him to Athens. His reply was seven hundred talents. On the motion of Demosthenes Harpalos was taken into custody and his money was carried to the acropolis for safekeeping.¹³⁵

Soon afterward Harpalos escaped from Athens and made his way to Crete,

where he was assassinated.¹³⁶ His Athenian guards had been negligent, and influential Athenians may have encouraged their negligence. The escape of Harpalos invited leading Athenians to engage in reproaches and recriminations, especially as the money he had brought proved to amount only to 350 talents, when it had been taken up to the acropolis.¹³⁷ When the assembly met to consider the scandal, a decree was passed on the motion of Demosthenes that the Council of the Areopagos should investigate the matter and report the names of those suspected of accepting bribes from Harpalos.¹³⁸ It is important to recognize that the protracted conflicts in Athens after the escape of Harpalos were strictly internal; the Athenians were not required to refund the money of Harpalos by Alexander or by anyone professing to act for him.¹³⁹ The investigation by the Areopagite Council continued some six months.¹⁴⁰ The delay confirms the inference that the Athenians were not under any external pressure to discover and try suspects.

Since Demosthenes proposed that the Council of the Areopagos should investigate the scandal, he must have thought that that Council was more likely to direct suspicion against his rivals than against himself. Indeed, in the past he had employed the Areopagite Council to further his policies (see chapter 7 at notes 87–92). Yet when at last the report was issued, the name heading the list of suspects was Demosthenes and he was alleged to have accepted twenty talents.¹⁴¹ Another of the men listed was Demades,¹⁴² to whom Demosthenes had reason to be grateful (see earlier at note 103). The political ties of some other suspects, such as Philokles and Aristogeiton, cannot be discerned. But at least it is clear that the investigation, while in progress, underwent a change of direction and came to be turned against Demosthenes. The reasons for this change cannot be detected with confidence. An attractive conjecture notes that Hephaistion, with whom Demosthenes had a connection, had died and Antipater, the friend of Demades, was threatened with overthrow.¹⁴³

At the insistence of the assembly the Council of the Areopagos presented its report within the early part of 323. The assembly elected prosecutors and one of them was Hypereides, who thus turned against his former associate, Demosthenes.¹⁴⁴ The latter was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a fine of fifty talents. He was imprisoned but allowed to escape, and he went into exile, residing at Aigina and Troezen.¹⁴⁵ Meanwhile Demades withdrew into exile without waiting to be tried.¹⁴⁶ But other trials had varied outcomes. Philokles, for example, was convicted but Aristogeiton was acquitted. After an interval that cannot have been long, the assembly granted pardon or exoneration in some form to many of the convicted men, perhaps to all except Demosthenes.¹⁴⁷ Of the Athenians who suffered in consequence of the scandal of Harpalos Demosthenes was probably the only one still in exile when Alexander died early in the summer.¹⁴⁸

In the months immediately preceding his death, Alexander might well have rejoiced in the political successes achieved since his return to Babylon from the east. He had overthrown a multitude of his Macedonian officers

without provoking revolt. The sole uncertainty remaining was Antipater. Krateros, sent to depose him, traveled slowly and was still in Kilikia when Alexander died.¹⁴⁹ It may have been difficult for anyone in Athens to estimate the degree of tension latent among Macedonian grandees. The Athenians observed caution but made preparations, in case an opportunity should offer. Leosthenes, who had private command of the mercenaries at Tainaron, was elected strategos for 324/3 and reelected for 323/2. The council of five hundred received him in secret session, evidently in the course of 324/3; it gave him fifty talents and a consignment of weapons. He opened negotiations with the Aitolians.¹⁵⁰

The Lamian War

The death of Alexander improved prospects for the Athenians by increasing markedly the probability of conflicts among leading Macedonians. Rivalries came to a head at once among the officers and men at Babylon. After complex negotiations and executions, Perdikkas, to whom Alexander had given his signet ring, was acknowledged as regent and satrapies were distributed. Apart from the Macedonian command in Europe, the satrapies that could have a bearing on armed conflict in Greece were Egypt, which was assigned to Ptolemaios; Thrace, assigned to Lysimachos; and Hellespontine Phrygia, assigned to Leonnatos. The officers at Babylon were content to leave control in Europe to Antipater and Krateros; they may not have been able to foresee whether these two men would help one another or fight one another.¹⁵¹

One cannot tell how much good information reached the Athenians about the intense bargaining for satrapies at Babylon. At least they could see that the unity of the Macedonians, held together precariously by Alexander in his last year, was disintegrating. They also knew that discontent was widespread in Greece. Many cities were perturbed at Alexander's decree about exiles. Many resented the Macedonian garrisons stationed among them. On the news of Alexander's death, the Rhodians expelled their Macedonian garrison.¹⁵² It is noteworthy that, when war broke out, the Hellenic cause was joined even by Argos, Elis, and Messene, Peloponnesian cities that had once been favorable to Philip II.¹⁵³

In the last months of Alexander's life it had been conceivable that Antipater would gain help from Athens and Aitolia for resisting the king's officers. The death of Alexander transformed Antipater into the primary enemy of the Athenians with a possibility that he would be isolated. They sent additional money and weapons to Leosthenes and told him to give up the pretense of acting as a private person. The force he held at Tainaron was about 8,000 men. Furthermore, the Athenians passed decrees inviting the Greek cities to join them in asserting the common liberty and driving out garrisons. They resolved to equip 40 quadriremes and 200 triremes. The contingents of infantry from three phylai should stay within Attica for defense, but those

of the other seven phylai should operate beyond the borders. Envoys were sent to the Greek cities to seek their collaboration; many responded favorably.¹⁵⁴

Demosthenes was still in exile when these resolutions were passed. But he joined the Athenian envoys who were traveling to Greek cities and seeking their adherence. On the motion of his cousin, Demon, the Athenians invited him to return. They gave him a sum of fifty talents on a religious pretext, so that his fine could be met. A trireme was sent to Aigina to bring him to Attica. When he landed at the Peiraeus, the citizens, led by the officers and the priests, escorted him to the city.¹⁵⁵

Leosthenes meanwhile made his way to Aitolia. He was welcomed there and the Aitolians supplied him with 7,000 troops. Advancing into central Greece, he gained the adherence of the Phokians and the Lokrians. He made for Thermopylai with a view to barring the Macedonian route into Greece. Serious resistance to him within Greece came solely from the Boiotians, for they feared to lose the land they had gained through the destruction of Thebes. The Athenians sent him a force of 5,000 infantry drawn from citizens, 500 cavalry, and 2,000 mercenaries. This force reached Plataia. Leosthenes brought part of his army southward and effected a juncture with the Athenians. With the combined force he defeated the Boiotians in battle. Then he returned to Thermopylai.¹⁵⁶

Antipater was faced with a diplomatic problem and two strategic problems. In diplomacy he had to deal with Ptolemaios, Lysimachos, Leonnatos, and Krateros. Promptly after the death of Alexander, Ptolemaios made his way to Egypt and took control there. He is not known to have taken any action in relation to the war in Greece. Egyptian money and Egyptian grain could have a large effect there, and so Egyptian inaction could help Antipater, if Ptolemaios was indeed inactive. After securing Egypt Ptolemaios sent messages to Antipater and they agreed to collaborate against Perdikkas.¹⁵⁷ Lysimachos set about installing himself in Thrace and found that he had a war to fight against an insurgent king, Seuthes.¹⁵⁸ He did not impede communications between Antipater and the officers in Asia Minor. Antipater sent requests for help to Leonnatos, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and to Krateros, who was still in Kilikia with 10,000 men. To Leonnatos Antipater offered his daughter in marriage. Krateros, like Leonnatos, was willing to help Antipater. Like Ptolemaios, he regarded Perdikkas as his rival.¹⁵⁹ But it is not clear how soon he took his decision and made it known.

One of the strategic problems facing Antipater was to secure the route southward from Macedon into Greece. He took an army of 13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry into Thessaly and set a fleet of 110 triremes to accompany it. Conceivably he expected to meet resistance at Thermopylai and relied on his fleet to turn the pass. But Leosthenes advanced into Thessaly against him. Moreover a large part of the Thessalians, who had originally adhered to Antipater, deserted him now and joined the Athenians. The Thessalians had been loyal to Philip and Alexander. Their desertion of Antipater indicated a good prospect for freeing Greece from Macedonian ascendancy.

Leosthenes defeated Antipater in battle in Thessaly and cut off his line of retreat to Macedon. But Antipater threw himself into Lamia in Malis. Leosthenes brought his whole force against Lamia but could not take it by storm; he had to settle down to a siege. When Antipater tried to negotiate the Greeks demanded an unconditional surrender. So the siege continued through the winter of 323/2. Meanwhile, part of the Athenian fleet, perhaps a contingent of some 100 ships, was operating successfully against Antipater's 110 triremes and confining them to Pagasai or a port on the Gulf of Malis.¹⁶⁰

The other strategic problem was command of the straits between Asia and Europe. If the Athenians could establish themselves there, Antipater would not be able to get help from the Macedonian officers in Asia Minor, however well disposed they might be toward him. The war had begun when the summer of 323 was well advanced, and the struggle for control of the straits probably did not begin until 322. The Athenians had equipped 240 ships when they went to war, but they employed many, probably about 100, of these against Antipater's fleet in European waters. Equipping additional ships, they sent a fleet of 170 under Euetion to the Hellespont. But a Macedonian fleet of 240 ships advanced against it. This Macedonian fleet was commanded by Kleitos. In 324 Alexander had sent Kleitos westward from Opis with Krateros. Presumably the fleet he commanded in 322 was the first contribution of Krateros to the cause of Antipater. The two fleets met near Abydos; the Athenians were defeated and had to retire to the Peiraeus.¹⁶¹

Leonnatos crossed into Europe. In Macedon he enlisted more troops and he marched into Thessaly with 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Changes had taken place in the allied force outside Lamia. The Aitolians had withdrawn to Aitolia for unknown reasons. Leosthenes had been killed in a skirmish. His generalship evokes admiration, and his successor, Antiphilos, was also capable. When Leonnatos approached Thessaly, the Greeks gave up the siege of Lamia and burned their camp. Antiphilos led them north to confront Leonnatos before he could join forces with Antipater. The Greeks had particular confidence in their Thessalian cavalry, commanded by Menon. Their force consisted of 22,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, including 2,000 Thessalians. The Greek cavalry had decisive effect in the ensuing battle. Leonnatos was killed and the Macedonian infantry was defeated, but it withdrew in good order into the hills, where the cavalry could not pursue it. On the next day Antipater succeeded in making a juncture with the defeated troops.¹⁶²

The Athenian fleet of Euetion, after repairs in the Peiraeus, sailed out again. But Kleitos met it at Amorgos and defeated it.¹⁶³ There could be no further hope of cutting the Macedonian communications. Krateros crossed into Europe and advanced into Macedon with reinforcements, comprising 10,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 1,000 Persian archers and slingsmen. He led his army into Thessaly and entrusted supreme command to Antipater. Consequently the latter had 40,000 heavily armed infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 3,000 archers and slingsmen. The Greeks were now seriously outnumbered.

bered, with 25,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, but they had confidence in their cavalry. The armies confronted one another in the valley of the river Peneios, and after some maneuvering the Macedonians brought the Greeks to battle at Krannon in Metageitnion of 322/1. The losses—130 Macedonians and more than 500 Greeks—were small in proportion to the forces engaged, but the outcome was a decisive victory for the Macedonians. The Greeks were not willing to continue fighting, since they no longer had any prospect of success. On the next day Antiphilos and Menon sent a herald to Antipater to open negotiations. About the time of the battle of Krannon, Kleitos advanced by sea toward the Gulf of Malis and defeated the Athenian fleet that had maintained the blockade there when Antipater was besieged in Lamia.¹⁶⁴

Antipater refused to negotiate peace with the league that had opposed him but insisted that each city should send its own envoys. The Greek cities hesitated to do so at first but complied when he and Krateros set about besieging and reducing the towns of Thessaly piecemeal. The Greeks who had most to fear were the Athenians and the Aitolians. Antipater led his army toward Athens. The Athenians sent an embassy, including Demades and Phokion, to negotiate, but the response they brought back from Antipater was a demand for an unconditional surrender. At this point Demosthenes, Hyperides, and some others fled into exile, and on the motion of Demades the assembly voted an unconditional surrender. Thereupon Antipater imposed terms whereby a garrison under Menyllos was installed in the Peiraieus. The constitution was altered; active citizenship, including the right to vote, was restricted to those whose property was worth at least two thousand drachmas, and people lacking this qualification of property were given permission to settle in Thrace. The question of Samos was to be referred to the kings, for whom Perdikkas was regent. He decided to restore the exiles and entrust control of the island to them. Meanwhile Menyllos led his garrison into Mounychia in Boedromion.¹⁶⁵

Antipater sent Archias with a party of Thracian spearmen in pursuit of the Athenian statesmen who had gone into exile. Archias caught Hypereides and others in Aigina, dragged them away from the sanctuary of Aiakos and sent them to Antipater at Kleonai. There they were put to death. Demosthenes had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Kalauria. Archias approached with his men, asked Demosthenes to come out and yield, and undertook that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenes did not trust him. Making as if to write to his relatives, he took poison, which he carried concealed in his reed pen. He staggered away from the holy place at the altar and died. That was in Pyanopsion.¹⁶⁶

When Antipater returned to Macedon, he gave his daughter in marriage to Krateros. It remained for the two Macedonians to lead a campaign in Aitolia. The task proved to be difficult because the enemy took to the mountains. Operations continued through the winter into 321. Finally Antipater and Krateros called off the campaign and concluded a makeshift peace with

the Aitolians, because they had received news from Asia of the designs of Perdikkas.¹⁶⁷

The career of Demosthenes ended in failure. It was the failure not only of the statesman but of his city. Neither the policy nor the strategy can be faulted. After the war of Chaironeia, the Athenians had built up their resources and waited for an opportunity, when divisions should arise among the Macedonians. Neither the Thebans in 335 nor Agis in 331 could draw them into hasty action, where there was little prospect of success. When at last the opportunity came, the Athenians committed their troops and their ships without stinting. For the Lamian War, as for the battle of Chaironeia, they brought together as large a coalition as could be hoped for among Greek cities. In numbers they were a match for the enemy, until Krateros made his juncture with Antipater. Their commanders were equal to their tasks. Leosthenes succeeding in cutting off Antipater's line of retreat and confining him to Lamia; Antiphrilos defeated Leonnatos before he could join forces with Antipater. But after the defeat at Krannon, Antiphrilos and Menon were wise in opening negotiations. The Lamian War reiterated the lesson of Chaironeia. In spite of some mutual distrust, the Macedonians were too cohesive and too powerful in warfare for the Greeks to challenge them with success.

Neither the policies which the Athenians had pursued nor consequently the disasters which overtook them were predetermined. One can think of other policies which they might have followed and which would have led to greater or speedier defeat. It is not so easy to think of alternative policies which would have been feasible and better. So to point a moral would be inept. Again, the failure of Demosthenes and his city should not be palliated; to do so would be offensive. It would also be presumptuous to set about assessing the merits of the cause to which Demosthenes had devoted his best years. History is not the Last Judgment. Rather the historian should acknowledge the failure and place it in association with other failures. For if meaning is to be found in history, it must be discerned in the fortunes of the people who lost as well as in those of the victors.

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Appendix 1

The Transmission of the Demosthenic Corpus

The question to be faced in this appendix is whether the speeches available as printed texts today are what Demosthenes spoke. No precise answer can be given, but the range of uncertainty can be delimited.

The Corpus

Two editions of the Demosthenic corpus are currently standard.

1. The Clarendon Press at Oxford published the corpus as three volumes in four: volume 1 (containing speeches 1–19), edited by S. H. Butcher, 1903; volume 2, part 1 (containing speeches 20–26), edited by Butcher, 1907; volume 2, part 2 (containing speeches 27–40), edited by W. Rennie, 1921; and volume 3 (containing speeches 41–61, prooimia, letters), edited by Rennie, 1931.

2. Early in the twentieth century Teubner of Leipzig set about replacing its former text, edited by F. Blass, with a new one. The following parts have appeared: volume 1 (containing speeches 1–19), edited by C. Fuhr, 1914; and volume 2, part 1 (containing speeches 20–26), edited by J. Sykutris, 1937. The untimely deaths of the editors prevented continuation.

There are also Demosthenic fragments—that is, allusions to lost speeches and quotations, genuine or spurious, attributed to Demosthenes by later writers. For these one must consult J. G. Baiter and H. Sauppe, *Oratores Attici* 2 (Zürich: S. Höhr, 1845–1850), 250–257. A new edition of the fragments is being prepared by N. Conomis.

The Oxford text comprises works of three kinds.

1. Speeches, genuine and spurious. Editors have customarily numbered these in the same order ever since the first printed edition, the Aldine of 1504. There are sixty-one items. The twelfth is not a speech but purports to be a letter of Philip, to which speech 11 responds.

2. Prooimia. These purport to be openings that could be employed in composing speeches. They do not supply any historical information and they can be neglected. In prooimia 54–55 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893, 2: 400–402) recognized parts of Athenian speeches of the third century B. C.

3. Six letters. Ostensibly the first four were written by Demosthenes during his exile in 323, the fifth in his youth, and the sixth during the Lamian War. They have been studied thoroughly by Goldstein (1968) and call for note in connection with the exile of Demosthenes. The history of their transmission does not differ from that of the speeches.

Byzantine Manuscripts

The standard editions of the speeches are based mostly on four Byzantine manuscripts:

1. F = Marcianus 416, written probably in the tenth century. The contents include the sixty-one speeches. The Aldine edition was based on three manuscripts of the same family as F, though not on F itself, and so the customary order of the speeches is that of this family.

2. A = Monacensis 485, formerly Augustanus, written in the tenth or eleventh century. The contents include fifty-four speeches. Those omitted are 12, 45, 46, 52, 60, and 61. Speech 51 is given twice, at different places in the series, with different readings evidently derived from different manuscripts.

3. Y = Parisinus 2935, written in the tenth or eleventh century. The speeches included total twenty-nine, namely speeches 1–21, 23, 22, 24–26, 59, 61, and 60 in that order.

4. S = Parisinus 2934, written early in the tenth or late in the ninth century. It omits the *Letter of Philip* (item 12) but includes the sixty speeches.

Other manuscripts of these four families have sometimes been employed, where one of the four is defective. For description of the manuscripts and studies of their relationships, reference may be made to Drerup 1899, to the introductions by Butcher and Fuhr to their editions, and to Wankel 1976, 1:63–82. Since the editions published by Bekker at Oxford (1823) and Berlin (1824), editors have commonly regarded S as superior to the other three manuscripts. This preference for S has lately been challenged by Irmer (1968, 43–47; and 1972, 95–99) and defended by Wankel. Where readings differ in such a way that one makes good sense and the others do not, the former is clearly to be preferred. Choice is more difficult, where both or all readings make good sense but they differ in rhythm or avoidance of hiatus, a matter which will call for note in appendix 2.

Apart from the 4 noted, there are many more Byzantine manuscripts giving Demosthenic work. His style was highly esteemed as a model, and so many copies of speeches and of extracts from speeches were made. Canfora (1968) recorded 258 manuscripts of Demosthenic speeches and 21 of extracts. Most of these were written in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and some as late as the nineteenth century. None is earlier than S. But in consequence of Byzantine interchange of information (“contamination”), a late manuscript can preserve a good reading that is not otherwise attested. An attempt has been made by Irmer (1972) to assess the value of the manuscripts more recent than FAYS for discovering the text. For speeches 8 and 9 he collated 73 manuscripts, restricting himself to those written before the first printed edition. He found that the lines of relationship are far from simple, but the other manuscripts do not offer any credible reading not attested in FAYS. It must be admitted that the lines of descent cannot be discerned with full clarity. Indeed a palimpsest in the Vatican (Pii II 29; cf. Irmer 1972, 89–90) has fragments of speech 9 with readings diverging from those of the known families; although none of its readings is con-

vincing, it may represent a separate line of transmission. Consequently it remains possible that a manuscript will be discovered with readings that are superior and hitherto unsuspected. But in the light of Irmer's inquiry there is no reason to expect this. In short the current editions can claim to offer as good a text as could have been compiled in the tenth century.

The scholia to Demosthenes are relatively poor and uninformative; for an exception, see note 8 to chapter 5.

Papyri

Egypt has yielded plentiful fragments from papyrus rolls that gave speeches of Demosthenes. Pack (1965, nos. 256-337) listed eighty-two Demosthenic papyri. Two of these are from the first century B. C., the rest from the first through sixth centuries A. D. They have not yielded readings of value toward determining the text of the speeches. They do not conform to the distribution of the Byzantine manuscripts into families; that is, the lines of transmission, complex and unclear for the period beginning in the tenth century, defy scrutiny for the previous millennium. The fact that the papyri are numerous shows that the speeches of Demosthenes were widely read in their period. If they are a fair sample, speech 18 was already especially popular. Two papyrus fragments of a different but related kind take the popularity of the Demosthenic text back to an earlier date. One of them (Pack no. 1574, first published by J. Barns, *CQ* 44 [1950] 126-37) is a collection of excerpts on Fortune and was written in the second century B. C. It includes sentences from speech 18.252. The other (Pack no. 2511; cf. Powell and Barber 1929, 120-21) was written in the third century B. C. and is a rhetorical exercise in the form of a speech by Leptines, the adversary to speech 20.

Byzantine and Roman Scholars

Turning from the manuscripts and papyri to the external tradition on the Demosthenic corpus, one may start with the information provided by Photios. He was at the height of his powers about the middle of the ninth century (cf. Reynolds and Wilson 1974, 54-57), and so no great interval separates the scribe of S from him. In his *Bibliotheca* (on which reference may be made to Treadgold 1980) he devoted a section (265) to Demosthenes. The section discusses questions about particular speeches, including questions of authenticity, and it outlines the orator's career. Thus it gives information of the type that often appears as a *Life* prefaced to the text of a classical author in Byzantine manuscripts. The section opens with the remark: "Nearly all the speeches of Demosthenes were read. Genuine speeches of his to the number of 65 are preserved." This information requires scrutiny.

Photios does not say that he had reached the figure of 65 by counting the speeches himself. Reason to think that he had not done so is furnished by the treatise called *Lives of the Ten Orators* and preserved with the works of Plutarch. The date of composition of the treatise is unknown, but the author drew much of his information from Caecilius of Calacte, who taught rhetoric at Rome in the time of Augustus (cf. Radermacher 1899). For each orator the author states the total number of speeches attributed to him and the number of these that are genuine (or spurious). Thus he says that 60 speeches are attributed to Antiphon and that Caecilius considers 25 of

them spurious (833c). The number of speeches extant and attributed to Lysias is 425, but the author adds that Dionysios and Caecilius recognize 233 of these as genuine (836a). For Isokrates the author gives a total of 60 speeches extant, but says that Dionysios considers 25 of them genuine and Caecilius considers 28 of them genuine (838d). The author proceeds in this manner for most of the orators, giving two figures for each, one for the total of speeches extant under the orator's name and the other for the number of speeches recognized as genuine. But for Demosthenes the author gives only one figure; he says that there are "65 genuine speeches" (847e). Questions about the authenticity of particular speeches attributed to Demosthenes were recognized by Dionysios of Halikarnassos at an early stage and by Photios at a late stage, to say nothing of scholars in between them. So it is likely that in speaking of "65 genuine speeches" of Demosthenes the author of the *Lives of the Ten Orators* (or a scribe transmitting his work) erred by omission. The information given by his source, probably Caecilius, was that 65 extant speeches were attributed to Demosthenes, and the source proceeded to say how many of these were genuine.

When Photios attributes 65 genuine speeches to Demosthenes, he doubtless draws either on the *Lives of the Ten Orators* or on an intermediary who depended on that treatise. The latter is perhaps more likely, since the section of the *Bibliotheca* (245) devoted to Plutarch does not mention the *Lives of the Ten Orators*. (Goldstein [1968, 8 n. 9] notes tentatively the possibility that the figure of 65 was reached by adding the prooimia as 1 item and 4 of the letters to the 60 speeches, without the *Letter of Philip*, given in S and F. But this calculation does not allow for further speeches attributed to Demosthenes in the first millennium and now lost. Some of them will be noted shortly.) One might, then, suppose that the whole collection of speeches, genuine and spurious but current under the name of Demosthenes, comprised 65 items in the time of Caecilius, and 4 of these had been lost by the tenth century, when the scribe of F copied 61 items. But so simple a reconstruction would be far less than the whole truth. For a scholiast to Aischines (2.18) gives the numbers of speeches composed by each of the ten canonical orators and attributes 71 speeches to Demosthenes.

Something can be learned about the contents of the Demosthenic corpus from works, mostly lexicæ, compiled by Roman and early Byzantine scholars. It will be convenient to treat them in approximately the reverse of chronological order. The *Suda*, compiled in the tenth century, has plentiful references to speeches extant in the corpus of today; a hasty count yielded a total of 353 references. It has three references to letters 2 and 3. It also has two references to passages absent from the current corpus. One of these (s.v. *axion* = Dem. frag. 19) does not name the speech from which it is taken. It may come from a lost speech or from a variant reading in an extant speech. The other reference (s.v. *hama* = Dem. frag. 12) attributes a passage to a speech of Demosthenes *For the Orators*. The same speech is mentioned by Plutarch (*Dem.* 23.5–6 = Dem. frag. 13). It was supposedly the speech delivered by Demosthenes in the assembly in 335, when Alexander demanded that the Athenians surrender some of their statesmen to him. That speech became famous (cf. Diod. 17.15), but there is no way of telling whether the text recognized by the *Suda* and by Plutarch was genuine or a rhetorical exercise.

Photios in his *Lexicon* has some 113 references to speeches preserved in the corpus now extant. He also has 3 references to words or phrases that cannot be placed. He attributes two of these (s.vv. *katēgorias echō*, *spoudazō peri ton andra*) to speeches 18 and 21; they may spring from variant readings or errors of memory. The third reference (s.v. *poa* = Dem. frag. 58) says that a particular sense of the word *poia* occurs "in Demosthenes and Lysias." A more substantial piece of information is to be drawn from the *Bibliotheca*. In the section on Demosthenes (265) Photios attri-

butes to him a speech *For Satyros about the Guardianship against Charidemos* (= Dem. frag. 14). Photios says that good judges attributed it to Demosthenes, Kallimachos assigned it to Deinarchos, and some assigned it to Lysias. Photios himself supports the attribution to Demosthenes with stylistic arguments.

Hesychios, who compiled his lexicon in the fifth or sixth century, draws a great many words from Demosthenes. They have been recognized by his editor, M. Schmidt, in the fifth and last volume of his edition (Jena: Mauk, 1858–1868). Hesychios does not name the authors or works on which he draws. So it is not possible to tell whether he had access to Demosthenic speeches now lost. Plutarch in the *Life of Demosthenes* 15 mentions briefly questions about the circumstances of twelve of the extant speeches (namely 49, 34, 45, 46, 36, 22, 24, 23, 25, 20, 19, and 18). He mentions (13.5) the opinion of Panaitios on speeches 18, 23, 20, and the Philippics. He alludes (12.3–6) to speech 21 in saying that Demosthenes settled his quarrel with Meidias out of court.

A much fuller picture of the Demosthenic corpus available in the Roman Empire can be drawn from Pollux (reference may be made to the edition by E. Bethe in two volumes, Leipzig: Teubner, 1900–1931, and to the index of names in the third volume of W. Dindorf's edition, Leipzig: Kühn, 1824). He cites words or phrases from most of the speeches now extant (namely 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 or 10, 9, 11, 14, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61), from two of the prooimia (45, 55), and from two of the letters (2, 4). He had access to at least one speech attributed to Demosthenes and now lost. For at 8.53 (= Dem. frag. 7) he mentions a speech of Demosthenes *Against Medon*. The same speech is mentioned by Harpokration (s.v. *dekateuein* = Dem. frag. 8). At 10.155 (= Dem. frag. 53) Pollux cites the word *galeagra* from "the speeches attributed to Demosthenes against Aristogeiton." It does not occur in the two extant speeches *Against Aristogeiton* (25, 26). Possibly Pollux knew of a third speech, or the word may come from a variant reading. In addition Pollux cites seven words or phrases as from Demosthenes without specifying the speeches where they occurred, and they are absent from the modern corpus. They appear in the *Onomastikon* of Pollux at 3.83 (= Dem. frag. 54); 4.163; 4.166; 5.89; 6.9; 6.183; 9.52 (= Dem. frag. 57).

Like Pollux, Harpokration in his *Lexicon to the Ten Attic Orators* has many references to Demosthenic speeches still extant. He has two references to the prooimia and a few to the letters. He also mentions two speeches now lost. His reference to the speech *Against Medon* has been noted already. The other is a speech *Against Kritias* (s.v. *enepiskēmma kai enepiskēpsasthai* = Dem. frag. 6).

The conclusion to be drawn from this survey of Byzantine and Roman scholarship is that the Demosthenic corpus of the first millennium comprised the 61 speeches now extant and at least 4 others, also the prooimia and the letters. The 4 speeches now lost were entitled *For the Orators*, *For Satyros*, *Against Medon*, and *Against Kritias*. It would be easy to add 4 to 61 and get 65, the figure given for Demosthenes in the *Lives of the Ten Orators*. But this simple sum overlooks the possibility that more speeches have been lost, and the figure of 71, given by the scholiast to Aischines, strengthens this possibility.

Dionysios

It is a relief to turn from the lexica to Dionysios of Halikarnassos. He provides suggestive and sometimes surprising insights into the condition of the Demosthenic corpus in the time of Augustus. In the *First Letter to Ammaeus* he said that a Peripatetic

philosopher had asserted that Demosthenes owed his excellence in oratory to study of the rhetorical art as expounded by Aristotle. Dionysios wrote the *Letter* to refute this assertion. By giving dates for some twenty-two speeches of Demosthenes and for events in the life of Aristotle, he showed that Demosthenes had delivered the speeches before Aristotle composed the *Rhetoric*. The professed occasion of the *Letter* may be fictitious, and the epistolary form is probably a mere convention; ancient writers liked to pose. That issue is of no great moment. But it is important to notice which speeches Dionysios mentions in the *Letter* and to ask how he ascertained dates for them.

The speeches are those now numbered 1–11, 14–16, and 18–24, with a difference. Dionysios divides speech 4 into two speeches; he assigns the earlier part of it to 352/1 and the later part, starting at 4.30, to 347/6. There is no reason to accept this division and one can only conjecture why it was made. It is also to be noted that Dionysios expresses no doubt of the authenticity of speeches 7 and 11.

It has sometimes been supposed that Dionysios determined dates for the speeches by recognizing their allusions to events and ascertaining the dates of the events from historical works. This hypothesis about his method was propounded by Schwartz (1893, 29–36). But the language of Dionysios does not support this hypothesis. Within the *First Letter to Ammaeus* one can distinguish with ease between his procedures for ascertaining Demosthenic and Aristotelian dates. In chapter 3 he makes the introductory remark: “But first it is perhaps necessary to state the information handed down by the biographers of the men, as I learned it from the general histories.” He proceeds in chapter 4 to give dates for twelve speeches of Demosthenes. He does not argue for the dates or cite sources on historical events mentioned in these speeches; he is content to assert the dates. His procedure is the same in chapter 10, where he gives dates for nine more speeches, and in chapter 12, where he gives the date for speech 18. But in chapter 6 he says in reference to Aristotle: “That is what has been handed down to us by the biographers of the man,” and in distinction from this he says in the next sentence: “But what the philosopher himself says about himself . . . provides the surest proofs.” He states dates for some events in the life of Aristotle without argument. But when he deals with the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, he quotes passages of Philochoros (in chapters 9 and 11) on the Olynthian War and on the final war between Philip and the Athenians, and he discerns in the *Rhetoric* allusions to events of these wars; thus he establishes *termini post quos* for composition of the treatise. In short, his statements of Aristotelian dates are in part assertive and in part argumentative, but all his statements about Demosthenic dates are mere assertion without argument.

There is a further reason for believing that Dionysios did not ascertain dates for speeches in the manner supposed by Schwartz. The earliest speeches composed by Demosthenes were the “epitropic” speeches, as they are sometimes called, the speeches he delivered in suing his guardians (27–31). Their dates are known from the references in 30.15, 17, and 33 to archons and intervals of years. Dionysios could have dated these speeches from these references. The epitropic speeches are several years earlier than the earliest of the speeches noted in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*. They are a fortiori earlier than the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. Had Dionysios ascertained his Demosthenic dates by recognizing allusions in speeches, he could have strengthened his argument against the Peripatetic philosopher by drawing on the epitropic speeches. Yet he did not do so.

It follows that Dionysios only carried out very little historical research in preparing the *First Letter to Ammaeus*. He expected his readers to accept without doubt the

dates he gave for a collection of speeches. That collection consisted solely of public speeches, some prepared for the assembly and some for the courts. So it omitted the epitropic speeches. In a sentence cited earlier, Dionysios mentioned both “the information handed down by the biographers of the men” and “the general histories” as his sources. The sentence may make the reader wonder whether Dionysios drew his dates from general histories of Greece or from biographies of Demosthenes and Aristotle. But a general history of Greece, such as the *Philippika* of Theopompos, is not likely to have given dates for the twenty-two Demosthenic speeches considered in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*. Probably the statement of Dionysios about his sources should be taken to mean that he consulted biographical works on Demosthenes and Aristotle but the authors of those works had drawn on general histories (as well, presumably, as sources giving dates for speeches). Alternatively he may have intended “general histories” in so vague a sense as to include biographies, or he may have meant works of reference that he consulted and that drew on biographies.

The minimal equipment Dionysios needed for composing the *First Letter* was small. He quoted Philochoros, he drew on the *Rhetoric*, he required a biography of Aristotle and a biographical work on Demosthenes. Only the last of these has importance here. From it Dionysios drew the date of birth of Demosthenes and the dates of delivery of each public speech. The biographical work need not have contained much more information about Demosthenes, for it evidently had nothing to say about the epitropic speeches. Dionysios identifies each speech discussed in the *Letter* by quoting its opening lines. Surely, then, the biographical work was a collection of public speeches with some historical information including dates of delivery. That work will henceforth be called the “core.” Two guesses will be made later about the name of the man who compiled it. It was recognized as authoritative in the time of Dionysios, for he could draw dates from it without fear of being challenged. If it was old, it may have suffered additions or losses in transmission. Since the “core” comprised some twenty-two speeches including the long forensic ones (18–24), it must have occupied several rolls of papyrus.

In another treatise, *On the Diction of Demosthenes*, Dionysios provides a modicum of information about the private speeches. In chapter 13 he notes similarities between Demosthenes and Lysias; he says that, as far as style is an indication, several speeches of Demosthenes might be by Lysias. To illustrate this point he specifies the speeches now numbered 36, 48, 39, 57, and 43, and he adds: “And all the other private speeches, not many more than twenty in number.” It is not clear whether Dionysios intends this figure of “not many more than twenty” to include the five he has specified. In the same chapter he also pays attention to speech 7, noting that it lacks some features characteristic of Demosthenes, but he does not express explicitly any doubt of authenticity.

Didymos

The last witness to be called to the transmission of Demosthenic speeches is Didymos, who was active at Alexandria. According to the *Suda*, he was adult in 63 B.C. and lived into the time of Augustus. Extensive fragments of a roll of papyrus, giving the comments of Didymos on speeches 9, 10, 11, and 13, were first published by H. Diels and W. Schubart in 1904 (Berlin; the same editors issued an *editio minor*, with improved readings, at Leipzig in the same year. On a recent edition, reference should be made to the review by H. Wankel, *Gnomon* 59 [1987] 213–223). The papyrus was

made in the second century A.D. The irregularity of the handwriting suggests that this copy was made by a scholar for his own use, not by a dealer for sale. The copyist may have shortened the explanatory comments of Didymos. Since a single roll was devoted to comments on speeches 9, 10, 11, and 13, it is likely that the comments on speeches 1–8 occupied two rolls. Indeed the subscription at the end of the roll said that this was the third roll of the *Philippics*. The subscription also indicated that this roll belonged to a series commenting on twenty-eight speeches of Demosthenes. The first editors suggested credibly that the twenty-eight speeches were 1–11, 13–24, and 27–31. The collection of twenty-eight speeches may reflect strictly the interests of the scholar who made this copy of the commentary. It bears no relation to the “core” known to Dionysios, which omitted 13, 17, and the epitropic speeches. References by Harpokration show that Didymos commented on far more Demosthenic speeches than the twenty-eight.

The comments of Didymos preserved on the roll of papyrus are mostly devoted to explaining historical matters. Toward understanding the early history of the Demosthenic text one must ask what sources Didymos drew on. He cites orators, such as Deinarchos, and historians, including Demon, Theopompos, Androtion, and, with the greatest frequency, Philochoros. Commenting on speech 11, he says: “Some say that this advisory speech is the work of Anaximenes of Lampsakos and is now included, almost in its entirety in the same words, in the seventh book of his *Philippika*” (11.10–14). The first editors noted that Didymos does not claim here to have consulted Anaximenes directly but refers to what “some say” for the content of the *Philippika*. They concluded that Didymos had not consulted the historians whom he names but drew on biographical compilers; they suggested the elusive Hermippos as his main source (pages XXXII–XXXVI of the *editio major*). But this was a large inference to draw from a single remark. Some years later P. Foucart (1909, 36–37 and 42–45) objected that Didymos wrote commentaries on many authors in haste; he may sometimes have refrained from looking up a reference anew and relied on the note he had previously made of it; nothing of the work of the compilers posited by the first editors has survived and so they cannot have been influential.

It is fair to presume that Didymos had consulted the historical and other authors whom he names. He often attributes opinions, especially opinions he rejects, to “some people,” whom he does not name. Evidently he did not think highly of the unnamed persons. The first editors of the papyrus called them “unbedeutende Schulmeister” (page XLII); Didymos had succeeded in passing on his estimate of his predecessors. There is every reason to believe that it was a sound estimate. Didymos was a man of great erudition and his work commanded respect after his time. The conclusion to be drawn is that even before the time of Didymos the speeches of Demosthenes had been studied and expounded, but the work of exposition had not been done well. Therefore Didymos based his explanations on standard works of history, such as Theopompos and Philochoros.

The Editor of the “Core”

In studying the early history of the Demosthenic text and in an attempt to discover the provenance of the “core,” three names call for consideration. The first is Kallimachos. In compiling the *pinakes* as a catalog of the Library of Alexandria, he sought to reduce to order the mass of literary material collected there (cf. Reynolds and Wilson 1974, 7). Doubtless he listed under the name of Demosthenes all the speeches

that came to him under that name (cf. Drerup 1899, 546). In the fourth and third centuries B.C. the conditions of the book trade made it easy for speeches to be attributed to the wrong author; booksellers were especially likely to assign speeches to famous names (cf. Dover 1968, 23–27 and 151–54). There is no reason to think that Kallimachos inquired into the authenticity of particular speeches or that he compiled the “core.” Possibly his work contributed to bringing into being the later corpus of sixty-five or seventy-one speeches.

The second name to consider is Demochares. He was the son of the sister of Demosthenes. In 280/79 he proposed a motion for setting up a bronze statue of his uncle in the agora ([Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 847d). He wrote a historical work, concentrating on Athens (*FGrHist* 75). He may well have tried to collect texts of authentic speeches of Demosthenes. It is often conjectured that Demosthenes sometimes issued a copy of a speech for written circulation after delivering it in the assembly or a court. This possibility is indeed presupposed by an anecdote about Aision, a contemporary of Demosthenes; he said that the latter’s speeches, “when read aloud,” surpassed those of earlier orators (Plut. *Dem.* 11.4; cf. Blass 1893, 49). If Isokrates issued “speeches” in writing even though he had not spoken them in public, Demosthenes had no reason to abstain from this way of propagating his views. If Demochares set about collecting together genuine speeches of Demosthenes and establishing the best texts, the task may have been difficult. He is the most likely person to have inherited the private papers of his uncle. Perhaps he is to be thanked for the preservation of the epitropic speeches. They are some, but not all, of the speeches delivered by Demosthenes in suing his guardians. When he composed them, he was still unknown. Conceivably Demosthenes himself issued them in writing in the hope of establishing an oratorical reputation. Yet they are not well suited to that purpose, since large parts of them are devoted to close calculations of finance. It is easier to suppose that Demochares included them in a comprehensive collection. Ancient editors treated the texts they inherited from their deceased authors with piety (cf. Pohlenz 1919, 96).

It is credible that Demochares tried to collect all the writings, and nothing but the writings, of Demosthenes. His collection may have been one of the sources from which the Library at Alexandria drew material. That Demochares also compiled the “core,” a collection of some twenty-two speeches with historical material, is less probable, though by no means impossible. By the time of Dionysios, the “core” included inauthentic material, namely speeches 7 and 11. Possibly these were later interpolations into an original “core” of purely Demosthenic material. Alternatively the compiler of the original “core” may have set out not solely to present the public life of Demosthenes but to give a documentary history of that orator’s time, and so he may have included speeches 7 and 11.

Whatever the compass of the original “core,” another candidate for the role of compiler is at least as probable as Demochares. After Philip II had defeated his enemies at Chaironeia and imposed terms of peace, recriminations were voiced among the Athenians and continued for many years. In 337 Aischines gave notice of prosecution against Ktesiphon for proposing honors for Demosthenes, and the case came to trial in 330. Some of his allegations were reiterated by Deinarchos in 323 in the trial concerning the scandal of Harpalos (cf. Montgomery 1983, 94–95). Prosecuting Ktesiphon in 330, Aischines surveyed the public activity of Demosthenes and divided it into four periods; he had little to say about the fourth period, that following the peace concluded in 338 (3.159–67). Probably Demosthenes spent much of his time from 337 until 324 in retirement. He had both the time and the motive for compiling the “core” as an *apologia pro vita publica sua*.

Appendix 2

Questions of Authenticity of Some Demosthenic Speeches

Style and Stylometry

When the authenticity of a speech attributed to a named author was doubted, ancient critics invoked criteria of two kinds, stylistic and substantive. Stylistic criteria included choice and order of words and structure of sentences. Substantive criteria depended on the compatibility of statements in the speech with historical occurrences, including events in the career of the putative author. Criteria of the two kinds can be illustrated from the hypothesis of Libanios to [Dem.] 7. Libanios refers to wording and arrangement and says that the offensive remark near the end of the speech, “if you carry your brain between your temples and not trodden down in your heels,” is not like Demosthenes. Proceeding to a substantive criterion he notes that the author of the speech had prosecuted Kallippos of Paiania for proposing an illegal decree (7.43), and he says that the prosecutor of Kallippos was not Demosthenes but Hegesippos.

Stylistic considerations have some weight, but substantive criteria, where available, have more chance of being decisive. A comparison of two judgments shows how unreliable an impression of style can be. In the work, *On the Diction of Demosthenes*, Dionysios of Halikarnassos quotes a speech of Lysias and one of Demosthenes; he finds them similar (11–12). He continues:

If each of these speeches were not known by its superscription, indicating whose work it is, but we came across them without titles, I do not think that many of us would be able to tell easily which speech is by Demosthenes or Lysias. Their characters have such great similarity to one another.

Dionysios proceeds to say that the same is true of all the private speeches of Demosthenes, and he names several of them. On the other hand Cicero (*Brutus* 285) says: “nam quid est tam dissimile quam Demosthenes et Lysias?” Admittedly Greek was not Cicero’s first language, but he probably had an ear more sensitive to it than anyone today.

An observation made by Blass (1893, 105–12) opened up the possibility of applying stylometric tests to the Demosthenic corpus. In solemn utterance an uninter-

rupted succession of short syllables offended Greek sensibilities. This principle explains why in the earlier tragedies resolution of long syllables in trimeters was avoided (cf. Ceadel 1941). Writers of prose made some effort to avoid collocations of short syllables, but Demosthenes, after he had reached maturity, was far more rigorous in avoiding the tribrach (the uninterrupted succession of three short syllables) than other writers were. It is to be noted that the Demosthenic habit of abstinence concerns only avoidable tribrachs. An uninterrupted succession of short syllables cannot be avoided if it occurs in a single word or in a short phrase, such as article and noun, which coheres as closely together as a single word.

Blass formulated his observation on Demosthenes in the statement (1893, 105): “Es besteht nun dies Gesetz darin, dass die Anhäufung von mehr als zwei kurzen Silben möglichst vermieden wird, wobei natürlich solche Silben, die durch Elision in Wegfall kommen, nicht mehr zählen.” Two scholars of the next generation followed up this observation independently. Adams (1917) counted the number of avoidable tribrachs per hundred lines for each speech; he drew on the Oxford text for speeches 1–27 and on that of Baiter and Sauppe for the other speeches. Vogel (1923) counted the number of avoidable tribrachs per hundred lines for each speech in the Teubner text. For questions of authenticity of particular speeches, their results were impressively similar. More recently McCabe (1981), employing a computer, tested the speeches in the light of Blass’s law, as it has come to be called, and other features, such as avoidance of hiatus. To a large extent, his findings agree with those of his predecessors.

Two words of caution need to be uttered. The first arises from uncertainties in reconstructing the text from the manuscripts. If variant readings agree in sense but differ in rhythm, an editor convinced of the validity of Blass’s law may be guided by it in his choice. Indeed, if the law is valid, he should be guided by it in determining the text. But if, after doing so, he applies Blass’s law to a further purpose, he runs a risk of circular argument. Blass has sometimes been criticized for this reason. The second factor of uncertainty is something to which Blass showed himself more alive than his successors. Occasionally Demosthenes utters a succession of short syllables to achieve an effect of agitation or ridicule. Thus at 8.11 he says:

Be aware of this, that Philip has not won superiority by any factor more than by being the first to reach the scene of action. He has a standing force with him permanently, he knows in advance what he wishes to do, and he arrives promptly among whatever people his own resolve takes him to. We on the other hand are at last thrown into disorder and preparations, whenever we hear that something is happening [*epeidan pythōmetha ti gignomenon*].

Again, at 5.2 he says with evident contempt:

Deliberation is by nature a burdensome and difficult task, but you have made it far more difficult, gentlemen of Athens. For all the rest of mankind engage in deliberation before the events, but you do so after the events [*hymeis de meta ta pragmata*].

In three of the epitropic speeches (27, 28, 30) Demosthenes admits tribrachs as frequently as other orators of the fourth century. But in two of them (29, 31), the frequency of tribrachs is lower; evidently Demosthenes was already growing more sensitive to the jarring character of uninterrupted sequences of short syllables. Speeches 41 and 55 have high figures for frequency of tribrachs, but there is no other reason to doubt that Demosthenes composed them. The plausible explanation is that they

come from an early stage in his career, before he had learned to avoid the tribrach with rigor. Long before Blass discovered his law, Schaefer (1858, 228 and 256 n. 3) recognized these two speeches as composed by Demosthenes in his youth. In speeches of undisputed authenticity from his mature period Demosthenes avoids the tribrach with far greater rigor than the other Attic orators. This Demosthenic rigor is apparent as early as speech 51, delivered in 360/59.

The conclusion to be drawn from Blass's law is that a speech purporting to have been composed by Demosthenes in his maturity is probably not authentic, if it has frequent tribrachs. An apparent but explicable exception is to be found in speech 24. In the first half (24.1–110) and the last part (24.155–218) of that speech the tribrach is avoided with Demosthenic rigor, but in a long passage near the middle of the speech (24.111–54) tribrachs are as frequent as in other orators. An independent study of the speech (Dover 1968, 163) found that occurrences of hiatus in this speech increase after 24.108, are frequent in 24.118–37, and decline in 24.138–59; the explanation suggested was that the irregular part of the speech was composed in large part by the client for whom Demosthenes wrote.

Blass's law, if not observed, provides reason for supposing that a speech is not authentic. It does not necessarily follow that observance of the law—that is, rigorous avoidance of tribrachs—proves authenticity. The question has a bearing on speeches 13 and 25 and on the first five of the letters. If Blass and his successors could discover the care Demosthenes took to avoid uninterrupted sequences of short syllables, an ancient rhetorician could do the same and could compose in a strictly Demosthenic manner. Indeed in the second century A.D. Aelius Aristides avoided the tribrach in many, though not all, of his speeches as carefully as Demosthenes (Vogel 1923, 105). One must also remember that most of the speeches composed by the classical orators have been lost. A speech that conforms to Demosthenic rhythm may be a later composition by a student of Demosthenes or it may even be the work of a contemporary of his.

Speeches 8, 9, and 10

A cluster of problems arises in connection with these three speeches and they should be considered together. Dionysios assigns speeches 8 and 9 to 342/1 and speech 10 to 341/0. In the nineteenth century many readers doubted the authenticity of speech 10. The discovery and publication in 1904 of parts of Didymos's commentary added new evidence. Much of the extant part of the roll (1.26–10.11) is devoted to elucidating this speech. The consequences were drawn promptly by Körte (1905; contrast Croiset 1925, 112–19, and Errington 1981, 79–80). As Körte recognized, a decisive argument for the authenticity of the speech is to be drawn from the misfortunes of Hermias of Atarneus. The speech (10.32) says that Hermias has been arrested and will betray Philip's plans to the Persian king. Didymos (4.59–6.62) talks at length about the arrest and death of Hermias; he quotes Theopompos, Kallisthenes, and Aristotle, and he mentions the views of others. When taken to the king, Hermias refused to give information under torture and was executed. His fortitude was much praised; Kallisthenes wrote a work about him, and Aristotle composed a poem in his honor. Comparison of speech 10.32 with the information supplied by Didymos shows that the speech was composed when the heroic death of Hermias was not yet known. That is, it is a genuine speech of 341.

A minor disagreement about the date of speech 10 is to be noted. Didymos (1.29–

30), like Dionysios, says that it was delivered in 341/0; he adds (2.2–3) that some unnamed people assigned it to 342/1. Listing aggressive acts of Philip, the speech (10.9) says that he won control of Oreos. Thanks to Didymos (1.13–18 = Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 159), it is known that the Athenians and Chalkidians liberated Oreos in Skirophorion 342/1. Körte concluded that speech 10 was delivered in 342/1, while Philip's men still held Oreos. But as pointed out by Cawkwell (1963c, 134–36), when the speaker mentioned Oreos he was concerned not to give an up-to-date report on the condition of that city but to list the evil deeds of Philip. The date 341/0, given by Dionysios presumably from the “core,” can stand.

Two further features of the speech have prompted comment. First, at 10.70–74 Demosthenes denounces a rival Athenian, Aristomedes, by name. Didymos (9.43–10.11) discusses his identity; he was an Athenian politician, nicknamed Chalkous (“the copper penny”?), and the comic poets called him a thief. (Indeed the term “thief” is applied to him at 10.73, the nickname at 13.20, and both in *Dem. frag.* 76.) Plutarch (*Mor.* 810d) says that in the *Philippics*, unlike the court speeches, Demosthenes abstains from personal abuse (*to loidoron*). So the naming of Aristomedes in speech 10 used to be cited as a reason for doubting authenticity. But this argument is weak. The naming of an opponent once in the course of the *Philippics* scarcely amounts to conflict with Plutarch's generalization, especially as Demosthenes (10.70) introduces his denunciation of Aristomedes by disclaiming personal abuse (*loidoria*). It is, however, striking that the *Philippics* habitually refer to the Athenian opponents of Demosthenes in general terms without naming them. One may wonder whether perhaps as delivered orally they named the opponents but later Demosthenes excised the names in preparing the speeches for written circulation, whether singly or as the “core.” If one thinks on these lines, one may also wonder why the name of Aristomedes was not excised from speech 10, and one may call to mind the piety of the orator's literary executor (Demochares?).

The other feature calling for comment is that two lengthy passages appear both in speech 10 and in speech 8, namely: 10.11–27 = 8.38–51; 10.55–70 = 8.52–67. Reading the speeches in the order in which they appear in printed editions, readers have sometimes supposed that the two passages were composed originally for speech 8 and inserted later into speech 10. Closer study of the passages and their contexts (by Adams 1938 and Daitz 1957; cf. Sealey 1955a, 105–10) has shown that the reverse is the case. The two common passages are integral to speech 10 and cannot be removed without leaving obvious gaps. They have been added clumsily in a compact block (8.38–67) to speech 8, where they are followed only by generalities and an epilogue (8.68–77). The original speech 8 must have consisted of 8.1–37, followed perhaps by an epilogue. One may wonder how the common passages came to be added to speech 8, and three possibilities may be noted in ascending order of probability. The first possibility is an accident occurring in the course of copying texts. But although it is not difficult to displace some leaves when books are made in modern form, columns were far less likely to be displaced within a roll of papyrus by accident; one would have had to cut some columns out and glue them into the roll at a different place. It is conceivable, secondly, that an editor of the speeches added the passages to speech 8. But if editors treated the inherited texts with respect, so bold a step is more likely to have been taken by Demosthenes himself. He had plentiful opportunity to do so, if he issued some speeches in writing singly and later put the “core” together.

Speech 9 is placed in sequence by Dionysios between speeches 8 and 10, and this date can be supported from Didymos and from the order of the speeches in the man-

uscripts. Difficulty arises because speech 9 exists in two versions, a longer one and a shorter one. That is, at many places in the speech the other manuscripts (FAY) give a longer phrase than S gives. Sometimes the difference is only a single word; sometimes it amounts to a whole sentence or even (9.6–7) a series of sentences. An old hypothesis, first propounded by L. Spengel in 1839 (according to Drerup 1916, 114 n. 115), said that both versions were issued by Demosthenes. Following this view, one could try to discern occasions for each. More recently Bühler (1978) has argued that only the shorter version was composed by Demosthenes; the additions in the longer version were made by a pedantic man of letters, who tried to clarify and normalize the text, diminishing its force and occasionally altering the sense.

Bühler based his study on a far more comprehensive survey of the variants than his predecessors had undertaken. Many of the additions in the longer version invite the explanation he offers. But at three points the longer version adds historical information:

1. 9.58. Demosthenes tells how Philip gained control over the Eretrians. “Philip as their ally sent Hipponikos and one thousand mercenaries, demolished the fortifications of the Porthmos and established three tyrants, Hipparchos, Automedon, and Kleitarchos. After that, when the Eretrians tried to save themselves, he has twice driven them from their territory.” The shorter version ends here. The longer version continues: “by sending once the mercenaries with Eurylochos and again those with Parmenion.” Although this additional information cannot be confirmed independently, there is no reason to doubt it, and its probability is strengthened by the attested intervention of Parmenion at Oreos (see Appendix 7).

2. 9.71 Demosthenes exhorts the Athenians according to the shorter version: “When we ourselves have carried out these preparations and deeds openly, let us then invite the others, and let us send out envoys to explain these matters, so that if you persuade them, you will have companions in dangers and expenses, should there be need, and if you do not, you will at least delay developments.” After the words “send out envoys to explain these matters,” the longer version inserts: “to all places, to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, I say to the king (for it is not outside his interests to prevent Philip from subduing everything).” About the time of this speech or soon afterward, the Athenians sent envoys to Chios and Rhodes ([Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 850a; Hyper. frags. 161, 194) and to the Persian king ([Dem.] 12.6).

3. 9.72. Immediately after envisaging delay of developments, Demosthenes continues in the shorter version: “Since the war is against a man and not against the might of an organized city, to do so [to delay developments] is by no means useless, nor are the embassies that went around the Peloponnese last year with accusations, embassies on which I served and so did that excellent fellow Polyeuktos and Hegesippos and the other envoys. We made Philip check his advance, so that he did not march on Ambrakia or approach the Peloponnese.” After naming Hegesippos the longer version adds: “and Kleitomachos and Lykourgos.” On the embassies of 342 see chapter 7 at note 54. The identity of the envoys sent to the Peloponnese is known only from this passage; there is no reason to doubt that Kleitomachos and Lykourgos were among them.

If in these three passages the additions were the work of the interpolator who created the longer version, that tasteless pedant had good historical knowledge, as Bühler (1978, 75–76) admits. One may then suppose that he was guided by motives of two different kinds, or one might posit two interpolators. It is surely easier to suppose that the author of the additional information in 9.58 and 9.71–72 was Demosthenes. That is, the orator composed speech 9 in two versions, even though the longer

version of the manuscripts other than S has later suffered extensive interpolation. Demosthenes had as many opportunities for rewriting speech 9 as for altering the compass of speech 8.

Speech 13

This speech was rejected as inauthentic by Schaefer (1858, 89–94) and Weil (1881, 436–38). The question was reopened when the papyrus of Didymos was discovered. Didymos devotes some two columns (13.14–15.10) to explaining this speech. He expresses no doubt of authenticity. He argues that the speech is not a *Philippic*, he maintains that its date is 349/8, and he provides information on the dispute with Megara to which the speech (13.32) alludes. That the speech is authentic was maintained by Foucart (1909, 95–108) and later by Cawkwell (1969a, 328 n. 1; cf. 1963a, 59), but they differed from Didymos on its date; Foucart suggested 351/0 and Cawkwell preferred 353/2. Dionysios does not mention the speech in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*, so it is not likely to have formed part of the original “core.”

The speech professes to be delivered at a meeting of the assembly summoned to consider how to distribute the proceeds from financial resources currently available (13.1–3). Without offering concrete proposals, it harangues the Athenians in general terms, mostly on the theme that they ought to be willing to engage in military service as well as to receive money. The conclusion is feeble (13.36): if the Athenians are good, their speakers will be good, for speakers conform themselves to the wishes of the audience. At 13.12 the speaker gives his name as Demosthenes. That is unusual among Demosthenic public speeches, although at 3.21 Demosthenes alludes to his own name without uttering it. At least the name at 13.12 excludes the possibility that the speech is by another orator of the same period. The speech was composed either by Demosthenes or by a later rhetorician.

The speech observes Blass’s law in avoiding the tribrach. But this has little positive significance, since at many places this speech imitates passages from known speeches of Demosthenes. Schaefer collected the echoes. Two parts of the speech call for note, because they resemble other speeches but with variation.

1. 13.21–24 resembles 23.196–200 in content and wording. Both passages contrast the esteem in which the Athenians held their leading statesmen in the past with the adulation bestowed on those of the present generation. Both passages proceed to draw a corresponding contrast between the honors granted to aliens in the past and in the present. In both passages the aliens named from the past are Menon of Pharsalos and Perdikkas of Macedon. But the passages differ in the honors specified for these two men. Speech 23 attacked the decree of Aristokrates, which provided that anyone killing Charidemus should be *agōgimos*. So that speech (23.199–200) said that the Athenians of the past had not conferred this privilege of special protection on Menon or on Perdikkas but had merely granted them citizenship. The author of speech 13 does not mention any such provision of special protection; it would not have been relevant to his subject. Instead he says (13.23–24) that the Athenians of the past did not confer citizenship on Menon or Perdikkas but were content to grant them fiscal immunity. In short speech 23 asserts and speech 13 denies that the Athenians granted citizenship to Menon and Perdikkas. So it is not likely, though not impossible, that both speeches were composed by the same author.

2. 13.25–31, though somewhat shorter, resembles 3.23–32 in content and wording closely. (Within 13.25–31 the last sentence of 13.26 occurs also with minor differ-

ences at the end of 15.35, and a phrase at the end of 13.30 occurs also in 19.275.) The passages in speeches 13 and 3 put their ideas into different order, but both contrast the glory of the Athenian past with the humiliations of the present, and both explain the difference by differences of behavior within the city. One of the distinctive features of the past is that leading Athenian statesmen formerly had modest houses. For this the men named as examples in speech 3 are Aristides and Miltiades. Those named in speech 13 are Themistokles, Kimon, and Aristides. Admittedly the difference in the names may not be significant ("Demosthenes may have been careless," Cawkwell 1969a, 328 n. 1). But at least one contemporary of Demosthenes, Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 89), knew that Kimon's house had been big enough for him to invite many poor men to dine at his table every day. Perhaps Demosthenes did know this; for at 23.207 he makes the same point about the modest houses of former statesmen and he cites as examples Themistokles and Miltiades but again he omits Kimon.

Two more resemblances between speech 13 and the *Olynthiacs* deserve note, for in each case the borrowed passage loses its point in speech 13.

3. The first occurs within the contrast, noted as 2 earlier, between past glory and present humiliation. At 3.27–28 Demosthenes has expatiated on the virtuous past and he makes the transition to the present thus:

In those days their affairs were in that condition, while they had the leaders whom I have mentioned. But how are our affairs now under the present exemplary men? Are they the same as before or similar? I pass over many things I could state, but since the Lakedaimonians have perished and the Thebans have their hands full and none of the others is of sufficient weight to compete with us for the first place, we have had the opportunity of a power vacuum, which you can all see, but although we might possess our own property in safety and administer justice to others, we have been deprived of part of our own territory, we have spent more than fifteen hundred talents to no need, with peace in force these men have lost the allies whom we had gained in the war, and we have raised up so great an enemy against ourselves.

Likewise at 13.27, the speaker makes the transition from the past to the present:

Those men did those deeds. But consider whether we, who have had the opportunity of a power vacuum, which you can all see, do similar things. Have not more than fifteen hundred talents been spent in vain on the feckless among the Greeks? Have not all the private estates and the common resources of the city and those derived from the allies been used up? Have not these men lost in the peace the allies whom we had gained in the war?

Both passages say that the Athenians have had the opportunity offered by "emptiness" (*erēmia*). This was a new and striking figure (feebly translated as "power vacuum" here), and so some explanation was needed. Speech 3 provides explanation by pointing to the condition of the Lakedaimonians, the Thebans, and the other Greeks. In speech 13 no explanation is given and so "emptiness" is unintelligible. (Cawkwell 1969a, 328 n. 1, objects that the borrowed passage "seems more appropriate in XIII when the peace at the end of the Social War and the loss of allies was still fresh in the mind; by mid 349 Athens could hardly feel herself to be *en tēi eirēnēi*." But the war in which the Athenians had gained allies was the Hellenic War of 378–362, not the Social War, and therefore the peace mentioned in the passage is the common peace of 362, which still provided a framework for Greek affairs in 349.)

4. The assertion that the Athenians conduct their politics by symmories is made in 2.29 and in 13.20. In speech 2 it is preceded by a sentence deploring divisions among the Athenians ("The outcome is that you quarrel among yourselves and diverge, since some of you are persuaded of one thing and others of another, and the common interest suffers"). No such explanatory sentence introduces the bold figure in speech 13, and so its force is lost.

The most likely hypothesis is that speech 13 is the work of a later rhetorician. It would be foolish to claim certainty. Conceivably the rhetorician was Demosthenes: that is, he may have composed speech 13 as a private exercise and left it among his papers, which were circulated posthumously by a diligent editor. The least likely hypothesis is that Demosthenes delivered speech 13 in the assembly; for in the four points numbered here, it is careless where Demosthenes is careful.

Speeches 25 and 26

Of the two speeches *Against Aristogeiton* (25, 26) the second admits tribrachs far more frequently than Demosthenes in his mature period. Modern readers appear to agree that it is not the work of Demosthenes, although it may be a genuine speech composed by another orator for a trial of Aristogeiton. Opinions have differed on speech 25. Schaefer (1858, 113–28) thought that it was composed by a later rhetorician. Weil (1883–1886, 2: 287–99) maintained that it was authentic. Blass (1887; 1893, 408–17) recognized features diverging from the practice of Demosthenes, but he also found that speech 25 avoids the tribrach rigorously. So responding to Weil, he maintained that Demosthenes composed the speech but did not deliver it or even perfect it for delivery; an editor published it after his death. Treves (1936, 252–58) argued that the speech was composed and delivered by an orator other than Demosthenes at a trial of Aristogeiton. More recently Hansen (1976, 144–52) has defended the authenticity of speech 25 as composed and delivered by Demosthenes; he has tried to answer readers who professed to detect in the speech inaccuracies on Athenian law and on the career of Aristogeiton.

Dionysios does not mention speech 25 or speech 26 in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*. Indeed, he held that the two speeches were not by Demosthenes; his view is reported by Libanios (*Hypothesis to Dem.* 25, 7) and by Photios (*Bibliotheca* 265.491a). Libanios indicates that Dionysios argued from the form of the speeches and notes the auxiliary hypotheses offered by those who tried to defend authenticity. The judgment of Dionysios evidently rested on thoughtful inquiry. Harpokration (s.vv. *theōris*, *nealēs*) refers to speech 25 and adds "if authentic."

Speech 25 purports to be delivered at an *endeixis* against Aristogeiton (25.14, 17, 49, 69–75), and the pleader professes to speak straight after Lykourgos has spoken for the prosecution (25.1, 54, 69, 97). The speaker also says that Aristogeiton, hired by supporters of Philip, has prosecuted him seven times by *graphai* and twice at *euthynai* (25.37). So he is or professes to be prominent. Deinarchos (2.13), pleading against Aristogeiton in 323, said that recently Lykourgos prosecuted Aristogeiton by the procedure called *endeixis*. Photios (*Bibliotheca* 265.491a) mentions a speech of Aristogeiton "Against the *endeixis* of Lykourgos and Demosthenes." As Hansen has observed, in the light of these data it cannot be doubted that speech 25 purports to be the work of Demosthenes. It is not a genuine speech of another orator; it was composed either by Demosthenes or by a later rhetorician.

Lipsius (1883) thought that speech 25 diverges at several points from Athenian law. Hansen has scrutinized his arguments and shown that several of them are invalid. But three of them retain some force.

1. At 25.42 the speaker alludes to the *atimia* incurred by Aristogeiton as a public debtor: "This man did not approach you for five years, the period for which he was sentenced not to speak." But a temporal limitation on this disability is unknown; the *atimia* incurred by a public debtor lasted until he paid the debt. (The auxiliary hypothesis, enabling defenders of authenticity to escape this difficulty, is an emendation proposed by Weil.)

2. At 25.13 the speaker says that the assembly elected him as prosecutor. Apart from this remark there is no evidence that prosecutors were elected for the procedure of *endeixis*. (Hansen notes that prosecutors were elected for the novel procedure of *apophasis*, as is evident from the scandal concerning Harpalos, and suggests that prosecutors could be elected for an *endeixis*.)

3. At 25.65 the speaker says that the mother of Aristogeiton lost an action *apostasiou* and was sold by the state. If a freedman failed to fulfill his obligations to his former master, the latter could have recourse to the action *apostasiou*, and if the freedman lost the case, he became again a slave to his former master (Lipsius 1905–1915, 621–25). Public sale of the unsuccessful defendant is not attested outside 25.65 and would deprive the action of its value as a remedy for the plaintiff.

The other sources on the career of Aristogeiton are speech 26, Deinarchos 2, and the hypothesis of Libanios to speech 25. At four points it is difficult to reconcile the statements of speech 25 with these other data, although auxiliary hypotheses are possible.

1. Libanios expounds two counts on which Aristogeiton became a public debtor for sums of five talents and of a thousand drachmas. Deinarchos (2.12) mentions the first debt. Perhaps he overlooks the second because it was small. Speech 25.71–74 says that Aristogeiton incurred a third public debt. Libanios noted the assertion but could find no information to offer about the third debt.

2. Speech 26 was delivered on the second of two occasions when prosecutors attacked Aristogeiton by the procedure of *endeixis* and this speech says that he was acquitted at "the previous *endeixis*" (26.20–21). Speech 25.67 says that Aristogeiton was condemned at "the *endeixis*" and imprisoned twice.

3. The misfortunes of Aristogeiton's father, Kydimachos, are reported by Deinarchos (2.8, 11, 18). Kydimachos, he says, was condemned to death by the Athenians and fled to Eretria, where he later died in want; his son neither sent him necessities while he was alive, nor provided the customary rites when he died. Speech 25.54 says that Aristogeiton departed from Eretria after betraying his father in prison; that he failed to provide the customary rites, after his father died, or to reimburse those who provided the funeral, and that he opened a lawsuit against them. To reconcile these two accounts, one must suppose at least that Kydimachos was imprisoned in Eretria, after escaping from Athens, and that Deinarchos had a reason for not mentioning Aristogeiton's lawsuit against those who saw to his father's funeral.

4. There is also divergence about Aristogeiton's sojourn in prison. Deinarchos (2.9–10) says that the other prisoners voted to have nothing to do with him; allegedly he had stolen from a fellow prisoner. Speech 25.60–62 mentions the incident and gives more detail: the other prisoner was a man of Tanagra; Aristogeiton stole a document from him and bit his nose off in the ensuing scuffle. The details cannot be dismissed as the fanciful distortion of a zealous litigant; the speaker claims to produce the mutilated man as a witness.

The easiest way to account for the divergence of speech 25 from the other sources at these four points is to suppose that its additional statements are fictions. But the easiest way to explain its statements as fictions is to suppose that it is the work of a later rhetorician, and its eccentricities on three points of Athenian law, considered earlier, invite that hypothesis. Yet the question cannot even be left there. Two repetitions within the speech call for note.

1. At 25.96 Aristogeiton is said to be “a viper by nature.” But he has already been compared to a viper at 25.52.

2. At 25.81 the speaker says: “Whatever law by nature each man has toward all others, he deserves to receive the same himself as treatment at the hands of every other.” The attentive reader will remember that “nature” and “law” have been contrasted at 25.15–16.

The repetitions can be explained when one observes that the speech can be divided easily into two parts at 25.53–54. The first part (25.1–53), which begins by saying that Lykourgos has already spoken, is discursive; it includes digressions, notably on nature and law (25.15–16) and on the supremacy of the laws (25.20–28). It does not call witnesses. It ends with a peroration (25.49–53), which compares Aristogeiton to a viper or a scorpion (25.52) and exhorts the judges to make an example of him (25.53). The second part (25.54–101) begins by saying:

It is right, gentlemen of Athens, that you should hear the remaining arguments. Those you heard just now, when Lykourgos was speaking, are powerful and cannot be excelled, and the remaining arguments will be found to be proper partners for them and of the same character.

That remark appears to open the second speech for the prosecution. The second part of speech 25 is less discursive than the first part; it calls for the testimony of witnesses, and it tries to supply factual details, for example on Aristogeiton’s treatment of his relatives (25.54–55) and on his behavior in prison (25.60–61).

Speech 25 is not one exercise by a later rhetorician but two.

Speeches 11, 12, and 17

For some other speeches brief treatment will suffice. Speech 11, *Against the Letter of Philip*, admits tribrachs far more frequently than Demosthenes in his mature period. Didymos (11.10–14) provides the information that virtually the same text appeared in the seventh book of the *Philippika* of Anaximenes. It follows that speech 11 was composed by Anaximenes after the manner of ancient historians. Possibly one may draw historical information from it in the same way as from the speeches in the works of Thucydides and Xenophon. It throws light on the way Anaximenes set to work, for a considerable part of it (11.8–17) is modeled closely on speech 2.14–23.

Of the four main manuscripts two (FY) give as item 12 a *Letter of Philip* immediately after speech 11; the other two omit it. Presumably the scholar who included item 12 alongside speech 11 in a parent of FY thought that 12 was the letter to which 11 responded. So in modern times suspicion arising from 11 has cast a shadow on 12. But the relationship between the two texts is not so close. Speech 11 purports to be delivered when a letter has been received from Philip (11.1). The speech says that the satraps in Asia have sent mercenaries and thereby prevented Philip from taking Perinthos by siege; at the dramatic date of the speech the siege of Perinthos had failed

but it was still not clear whether Philip would capture Byzantion (11.5). In the late summer of 340 Philip advanced on Byzantion, seized the merchant ships conveying grain to Athens, and sent the Athenians a letter; but the Athenians in response destroyed the stele bearing the peace of Philokrates and went to war (Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 55). This letter of Philip became famous (Dem. 18.73, 76, 79). But the situation revealed in item 12 is some weeks earlier in the season of 340. The letter preserved as item 12 voices a series of grievances against the Athenians and comes to the point by saying that Philip has sent an army through the Chersonese to protect his fleet, as it made its way through the Hellespont (12.16). This insight into the occasion of the preserved letter was achieved by Pohlenz (1929) and elaborated by Wüst (1938, 133–36; cf. 28–30 and 128–29, with recognition of earlier views). So item 12 may be an authentic letter of Philip, and one may ask how far he composed it himself and how far he relied on an adviser (cf. Griffith 1979, 714–16). The question is of more interest to students of Macedon than to students of Athens. One may still wonder how the letter came to be preserved in literary circles.

The only other public speech requiring attention is 17, *Concerning the Treaties with Alexander*. It has frequent tribrachs. Dionysios (*On the Diction of Demosthenes* 57) says that it was not by Demosthenes. Its authenticity, though apparently accepted by Pollux (8.69; cf. [Dem.] 17.2, 22, and 30), was doubted by Harpokration (s.v. *pro-bolas*) and by Libanios, who found its character and wording more suggestive of Hypereides. It was probably delivered by a contemporary of Demosthenes during the rising of Agis in 331 (see Schaefer 1885–1887, 3: 203–10; Cawkwell 1961b; for the date, Badian 1967, 190–92).

Inquiries into particular speeches in the Demosthenic corpus continue; for those published between 1915 and 1965 reference may be made to the survey by Jackson and Rowe (1969). On questions of authenticity, the results reached by Schaefer and Blass have for the most part withstood criticism successfully. Effective modification of those results has been accomplished where the discovery of the papyrus of Didymos supplied additional evidence.

A general observation may be in order. The speeches of Demosthenes are the most extensive primary source for the history of Athens in his lifetime. Consequently one sees the Athens of Demosthenes through the eyes of Demosthenes, even if one recognizes this perspective and tries to make allowance for it. There may be a difference between the perspective of Demosthenes at the time when he delivered a speech and at the later time when he issued it in writing, if he did so, and again at the still later time when he conjecturally compiled the “core.” It is not often possible to say that a speech has been altered after delivery. Defending himself in 343/2, Aischines (2.10) said that Demosthenes had compared him with Dionysios of Syracuse and told the story of the dream of a priestess in Sicily. Those passages do not appear in speech 19. Presumably they have been removed after delivery, if Aischines was telling the truth. Apart from this specific point one may suspect Demosthenes of carrying out a more pervasive change in editing his speeches after delivery. For in one respect the speeches are disappointing to the historian. Often they provide general exhortations and reprimands, where one would prefer to be told about immediate circumstances. This tendency to vagueness bedevils inquiry into the question of authenticity, for example, in relation to speech 13. The modern reader would gladly sacrifice generalized denunciations of Athenian laziness and political corruption for some names. Possibly names and precise circumstances have been excised by the man who compiled the “core.” But at least he had no reason to assign the speeches to erroneous dates. That is why the dates given by Dionysios should be believed.

Appendix 3

Autonomia

The purport of the word *autonomos*, with the related noun and verb, has been clarified by the studies of Bickerman (1958) and Ostwald (1982). They have collected and interpreted the fifth-century texts. Their work need not be repeated, but something more can be said about the way the word was used.

Bickerman distinguishes between *eleutheria* and *autonomia*. He maintains that every state had *eleutheria*, independence, as soon as it came into being. So the *eleutheria* of a political community was prior to any conventions into which the community entered; in this sense it was extrajudicial and existed *iure naturali*. “L’ *autonomia*, d’ autre part, n’ existe que *jure gentium*, *nomōi*. Elle est établi par un acte extérieur du droit public. C’ est ce critère formel, et ce critère seul, qui définit l’ *autonomia* au V^e siècle. Créé par une volonté d’ autrui, dérivée d’ une soumission à un ordre juridique supérieur, l’ indépendance d’ une cité autonome est nécessairement imparfaite” (336–37). In Bickerman’s view *autonomia* was a relative independence, which a state might enjoy when subject to a stronger state; so it was an incomplete or precarious independence. “Au cinquième siècle, les Grecs distinguaient entre la souveraineté originaire, possédant le caractère absolu, et la souveraineté réalisée par le pouvoir constituant d’ une autre puissance ou d’ autres puissances souveraines” (343).

Ostwald accepts this conclusion: “It is the great merit of his [Bickerman’s] work to have established that *autonomia* differs from *eleutheria* in being a concept in interstate relations, in that the independence of the ‘autonomous’ state stands always in the shadow of a stronger power” (1). Ostwald seeks to discover what positive conditions had to obtain if a state was to be *autonomos*. His finding is: “we may conclude that a state is *autonomos* when it is left free to exercise on its own the most rudimentary powers necessary for its survival. In practice it means that it can make its own decisions, free from violent interference by a stronger state, about what is and what is not in the interest of its survival, and that it can dispose of the military means necessary to ensure its survival” (29). So the means to realize *autonomia* could vary from state to state; an island might require a fleet but be able to dispense with a city wall, a city on the mainland might require fortifications and a land force.

It is, however, mistaken, to suppose that the word *autonomos* was only used of states whose independence was imperfect or precarious. It was used sometimes of communities whose independence was absolute. Thucydides (2.29.2; 2.96.2; 2.98.3–4; 2.101.3) uses the word to distinguish those Thracian tribes who were not ruled by

kings from those who were. The peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.18.2) declared Delphi *autonomos*. Since Delphi was declared to be *autonomos* "in accordance with ancestral custom," it is difficult to believe that the independence of Delphi derived from this undertaking of the Athenians, the Lakedaimonians, and their allies, although Bickerman (333–34) appears to imply this. Herodotos (1.96.1) chooses the word *autonomos* to specify the condition of the nations of Asia before kingship arose among the Medes. The historical sequence excludes any hypothesis that the independence of those nations stood "in the shadow of a stronger power." Likewise the author of the Hippocratic treatise, *Airs, Waters, Places* (16 bis, cf. 23), distinguishes among the nations of Asia between those who are subject to masters (*despotai*) and those who are *autonomoi*. The latter epithet cannot in this passage imply a condition of imperfect or precarious independence, for if it did, the author would have overlooked those nations, such as the Skythians and the Massagetai, whose independence was not limited in any sense.

The derivation of the word *autonomos* has been disputed. Bickerman noted that Greek cities, even if subject to interference by another Greek or even barbarian power, had their own laws, and so he rejected any attempt to derive the word from *nomos*. Instead he proposed to derive it from *nem-*, the root of *nemein*. The basic idea, he supposed, was that of distribution; "*autonomos* serait originalement celui qui a sa propre, particulière, portion" (341). Against this Ostwald cites a well known rule about accentuation of verbal compounds ("Greek verbal compounds in *-os* whose first element is not a preposition are oxytone [or paroxytone, if ending in two short syllables] when their sense is active, and proparoxytone when their sense is passive" 51, n. 5). But there are enough exceptions to the rule to make the inference about *autonomos* insecure (cf. Vendryes 1904, 193: "Cette règle souffre quelques exceptions, d' ailleurs inexplicables . . . mais elle se vérifie dans un nombre considérable d' exemples").

Moreover, if *autonomos* is derived from *nomos*, it should be used only of political communities. It is often so used, but once in the *Antigone* of Sophokles it is used of an individual person. There the chorus, looking ahead to Antigone's death, say to her:

Honored, indeed, and receiving praise thou wilt depart to that covered place of corpses.
Neither struck by corrosive diseases, nor overcome by the recompense of swords, but
alone of mortals thou wilt go in life *autonomos* down to Hades. (817–22)

Insisting on a derivation from *nomos*, Ostwald (54 n. 38) renders the last clause: "But living by your own laws (or perhaps: being a law unto yourself) you shall [*sic*] descend to Hades as no mortal ever has." But the phrases leading up to this clause invite a different interpretation. Going *autonomos* to Hades is contrasted with death by disease and death by the sword. The chorus say that Antigone will go "self-directed" and alive to death. The sense of "self-directed" accords well with a derivation from the root of *nemein*. Thus understood, *autonomos* is inherently vague but gains precision from the alternatives with which it is contrasted.

The work of Thucydides provides plentiful material for studying the usage of the word *autonomos*. On scrutiny the word proves to be vague but its vagueness is restricted within recognizable limits. As already noted, it can contrast communities that are fully independent with those subject to kings or to external powers. Yet it is often used of some cities that were allied to Athens within the Delian League, although in consequence of membership in the League these cities were not fully

independent. In particular it can distinguish allies who contribute ships to the federal fleet from those who pay tribute. It has this force, for example, at 7.57.3, 4, and 7, in the list of forces on the Athenian side in Sicily (cf. 6.84.3; 6.85.2).

On the other hand, *autonomos* can sometimes be predicated of cities required to pay tribute. Thus a clause of the peace of Nikias (5.18.5) provides:

Whatever cities the Lakedaimonians handed over to the Athenians, let the inhabitants be free to depart wherever they wish and take their property with them, but let the cities pay tribute according to the assessment of Aristides and be *autonomoi*. Once the treaty has been concluded, neither the Athenians nor their allies shall be free to take armed action against these cities, provided that they pay the tribute. The cities are Argilos, Stagiros, Akanthos, Skolos, Olynthos, and Spartolos.

This clause was evidently drawn up with some care for precision, since it includes a list of the cities that are to benefit from it. Within the clause *autonomia* is compatible with tributary status and appears to be defined by the guarantee against armed action. Again Thucydides speaks of Athenian behavior in the early stages of the Delian League and says (1.97.1): "They had leadership among allies who were at first *autonomoi* and who deliberated in common gatherings." He has just noted (1.96.1) how the Athenians assessed the allies to supply money or ships. So in the passage quoted he can scarcely mean that only allies furnishing ships took part in the common gatherings. Rather the word *autonomoi* is predicated in this passage of allies of both kinds. Here Thucydides treats membership in the deliberative gatherings as the salient, but not necessarily the sole, feature of *autonomia*.

Thucydidean usage shows that *autonomia* in different passages of prose specifies widely differing conditions. Therefore its meaning is not a question of international law but of semantics. It is vague but in a systematic way. In each of its occurrences, it takes its meaning from the immediate context and often from the condition with which it is contrasted. When it is contrasted with subjection to kings, it means freedom from royal rule. When it is contrasted with the obligation of paying tribute, it means freedom from that obligation. When it is clarified by a provision exempting the beneficiary from Athenian armed reprisals, it means that exemption. *Autonomia* is always preferable to the other stated or implied condition. Incidentally it can always be rendered by the English word "self-directed," since that word is vague in the same systematic way.

If *autonomia* is a preferable status, and if at each occurrence the word takes on meaning from its context, an important consequence follows. When namely the context fails to provide specification or contrast, the material content of *autonomia* decreases and may even vanish but the word retains its suggestion of preferability. The text of Thucydides provides an illustration. In 432 the Spartan assembly received complaints against the Athenians. The Aiginetans complained that they were not *autonomoi* as required by the treaty (1.67.2; cf. 1.139.1). Some readers have supposed that a clause in the Thirty Years' Peace of 446/5 guaranteed the *autonomia* of Aigina specifically. An alternative possibility is that the Thirty Years' Peace recognized the *autonomia* of all the allies of Athens. In either case it is to be noted that Thucydides does not waste words in any attempt to expound or assess the Aiginetan grievance of 432. If the Thirty Years' Peace spoke of *autonomia* in a context that failed to specify material meaning, any action of the Athenians could be represented as an infringement of the preferred condition.

The king's peace of 387/6 provided that the Greek cities, with stated exceptions, should be *autonomoi*. Since the context failed to indicate material meaning, this

clause did not put any restriction on the discretion of the Spartans, when they set about ordering the affairs of Greece. But since *autonomia* was a preferable condition, the clause enabled all parties to save face. For similar reasons—respectability and the lack of material content—a clause guaranteeing *autonomia* was to recur in later treaties and in Athenian decrees.

Appendix 4

Dates in the Early Life of Demosthenes

The reforms of Kleisthenes, carried out toward the end of the sixth century, distributed the citizens of Athens into 139 territorial units called demes. Membership in a deme depended on residence at the moment of the reforms and was, for the future, hereditary in the male line. Accordingly, when Aristotle or perhaps a pupil of his began composing the descriptive part of the treatise on the *Constitution of the Athenians*, the account of the constitution as it was in the author's own time, he said first that children inherit citizenship if both their parents are citizens, and he continued at once to the procedure for enrolling young men in their demes when they approached manhood (*AP* 42.1–2). The presence of a name on the list of members of a deme established the bearer's title to citizenship.

Adult male citizens, probably all of them, were also members of units called “phratries.” The number of these is not known and their origin is obscure. Some of them may have been older than the organized city of the Athenians. Aristotle does not mention phratries in his description of the constitution as it was in his own time. It has been suggested that that description in view of the arrangement of its material was based on the law code of 403–399 (Rhodes 1981, 33–34 and 516). If so, one may conjecture that that code did not treat phratries systematically, even though a reference to members of the phratry should be restored in the law on homicide as reissued in 409/8 (*IG* I³, 104 line 18; cf. [Dem.] 43.57). Phratries were private corporations, not brought into being by the authority of the city. But they played an important part in the social life of the citizens. When a male Athenian married, he offered a sacrifice, the *gamēlia*, and invited members of his phratry to take part. Ten days after the birth of a child the father again offered a sacrifice, the *dekatē*, and invited members of his phratry; this was the occasion when he gave the child a name. The father offered further sacrifices, the *meion* and the *koureion*, in honor of his son as the boy grew older; each of these was offered at a gathering of the father's phratry when it celebrated the Apatouria, a festival held in the fall of each year. The name *koureion* suggests that this sacrifice was offered when the boy first shaved his beard. Finally the father presented his son at a meeting of his phratry and asked the members to accept him by vote as an additional member. There was opportunity now for challenge, and the members swore an oath before voting. (On the significance of these rituals, see Rudhardt 1962; cf. Sealey 1987, 14–15.)

Presentation of the son to the father's deme doubtless occurred later than presentation to the phratry. Some light on the relation between the two occasions for reg-

istration is thrown by the story of Boiotos. When he grew up, he opened legal proceedings to compel his father, Mantias, to recognize him as his son. The case went to arbitration, and Mantias agreed to abide by the sworn testimony of the boy's mother, Plangon. She swore that the father of Boiotos was Mantias. Consequently Mantias introduced Boiotos to his phratry and the boy was added to its list. Mantias, who may have delayed unnecessarily, died before Boiotos was enrolled in his deme, but after his father's death Boiotos gained enrollment in the deme, apparently without difficulty (Dem. 39.5). Perhaps enrollment in the phratry created a presumption of true descent. But the case of Boiotos is a poor basis for generalization, since the testimony of Plangon was remembered as a sensation (Ar. *Rhet.* 2.1398b2–3; on the family see Davies 1971, 364–68). At least an applicant rejected by his father's phratry would not be likely to seek admission to membership in the deme.

Several occasions for festivals of the family are known. In many of them the phratry was the group of people among whom the family sought companions. There is no attestation of any Athenian celebration at anniversaries of birth. Indeed, Herodotos (1.133.1) remarks on the Persian custom of celebrating the birthday annually. His language suggests that this practice, cultivated nowadays in Protestant countries, was strange to the Greeks. Accordingly the Athenians had no need to keep a precise record of the day when a child was born. But they needed a record of the year of birth, as appears from Aristotle's account of admission to membership in the deme.

When a father presented his son to his deme, the demesmen voted on two questions, whether he had attained the requisite age, and whether he was of free status and lawful birth (Ar. *AP* 42.1). After the additions to the list of each deme had been made, the council of five hundred scrutinized the young men for age (*AP* 42.2). Those who passed the scrutiny entered on two years of service as *ephēboi* (*AP* 42.3–5). Dittenberger (1863, 22–23) offered epigraphic arguments of three kinds for believing that the new epheboi began their training at the beginning of Boedromion. Many more inscriptions have been found since Dittenberger wrote and they conform to his conclusion. So it will not be amiss to summarize the data.

1. The lists of monthly gymnasiarchs begin with Boedromion (*IG* II², 2004, 2037, 2042, 2044, 2046, 2050, 2052, 2058, 2059, 2065, 2067, 2068, 2085, 2097, 2103, 2111/12, 2113, 2119, 2125, 2208, 2231, 2239, 2243). But the earliest of these (2004) is assigned by Kirchner to the end of the first century A. D.

2. The honorific decrees that name the rites in which the epheboi took part begin with rites performed in Boedromion (*IG* II², 1006, 1008, 1009, 1011, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1039, 1043). The earliest of these decrees (1006) belongs to 122 B.C.

3. These same decrees, honoring the epheboi of the previous year, were often passed in Boedromion.

These data provide adequate reason for believing that the opening of Boedromion was the time of the year when the new epheboi began their training, at least from 122 B.C. until the third century A.D. One cannot be sure that the same season was already observed in the time of Demosthenes. The *ephēbeia* was reformed by a law of Epikrates in 336 (see chapter 8, note 118). But it is reasonable to suppose that the time of the year for commencing ephebic service was already traditional and was tied to seasonal festivals; there is no obstacle to supposing this. In support, it is to be noted that Demosthenes according to his own account (30.15; cf. 17) passed his scrutiny straight after a marriage that had taken place in Skirophorion 367/6. That is, his scrutiny followed in the last days of 367/6 or in the earliest months of 366/5.

Aristotle (*AP* 42.1–2) says that boys are enrolled in their demes when they are *oktōkaideka etē gegonotes*, and that the council, after scrutinizing them, punishes the

demesmen if any of those newly enrolled is found to be *neōteros oktōkaidek' etōn*. The question has to be asked, whether the candidate for enrollment had to be eighteen years old, in modern terms, or in his eighteenth year (and therefore seventeen years old). A philological approach, studying the import of Aristotle's chosen words, has been made to solve this question (Carter 1967) but has not proved conclusive. Another passage (53.4–5) in the same work of Aristotle provides a different starting point for solving the problem. Explaining how men are required to serve as arbitrators, Aristotle says:

Men serve as arbitrators when they have their sixtieth year. That is ascertainable from the archons and the eponyms. For there are ten eponyms of the phylai and forty-two of the age groups. On enrollment the epheboi were previously recorded on whitened boards, and at the head were recorded the archon under whom they were enrolled and the eponym who had provided arbitration in the previous year, but now they are listed on a bronze stele, and the stele is set up in front of the bouleuterion beside the eponyms. The forty judges take the last of the eponyms and distribute to them cases for arbitration.

That is, within each *phylē* the young men, on passing their scrutiny for ephebic service, were recorded on a list, and this list was headed with the name of the eponymous archon of the year. The list on which the new epheboi of the current year were recorded was the most recent of a series of forty-two lists. These were arranged in chronological order. To provide arbitrators for each phyle, the forty judges took the oldest of the lists for that phyle. From the Aristotelian account translated here, it follows that the reckoning of year-classes was inclusive. That is, on passing his scrutiny a man served for two years as an ephebos, then for thirty-nine years as a man liable for military conscription, and finally for one year as an arbitrator (cf. Golden 1979, 38). Since the age groups for public service were counted thus by inclusive reckoning, it is likely that the age of boys presented to their demes for enrollment was also counted by inclusive reckoning. In other words, a boy was of the required age if the names of the archons under whom he had been alive numbered eighteen.

Consequently, if Demosthenes passed his scrutiny in time to begin ephebic service at the opening of Boedromion 366/5, the eighteen archons under whom he had been alive ended with the one of 367/6 and began with the one of 384/3. One can count backward from the start of 366/5 and by naming eighteen archons one can ascertain that Demosthenes was born in the course of the year 384/3. This conclusion derives some support from statements made by the orator in suing his guardians. He says that he was seven years old when his father died (27.4; cf. 63). He says repeatedly that the guardians had charge of the property for ten years (27.6, 17, 35–36, 39, 59, 63; 29.34, 59; 31.14). The wardship came to an end when Demosthenes passed his scrutiny for enrollment in his deme. Aristotle could state the age for the scrutiny by employing the figure of eighteen years. It follows that the meaning of Aristotle's numerical expression was compatible with the addition of seven years, the age when Demosthenes became an orphan, and ten years, the duration of the wardship, however approximate those two figures may be.

The figure of ten years for the duration of the wardship is likely to be approximate. For the season when Demosthenes was enrolled in his deme was tied to the public customs of the Athenians, but the moment of his father's death was not. So the question arises, whether the wardship lasted rather less than ten years or rather more than ten years. Two arguments can be offered in favor of the former alternative.

1. It was in the interests of Demosthenes to exaggerate the length of time when the guardians exploited the property, not to minimize it. Against this argument it has

been objected: "The orator makes quite a point of being generous in estimating his guardians' debt to him (17, 23, 34), and this particular instance of generosity would cost only a few weeks' interest—little enough if it could help win the case as a whole" (Golden 1979, 33). When a litigant professes generosity toward his adversary, it is prudent to entertain doubt.

2. Demosthenes (27.19) says that Aphobos possessed the sword factory for two years and then Therippides possessed it for seven years. These periods add up to nine years. Against this argument it has been objected that elsewhere (27.23) Demosthenes calculates interest for eight years from the profits that had been earned while Aphobos had the factory; the eight years must be the period when Therippides had it (Davies 1971, 124; Golden 1979, 35). But of the two figures of seven and eight years for the period when Therippides was in possession, the one more advantageous to Demosthenes is the one more likely to result from distortion.

It can also be observed that in one passage (27.69) Demosthenes complains that Aphobos has failed to restore the dowry of the orator's mother "in the tenth year." The remark might suggest that the wardship had lasted nine years and some months. But after the death of the elder Demosthenes, it took Aphobos some time to gain full payment of the dowry; possibly the calculation represented by "in the tenth year" runs from the moment when Aphobos first held the dowry in full (Davies 1971, 124; Golden 1979, 34).

At least the two numbered arguments show that the wardship, expiring at the end of 367/6, had lasted more than nine years but less than ten years. It follows that the elder Demosthenes died sometime in 376/5. This conclusion is compatible with the movements of Aphobos. Promptly after the elder Demosthenes died, Aphobos took up residence in his house. He seized drinking vessels and part of the widow's jewelry to a value of fifty minai. He sold some slaves to the other two guardians. Thus he secured in all eighty minai, the whole value of the dowry assigned to him in the will, and since he was preparing to sail as trierarch to Kerkyra, he recorded these assets with Therippides (27.13–14). It is an old and likely conjecture that the voyage to Kerkyra was the expedition conducted by Timotheos in 375 (Schaefer 1885–1887, 1: 277).

Appendix 5

Chronological Notes on the 360s

The battle of Leuktra is assigned to the Attic year 371/0 by the Parian Marble (line 84; also by Eratosthenes apud Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 1.21.138.3). Plutarch (*Ages.* 28.7; cf. *Cam.* 19.4) says that the treaty preceding the battle was concluded at Sparta on 14. Skirophorion and the battle was fought on 5. Hekatombaion. The treaty brought about by the Athenians after the battle (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1–3) will have been concluded in the later part of 371 or the winter of 371/0. This treaty provoked changes in Mantinea and Tegea, and in reaction Agesilaos led a campaign in Arkadia (*Hell.* 6.5.3–22).

Protecting the new federation of Arkadia, the Thebans conducted their first expedition to the Peloponnese (*Hell.* 6.5.22–32). The Spartans together with the Corinthians and the Phleiasians appealed to Athens for help against the Thebans (*Hell.* 6.5.33–48). In response the Athenians sent a force under Iphikrates, and he operated in Arkadia and the territory of Corinth (*Hell.* 6.5.49–52). By then it was winter (*Hell.* 6.5.50).

Epameinondas and Pelopidas both held command on this expedition (Diod. 15.62.4; Plut. *Pelop.* 24). They were away eighty-five days (Diod. 15.67.1). Their campaign lasted beyond the end of the Boiotian year, which occurred in the middle of winter, and so they were prosecuted because they had failed to lay down the command in the first month of the new year, but they were acquitted (Plut. *Pelop.* 25.1–3). The winter into which this expedition was protracted must be that of 370/69, not that of 371/0; for the date in the winter of 371/0 would not allow enough time for the events following the battle of Leuktra.

Two further indications harmonize with this distribution of events between the summer of 371 and the winter of 370/69.

1. Jason of Pherai came south after the battle of Leuktra and mediated a truce between the Thebans and the Lakedaimonian survivors. He returned to Thessaly and set about preparations to attend the Pythian festival, due in the summer of 370, with a large train. The prospect caused alarm in central Greece, but he was assassinated (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.20–32). It is reasonable to suppose that the Boiotians would not send their force into the Peloponnese until the Thessalian alarm was over.

2. When the Thebans came to the Peloponnese on their first expedition, they brought with them not only Boiotians but also forces from Phokis, from all the cities of Euboia, from East Lokris and West Lokris, from Akarnania, Herakleia, and Malis,

also cavalry and peltasts from Thessaly (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23). It must have taken them some time after the battle of Leuktra to acquire these allies.

A third indication is more troublesome. In Xenophon's narrative (*Hell.* 6.5.20) one reads with some surprise that "the middle of winter" supervened while Agesilaos was conducting his campaign in Arkadia. If Xenophon means the winter of 371/0, events since Leuktra, including the peace made at Athens and the consequent changes in Mantinea and Tegea, had developed rapidly but were followed by a protracted lull, occupied only by an Arkadian attack on Heraia (*Hell.* 6.5.22), until the Thebans arrived. If on the other hand Xenophon means the winter of 370/69, "the middle of winter" was followed by the withdrawal of Agesilaos to Lakonia (*Hell.* 6.5.21) and the Arkadian attack on Heraia before the Theban arrival. Perhaps Xenophon means the winter of 370/69 but has misapplied the phrase "the middle of winter" to October.

After the first Theban expedition to the Peloponnese Xenophon puts "in the next year" (*Hell.* 7.1.1) the meeting at Athens, where the Spartans discussed with their allies the question of sharing the command. The same season of 369 saw the second Theban expedition to the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15–26; cf. Diod. 15.68.1–15.70.1). Diodoros says that Epameinondas commanded this expedition, while Pelopidas led a campaign into Thessaly (15.67.3–15.68.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 26). So the first journey of Pelopidas into Thessaly, when he took an army, advanced into Macedon, and reconciled Alexander II with Ptolemaios, took place in 369. His second journey into Thessaly, when he was accompanied by Ismenias but did not take an army, followed in 368 (Diod. 15.71; Plut. *Pelop.* 27; cf. Dem. 23.120). Now Alexander of Pherai arrested Pelopidas and Ismenias. A Theban force was sent later in the same year to rescue them, but it was driven off by Alexander, who had Athenian help. Epameinondas, who had been tried and condemned after his second expedition to the Peloponnese, served as a private soldier with this force and brought about its safe retreat from Thessaly (Diod. 15.71.6–15.72.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 28.1; 29.1). At last in 367 Epameinondas, now restored to office, led a third Theban campaign into Thessaly and recovered Pelopidas and Ismenias (Plut. *Pelop.* 29; cf. Diod. 15.75.2). This chronology of Boiotian operations has been defended successfully by Cawkwell (1972, 276–78) against Niese (1904, 88–104) and Wiseman (1969); Niese and Wiseman offer 368 as the date of the second Theban expedition to the Peloponnese and of the first Theban expedition to Thessaly.

Dionysios of Syracuse sent a force to help the Spartans, and Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.20–22) synchronizes it with the second Theban expedition to the Peloponnese. Diodoros (15.70.1) says that the force brought pay for five months and set off on its journey back to Sicily "when the summer was coming to an end." So its operations took place in the campaigning season of 369. The second dispatch of help from Dionysios to the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–31) must belong to the next year. Between these two expeditions from Sicily Xenophon tells how Lykomedes of Mantinea persuaded the Arkadians to act independently of the Thebans (*Hell.* 7.1.23–26) and how Philiskos of Abydos summoned an abortive peace conference to Delphi (*Hell.* 7.1.27; cf. Diod. 15.70.2). It follows that the diplomatic mission of Philiskos took place in 368.

With the help of the second force sent by Dionysios, the Lakedaimonians defeated the Arkadians and the Argives (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–32). So this victory, which was understood to fulfill a prophecy of a "tearless war" (Diod. 15.72.3), was won in 368. After it Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.33–38) tells how Greek cities sent envoys to Susa to discuss prospects of peace. He implies (*Hell.* 7.1.35) that this took place later than

the tearless battle. So one would suppose that the conference at Susa took place in 367 and the ensuing conference at Thebes (*Hell.* 7.1.39–40) late in that year or in the winter of 367/6. The travels of Pelopidas conform to this date. Relatively early in 367 Epameinondas compelled Alexander of Pherai to release Pelopidas from custody, and so Pelopidas was free to travel to Susa later in 367.

The mission of Philiskos in 368 and the conference at Susa should be borne in mind in approaching questions about chronology of operations in the north Aegean. Meanwhile it is to be observed that the sequence of subsequent events of the 360s in the Peloponnese and in central Greece is clear. Some secure points call for note.

1. The third expedition of the Thebans to the Peloponnese, when Epameinondas intervened in Achaia (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.41–43), should belong to 366. For in 367 the Thebans tried to get their way by diplomacy; as long as they relied on a conference, they would not endanger its outcome by having recourse to armed force (thus Roy 1971, 592).

2. The Athenian loss of Oropos to the Thebans (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.1) is narrated by Diodoros (15.76.1) under 366/5. But the scholiast to Aischines 3.85, who is often sound on dates, puts it in 367/6. In the crisis the Athenians recalled Chares from Thyamia (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.1). He had seized Thyamia on conducting noncombatants from Phleious to Pellene in Achaia (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.18–23). This operation can only have taken place after the cities of Achaia had renounced the Theban allegiance (*Hell.* 7.1.43), which Epameinondas had imposed in 366. So the loss of Oropos occurred in 366 but the crisis may have begun late in the Attic year 367/6 and lasted into 366/5.

3. The Olympic festival of 364 (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.28) provides a fixed point amid the conflicts that arose in Arkadia. This also provides a date for the dispatch of a Boiotian fleet, allegedly numbering a hundred ships, into the Aegean. For Diodoros (15.78.4–15.79.1) reports that expedition after he has told of the celebration of the Olympic festival by the Pisatans (15.78.1–3) and before an expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (15.80); on setting off, this expedition saw a solar eclipse, which occurred on 13 July 364. This expedition culminated in the victory at Kynos Kephalai and the death of Pelopidas (*Diod.* 15.80; *Plut. Pelop.* 31.2–35.3).

4. The battle of Mantinea is dated to the Attic year 363/2 by [*Plut.*] *Ten Orat.* 845e. Diodoros (15.82–87) reports it under that year. The Athenians used to commemorate it on 12. Skirophorion (*Plut. Mor.* 350a). Shortly before the battle Epameinondas sent his cavalry from Tegea to attack the cattle of the Mantineans; he reasoned that the Mantineans would be away from the city because it was the time of the harvest (*Xen. Hell.* 7.5.14).

The siege of Samos by Timotheos provides data crucial for reconstructing the naval operations of the Athenians. Timotheos captured Samos after a siege of ten months (*Isok.* 15.111) and reorganized it as a cleruchy. The Samians now expelled were restored by Perdikkas at the end of the Lamian War. Diodoros (18.18.9), recording their restoration, says that they had been in exile forty-three years. The Lamian War came to an end when the Athenians made an unconditional surrender to Antipater and he imposed terms on them (*Diod.* 18.18). By the terms he installed a garrison under Menyllos in Mounychia and he referred the question of Samos to the kings for decision (*Diod.* 18.18.5–6). The garrison under Menyllos was established at Mounychia on 20. Boedromion 322 (*Plut. Phok.* 28.1; cf. *Plut. Dem.* 28.1; Errington 1970, 76). It would appear to follow that Perdikkas restored the exiles to Samos in the later part of 322 and they had been driven out in 365. But imprecision arises because it is not wholly clear how Diodoros reckoned the interval of forty-three

years. He recounted the Lamian War and the settlement at Samos under the Attic year 323/2. So he may have believed that the period of exile had begun in the Attic year 366/5.

Help toward chronology can be found in the instructions given to Timotheos, when he sailed on the voyage that took him to Samos. The Athenians told him to assist Ariobarzanes but not to break the treaty with the king (Dem. 15.9). These instructions can be understood as the response of the Athenians to the discomfiture they had suffered in the negotiations at Susa in 367, when the king refused to recognize the claim of the Athenians to Amphipolis (Dem. 19.137) and wished them to recall their warships from the seas (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36). So Timotheos probably set out for Samos in the sailing season of 366 and Samos fell to siege sometime in 365. A stratagem attributed to Timotheos shows that he was besieging Samos at the time of the harvest ([Ar.] *Oikon.* 2.1350b4–15; Polyain. 3.10.9–10). Some support for this dating may be derived from a decree passed by the Athenians in the fifth prytany of 366/5 (*IGII*², 108); it dealt with Erythrai and mentioned (lines 9–10) a report received from Timotheos. Evidently he was in the Ionian area (cf. Davies 1969, 328–31).

Nepos (*Tim.* 1.3) says that Timotheos with Agesilaos went to the aid of Ariobarzanes and the Athenian received Sestos and Krithote as a reward. Isokrates (15.112), after telling how Timotheos captured Samos, says that “sailing out from there he took Sestos and Krithote.” So it is reasonable to suppose that in 365 Timotheos proceeded directly from Samos to the north, and that Sestos and Krithote were the first acquisitions he made on arriving there. With this operation, the remarkable scene described by Xenophon, *Agesilaos* 2.26–27, should be associated: Ariobarzanes was besieged in Assos by Autophradates, and Kotys besieged Sestos, which still belonged to Ariobarzanes, but both attackers withdrew when Agesilaos approached, and Tachos and Maussolos gave the Spartan a magnificent escort for his journey home. The date for this incident, where Timotheos brought a fleet and Agesilaos conducted himself as a diplomat, was probably 365 or possibly a little later.

Before pursuing the travels of Timotheos further, one may notice his predecessor in the north. Pleading in 352/1, Demosthenes said that Charidemos served under Iphikrates “more than three years,” until the Athenians declined to reelect Iphikrates and sent out Timotheos to operate against Amphipolis and the Chersonese (23.149; on the meaning of *apostatrēgos*, see Kallet 1983, 244–45). So it has often been supposed that Iphikrates sailed out to the north in 368, took Charidemos into his service, and operated for three years until Timotheos replaced him in 365. But the phrase “more than three years” may be an exaggeration. In 346 the second embassy to Philip of Macedon set off soon after 3. Mounychion (Aischin. 2.91–92) and returned on 13. Skirophorion (Dem. 19.58). So it was away not more than two months and ten days; even if some additional days were intercalated during its absence, these can scarcely have been very numerous. Yet Demosthenes, pleading in 343/2 and again in 330/29, said that the second embassy was away “three whole months” (19.57; 18.30). When he says that Charidemos served under Iphikrates for more than three years, the truth may be that Iphikrates took up the command in 367 and held it until 365. In short, there is no way of deciding between 368 and 367 as the year when Iphikrates sailed to the north.

Timotheos, who took over the command in 365, was still in the north late in the winter of 363/2. A decree of the sixth prytany of that year (*IG II*², 110 = Tod no. 143) accorded honors to Menelaos the Pelagonian, after the Athenians had received a report from Timotheos that Menelaos was helping him in warfare against the Chalkidians and Amphipolis. Again, Timotheos was in the north in 360/59, when

he led an unsuccessful campaign against Amphipolis (schol. Aischin. 2.31). It has often been supposed that he had returned to Athens in the summer of 362; the expedition of 360/59 would be a separate venture, chronologically distinct from the command Timotheos had exercised in the north from 365 to 362. The grounds for this supposition depend on the date of the trial in which speech 49 of the Demosthenic corpus was delivered.

In this action Apollodoros set out to recover loans that his father, Pasion the banker, had made to Timotheos in 373 and 372. Pasion died in 370/69 ([Dem.] 46.13), leaving two sons, Apollodoros and Pasikles. Apollodoros had been born about 394 (Dem. 36.22), but Pasikles was a minor when his father died. The property left by Pasion included his bank and a shield factory; he entrusted these to Phormion, who was to pay a fixed sum annually to the two brothers, until Pasikles came of age (Dem. 36.4, 9–11, 37). The lease continued for eight years (Dem. 36.37; cf. Davies 1971, 432); then Phormion surrendered the properties. Thus it is likely that Pasikles came of age in 362. In speech 49 Apollodoros speaks of Kallistratos with respect (49.9 and 47), so the speech was probably delivered before Kallistratos was driven into exile in the course of 361/0 (cf. [Dem.] 50.46–52). Apollodoros set sail as trierarch from Athens about the beginning of the third month of 362/1 ([Dem.] 50.4 and 10) and he was away in consequence for seventeen months ([Dem.] 50.1, 10, 14, 20, 23, 29, 36, 39). Noting these indications, Schaefer (1858, 137) and Blass (1893, 522–23) observed also that in speech 49 Pasikles is called to give evidence (49.42). They supposed that a man could not be called as a witness in court until he had come of age. So the trial would be held in the first two months of 362/1 and Timotheos would be in Athens then.

It has lately been objected by Harris (1988) that the exclusion of minors from testifying in court is not certified by any text. So an earlier date for the trial may be defensible. In favor of an earlier date it has been argued that Apollodoros would be likely to seek to recover the debts soon after Timotheos returned well rewarded from Persian service. A date in 368/7 is not likely, for then Apollodoros served as trierarch, sailing around the Peloponnese and then to Sicily (Dem. 45.3; [Dem.] 46.20–21; 53.5; cf. Tod no. 136). So the trial may have taken place in 369/8 or 367/6. But against Harris's reconstruction it should be observed that his arguments against a date for the trial in 362/1 are not decisive. His thesis has been challenged by Trevett (1991). If Timotheos returned to Athens in the summer of 362, he had had enough time in the north since 365 for his recorded achievements. Certainty cannot be claimed, but it is probable that Timotheos was in Athens and was sued in the first two months of 362/1.

While Timotheos was in the north, other Athenian generals also operated there. Presumably they conducted themselves as his subordinates, whatever the legal relation of their authority to his may have been. Several of them can be listed year by year, and there may have been others who have escaped record.

1. The scholiast to Aischines (2.31) says that in 364/3 Alkimachos was sent to operate at Amphipolis by Timotheos but was overcome and surrendered to the Thracians.

2. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.1380b10–13) says that Kallisthenes and Ergophilos were tried on successive days, Kallisthenes being condemned to death and Ergophilos acquitted. So it is likely that the operations for which they were criticized were carried out in the same year. Demosthenes (23.104) says that an Athenian decree favorable to Kotys was passed "after Ergophilos had departed and when Autokles was preparing to sail out as general." It follows that Ergophilos operated in the Hellespontine dis-

trict in the year before Autokles. The latter was there in 362/1 (see number 3). Aischines (2.30) reports that Kallisthenes operated against Perdikkas but made a truce with him. Evidently in 363/2 Ergophilos and Kallisthenes exercised command in the Hellespontine and Macedonian/Amphipolitan districts respectively.

Further commanders in the straits can be traced after the return of Timotheos.

3. The speech of Apollodoros against Polykles ([Dem.] 50) tells of alarming news that reached the Athenian assembly on 24. Metageitnion 362/1 and of a decree passed in consequence on the motion of Aristophon (50.4–6). Hence Autokles sailed out to the straits, but eight months later the Athenians recalled him and replaced him with Menon (50.12). Thus Autokles and Menon held office in 362/1.

4. Apollodoros served as trierarch under Autokles and Menon. Even after his year had expired, he continued in service after Timomachos as general came out to take up the command ([Dem.] 50.14). So Timomachos held command in 361/0.

5. The record for 360/59 is delicate to reconstruct. The scholiast to Aischines (3.51) says:

In the archonship of Kallimedes [360/59], in the first year of the 105th Olympiad, in which year Philip became king of Macedon, the Athenians sent a force to the Hellespont and Kephisodotos as general with it.

Demosthenes (23.153–58) tells something of the circumstances immediately preceding the departure of Kephisodotos for the Hellespont. Charidemos held three positions (Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilion) in the Troad but expected to be attacked by Artabazos, the satrap of Daskylion. So he sent a letter addressed to the Athenians but intended for Kephisodotos. In it he asked for a naval escort to convey him across the straits and he offered to secure the Chersonese for the Athenians. But Memnon and Mentor, the brothers-in-law of Artabazos, persuaded him to let Charidemos go under truce. So without waiting for the Athenian ships, Charidemos crossed from Abydos to Sestos, which was held by Kotys of Thrace, and entered the service of Kotys. A little later in the same speech Demosthenes (23.163–68) tells how the situation developed after the arrival of Kephisodotos. Kotys was assassinated, and since Kersebleptes and his other sons were young, Charidemos took control (23.163). But he fought against Kephisodotos for seven months (23.165) and compelled him to make a treaty, which induced the Athenians to depose him and fine him five talents (23.167).

Sestos had been acquired by Timotheos for the Athenians in 365, but it was held by Kotys when Charidemos crossed from Abydos. Hypereides (*Eux.* 1) lists men who were prosecuted by the procedure of *eisangelia*: “Timomachos, Leosthenes, Kallistratos, Philon from Anaia, Theotimos who lost Sestos, and others like them.” These men, except for the unknown Philon, are known to have suffered their misfortunes about 360. So the Athenian general who was in command in the straits when Kotys captured Sestos was Theotimos. It is likely that Theotimos was one of the generals of 360/59 and exercised command in the fall of 360 but was recalled and prosecuted. Kephisodotos was sent to replace him later in the same Attic year (cf. Höck 1891, 97–100). Thus the letter of Charidemos could be intended for Kephisodotos, although it reached the Athenians while Kephisodotos was still in Athens. It is not likely that Kephisodotos sailed to the Hellespont in the depth of winter. Probably he set sail toward the spring of 359. So his seven months of operations against Charidemos kept him in the Hellespont into the opening months of 359/8, the season when the merchant fleet bringing grain sailed from the Black Sea.

6. Continuing his account of Athenian relations with Charidemos and Kersebleptes, Demosthenes says that the Athenians repudiated the treaty made by Kephisodotos (23.169) and sent Chabrias to conduct the war (23.171). Chabrias will have held the command in 358/7.

7. Demosthenes (23.173) completes his account by giving the circumstances in which Chares achieved a satisfactory treaty: "We made our expedition to Euboeia, and Chares arrived with his mercenaries and was sent by you as general with full powers to the Chersonese." The expedition to Euboeia was carried out in the summer of 357; it lasted only thirty days or less (Aischin. 3.85; see chapter 5, note 3). Chares was still in Athens at the beginning of 357/6 (*IG* II², 124 = Tod no. 153) and sailed to the Hellespont promptly, within the early part of the Attic year.

The remaining chronological question to note here concerns the deaths of Kotys of Thrace and Perdikkas of Macedon. Kotys was assassinated after Charidemos had crossed from Abydos to Sestos but within the year when Kephisodotos came out to command (Dem. 23.158, 163). That is, Kotys died in 360/59. Perdikkas was killed in battle against the Illyrians and Philip II became king of Macedon in the same Attic year (Diod. 16.1.3; 16.2.1; 16.95.1; cf. Griffith 1979, 209). It could be important to discover the chronological relation between these events. Help has been sought in passages from two lost works.

1. Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 31 apud Athen. 12.531e–532a) says that Philip came to a place called Onokarsis in Thrace. This was a grove offering shade in summer, and Kotys had frequented it as a pleasure resort. Theopompos proceeds to expatiate on the licentious behavior of Kotys. This passage occurred in the first book of the *Philippika*. Schaefer (1885–1887, 2: 17 n. 4) inferred that Kotys was still alive after Philip had become king. But that does not necessarily follow; Theopompos may have said that Philip came to Onokarsis, which Kotys had frequented previously.

2. In a discussion of *parasitoi*, Athenaios (6.248e) quotes Hegesandros of Delphi for a story about Kleisophos of Athens. Kleisophos lived as *parasitos* with Philip. When Philip as king said that a letter had come to him from Kotys, king of the Thracians, Kleisophos congratulated him on the good news. Philip asked how he knew that the news was good, and so Kleisophos replied that Philip had been right to correct him. Hegesandros was active in the middle of the second century B. C. and compiled a collection of anecdotes (cf. Jacoby, *RE* 7.2600–2602). Elsewhere Athenaios (250d) attributes the same exchange of remarks to Dionysios of Syracuse and his flatterer, Demokles; Athenaios names Timaios as his source. Evidently the witticism had the vitality of a folktale and could attach itself to different men of note. The version told by Hegesandros presupposes that the death of Kotys occurred later than the death of Perdikkas. That implication may be true.

In any case the two deaths can only have been separated by a few months at most, and that has an important consequence for understanding the rise of Philip. Kotys had built up the Odrysian realm as a strong kingdom. But when he died, the kingdom was divided into three parts under three kings who were rivals, and the westernmost of the three was Berisades (Dem. 23.8). Diodoros (16.2.6) describes the dangers threatening Philip at his accession. "The Thracian king" was supporting the Macedonian pretender, Pausanias, but Philip bought off the Thracian with gifts (16.3.4). That must have been Berisades. Kotys, powerful and ambitious, might have been more difficult to dispose of. For Philip the assassination of Kotys was the stroke of luck that enabled him to survive.

Appendix 6

The Theoric Fund

Cawkwell's study of the theoric fund (1963a, 53–58) has superseded previous inquiries. In particular he has established two points.

1. Arguing against Jones (1957, 33–35), Cawkwell has shown that the amount of money passing through the fund was large. This follows from Demades' description of the fund as "the cement of the *dēmokratia*" (Plut. *Mor.* 1011b) and from the description given by Aischines (3.25) of the large tasks which those in charge of the fund performed.

2. The fund was brought into being some years before the middle of the fourth century and probably soon after the end of the Social War. The first steps may have been taken by Diophantos of Sphettos and they were completed soon by Euboulos. Statements in late sources to the effect that the fund existed already in the fifth century or early in the fourth are due to error or confusion.

Cawkwell's findings have been accepted by Rhodes (1981, 514–16). The latter (1972, 235) has also made a suggestion that calls for note here. In the time of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (43.1) the theoric fund was under the care of a board of men, probably numbering ten. But an inscription of 343/2 (*IG* II², 223) records various honors awarded in connection with the council of that year. The first nine lines of the right face (C 1–9) name a series of individual officers: the *grammateus kata prytaneian*, the man *epi ta psēphismata*, the man *epi to theorikon*, and the two treasurers of the council. Only one officer for the theoric fund is named here. Possibly he was that member of a larger board who dealt with the council. But since he is named in sequence with other offices held by single men, the easiest explanation for naming only one officer in charge of the theoric fund is that there was only one. That is, when the theoric fund was created, it was put under the care, not of a board, but of a single officer. Later the law of Hegemon (Aischin. 3.25), passed probably in the 330s, diminished the powers of the office and conjecturally made it collegiate. On this view, in the time of Euboulos the office, being elective without restriction on reelection, had great potential for power, if held by a capable man.

The attempt of Apollodoros to divert some funds in 349/8 has often been noted but may repay further study. It is known from the speech *Against Neaira* ([Dem.] 59), which was delivered in court between 343 and 340 (see Blass 1893, 536, on the date). Theomnestos, the first plaintiff (59.16), says that Apollodoros as councillor proposed a measure, which was passed as a *probouleuma*, when the Athenians were preparing to send an expedition in full force to Euboia and Olynthos. The probou-

leuma advised the assembly to decide by vote whether “the moneys remaining after the administration” (*ta perionta chrēmata tēs dioikēseōs*, 59.4) should go to the stratiotic fund (the war chest) or to the theoric fund. The vote of the assembly was taken and it was unanimous in favor of assigning the moneys to the stratiotic fund. But Stephanos prosecuted Apollodoros by *graphē paranomōn* successfully. When the court had convicted Apollodoros and met in a further session to determine the penalty, Stephanos proposed a fine of fifteen talents, but the court inflicted a fine of only one talent, presumably what Apollodoros proposed (59.3–8).

Theomnestos mentions only one argument employed by Stephanos in prosecuting Apollodoros. He provided testimony, allegedly false, to say that Apollodoros was a public debtor and therefore not qualified to make a proposal. Remarks of Demosthenes in two speeches delivered to the assembly in the same year suggest that additional arguments could be offered against diverting money away from the theoric fund. In the one speech (1.19–20) he said that there was available money that could be assigned to military purposes, that he himself did not dare to propose doing so, and that his hearers preferred to receive the money for festivals. In the other speech (3.10–13) he said that the Athenians ought to set up a board of *nomothetai* for the purpose of repealing the laws concerning the theoric fund; once that had been done, it would be possible to make beneficial proposals for military action.

From these remarks and from the misfortune of Apollodoros it can be inferred that the law assigned some money to the theoric fund. It can also be inferred that Libanios (*Hypothesis to Dem. I*, 5) was mistaken when he said that the law imposed a penalty of death on anyone who tried to divert money from the theoric to the stratiotic fund. Apollodoros was not condemned to death.

More can be learned from the considerations that, according to Theomnestos, swayed Apollodoros to propose his probouleuma. One of them is stated thus (59.4):

The laws provide that, when there is war, the moneys remaining after the administration should be stratiotic.

The term “administration” (*dioikēsis*) has to be understood in the light of the law code of 403–399. The laws mandated expenditure for many activities, which recurred every year (Dem. 24.96–101; Lys. 30.17–21; Kahrstedt 1938, 4–5). In some of these activities, such as meetings of the assembly and of the courts, there was a possibility of variation in total expenditure from year to year. But many of the mandatory expenses were for sacrifices at prescribed rates. The activities and expenditures thus required by law constituted the *dioikēsis*. The proposal of Apollodoros about “the moneys remaining after the administration” concerned not the surplus, if any, remaining after all current expenses of the year had been met but the surplus remaining after the expenses required by the laws had been met. That larger surplus was to be assigned during war to the stratiotic fund, according to Theomnestos’s statement of the law known to Apollodoros.

Many readers have supposed that in peace that same surplus was to be assigned to the theoric fund. Although Theomnestos does not go so far as saying so, this is a reasonable inference from his words and from the guarded language of Demosthenes in 349/8. It does not necessarily follow that the surplus was the sole source of income for the theoric fund. Possibly the laws assigned some revenues to the theoric and stratiotic funds, just as to other parts of the *dioikēsis*, but also provided that in peace the surplus, defined as previously noted, should go to the theoric fund. If that is true, the theoric fund would receive its own allocation, and in addition all moneys, except

those assigned by law to specific purposes such as sacrifices, would come within the purview of the office in charge of the theoric fund. Thus the provision about the surplus could give the theoric office a voice, most likely a restraining voice, in relation to all proposals for new policies. Hence the office in charge of the theoric fund could acquire great political influence, especially if it was held by one officer and reelection was allowed.

What was the tenor of the laws or laws concerning the surplus? According to Theomnestos, Apollodoros thought that the law said that in wartime the surplus should go to the stratiotic fund. But Apollodoros was condemned at his trial for acting on this belief. Cawkwell (1962a; cf. 1963a, 53–58) holds that Apollodoros in 349/8 was relying on a law that was no longer in force. Supposedly in the opening years of the Second League a law was made assigning the surplus during war to the stratiotic fund, but soon after the end of the Social War this law was repealed and a new law was made assigning the surplus to the theoric fund. For in 349/8 the Athenians were at war with Philip, as they had been since his seizure of Amphipolis and Pydna, and they were preparing expeditions to Euboia and Olynthos. If the law that Apollodoros recognized had been in force in 349/8, surely he ought to have been acquitted. Thus Cawkwell supposes a sharp change in the law about 355.

If the theoric fund was created about 355, this may well have necessitated some modification in the law or laws concerning the surplus, but the change need not have been so sharp. There are objections to Cawkwell's view. He makes Apollodoros very foolish. Supposedly in 349/8 Apollodoros relied on a law that had been repealed half a dozen years before, and disregarded a current law under which his proposal would certainly be declared invalid and he would be penalized. Again, according to Philochoros (*FGrHist* 328 F 56a), early in 339/8 the Athenians "suspended work on the dockyards and the arsenal because of the war against Philip, and they voted that all the moneys should be stratiotic on the proposal of Demosthenes." The office of the theoric fund had had charge of the dockyards and had engaged in building the arsenal (Aischin. 3.25). The decisive word in the statement of Philochoros is "they voted" (*epsēphisanto*). That is, in 339/8 all that was required to transfer revenues from the theoric to the stratiotic fund was a decree (*psēphisma*); a change in the laws was not needed.

With these objections in mind one may return to the trial of Apollodoros. It is to be noted that, in spite of the prosecutor's demand for a much heavier fine, the court imposed a relatively mild fine. The offense, then, was not nearly so blatant a violation of the law as Stephanos contended or as Cawkwell's theory would imply. The various phenomena of 349/8 and 339/8 can best be saved by supposing that the law contained limiting conditions more precise than a mere distinction between war and peace; there may have been a concept of major war or military emergency. The law said that under some conditions the surplus should be assigned to military purposes, but as long as those conditions did not come about, it should go to the theoric fund. A legislative statement of limiting conditions is never precise enough to cover all the circumstances that arise. In 339/8 there was no doubt that the conditions had arisen for assigning the surplus to military purposes. But in 349/8 opinions could differ on the question whether the expeditions to Euboia and Olynthos amounted to the conditions for transferring the surplus from the theoric to the stratiotic fund. The difference had to be resolved by a court, and the court decided against Apollodoros. But it did not consider his interpretation of the law so blatantly untenable as to deserve a fine of fifteen talents.

Appendix 7

Euboia 343–340

The island of Euboia had four sizable cities, Oreos in the north, Karystos in the south, and Chalkis and Eretria on the west coast. Chalkis was the most powerful of these. Any movement toward linking the cities in a federation was likely to be headed by Chalkis and might meet with resistance in some of the other cities. The earliest hint of such a movement is to be discerned in a remark of Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.23), referring to the condition late in 370. He says that the forces accompanying the Thebans on their first expedition into the Peloponnese included “Euboians from all the cities.” It was about this time that Mnesarchos emerged as the leading man in Chalkis. He is known solely from a remark made by Aischines in court in 330:

Gentlemen of Athens, you suffered many injuries at the hands of Mnesarchos of Chalkis, the father of Kallias and Taurosthenes, for whom my adversary now dares to propose a grant of Athenian citizenship in return for pay, and at the hands of Themison of Eretria, who deprived us of Oropos while peace was in force. (3.85)

Oropos was lost to the Athenians in 366 (chapter 4 at note 51). The order of ideas in the remark of Aischines implies that Mnesarchos was active about the same time as Themison or earlier but not significantly later. After the battle of Leuktra altered the international distribution of power, Mnesarchos may well have headed a Euboian federal movement, which took the cities out of the Athenian League.

In 357 the Athenians intervened in Euboia to resist Theban encroachment (chapter 5 at note 2). The expedition was brief and successful. Stating its outcome to an Athenian audience in 330, Aischines says:

Having become masters of Euboia, in accordance with propriety and justice you restored the cities themselves and the constitutions to those who had entrusted them to you. (3.85)

This should mean that in 357 the Athenians dissolved a federation of Euboian cities.

By 348 Mnesarchos of Chalkis was dead. But his sons, Kallias and Taurosthenes, inherited his influence in their city and his policy. When the Athenians sent a force under Phokion to support Ploutarchos in Eretria, they did not expect the resistance that Kallias led. Indeed Aischines (3.86) says that at first the Chalkidians professed to be friends of the Athenians. In the outcome Kallias and Taurosthenes were

defeated in battle at Tamynai but they won the war (chapter 6 at notes 10–12). Euboian envoys came to Athens in the summer of 348 and made peace. There is no trace of a Euboian federation for several years afterward.

The condition of Eretria after the expulsion of Ploutarchos is known from two texts. First, Demosthenes (9.57–58) said in 342/1:

In Eretria, after the departure of Ploutarchos and the mercenaries, the *dēmos* held the city and Porthmos. Some tried to draw policy into your direction and others into that of Philip. The unfortunate and ill-starred Eretrians paid attention in many or rather in all ways to the latter and were finally persuaded to banish those who spoke in their cause. For their ally, Philip, sent Hipponikos with one thousand mercenaries, dismantled the fortifications of Porthmos, and set up three tyrants, Hipparchos, Automedon, and Kleitarchos.

Second, Philochoros (*FGrHist* 328 F 160), telling of Athenian intervention in 341/0, says that they overthrew Kleitarchos,

who was previously the adversary of Ploutarchos and opposed him in politics; but when Ploutarchos was expelled, Kleitarchos became tyrant.

The two pieces of evidence are compatible. Tyranny was not an office and did not necessarily alter the laws; it was an informal preeminence, which might be maintained in varying ways, severe or mild. When Philochoros says that Kleitarchos became tyrant on the expulsion of Ploutarchos, he does not necessarily conflict with the statement of Demosthenes that the *demos* held the city and the harbor called Porthmos. Kleitarchos became highly influential in consequence of the overthrow of Ploutarchos. It is misleading to say: "After the fall of Plutarchus a democracy was established in Eretria" (Brunt 1969, 251). Ploutarchos had tried to achieve preponderance, but there is no good reason to suppose that he had altered the laws, or that any such alteration was needed on his expulsion.

As the remarks of Demosthenes indicate, the ascendancy of Kleitarchos was challenged internally. After a time the Eretrians exiled his opponents, but these seized Porthmos. Then Kleitarchos and his friends gained help from Philip. Hipponikos was sent with one thousand men. He overcame those who were in Porthmos and destroyed its fortifications. In this way Kleitarchos, Automedon, and Hipparchos were secured in power. An approximate date for the intervention of Hipponikos can be ascertained from the speech of Demosthenes, *On the Embassy*. That speech says that troops sent by Philip have been present at Porthmos and in Euboia (19.87, 204; cf. 83, 326). That is, when the speech was delivered, the expedition of Hipponikos was recent and may still have been in progress. The speech is assigned to 343/2 by Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*First Letter to Ammaeus* 10). Not much can be said about the time of delivery of the speech within the year. It was earlier in the Attic year than [Dem.] 7, for the latter speech knows of Philip's advance against Ambrakia (7.32, early 342) but speech 19 does not. Evidently Hipponikos led his expedition to Euboia during 343.

Even after that expedition, Kleitarchos was not fully secure. He was challenged by other Eretrians, and Demosthenes (9.58) says that on two successive occasions he gained mercenary forces from Philip, the commanders being Eurylochos and Parmenion respectively. It is to be presumed that Eurylochos and Parmenion conducted their expeditions during 342. There followed about a year of stability in Eretria.

Delivering speech 9 late in 342/1, Demosthenes had nothing more to report on that city. In the next sentences of the speech, he told the story of Oreos, as follows:

In Oreos the cause of Philip was promoted, as everyone knew, by Philistides, also by Menippos, Sokrates, Thoas, and Agapaios, the men who now have the city. But a certain Euphraios, who had lived here among us for a time, worked to ensure that his fellow citizens should be free and enslaved to none. It would take a long time to relate how he was insulted and calumniated by the demos. A year before the capture of the city, he indicted Philistides and his companions on a charge of treason, since he saw what they were doing. Many men rallied against him. Receiving funds from Philip and holding high office, they threw Euphraios into prison on the grounds that he was subverting the city. Perceiving this, the demos of Oreos, so far from coming to the aid of Euphraios and crucifying the other party, did not even turn any anger upon the latter but rejoiced at the fate of Euphraios and said that he deserved it. Then the other party, being untrammelled in power, worked to bring about the capture of the city and they plotted the final act. If anyone of the multitude perceived this, he held his peace in terror, for they recollected what had happened to Euphraios. They were in such a wretched condition that no one dared to break the silence in face of the approaching danger, until the enemy had made their preparations and were advancing on the walls. Then at last some began to defend the city while others betrayed it. Now that the city has suffered so miserable and shameful a capture, the one party exercises rule and tyranny. Of those who previously tried to save themselves and were willing to inflict anything on Euphraios, some have been exiled and others executed. Euphraios himself has committed suicide, proving by his deed that his resistance to Philip on behalf of his fellow citizens was just and above reproach. (9.59–62)

Karystios of Pergamon (apud Athen. 11.508d–e) wrote in his *Historical Commentaries* that Parmenion captured Euphraios in Oreos and killed him. Demosthenes says that Euphraios killed himself when Macedonian forces captured his city. It would be pedantic to insist on the divergence between the two reports. Karystios adds the information that Parmenion commanded the force that operated at Oreos. So that operation belonged to the same campaign as the third and decisive intervention in Eretria, a campaign of 342. As Demosthenes said later (18.71), Philip set up Philistides as tyrant in Oreos and Kleitarchos as tyrant in Eretria. But the account given in speech 9.57–62 shows that conditions in both cities had been highly volatile for at least a year before. Chalkis remained free.

Preserved passages of Philochoros (*FGrHist* 328) tell how Oreos and Eretria were liberated in the summer of 341. First:

The Athenians contracted an alliance with the Chalkidians and together with the Chalkidians they freed the people of Oreos in an expedition commanded by Kephisophon in the month of Skirophorion. Philistides the tyrant died. (F 159. Skirophorion is supplied from schol. Aischin. 3.85. Charax, *FGrHist* 103 F 19, adds that the Megarians took part with the Athenians in this expedition.)

Second, on naming Nikomachos as archon of 341/0, Philochoros says:

In his archonship the Athenians under the command of Phokion crossed to Eretria, brought back the demos, and began to besiege Kleitarchos. He was previously the adversary of Ploutarchos and opposed him in politics; but when Ploutarchos was expelled, Kleitarchos became tyrant. Now the Athenians besieged him successfully and restored the city to the demos. (F 160; cf. F 161, also Diod. 16.74.1)

Since this quotation opens with “in his archonship,” it gives the first event recorded by Philochoros under the year. So the liberation of Eretria followed closely on that

of Oreos. The statement that the Athenians under Phokion "crossed" to Eretria suggests that this force came from Attica. Kephisophon was stationed for a time at Skia-thos, and it has been conjectured that he advanced from there to Oreos (Cawkwell 1978b, 135, from *IG II*², 1623 lines 35–37 and 1629 lines 484–86). The report of the liberation of Eretria does not mention Chalkidians; possibly they were held in reserve away from Eretria for fear of provoking antagonism in a city that was their neighbor. Whatever the relation between the forces liberating the two cities, the operations sprang from a single policy, pursued by the Athenians in collaboration with the Chalkidians in the summer of 341.

The beginning and the end of Philip's gains in Euboia are clear. Difficulty arises when one tries to bring a story told by Aischines (3.89–105) into the sequence of events. Seeking to belittle the diplomatic achievements of Demosthenes, Aischines says that Kallias conceived a design for a federation of Euboian cities with a council (*synedrion*) to sit in Chalkis. Kallias sought endorsement from Philip and from the Thebans in turn, but he quarreled with each of them to the extent that a joint expedition was ordered against him. Thereupon he sent three envoys (Glauketes, Empe-don, Diodoros) to Athens, and they gained a defensive alliance with the help of Demosthenes, who proposed the decree. Aischines leaves his hearers to understand that the conclusion of this alliance deterred Philip and the Thebans from launching their joint expedition.

Aischines continues his story by saying that Kallias came in person to Athens and addressed the assembly in collaboration with Demosthenes. Kallias told the Athenians that he had come from the Peloponnese, where he had found cities willing to contribute money for land and sea forces to be employed against Philip. The Achai-ans and Megarians would supply sixty talents, and the cities of Euboia would supply forty talents. When Kallias had finished speaking, Demosthenes reported on the embassy on which he had served to the Peloponnesians and to Akarnania. He said that he had won the approval of all the Peloponnesians and all the Akarnanians for operations against Philip, so that they would furnish enough money to man a hundred ships and raise mercenaries to the number of ten thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry; they would also supply citizen troops, more than two thousand hoplites from the Peloponnese and as many more from Akarnania. He added that the prospective allies would send envoys to a gathering that was to meet in Athens on 16. Anthesterion.

Thereupon, according to Aischines, Demosthenes proposed a lengthy decree for sending envoys to Eretria and Oreos with a view to an offensive and defensive alliance ("to have the same friends and enemies," in Greek parlance); the decree endorsed the plan of Kallias for a Euboian federation, so that Eretria and Oreos should each deliver a financial contribution of five talents to Kallias. Aischines concludes his story by saying that Demosthenes received a bribe of three talents for his services. One talent was supplied from Chalkis by Kallias, one talent from Eretria by Kleitar-chos, and one talent from Oreos. The latter city did not have a tyrant but conducted its business by public resolutions, and so the matter of the bribe became known when the city fell into arrears in paying installments. Thus far the allegations of Aischines.

Not much need be made of the alleged bribe from Oreos and the decree of that city about payments. It has been suggested (by Brunt 1969, 255) that they were repayments of a loan. Two theories have been proposed on the date and context of the diplomacy reported by Aischines. The one theory notes that the Athenians contracted an alliance with Chalkis in 341, immediately before liberating Oreos (Philochoros F 159). It identifies this alliance with the defensive alliance negotiated, accord-

ing to Aischines, by the three envoys of Kallias. The embassy of Kallias and Demosthenes to the Peloponnese would follow later in 341, and the date when the congress of envoys was to meet in Athens would be 16. Anthesterion 340. On this view the alliance thus brought into being continued in the coalition of states which fought against Philip at the battle of Chaironeia. It is a difficulty for this theory that Kleitarchos according to Aischines furnished a bribe to Demosthenes when the Euboian federation was being launched late in 341, although Kleitarchos had been overthrown near the beginning of the Attic year 341/0 (Philochoros F 160). But the account of the bribes is the least credible part of the story; holders of this theory can dismiss the reference of Aischines to Kleitarchos as a mistake.

The second theory finds a context two years earlier for the story Aischines tells. In the winter of 343/2, perhaps very early in 342, Philip intervened in Epeiros (Just. 8.6.4–8; Diod. 16.72.1). Thence he continued southward, subduing the Greek cities of Kassopia and making a hostile approach to Ambrakia ([Dem.] 7.32; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 206; cf. Dem. 10.10). Ambrakia probably sought and received help from Corinth, its mother-city (Dem. 9.34). Appeals were made to Athens, and the Athenians responded in two ways. They sent troops to Akarnania ([Dem.] 48.24–26, giving the date 343/2) and they sent an embassy around the Peloponnese. Mentioning this embassy about a year later, Demosthenes named the envoys (himself, Polyeuktos, Hegesippos, Kleitomachos, Lykourgos) and boasted: “We made him stop his advance and neither attack Ambrakia nor proceed to the Peloponnese” (9.72). In 330 Demosthenes said that he had gone as envoy to Ambrakia and overcome an embassy of Philip there (18.244). A scholiast to Aischines (3.83) says that in 343/2 the Athenians sent out embassies and hence gained alliances with several Greek states, namely the Achaiaans, those of the Arkadians who adhered to Mantinea, the Argives, the Megalopolitans, and the Messenians. A fragment of an inscription (*IG* II², 225) records the alliance of the Athenians and the Messenians; it is dated to the fourth day of the tenth prytany of 343/2.

The second theory to explain Aischines’ story of the diplomacy of Demosthenes and Kallias says that their activity took place in 343/2; it was part of the Athenian response to Philip’s advance on Ambrakia, and it brought into being the alliances listed by the scholiast to Aischines 3.83. It is no obstacle to this reconstruction that the tenth prytany, when the alliance with Messene was ratified, was later than Anthesterion, the month in which according to Aischines envoys were to gather in Athens. Anyone who has studied the inscriptions bearing on the early years of the Second Athenian League knows that diplomacy and its formalities could be protracted for many months.

The second theory has been proposed by Cawkwell (1963c, 210–13) in contrast to his predecessors. The first theory has since been defended by Brunt (1969, 255–59) and by Griffith (1979, 545–52, especially 549 n. 3). Cawkwell has defended his theory since (1978c, 56–66). It would not be fruitful to review and assess the arguments in full. In historical criticism there sometimes comes a point where the historian can only say that one argument seems to him stronger than the others. What follows may be no better than a personal confession of faith. But confessions must sometimes be made.

In telling his story of the diplomacy of Demosthenes and Kallias, Aischines says that they professed to win the alliances of all the Peloponnesians and all the Akarnanians. This account must be compared with two attested groups of allies.

1. In 343/2 the Athenians sent forces to help the Akarnanians, and according to the scholiast to Aischines they won alliances with Peloponnesian states (namely the

Achaïans, those Arkadians who adhered to Mantinea, the Argives, the Megalopolitans, and the Messenians).

2. Demosthenes (18.237) lists the allies whom he secured for Athens for the war that culminated in the battle of Chaironeia. They are the Euboians, the Achaïans, the Corinthians, the Thebans, the Megarians, the Leukadians, and the Kerkyraians. ([Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 845a gives an incomplete list: the Thebans, the Euboians, the Kerkyraians, the Corinthians, the Boiotians [*sic*], “and many others.”)

The second list, that for the war of Chaironeia, includes only two Peloponnesian states, namely the Achaïans and the Corinthians. The list given by the scholiast for 343/2 consists wholly of Peloponnesians; to these one may add the Akarnanians, since Athens sent them armed help at the same time. Therefore, since the diplomacy attributed to Demosthenes and Kallias by Aischines sought alliances among the Peloponnesians and the Akarnanians, it belonged more probably to 343/2 than to the antecedents of the war of Chaironeia.

Aischines (3.98–99) implies that the conference scheduled for 16. Anthesterion did not meet. Griffith (1979, 551) suggests that it was postponed and met later. He draws on an anecdote cited by Plutarch (*Dem.* 17.4) from Theophrastos: when the allies wished to put a limit to the assessment of financial contributions, Hegesippos said: “War does not feed on defined rations.” This story certainly points to a conference of allies and probably to one meeting after war had been declared. But there may have been many meetings during the final war between Athens and Philip. Indeed anecdotes can be displaced in context or distorted or even invented. The question, whether the conference scheduled for 16. Anthesterion ever met, should be left open.

Something needs to be said about the role attributed to Oreos and Eretria in the story told by Aischines. Indeed a critic has argued: “On Cawkwell’s view we have to posit that Eretria and Oreos were hostile to Athens in autumn 343, friendly in winter 343/2, and hostile again later in 342. How can such a double diplomatic revolution be explained?” (Brunt 1969, 258). But if the diplomacy of Demosthenes and Kallias is rightly assigned to 343/2, Aischines’ account of that diplomacy does not imply that Oreos and Eretria were friendly to Athens in that winter. Aischines only implies that Demosthenes and Kallias hoped that Oreos and Eretria would be friendly. Certainly an Athenian embassy was sent to Eretria but rebuffed, at the point when Kleitarchos took control (*Dem.* 9.66). The hope Demosthenes and Kallias entertained for friendly responses from Oreos and Eretria may not have been unreasonable, for as observed earlier, in 343–342 conditions in Oreos and Eretria were highly volatile, until Parmenion intervened decisively. Demosthenes and Kallias may not have erred in their assessment of the strictly internal situation in the two cities. The force with which they had not reckoned was Parmenion.

Appendix 8

The Chronology of the Scandal Concerning Harpalos

When Harpalos first approached Attica, he brought his army with him and the Athenians refused him admission. So he took his army to Tainaron, left it there, and came as a suppliant to Athens. This time he was admitted (Diod. 17.108.6–7). The central question to be addressed here is whether he was admitted in Attic 325/4 or in Attic 324/3.

Prosecuting Philokles, the speaker of Deinarchos 3 said that Philokles had been *stratēgos* in command of Mounichia and the dockyards; that he had said in the assembly that he would prevent Harpalos from sailing into the Peiraieus, and that he had sworn a false oath (3.1–2). The speaker also said that Philokles had been the leader in the occurrence of bribery (3.7) and that he had betrayed Akte, the harbors, and the dockyards (3.13). By these statements the speaker led his hearers to believe that Philokles was the man who had admitted Harpalos to Attica. The proposition that Philokles admitted Harpalos to Attica will here be called Tenet A.

The inscription found at the Amphiarakon (see V. Leonardos, *Arch. Ephemer.* [1918]: 73–100, for the first publication; Goldstein 1968, 276–81, for up-to-date discussion) shows that in 324/3 Philokles was *kosmētēs* of the *ephēboi* and Dikaiogenes was strategos in charge of the Peiraieus. So if Tenet A is true, Harpalos was admitted not later than Skirophorion 325/4.

After he was admitted, Antipater and Olympias demanded his extradition (Diod. 17.108.7). Messengers also came from Philoxenos to demand extradition of Harpalos. The assembly deliberated. On the motion of Demosthenes, it decided to take Harpalos into custody and carry his money up to the acropolis (Hyper. Dem. 8–10; Dein. 1.89). Later Harpalos escaped (Dein. 1.112; Diod. 17.108.7). The assembly met in consequence of the scandal, and on the motion of Demosthenes and others it instructed the Areopagos to investigate (Hyper. Dem. 1; Dein. 1.4, 82; 3.5, 16). These events must have taken some time but not necessarily a long time.

Deinarchos (1.45) says that the Areopagos took six months over its investigation. This statement cannot be wrong to any large extent. If the investigation had taken five months or seven months, Deinarchos could have said so without damaging his case (cf. Badian 1961, 42). But the investigation is not likely to have taken six months to the day. So the question arises, did it take something between five and six months or something between six and seven months? The former is more likely. Athenian

orators were more given to exaggerating intervals of time than to minimizing them. Another prosecutor at the same trial made the point that the assembly had required the Areopagos repeatedly to present its report (*Hyper. Dem.* 5); evidently the prosecution wished to draw attention to the delay. If one allows five and a half months for the investigation and half a month for events from the admission of Harpalos to the opening of the investigation, then it follows from Tenet A that the Areopagos presented its report and the trials began not later than Posideion 324/3. Possibly one could bring the opening of the trials into early Gamelion by extending the duration of events before the Areopagite investigation began, but a long extension is not likely.

A fragment of the *Delos* or *Delios* of Timokles (frag. 4, apud Athen. 8.341e–342a) lists some people alleged to have accepted bribes from Harpalos. They are Demosthenes, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes, and Hypereides. Only one of these, Demosthenes, is known to have been named in the report presented by the Areopagos. Moreover the comedy says that Demosthenes had accepted fifty talents, whereas the report said that he had accepted twenty talents (*Hyper. Dem.* 2; *Dein.* 1.6). The discrepancies indicate that the comedy was performed while rumors were still rife and the Areopagos had not yet presented its report. The possible occasions for performing the comedy are the Lenaia, celebrated on 12. Gamelion (Deubner 1932, 123) and the City Dionysia of 9–13. Elaphebolion. Even if the comedy was performed on the earlier of these two occasions, its ignorance of the Areopagite report is difficult to reconcile with the inference drawn from Tenet A in the previous paragraph.

The grounds for Tenet A should be scrutinized afresh. The speaker of Deinarchos 3 certainly leads his hearers to believe that Philokles admitted Harpalos, but he does not say so explicitly. The implication may be deliberately deceptive. If so, one should suppose that Harpalos made his first approach to Attica late in 325/4, while Philokles was still in command at the Peiraieus. But Harpalos was rebuffed and took his men to Tainaron. He came back to Attica early in 324/3 and was admitted, when Dikaiogenes held command at the Peiraieus.

On other questions of chronology, reference may be made to Badian 1961, 41–43, which supersedes earlier inquiries, and to Jaschinski (1981, 34–44: accepting Tenet A, Jaschinski supposes that there were two men called Philokles; one was kosmetes in 324/3, the other was strategos in 325/4 and in 324/3 and admitted Harpalos in the later year. The consequent chronology is similar to that advocated here. Worthington 1986 accepts Tenet A and lengthens the stay of Harpalos in the Athenian prison). Since 1961 it has become clear that attempts to equate dates in an Athenian calendar with Julian dates must be abandoned; see appendix 9.

Since 1961 there has also been further discussion of the date of the Olympic festival. The theory that now appears most likely is that the date was not determined by any local calendar but by astronomical phenomena that all Greeks could observe; to be precise, it is likely that the festival culminated at the second full moon after the summer solstice, and in 324 that full moon occurred on 4 August. See Miller 1975. Unless the beginning of the Athenian calendric year was much out of step with the solar year—a possibility that cannot be wholly excluded—Hekatombaion in 324 was probably either the month following the summer solstice or that preceding it. In that year the summer solstice fell on 27 June. If Hekatombaion began with the new moon following the solstice, the full moon of 4 August, when the Olympic festival culminated, fell in the middle of Hekatombaion (the alternative is to make Hekatombaion begin with the new moon preceding the solstice, so that the full moon of 5 July fell in the middle of Hekatombaion). The decree of Alexander for restoring exiles was announced by Nikanor at the Olympic festival (*Diod.* 17.109.1; 18.8.2–5). The con-

tent of the decree was known when Harpalos reached Greece (*Hyper. Dem.* 18). But it does not follow that Harpalos reached Greece at the time of the Olympic festival (4 August). The content of the decree had been known before the formal announcement at the festival, for many exiles gathered at Olympia to hear it (*Diod.* 18.8.5; cf. Badian 1961, 31 and 42). Thus the probable date of the festival does not furnish an objection to saying that Harpalos made his first approach to Attica late in 325/4 but made his second approach and was admitted early in 324/3.

Appendix 9

The Athenian Calendars

For celebrating festivals the Athenians recognized a year of twelve months. The year began about the middle of summer and the months had the following names:

1. Hekatombaion
2. Metageitnion
3. Boedromion
4. Pyanopsion
5. Maimakterion
6. Posideion
7. Gamelion
8. Anthesterion
9. Elaphebolion
10. Mounychion
11. Thargelion
12. Skirophorion

These were lunar months; that is, the beginning of each was determined by watching for the new crescent. The average length of a true lunar month is 29.53 days. So Athenian months had sometimes 29 and sometimes 30 days. If a year has approximately equal numbers of months of the two lengths, it has approximately 354 days. This result differed from the solar year. To bring the calendar of festivals into approximate agreement with the solar year the archon inserted or “intercalated” an additional month at irregular intervals. Sometimes the intercalary month was a second Posideion and sometimes other months were repeated. A year that consequently included a thirteenth month had approximately 384 days.

The archon could also repeat and suppress individual days. For these reasons the months of the archon’s calendar could get out of step with the lunar months. Inscriptions of the second century B.C. sometimes give two designations for the same day, the one being “according to the archon” and the other “according to the god,” that is, according to the moon. A divergence as great as 30 days is attested (*IG* II², 947).

Once the council of five hundred was divided into ten prytanies and each of these held office for a tenth of the year, they provided an additional way of counting days. Aristotle says (*AP* 43.2) that each of the first four prytanies had 36 days and each of the remaining six prytanies had 35 days. As a working hypothesis it should be sup-

posed that these lengths of prytanies were upheld in a normal year of 354 days, and in an intercalary year the lengths of the prytanies were 39 and 38 days.

With the discovery of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (32.1) it became known that in the fifth century the archon's calendar and the calendar of prytanies could differ even in the day which they designated as the first day of the year. But from 407 onward they agreed to that minimal extent (as appears from *IG I²*, 304B); that is, 1. Hekatombaion coincided with the first day of the first prytany. It is, however, to be noted that the year began about the middle of summer. There are no adequate grounds for the assumption, sometimes made, that Hekatombaion was the lunar month beginning after the solstice. The main source (Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* 5.11.543b) says that Hekatombaion falls "about" the time of the solstice and does not exclude the possibility that it could begin with the new moon preceding the solstice.

Because of the many uncertainties, attempts to equate dates given in Athenian terms with dates in the Julio-Gregorian calendar have not been successful. From an attested Attic date nothing more precise can be inferred than the season of the year (see, for example, chapter 2 at notes 39, 40, and 41). Occasionally precise dates can be learned from astronomical phenomena, such as solar eclipses, or from the Babylonian calendar (see, for example, chapter 8 at note 148).

Study of the Athenian calendar can best begin from three works: W. K. Pritchett and O. Neugebauer, *The Calendars of Athens*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947; W. K. Pritchett, "Ancient Athenian Calendars on Stone." Berkeley: *University of California Press*, 1963, 267–401; W. K. Pritchett, *The Choiseul Marble*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

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Notes

Introduction

1. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.7; Diod. 18.15.8–9.

2. Plut. *Dem.* 20.3.

3. G. Clemenceau, *Démosthène* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1926), 78–79.

4. Information about his career is taken from J. Asbach's article in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, 1875–1912), 30: 521–24.

5. This assumption mars the works of Beloch 1884 and Jaeger 1938, among others. Jaeger's procedure is strange. On the one hand he writes: "As the Assembly was not an elective body but included all free citizens, there could be no changes of administration in the modern sense" (68). Yet elsewhere he says "the three speeches are directed particularly against the administration's financial policy" (55); "it was no great victory for Demosthenes in his fight against the previous administration when the official statesmen swung into line with what he had been urging" (127); "In the *First Olynthiac* he has denounced the administration's practical measures as inadequate" (135); and "anyone who attacked the *theorica* struck simultaneously at Eubulus, the present head of the administration, who owed his immense prestige to his four-year term as comptroller of the *theoric* treasury" (140). In a similar vein Cloché (1934, 222) spoke of "les dirigeants de la politique athénienne en 348, Eubule et ses amis." Elsewhere Cloché's book illustrates the impressionism that has sometimes afflicted inquiries into Athenian politics. He speaks of "les démocrates" and "les aristocrates" (23) or of "les chefs du parti de la guerre" (12, n. 1) and "les partisans de la paix" (21); in later chapters these become "les orateurs achetés ou dupés" and "les partisans résolu et systématiques d' une paix durable" (241) or "le parti macédonien" (260) in contrast to "le parti patriote" (240; cf. 243, 248).

6. The assumption that each Greek city had a "government" in the modern sense underlies the study by Hamilton (1979), who tries to detect parties characterized by distinctive programs, for example, "the government sent Lysander back to the Aegean theater of war in 405" (60, of Sparta), "the government acted with prudence and caution" (176, of Athens), "a new, aggressive government was in power in Boeotia" (190), "The Corinthian government, composed in large part of landowning oligarchs who were traditionally pro-Spartan . . ." (223), "a Spartan force treacherously seized the Theban Cadmeia, overthrew the government . . ." (324; cf. 262–64 of Corinth). Virtually all that is known about the Corinthian constitution early in the fourth

century has to be inferred from a remark of Demosthenes (20.52–53): a minority opened the gates “against the will of the many” to admit fugitives from the battle of Nemea. In Hamilton’s account (265) “the many” of Demosthenes become “the pro-Spartan aristocrats.”

7. See especially Strauss 1987, 15–31. He prefers the term “faction” to “group” (17–20), but unless one keeps his careful definition in mind, the pejorative associations of the word can intrude.

8. Views of modern type are defended by Pecorella Longo 1971, Funke 1980, Strauss 1987, and Tritle 1988. An atomistic view is endorsed by Seager (1967) and by Funke, if I understand them aright. On the habits and assumptions of Athenian political life, rich material has been collected by Rhodes 1986. Ober (1989, 121–25) has some refreshing observations, but for the fluidity of political groups he can only say: “Most specialists in fourth-century politics would, I think, agree” (122).

9. Ellis 1976, Cawkwell 1978b, Griffith 1979, Wirth 1985; cf. Errington 1981. The nearest approach to a political biography of Demosthenes in recent years is the book by Montgomery (1983), but that work is focused on “the role of the Athenian people in forming the foreign policy of their state” (12).

Chapter 1

1. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–6; for the grudge of Derkylidas against Pharnabazos, see 3.1.9.

2. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31–39; on the chronology, see Funke 1980, 99–100.

3. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6–7. The navarch probably took office in the spring; see Sealey 1976b. The office was limited to a year and a second tenure was forbidden; but as early as 405 the Spartans had devised a way to circumvent the restriction (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7). In 387 Antalkidas remained in actual command, whatever his title.

4. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–17. Spartan help to Kyros: *Hell.* 3.1.1.

5. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; 5.1.6 and 25.

6. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25–29; Polyain. 2.24; *IG II²*, 29 = Tod no. 116.

7. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35–39.

8. This theme has been developed by Funke 1980, 1–73. Strauss (1987, 171–73) argues for more lasting tension but admits that the Athenians achieved sufficient unity to uphold the amnesty of 403 and fight the Corinthian War.

9. *Hell. Oxy.* 7.2 and 5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2. Xenophon says that Timokrates was sent by Tithraustes, but this can be corrected from *Hell. Oxy.* 7.5; Polyain. 1.48.3; cf. Meyer 1909a, 44.

10. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3–24.

11. Diod. 14.82.

12. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–17; Andok. 3; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 149. On the chronology see Sealey 1976b, 352 n. 34; Funke 1980, 76 n. 4. Hamilton (1979, 236–39, cf. 318–22) and Badian (1991, 26–34) would refer Philochoros F 149A to 387/6. Admittedly something is wrong in the passage of Didymos preserving the fragment. But since Didymos begins by naming the archon of 392/1, the error is not likely to be in the date. Besides it is more probable that the four envoys were exiled in consequence of the unsuccessful negotiations of 392/1 than in 387/6, when the assembly accepted the results.

13. The work was begun within the Attic year 395/4: *IG II²*, 1656 = Tod no. 107A. So it was begun before the battle of Knidos, which was fought in 394/3 (Lys. 19.28; cf. Funke 1980, 155 n. 25). For the continuation of the work, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9–10.

14. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25–30; for the date, see Funke 1980, 96 n. 91.
15. *IG* II², 28 = Tod no. 114; Thuc. 7.28.4; *IG* II², 24.
16. *Hell. Oxy.* 6–7; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.16.
17. Cawkwell 1976, criticized by Strauss (1987, 107–8, 130), who draws attention to tension between the two men in the Ionian War (cf. Strauss 1984).
18. See especially Funke 1980, 1–16; Funke outlines earlier approaches. Strauss (1987, 90–104 and 125–36), who is also critically aware of earlier views, reconstructs with care the alignments among politicians active before and during the war. It must be admitted that his reasons for the suggested alignments of some men (for example, Sophilos and Kinesias, p. 134) are not strong, but as a whole his reconstruction is plausible.
19. Mosley 1965, 263–66; Mosley 1973, 45. For the five men, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13.
20. Andok. 1.133–34, 150. Seager (1967, 96 n. 9) says of the trial: “Interpretation of that highly personal affair in terms of political groupings (cf. R. Sealey, *Historia* V [1956] 182) is unnecessary and unwise.” But Andokides, Agyrrhios, Kephalos, and others involved in the trial engaged in political activity, and the trial should not be detached from other aspects of their careers.
21. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 149; Dem. 24.135. Hamilton’s treatment of this embassy illustrates the difficulties that arise from attempts to discern parties divided along constant lines of policy. Epikrates, because of his activities of 397–395, is assigned by Hamilton (1979, 172) to a party advocating war. But Epikrates served on the embassy that tried to negotiate peace with Sparta in 392/1. So Hamilton (1979, 253) supposes that the negotiations were brought about by an Athenian coalition that included “elements of Thrasybulus’ moderate faction and of the radical warmongers of Cephala and Epikrates.”
22. Harpok s.v. *xenikon en Korinthōi*; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11–17. For the date see Funke 1980, 91. The later fame of the victory is attested by Dem. 4.24; 23.198; Aischin. 3.243; Dein. 1.75. Light-armed troops had been employed with success against Spartan hoplites at Sphakteria in 425 (Thuc. 4.33–36). Davies (1971, 249) notes that Iphikrates did not gain good relations with Timotheos, the son of Konon, until well into the 360s and explains the selection of Iphikrates for the command by his association with Thrace, the probable source of the peltasts. But the selection implies at least that Konon considered Iphikrates a good officer.
23. Plut. *Mor.* 187a.
24. Plut. *Mor.* 187b = Lys. frag. 15 (Th).
25. The father of Iphikrates: Paus. 9.14.6. The father of Konon: *IG* II², 3774 = Tod no. 128.
26. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.30–31. The nature of the royal edict and of the treaty have been further elucidated by Badian 1991. As he recognizes, reservations can be entertained about the term “common peace.”
27. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15. On the form and genesis of the agreement, see Ryder 1965, 25–36.
28. The term “common peace” does not appear in the work of Xenophon. Diodoros employs it frequently. The only fourth-century document where it occurs is *SIG*³, 182 = Tod no. 145, but there it may not be technical.
29. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.32–34. On the remarkable relationship between Corinth and Argos during the war, see Griffith 1950.
30. R. S. Stroud, *Hesperia* 40 (1971): 162–73 (no. 23).
31. Asserted by Cawkwell 1973b, 51–54 and 1981a; denied by Sinclair 1978, 29–37.

32. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.34 (with 20); Diod. 15.29.7.

33. Dem. 19.125. Provisions of the decree of Kallisthenes, without the order for fortifying the Peiraieus, are mentioned by Aischin. 2.139 with schol.; 3.80; Dem. 18.36–37.

34. Ober (1985, 3) maintains that “the psychological and economic impact of the Peloponnesian War, together with the danger posed by the new-style warfare, led to the growth of a defensive mentality at Athens, characterized by a deep fear of enemy invasion and by the determination to guard the homeland against incursions by hostile forces.” He bases his argument on a study of forts and towers in Attica (130–80) and of their dates (191–207). His thesis has been criticized effectively by Harding 1988b: the forts, so far as they form a system, cannot be earlier than the 370s and so they were a reasonable precaution against Theban ambitions.

35. *IG* II², 29 = Tod no. 116, lines 11–15.

36. Dem. 19.180; Pritchett 1974, 10 n. k. Strauss (1987, 169 n. 26) rightly rejects the view of Roberts (1982, 84, 96, 106), that the trials were attacks by “conservatives” on “radicals,” and insists that they were “attacks on unsuccessful generals by an angry *demos* (egged on by factional enemies).”

37. Lys. 26.21–23; Dem. 24.134. Demosthenes says that Thrasyboulos was twice arrested and tried, but that may be exaggeration.

38. Anaxandrides frag. 41 apud Athen. 4.131a; Davies 1971, 249–50. The sources on the activities of Iphikrates in Thrace are collected and discussed by Pritchett 1974, 64–66. The date of the marriage depends on calculations about its son, Menestheus. He was Athenian *stratēgos* in 356/5. It has often been assumed that a minimum age of thirty years was required for the *stratēgia*, as it certainly was for many Athenian offices; if so, the marriage took place no later than 386. But Pritchett (1974, 63 n. 17) has pointed out that the supposition of this minimum age for the *strategia* is not supported by evidence or probability. Even so, it should be noted that Menestheus was old enough to marry in 368 or a year or two earlier (Kallet 1983).

39. Burnett and Edmonson 1961, 79–81 (frag. L); Davies 1971, 162; Cargill 1981, 153.

40. Ecclesiastic pay: Ar. *AP* 41.3. Succession to Thrasyboulos: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31. Operations in Lesbos: schol. Aristoph. *Ekk.* 102. Imprisonment and Kallistratos: Dem. 24.135.

41. *IG* II², 31 and Addenda p. 656 = Tod no. 117; cf. Sinclair 1978, 47–49.

42. Sinclair 1978, 43–44.

43. *SIG*³, 142 = Tod no. 118.

44. Thuc. 8.24.4–5; 8.40.2.

45. See Sinclair 1978, 49–51, for the calculations. The figure for 387 is reached by adding the squadrons mentioned by Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.7, 10, 19–20, and 26. The figure of 100 given for 378 by Polyb. 2.72.6 is preferable to that of 200, given by Diod. 15.29.7, as Sinclair pointed out.

46. Pritchett 1979, 209–29, esp. 210 and 224; also 66 n. 83 for discussion of Lys. 26. For the procedure in *dokimasia* of the nine archons, see Ar. *AP* 55.2.

47. Diod. 15.20.1; cf. Kirchner 1901–1903, 1: 344.

Chapter 2

1. Ktesikles *FGrHist* 245 F 1 apud Athen. 6.272c. This and the other texts bearing on population are collected and discussed by Ruschenbusch 1984a. He also reviews previous inquiries. My treatment relies much on his.

2. Diod. 18.18.4–5; Plut. *Phok.* 28.4.

3. [Lys.] 20.13; cf. Thuc. 8.97.1.

4. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17; Diod. 15.84.2–4.

5. Dem. 3.4.

6. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.11–12.

7. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 843d–e. The author says that according to another version each man received one hundred drachmas. But that would imply a total of only 9,600 citizens, which is impossibly low.

8. Hansen 1985a, 18–20, 33–36; cf. 1988b, 7–13; 1988c; 1989. Ruschenbusch (1988a, 1988b) has criticized Hansen's view from the annual number of ephebes. Hansen also (1985a, 8) draws a distinction between the total number of Athenian citizens and the number of Athenian citizens in Attica. The distinction is in principle sound, especially for times when some citizens lived abroad as cleruchs. But by the time when Demetrios governed Athens the cleruchies had been lost. Moreover calculations from the few extant figures must be highly approximate; Hansen's distinction would gain significance if more precise figures could be ascertained.

9. Whitehead 1977, 7–10, arguing from *IG II²*, 141 = Tod no. 139, lines 30–36.

10. Harpok. s.v. *metoikion*; Poll. 3.55. Allowance for the possibility of metics serving in the fleet may strengthen the arguments given for the lower figure (12,000) for citizens owning less than two thousand drachmas.

11. Harpok. s.v. *metoikion*; cf. Hesych. s.v. *isoteles*; Whitehead 1977, 16–17.

12. [Dem.] 49 *passim*.

13. [Dem.] 59.3–8. On the fortunes of the family, see Davies 1971, 427–42.

14. Thuc. 7.27.5; cf. Sealey 1987, 8–9.

15. Wood 1983; cf. Davies 1981, 53–54 (scattered parcels); R. Osborne 1987, 37–39 (the advantage of scattered parcels).

16. Aristoph. *Plout.* 552–54; Davies 1981, 9–14; Ruschenbusch 1979, 133–52, esp. 149. It was characteristic of a free man that he did not conform his life to the wishes of another: Ar. *Rhet.* 1.1367a33.

17. Hdt. 8.17.

18. Dem. 51.

19. That the *proeisphora* was instituted in 378/7 has been maintained by Ste. Croix 1953 and denied by MacDowell 1986.

20. Dem. 21.160–62; 18.99.

21. Ar. *AP* 61.1; cf. 56.3. Christ 1990 provides an up-to-date study of *antidosis* with references to earlier inquiries.

22. [Dem.] 47.21; Dem. 14.16–18; the date is inferred from [Dem.] 47.44.

23. Hyper. frag. 134; Aischin. 3.222; Dem. 18.102–7.

24. Dem. 20.8. Performance of a trierarchy brought exemption for two years: Isai. 7.38.

25. Isai. 11.48; cf. 11.40.

26. They are called *plousiôtatoi* and contrasted with *penētes* at Dem. 20.18. They are contrasted with *aporoí* at Dem. 18.104. See also Isok. 8.128; Dem. 18.102; 21.151, 208; [Xen.] *AP* 1.13; Lys. 27.9–10 (large houses); cf. Davies 1981, 9–14.

27. Davies 1971, xxiii–xxiv; 1981, 28–34.

28. Dem. 29.59; cf. 27.7. Other large fortunes are mentioned, perhaps with exaggeration, by Dem. 30.10.

29. Lys. 19.39–40.

30. Xen. *Oik.* 2.3; Lys. 19.47.

31. Such a theory is presented in an extreme form by Finley 1983, 1. In a milder form it is often endorsed, for example by Jones 1957, 131, and by Hansen 1987c, 86.

A more sophisticated variant is offered by Ober 1989. He maintains that in the fourth century there was tension, as distinct from conflict, between “the mass” and “the elite,” and that the tension was surmounted by devices of communication. As “the leisure class,” from which the elite was drawn, he recognizes “those who possessed family fortunes of about a talent or more and so were freed from the necessity of working” (195). This group was larger than the liturgical class and to recognize it as a class may be defensible. But Ober classifies all others as the mass (“Anyone who was not a *plousios* was a *penēs*, *ibid.*, cf. 127–31). In doing so he disregards the distinction between the independent poor and the indigent, a distinction so important that Antipater made it the basis of his settlement in 322. In general Ober’s thesis, though offering suggestive insights, scarcely recognizes the enormous number of Athenians who suffered extreme poverty. Those asserting a simple division between rich and poor as the dominant factor in politics (for example, Cloché 1934, 21) sometimes cite Aristoph. *Ekkl.* 197–98. A better understanding of these two lines and an improved translation of them have been offered by Strauss 1987, 61–63. They occur in a speech that is a comic parody of an address to the assembly and they do not provide sufficient ground for understanding the politics of the fourth century. Strauss (1987, 42–43) offers terms for distinguishing no less than six classes by wealth. But some of his lines of division (for example, between a “thetic class” poorer than hoplites and the “genuinely destitute”) are evanescent, and when he claims to discern differences of policy between classes, his distinction appears to be drawn solely between the leisured elite and all the others (“the Few” and “the Many,” 100–101, 157; cf. 174, “the *plousioi*” and “the *demos*”).

32. The lower estimate is defended by Davies (1981, 15–28), the higher by Rhodes (1982, 2–5). The Athenians boasted that they could send 300 triremes (Thuc. 2.13.8; Aristoph. *Ach.* 545; Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.27; Aischin. 2.175) or even 400 triremes ([Xen.] *AP* 3.4; Andok. 3.9) to sea early in the Peloponnesian War. By the middle of the fourth century, performance of an agonistic liturgy brought exemption from liturgies for one year and performance of a trierarchy brought exemption for two years. If the law did not provide those exemptions in the fifth century, a liturgical class of 300–400 would suffice to maintain a maximum fleet of 300–400 triremes; but if the law already offered those exemptions, a fleet of that maximum size would require a liturgical class of 800–1,200. The question whether the exemptions were available in the fifth century depends on interpreting two texts (Lys. 21.1–5; Isai. 7.38), which have been understood differently by Davies and Rhodes. Cf. Sealey 1990, 161–64.

33. Ar. *AP* 43.4; 51.3 with the comments of Rhodes 1981, 577–78.

34. *IG* II², 1672; Dem. 20.31–32; Jones 1957, 77–78.

35. R. Osborne 1987, 44–46.

36. *IG* II², 1672, lines 275–79, 297–98; Dem. 4.32.

37. Lys. 32.15.

38. Thuc. 8.96.2; cf. 7.28.1; Andok. 3.9.

39. Didym. 10.34–11.5, drawing on Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 162 and Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292.

40. [Dem.] 50.4–6.

41. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.60–61; Diod. 15.34.3–15.35.2. The day is given by Plut. *Phok.* 6 and Polyain. 3.11.2.

42. Andok. 1.82–89; Lys. 30.4. The quotation is from Andok. 1.84. On the inscribed fragments, see Dow 1960, 1961. Following a view expressed by Ostwald (1986, 519), Robertson (1990) thinks that the wall was for temporary publication of measures awaiting ratification, and he offers a different reconstruction of the work

carried out in 403–399. But the present participle can refer to the past with imperfect force, as at Thuc. 1.2.1. I plan to return to the question elsewhere.

43. Ar. *Eth.* 5.1137a31–1138a2; *Pol.* 4.1292a4–7, 32–37; [Plat.] *Def.* 415b; Hansen 1979, cf. 1978b.

44. Andok. 1.87, 89; Dem. 23.87; 24.30.

45. Andok. 1.17, 22; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 833d; Harpok. s.v. *keleontes*; Antiph. frags. 8–14 (Blass); Thuc. 8.67; Ar. *AP* 29.4–5; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12–13, 20–23.

46. The most informative text is Dem. 24.20–23, 27, 33. The procedure of legislation has had much discussion lately; for exposition and references, see Sealey 1987, 41–45, and add Hansen 1985b.

47. Dem. 24.138.

48. Dem. 24.33–35; cf. 20.93.

49. Kroll 1972, 69–90.

50. *Atimia*. The nature of this penalty in the fourth century is disputed; for discussion and references, see Sealey 1983, 98–111. Further study may be needed; for the present it suffices to recall that in the fourth century some men, such as Aischines, withdrew into exile on incurring *atimia*.

51. Ar. *AP* 63.3. The oath was reconstructed by Fränkel 1878.

52. Ar. *AP* 53.3.

53. The Athenian notion of gaps in the law was recognized by Ruschenbusch (1957, 264–65). Its presence in the dikastic oath is overlooked by Ostwald (1986, 5–6).

54. The texts bearing on the number of meetings of the assembly are Dem. 24.21 and Ar. *AP* 43.4–6. For discussion, see Hansen and Mitchel 1984, Hansen 1987a. Plentiful information about the council and the assembly is collected by Rhodes 1972.

55. Dem. 24.33; Ar. *AP* 68.4.

56. Such an organ is called a sovereign. As far as I know, only one Western nation today has a sovereign and the official name of that sovereign is “the crown in parliament.” It is unfortunate that some historians (Ostwald 1986, Ober 1989) have coined the phrase, “sovereignty of the law(s).” Only a person, natural or corporate, can be sovereign. Laws are inanimate. If laws are to be applied to an occurrence, there must be an intelligent being to apply them. The independence of the judicial power, its separation, that is, from other organs of authority, is an important step toward upholding the rule of law. I have maintained (1987) that the Athenians conceived an ideal of the rule of law and created some institutions to uphold it, one of the institutions being an independent judicial power. A reviewer (A. Kränzlein, *ZSR* 120 [1990]: 462–70) has rightly objected that they did not create some additional institutions, which might have gone much further toward achieving the goal. But it is amazing to read that “the rule of law would favor the wealthy and the educated” (Ober 1989, 303). On the contrary the argument for the rule of law at the most basic level is that self-help favors the powerful. The alternative to the rule of law is arbitrary government.

57. I have learned much from Hansen 1981a. Although my formulation may differ from his, it is not intended as a criticism.

58. Thus recently Sinclair 1988, 67, 70–71, and Ober 1989, 141–48. Ober (146) cites passages where pleaders exhort a court to respect the will of the assembly; taken strictly, these passages recognize that the court was different from the assembly. Ober also maintains that the class composition of each dikastic court was the same as that of the assembly. That may or may not be true; no test is possible. But the salient point is that authority was not concentrated in a single body but diffused.

59. Cf. Hansen 1978a.

60. *IG I³*, 40 = Meiggs/Lewis no. 52, lines 4–12.

61. This paragraph answers P. J. Rhodes, *CR*, n.s., 38 (1988): 86 (“I am not convinced that the Athenians saw . . . that they had separated the judiciary from other organs”).

62. Ar. *AP* 62.3.

63. Ar. *AP* 24.3; Hansen 1980.

64. Aischin. 1.27; Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.1.

65. Hansen 1981b, 1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1987b.

66. For the law, see Dein. 1.71. But it must be admitted that Deinarchos offers a paraphrase, not the text of the statute. Other passages are collected by Hansen 1983a, 37–38.

67. Hansen 1983a, 36–49.

68. Hyper. *Eux.* 3, 9, 11, 27–30; cf. Hansen 1983a, 48–49.

69. Hansen 1983b; cf. 1987b.

70. Hansen 1984. For the agenda of the meetings of the assembly, see Ar. *AP* 43.4–6. That only a few members of each annual council proposed decrees is known from Dem. 22.36 and 38.

71. Hansen 1981b, 20.

72. Hansen 1984, 153. Aristophon: Aischin. 3.194. Timarchos: hyp. to Aischin. 1.1.

73. Dem. 3.31; 6.3; [Dem.] 13.14; cf. Plat. *Apol.* 32b; Plut. *Dem.* 6.1–2.

74. Hyper. *Dem.* 9.

75. Dem. 18.219.

76. Hansen 1984, 154; cf. Ober 1989, 108.

77. For the law: Hyper. *Eux.* 7–8. Hansen (1975, 66–120) lists the known cases and remarks on their high frequency.

78. [Dem.] 42.4.

79. Davies 1981, 73–87.

80. Hyper. *Dem.* 25; Hansen 1981, 23–25. Davies (1971, 133–35) tries to review the assets acquired by Demosthenes, noting that no figure can be given for his property at any one time in his career.

81. Cf. Strauss 1987, 31–32.

82. Ar. *AP* 41.3; 62.2.

83. Dem. 24.45–46.

84. Andok. 1.87, 89; Dem. 24.59. The procedure was probably that an assembly attended by at least six thousand voted for calling a board of lawgivers into session and these in turn voted on the proposed law; cf. Hansen 1987c, 14–19. I am much indebted to Hansen’s discussion of the number of citizens attending the assembly, although my conclusion differs somewhat from his.

85. [Dem.] 59.89.

86. Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.7; Andok. 3.41. The Athenians did not share the modern insistence on secrecy in voting; a *psēphisma* was a measure reached by an accurate count of votes, and counters (*psēphoi*) could be employed for accuracy; see Boegehold 1963, 368–72.

87. Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.2; Antiph. 1.14; Isok. 7.32.

88. Ar. *Eth.* 4.1123a34–1125a35. Admiration for personal grandeur coexisted with envy; Ober’s book of 1989 is a protracted meditation on this tension in Athenian thought.

89. Polyain. 3.9.29.
90. Aischin. 1.117–18; 2.5; 3.8, 56.
91. Stanton and Bicknell 1987, challenged by Hansen 1988a.
92. Plutarch tells the story three times with variations: *Nik.* 11; *Alk.* 13; *Arist.* 7. The date 416/5 is proposed and defended by Raubitschek 1955; others have preferred dates one or two years earlier.
93. Hansen 1981b, 32; 1987c, 76.
94. Plut. *Per.* 11.2.
95. Thuc. 6.13.1. Andrewes (1970, 238) finds fault with my understanding of the passage but overlooks the word “over there” (*enthade*).
96. Hansen 1981b, 29–39; cf. 1987c, 77–86; cf. Strauss 1987, 28–31. There is much to be said in favor of the notion of an “action set,” introduced by Strauss and paraphrased as a “mobilized body of opinion” (28). There is even more in favor of his picture of the following of Konon in 393–392 as “concentric circles” at varying distances from the leader (136).
97. Thuc. 8.54.4; cf. 8.65.2; Sealey 1967a, 9 = 1960a, 155–56.
98. [Dem.] 58.42; 54.35. The legal provision against “bringing together a *hetairikon*” (Hyper. *Eux.* 8) defies interpretation.
99. This durable friendship was pointed out in 1955: *JHS* 75: 79. Yet some historians (for example, Jones 1957, 131; Sinclair 1988, 139) have been curiously insistent that alliances between leaders were temporary.
100. Ruschenbusch 1985; cf. 1984b, 1988c. A Hellenistic figure preserved epigraphically for Keramos agrees; see Merkelbach and Varinlioglu 1985.
101. Arkesine: Ruschenbusch 1984b. Siphnos and Seriphos: Hdt. 8.48.
102. Thuc. 5.29.1; 5.44.1; cf. 5.31.6; 7.55.2. It can be shown easily that the words *dēmokratia* and *oligarchia* were not innocent terms of empirical description; they were loaded with charges of approval and disapproval, and these charges changed as time passed (see Sealey 1973; 1987, 91–106). Aristotle and other Greek philosophers erred by overlooking the nonempirical content of these words; the error is perpetuated by some historians, most recently by Ober (1989, 7 and *passim*).
103. R. Osborne 1987, 113–36, esp. 132. From Thuc. 8.64.2 it may well be inferred that the word “democracy” could be used of Thasos. It is not wholly clear why Elis has been considered democratic; its internal changes in the fourth century have been reconstructed, perhaps too systematically, by Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.1: 541.
104. *Hell. Oxy.* 17.3–5.
105. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.2: the Athenians are there said to be not inferior in number to the Boiotians.
106. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19.
107. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4.
108. Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1–6; 4.8.15; 5.1.34; G. T. Griffith 1950.
109. Thuc. 1.71.4; 5.27; 5.30.
110. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34; 7.4.4–5.
111. These conclusions are to be drawn from the complex narrative of Thuc. 5.27–82.
112. Cawkwell 1983.
113. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1–10; Ephoros, *FGrHist* 70 F 79; Diod. 15.5.3–5.
114. For the destruction, see Thuc. 3.52–68. The restoration is known from Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10 and Paus. 9.1.4. For the garrison, see Isok. 14.13.
115. Zahrnt 1983.

116. Hallock 1969; cf. Cameron 1948; Lewis 1977, 1–26.

117. On Phoenicia, see Hdt. 3.19.3. The flattery of courtiers, who told Kambyases that he was better than his father because he had acquired Egypt and the sea, may indicate that the Phoenicians made their submission to Kambyases (Hdt. 3.34.4; I owe this observation to the late H. T. Wade-Gery). Herodotos does not mention the submission of Cyprus but reckons it as part of the same tributary district as Phoenicia and Palestine (3.91.1). Voluntary submission of Cyprus to Kyros is implied by Xen. *Kyroup.* 7.4.1 and 8.6.8; the value of this source on this point is difficult to estimate; cf. Hirsch 1985, 61–97.

118. Hdt. 3.120. On Greek secretaries as sources of information for Herodotos, see Lewis 1985, 107–8. Greeks had traveled as traders and mercenaries in the Near East as early as the time of the Assyrian Empire; see T. F. R. G. Braun, *CAH*² 3.3: 1–31.

119. Diod. 14.80.6–8; Polyain. 7.16.1; their account gains some confirmation from the lacunose chapter (13) of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia*. Cf. Westlake 1981, 268–75. The office of Tithraustes is mentioned by Nep. *Con.* 3.2, but doubts are expressed by Lewis 1977, 17–19.

120. Hdt. 3.139–49; 4.138.2; cf. 6.13.1 for the descent of Aiakes.

121. Hdt. 3.13.1; 4.97; 5.11.

122. Vickers 1986, 243–48.

123. Thuc. 1.129.1; 2.67.1; 5.1.

124. Thuc. 8.6.1–2; 8.80.1–2; 8.99; 8.109.1.

125. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.6; 1.1.14; 1.1.24–25.

126. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16; 1.3.5–14; 1.4.1–7.

127. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9; 3.2.13.

128. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25–26; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 21.1.

129. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.1; 4.1.16; 4.1.29–38. It is a surprise to find that a modern historian calls Pharnabazos “pro-Athenian” (Hamilton 1979, 309 n. 30).

130. Diod. 14.39.1–4; *Hell. Oxy.* 15; Isok. 9.56; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 144–45; Just. 6.1.4–9; Oros. 3.1.7.

131. Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10–12; 4.8.1–6.

132. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.6–9.

133. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28.

134. This relationship was inferred from Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.40 by Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2: 146; cf. Hornblower 1982, 173. Weiskopf (1989, 27–31) would make Ariobarzanes a son of Pharnabazos; that is possible but not more likely.

135. Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.1–15; 4.1.20–27; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 19.3; 21.3–22.1. For the proper interpretation of Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.27 fin., see Meyer 1909a, 29–30.

136. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12–20; 3.4.12; 3.4.21; cf. Hornblower 1982, 19 and 34.

137. Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.4; Deinon apud Plut. *Artox.* 10.1.

138. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–17. Hekatomnos is first attested as ruler of Karia about 390; Diod. 14.98.3; cf. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 103; Hornblower 1982, 35–38, 68.

139. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.13.

140. Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.11; 1.2.1; 1.9.14; cf. 2.5.13.

141. *Hell. Oxy.* 21.1.

142. Diod. 15.90.3; cf. M. J. Osborne 1973, 538; 1975; but a different view is defended by Weiskopf 1989, 70–76.

143. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.12; 1.2.21–27; Diod. 14.20; cf. Hdt. 1.74.3; 5.118.2; 7.91; 7.98; Thuc. 1.112.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1; Diod. 11.60.5; 11.75.2; 11.77.1; 12.3.3.

144. Nep. *Dat.* 1.1–2; 2.2–5; for the revolt of the Kadousioi, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.13,

and for the expedition of Artaxerxes against them, see Plut. *Artox.* 24–25; cf. Syme. 1988, 139.

145. Nep. *Dat.* 2.2–5; 3.5. Nepos calls the Paphlagonian king Thuys. In view of the difficulties of transliteration the name may be the same as Otys.

146. Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.19; cf. 3.2.23. For Kataonia, see Nep. *Dat.* 4.

147. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2.

148. Diod. 16.42.4. Hill (1940, 113) counts ten.

149. Isok. 9.27–32; cf. Hill 1940, 127.

150. For the statue of Konon, see Isok. 9.57; Dem. 20.70; Paus. 1.3.2; Nep. *Tim.* 2.3. For the statue of Evagoras, see Isok. 9.57; Paus. 1.3.2. For the grant of citizenship, see Isok. 9.54. For the decree, see Lewis and Stroud 1979, 190; cf. Funke 1983.

151. Among the Greek inscriptions found in Cyprus only one, the bronze tablet of Idalion, is long enough to reveal sentence structure. It is accessible in Hoffman (1891–1898, 1, 68 no. 135) and Buck (1955, 210–13, no. 23). Like other Greek texts, this one links sentences with a connective particle, but the particle is *kai*, which here has the neutral force of “and,” as in modern Greek. In all other dialects, including Arkadian, the dialect closest to Cypriote, the commonest connective particle is *de*, and *kai* usually has more color. Dare one suspect in Cypriote speech the influence of the Semitic particle appearing in Hebrew as *vau*?

152. The date follows from Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; cf. Funke 1980, 95; Sealey 1976b, 353. Costa (1974) reviews the previous career of Evagoras and argues convincingly that it was Artaxerxes, not Evagoras, who brought about the state of war between them.

153. Diod. 14.98.3 names only Hekatomnos as commander. Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 103), or rather the summary of Theopompos by Photios, says that there was another commander, Autophradates, satrap of Lydia. But Tiribazos was still satrap of Lydia in 387, and Autophradates held that office later. Hornblower (1982, 37 n. 11) accepts Autophradates as satrap of Lydia sent with Hekatomnos against Evagoras, but on that reconstruction it is not clear how to accommodate Tiribazos.

154. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; 5.1.10. Stylianou 1988 argues for a third expedition.

155. Diodoros (15.2–4 and 8–11) gives a good deal of information but one cannot tell how much has been omitted or distorted. Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 103) confirms that the naval battle off Kition was important and memorable. The *Panegyrikos* of Isokrates, composed for the Olympic festival of 380, has a bearing on chronology. It indicates (4.141) that Evagoras had not yet been overcome at the time of the speech. This information should be combined with the ten years' duration of the war (Diod. 15.9.2) and with the fact that it was already in progress in 390 (see my note 152). Admittedly Isokrates (4.141) says that the Persian king, since undertaking operations against Evagoras, “has already wasted six years.” He implies that something had happened six years before the time of the speech, but one cannot say what; possibly the allusion is to the peace of Antalkidas. The reconstruction by Reid (1974, 135–42) would do justice to Isokrates' interval of six years but at the cost of supposing that Isokrates was at work on the *Panegyrikos* for many years without bringing it up to date at the end. For a useful study of the war, see M. J. Osborne 1973, 522–37.

156. Diod. 15.8–9; Theopompos *FGrHist* 115 F 103 includes Evagoras in the trick played on Tiribazos. Cf. Weiskopf (1989, 18–22), who draws attention to the importance of the activity of the royal court in interpreting data brought to it from distant localities.

157. Diod. 15.8.5; 15.10–11; 15.18.

Chapter 3

1. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–15. The foundation of the federation is reported by Thuc. 1.58.2. On Poteidaia in 382, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24. On the character and history of the federation, reference may be made to Larsen 1968, 58–78 and Zahrtnt 1971.

2. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.11–24. Diodoros 15.31.2 gives the structure of the ten thousand for a later date.

3. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24.

4. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–36.

5. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.37–5.3.26. For the journey of many days, see Thuc. 4.85.4. For the chronology it is to be noted that Kleombrotos, the brother and successor of Agesipolis, reigned for nine years (Diod. 15.23.2) and was killed at Leuktra (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13; Diod. 15.55.5) in 371 (appendix 5). So the summer (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.19) in which Agesipolis died was that of 380. Xenophon's account of his activities (*Hell.* 5.3.8–9 and 18) suggests that he had come out in the previous year. Teleutias had come out in the year before that, since he lived to see spring in Chalkidike (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.1). See Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2: 231–34. Modern works of reference sometimes assign the seizure of the Kadmeia to 383, but this date rests on the less defensible chronology of Fabricius 1893, 448–60.

6. Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10–17 and 21–25. Xen. *Ages.* 2.21 defended Agesilaos against criticism for his action at Phleious: at least he was loyal to his friends.

7. For a careful study of the *Panegyrikos*, reference may be made to Bringmann 1965, 28–46. He refutes the thesis that the speech offers the program of the Second Athenian League.

8. A strong argument, drawing on the intervals required for moving armies and ships, has been offered by Kallet-Marx (1985) for supposing that the earliest invitations leading to alliances were issued before the end of the sailing season of 379. It is also to be noted that an inscription of 379/8 (Pritchett 1972, 364–69) honors a certain Euryphon for assisting some Athenian envoys; the envoys must have traveled well before the end of that Attic year, since an interval would elapse before the grant of honors. The alliance with Byzantion is *SIG*³, 146 = Tod no. 121; it may have been contracted even before 379.

9. Diod. 15.29.1–4; cf. chapter 4 at note 14.

10. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2–12. Diodoros (15.25–27) gives a divergent account: the Athenians receive a Theban embassy and dispatch a force that takes part in making the Spartan garrison yield. Diodoros seems to derive support from Deinarchos (1.37–40), who mentions a decree of Kephalos for sending a force to help the liberators. Some (Fabricius 1893; Judeich 1927; Cawkwell 1973b, 56–58) try to accept both accounts. The decisive objection to Diodoros is that he implies a significantly longer duration for the siege of the Kadmeia (thus Kallet-Marx 1985, 140–141; cf. Burnett 1962, 15–17; Rice 1975, 96–103). The decree of Kephalos may have been passed later in 378 and misdated by Deinarchos to the first crisis; cf. note 23.

11. *Hell. Oxy.* 6.1. That secret soon became known.

12. Isok. 14.29.

13. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13–18.

14. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15; Kallet-Marx 1985, 143–44.

15. Plut. *Pelop.* 14.1; 15.1. For defense of the inference, see Kallet-Marx 1985, 144–45. Plutarch's inaccuracies in this context were pointed out by Stern 1884, 44–

57. On matters of Boiotian history, Plutarch was especially accessible to the romantic errors of oral tradition; cf. Frost 1980, 46–52.

16. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.19.

17. Successive stages in the formation of the League are distinguished by Diodoros 15.28–30. He gives the creation of the synedrion at 15.28.3–4. See also note 30. The stages have been clarified by Burnett 1962 and Cawkwell 1973b.

18. This is known from the role of the synedrion in the negotiations leading to conclusion of peace with Philip in 346: Aischin. 2.60–61, 85, 97; 3.69–70, 74; Dem. 19.144. The division of power between the Athenians and the synedrion is reflected in the phrase “without the Athenians and the majority of the allies” in such documents as *IG* II², 97 = Tod no. 127, lines 13–14. Some light is thrown on the role of the synedrion by the inscription of 373/2 regulating relations with Paros: Accame 1941, 230.

19. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22 and 32; cf. Cawkwell 1973b, 55. Cawkwell suggests that a divergence within Sparta can be discerned: the embassy reflected the policy of Agesilaos, but Sphodrias carried out that of Kleombrotos. That may be true. At least Cawkwell offers a satisfactory explanation for the presence of the three Spartan envoys in Athens at the time of the raid of Sphodrias.

20. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20–23. On the purpose of Sphodrias, I am much indebted to Kallet-Marx 1985, 149–51. As he points out, it is amazing that Xenophon would have him cover the distance from Thespiiai to the plain of Thria in a single night. Perhaps one may call to mind that a Peloponnesian plan to surprise the Peiraeus had failed in 429: Thuc. 2.93–94. The thesis that Sphodrias acted on orders from Kleombrotos has been defended by Macdonald 1972.

21. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.24–33. The competence of the *gerousia* in capital trials is known from Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 10.2.

22. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.34; Diod. 15.29.7; cf. chapter 1 at note 32.

23. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.35–41; Diod. 15.32–33. Demophon, whose service is mentioned in a curious context by Diodoros (15.26.2; cf. note 10), may have been a colleague of Chabrias in this command.

24. Diod. 15.29.7–8. For the purpose, see *IG* II², 43 = Tod no. 123, lines 9–15.

25. *IG* II², 43 = Tod no. 123. For an up-to-date report on readings, see Cargill 1981, 14–47.

26. *IG* II², 43 = Tod no. 123, lines 12–14. These lines were later erased and modern attempts to restore their wording in full are insecure. But the legible traces indicate an allusion to the king; see Cargill 1981, 28–32.

27. Cargill 1981, esp. 146–60. The older view has been restated by Cawkwell 1981b; for criticism, see Mitchel 1984b, 33 n. 23. When a city votes honors to the commander of an Athenian garrison stationed in its territory (*SIG*³, 193 = Tod no. 152), it is to be presumed that the citizens welcomed the garrison.

28. Ar. *AP* 23.5. Aristotle's statement has sometimes been doubted as anachronistic, but a purpose including offensive operations is attributed to the Delian League by Thuc. 1.96.1. For cautious discussion, see Rhodes 1981, 296.

29. The total of 5,750 talents is known from Polyb. 2.62.7; cf. Dem. 14. 19, 27, 30. See chapter 2 at note 19. Reference may also be made to Thomsen 1964. The earliest literary attestation of the *eisphora* is Thuc. 3.19.1; cf. J. G. Griffith 1977.

30. Diog. L. 5.35. Even less is known about Astyphilos, who proposed a decree of considerable interest about Methymna (*IG* II², 42 = Tod no. 122). The Methymnaians, being already allies of Athens, were admitted by this decree to member-

ship in the League. They were to be recorded just as the other allies had been recorded. The temporal relation of this decree to the decree of Aristoteles is puzzling, because there the Methymnaians are one of the names inscribed in the first hand. But the puzzle has no bearing on the history of political power.

31. See note 8; *IG II²*, 44 = Tod no. 124, line 7. Pyrrhandros was still alive in 330: Aischin. 3.139.

32. Dem. 24.134.

33. Diod. 15.29.7. After narrating the raid of Sphodrias and saying that the Athenians declared that the Lakedaimonians had broken the peace, Diodoros adds that the Athenians chose these three men as *stratēgoi*. This remark can most easily be understood as pointing to the generalship of 378/7.

34. Davies 1971, 508–10. For the way his wealth was spoken of in the 360s see Dem. 27.7; 29.59.

35. *IG II²*, 21; Harpok. s.v. *xenikon en Korinthōi*; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.10–13; Dem. 20.76; Nep. *Chabr.* 2.2.

36. Diod. 15.29.2–4 (cf. discussion at note 9); Dem. 20.76; Nep. *Chabr.* 2.1; cf. Strabo 16.760; 17.803; Plin. *NH* 5.68; Kienitz 1953, 85 and 89.

37. Funke 1980, 145 n. 46.

38. [Dem.] 59.27. Rice (1975) has tried to revive the old view that Kallistratos was constantly in favor of achieving good relations with Sparta. This view does not suit his activities of 392/1, when he attacked the envoys who had tried to negotiate peace, or his—admittedly obscure—share in shaping Athenian policy in the early years of the Second League. It is better to suppose that Kallistratos learned to favor the Spartan cause shortly before he persuaded his fellow citizens to do so. A successful statesman should be only one step ahead of his audience.

39. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 97–98.

40. Diod. 15.30.1. The identity of Arethousa, previously disputed, should be settled by the observation of Cargill 1981, 33. Ikos was immediately northeast of Peparthos. The inscription giving the alliance with Chalkis is *IG II²*, 44 = Tod no. 124. For the tradition on Timotheos, see Plut. *Mor.* 350f.

41. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.47–55; Diod. 15.34.1–2. For Chabrias, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.54.

42. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.59–61; Diod. 15.34.3–15.35.2. For the gift of wine, see Plut. *Phok.* 6.3; cf. chapter 2 at note 41.

43. Aischin. 3.243 (the statue); Dem. 24.180, cf. 20.84 (the crown). Burnett and Edmonson 1961.

44. Plut. *Phok.* 7.1.

45. Anderson 1963; Buckler 1972.

46. Dem. 20.70; cf. *IG II²*, 3774 = Tod no. 128.

47. Diod. 15.36.4. The date is secure, since Diodoros relates the campaign after the battle of Naxos and before giving the expedition that Timotheos led in 375 to the northwest. He adds that Chabrias was assassinated in Abdera, which is not true.

48. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.62–66; Diod. 15.36.5.

49. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2; Diod. 15.45.2–3 (for the name Arkadia).

50. Theraians: Bradeen and Coleman 1967. Pheraians: Mitchel 1984a.

51. One line of lettering was erased deliberately (Woodhead 1957). If it was an entry, hand Y had inscribed twenty-eight names in all. But it may have been an error of the mason.

52. Cawkwell 1963b, 88.

53. Mitchel 1981.

54. Hansen 1978a.

55. Kerkyra did not become a member of the Athenian League. Its relation to Athens is obscure and is discussed by Cargill 1981, 68–74, and by Tuplin 1984, 544–66.

56. Aischin. 3.243; cf. *IG* II², 3774 = Tod no. 128, with Tod's comments.

57. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1; Diod. 15.38.1–2; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 151; cf. Hampl 1938, 14.

58. Isok. 15.109–10; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 151. For the date of the festival, see schol. Aristoph. *Peace* 1019.

59. A date for conclusion of the peace in 375 has often been defended, notably by Cawkwell 1963b, Buckler 1971, and Gray 1980. Their thesis starts from the observation that Timotheos, having only scanty funds for his expedition (Isok. 15.109), would not be likely to winter in the northwest. But in 372/1 Iphikrates contrived to winter in the northwest by setting some of his men to till the soil for the Kerkyraians (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.37). Cawkwell added an argument for 375 by drawing on the sequence of Spartan navarchs, but the theory on which that reconstruction of the navy depended has since been challenged (Sealey 1976b, 355–57). The compelling argument for recognizing 374 as the date when peace was concluded springs from the insistence of Xenophon, a contemporary, on the haste with which the deeds causing further hostilities followed (*Hell.* 6.2.2–3: “straightaway” twice; dates for some stages in the resumption of hostilities are known from [Dem.] 49.6, 9–10, 22). Cf. Sealey 1976a, 414–18.

60. Diod. 15.30.2; Aischin. 2.70.

61. First published by J. H. Oliver, *AJA* 40 (1936): 461–63; for an improved text see Accame 1941, 230; cf. Cargill 1981, 163–64. Toward understanding this inscription I am much indebted to a lecture given by M. Dreher at Konstanz on 28 June 1989; naturally he is not responsible for the imperfections of my treatment.

62. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46; 6.1.1; 6.2.1. On the constitution of the restored Boiotian federation, see Larsen 1968, 175–80. Buckler (1971) and Gray (1980, 307–15) suppose that the Theban attack on Phokis took place in 375. But Xenophon insists that the temporal relation of events in *Hell.* 6.1.1–2 is approximate. It is better to assign the events of 6.1.1 to 374, since in 375 the naval expedition of Timotheos deterred the Spartans from crossing the gulf. The major difficulty of 6.1.1 was recognized by Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2: 236–37. There Xenophon says that Kleombrotos took four *morai* to Phokis, and he still had four *morai* there in 371 (6.4.17). But it is difficult to believe that the Lakedaimonians kept two-thirds of their army in Phokis for three years. Perhaps Kleombrotos took a large force in 374, sent much of it home soon, and kept a skeleton force in Phokis; then his army was brought up to the strength of four *morai* in 371 in time for action (cf. Gray 1980, 307–15). This hypothesis is admittedly large, but Beloch's solution supposed an excessive error in the text of Xenophon.

63. Diodoros (15.38.3–4) says that Thebes was excluded from this peace, but that is a doublet of 15.50.4; see Lauffer 1959.

64. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 98 (cf. Plut. *Sol.* 15.2–3); Plut. *Phok.* 7.1; Mitchel 1984b.

65. [Dem.] 49.49; Cawkwell 1963b, 91–93.

66. Aischin. 2.71; Dem. 18.234.

67. [Dem.] 50.53; *IG* II², 213 = Tod no. 168, line 13; cf. *IG* II², 207 line 13, but the date of this is uncertain (M. J. Osborne 1971).

68. *IG II²*, 123 = Tod no. 156, lines 11–12.

69. The estimates made by Ruschenbusch (1983) for the Delian League may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to members of the Second League.

70. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.2–11; Diod. 15.45–47. The chronology followed here rests on the belief that Mnasippos took office as navarch in time for the opening of the sailing season of 373 (Sealey 1976b, 355–57). The narrative assumes that Xenophon is superior to Diodoros when they conflict; this view is defended by Gray 1980. In particular Diodoros (15.47.2) would have Timotheos sent to sea by the Athenians before Mnasippos set sail, but Xenophon gives the opposite sequence. One may, however, follow Diodoros with caution when he adds items (the missions of Aristokrates and Alkidas) omitted by Xenophon.

71. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.12–26; Diod. 15.47.2–3. Diodoros says that Timotheos procured thirty ships from the islands, but this assertion is bound up with his story that Timotheos was restored to the command. [Demosthenes] 49.6, 9–10, 22 provides data valuable for chronology: in Mounychion 374/3 Timotheos was preparing to set sail in the Aegean, and his trial was held in Maimakterion 373/2. For the chariot victory of Chabrias, see [Dem.] 59.33.

72. [Dem.] 49.9–10, 13, 22, 25, 28, 30, 59–62.

73. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.26–38. The relation of the Kephallenian cities to Athens is discussed by Cargill 1981, 74–75. Gray (1980, 315–26) holds that Iphikrates set sail within the season of 373; for Timotheos was deposed because the Athenians demanded prompt dispatch of the fleet. To account for the statements of [Dem.] 49.9 and 13, that Iphikrates and Kallistratos prosecuted Timotheos and that the trial took place in Maimakterion, she supposes that Iphikrates joined Kallistratos in making the initial complaint but left him to argue the case in court alone. This reconstruction is certainly possible but implies that Iphikrates stayed in Kerkyra for two winters; that is rather unlikely, since he ran short of funds (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.3). The positive reason for putting the departure of Iphikrates in 373 is not strong. Timotheos was deposed through the machinations of his enemies and popular passion, factors that are not necessarily consequential in their subsequent behavior. Gray's thesis has been challenged by Tuplin 1984, 537–44, but he assumes that the peace was concluded in summer 375.

74. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.3.

75. Diod. 15.81.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 16–17. For the admission of Orchomenos to the federation on terms after Leuktra, see Diod. 15.57.1.

76. [Dem.] 49.14–21, 48–54.

77. Isok. 14.37; cf. Buckler 1980, 46.

78. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1; Diod. 15.46.4–6; Isok. 14. Pausanias (9.1.8) gives the date 373/2 for the destruction of Plataia. The course of developments at Thespiiai is not clear and may not have been straightforward; Pausanias (9.14.1–4) puts the destruction of the city after the battle of Leuktra. The privileges granted to the Plataians at Athens are known from Lys. 23.2–3; Isok. 12.94; 14.51–52; [Dem.] 59.104–6; Diod. 15.46.6; cf. Kahrstedt 1934, 69–71.

79. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1–18. The mission of Antalkidas is known from *ibid.* 12; the interpretation followed here was proposed by Accame 1941, 152–53, cf. Ryder 1965, 127–30. The provision for expelling garrisons in 374 is known from Diod. 15.38.2. Cf. Theopompos Comicus *FAttCom* frag. 30 (with the notes of Edmonds, pp. 858–59).

80. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.19; cf. Mosley 1972.

81. Cawkwell 1972; cf. 1983, 397–99.

82. For the dates of the treaty and of the battle, see appendix 5. It follows from Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.17 that Kleombrotos had four morai in Phokis; cf. note 62. The presence of allies with the Lakedaemonians is indicated by Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9; cf. 6.1.1.

83. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3–15 and 18.

84. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19–20.

85. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20–25. For the invitation, see 6.5.1.

86. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1–3. For discussion, with references to earlier views, see Ryder 1965, 131–33. Sordi (1951) argues that Sparta took part (on this I follow her and Ryder). She also argues that the agreement was not an alliance but a treaty of common peace, although it had some features of an alliance. But there is no need to insist on exclusive categories; if one does insist, the distinction becomes merely verbal.

87. Cf. Buckler 1980, 68–69: “The stipulation, however, also turned the peace into a virtual defensive alliance, with the Thebans as the unspoken enemies.”

88. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.18; cf. Ryder 1965, 127–30.

89. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2–5.

90. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.36–37; cf. Sordi 1951; Ryder 1965, 131–33.

91. See Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6–32 for these events and the Theban expedition into the Peloponnese; Diod. 15.62.3 for the Arkadian appeals to Athens and to Thebes.

92. For the allies secured by Thebes, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; Diod. 15.57.1; 15.62.4.

93. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33–52. The winter season is indicated at 6.5.20 and 50. Athenian opposition to helping Sparta is mentioned at 6.5.35.

94. *IG II²*, 107 = Tod no. 131. The inscription is too poorly preserved to allow certainty about the business that brought the Mytilenian envoys to Athens. But the reference (lines 41–45) to the war that the Athenians had fought against the Lakedaemonians for the liberty of the Greeks suggests that the Mytilenians required the Athenians to justify their recent change of alignment.

95. [Dem.] 59.27.

96. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.25; Diod. 15.68–69.

97. Thuc. 3.86, 90, 103, 115; 4.118.11; 5.19, 24, 43; Plat. *Lach.* 181b, *Symp.* 221a. He is probably the Labes of Aristoph. *Wasps* 895.

98. For the *proxenia*, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4. Hipponikos, the father of this Kallias, was said to be the richest man in Greece: Lys. 19.48; Andok. 1.130; Isok. 16.31. Cf. Davies 1971, 254–70. Herodotos (6.121) tells a suggestive story about the origin of the family’s wealth; reconstruction of the stemma points to the time of Kleisthenes; cf. Sealey 1976a, 158.

99. Athen. 13.577b–c, summarizing Karystios.

100. *IG II²*, 111 = Tod no. 142, line 4; *IG XII* 5, 542, line 43; Hyper. *Eux.* 28 and frag. 40 = schol. Aischin. 1.64.

101. [Dem.] 50.4–6, 12; Hyper. frags. 40–44, 55–65.

102. Dem. 20.146.

Chapter 4

1. See Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1–14 for the conference, 7.1.1–2 for the issues discussed, 7.1.15–26 for the armed operations; cf. Diod. 15.67–70. Buckler (1980, 90–91) offers a diplomatic explanation of the provision about sharing command.

2. I am especially indebted to the following discussions: Hampl 1938, 18; Accame 1941, 155–57, 165–67; Cawkwell 1961a, 80–82; Ryder 1965, 128–30.

3. Diod. 15.60.3.

4. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–38.

5. This consideration was offered by Cawkwell 1961a. He also noted that Aischines (2.27) calls Iphikrates “general against Amphipolis,” whereas in operations begun in 365 Timotheos is called “general against Amphipolis and the Chersonese” (Dem. 23.149); he inferred that, although the claim of the Athenians to Amphipolis was recognized in 369, their claim to the Chersonese was not recognized until 366, where Diodoros (15.76.3) puts a treaty of common peace. But it is not likely that such a treaty was made in 366 (Ryder 1957; 1965, 137–39; Hampl 1938, 62–64). It is fully possible that for 368 Iphikrates was commissioned to operate against Amphipolis and the Chersonese but Aischines mentions only the part of the commission germane to the context, the orator’s account of an address to Philip II (2.25–33).

6. Thuc. 4.108.1.

7. Discussion on these lines is illustrated by Sealey 1976a, 430–31, Cawkwell 1981b, 53–54; cf. Cargill 1981, 166–68, 192. I am indebted to Mr. J. J. McInerney for the alternative suggestion, that Athenian policy was a response to changes in the north, changes in which the Athenians recognized novel threats to their interests. That suggestion is fundamental to this chapter. Mr. McInerney is not responsible for the way I have developed his idea.

8. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31–35; 6.5.23; Diod. 15.60.5–15.61.2; cf. Sordi 1958, 193–223.

9. Diod. 15.61.3–5; 15.67.3–4; Plut. *Pelop.* 26.

10. Diod. 15.71; 15.75.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 27–29.

11. Dem. 23.120.

12. Diod. 15.60.3.

13. Diod. 15.60.3; 15.67.4; 15.71.1; 15.77.5; Plut. *Pelop.* 26.4–5; 27.2–4; Aischin. 2.26–29. The dates are those under which Diodoros gives changes of ruler.

14. Diod. 15.29.1–4. Chabrias was recalled not later than the winter of 380/79, for he was elected general for 379/8 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14). For the temporary participation of Tithraustes in the Persian preparations, see Nep. *Dat.* 3.5; for the place, see Nep. *Dat.* 5.1, and Diod. 15.41.3.

15. Kienitz 1953, 88–89.

16. Nep. *Dat.* 4–5. Nepos is late, brief, and sometimes inaccurate, and the story of the changes in command is strange. He may have made mistakes. But his report shows that there were changes in command and the king’s favor could be lost. The uncertainties of politics at the royal court may account for the cautious behavior of Pharnabazos during the expedition into Egypt.

17. Diod. 15.38.1; 15.41–43. Iphikrates was back in Athens by Maimakterion 373/2 ([Dem.] 49.9 and 22). So the expedition may have been undertaken in 373 or 374. The Nile at Cairo is at its lowest in late May and at its highest in mid-September (Cawkwell 1963c, 121 n. 2). The operations of Pharnabazos were impeded as the Nile rose (Diod. 15.43.4). Evidently he retreated from Egypt in summer 373. Diodoros (15.41.4) says that Pharnabazos set off on the expedition at the beginning of summer; the remark implies the early summer of 373, but it may be a conventional phrase and inaccurate.

18. Xen. *Ages.* 2.26–27; see further at note 26. The name Tachos has been brought into the text by emendation; without it there is a subject in the singular, Maussolos. Hornblower (1982, 175) challenges the emendation. But as the sentence has a verb in the plural, emendation is necessary; cf. Weiskopf 1989, 65–66.

19. Trogus (*Prol.* 10) says that Datames was the first of the rebels to be overcome. The study to which all subsequent reconstructions are indebted is that of Judeich

1892, 190–209. Recent and useful inquiries include M. J. Osborne 1973, 537–51, Hornblower 1982, 170–82, and Weiskopf 1989.

20. For the occupation of Paphlagonia, see *Nep. Dat.* 5.6. For the attack on Sinope, see *Polyain.* 7.21.2 and 5. For the betrayal by Sysinas, see *Nep. Dat.* 7.1. For the desertion by Mithrobarzanes, see *Nep. Dat.* 6.3–6; *Diod.* 15.91.2–6; *Front. Strat.* 2.7.9; *Polyain.* 7.21.7. For the operations of Autophradates and the inconclusive treaty, see *Nep. Dat.* 7–8.

21. *Nep. Dat.* 5.6.

22. *Dem.* 15.9. For the date, see appendix 5. Weiskopf (1989, 41–44) may be right in maintaining that the machinations of Autophradates were decisive: he was jealous of Ariobarzanes and misrepresented him as disaffected.

23. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.27. For the date, see appendix 5.

24. Burnett and Edmonson 1961; cf. chapter 3 at note 43.

25. *Dem.* 23.141–42. Here, as often, the term “Hellespont” must include the Propontis in view of the mention of Perinthos. Demosthenes says that Philiskos controlled “the whole Hellespont”; that is doubtless an exaggeration.

26. *Xen. Ages.* 2.25–27; cf. Hornblower 1982, 174–75. The date is inferred from the movements of Timotheos; Isokrates (15.111–12) specifies Sestos and Krithote as his next gains after Samos; cf. *Nep. Tim.* 1.3. Xenophon says that Ariobarzanes was besieged in Assos; *Polyainos* (7.26) says that he was besieged in Adramyttion. Xenophon is to be preferred as contemporary.

27. *Dem.* 23.154; cf. chapter 2 at note 134. Diodoros (15.91.2–5) makes Artabazos command the royalist forces against Datames in the campaign marked by the treachery of Mithrobarzanes. That is a mistake for Autophradates. But the mistake was easy to make if Artabazos took part in that campaign.

28. Cf. *Isok.* 5.30–31.

29. *Xen. Hell.* 6.5.51–52; cf. chapter 3 at note 93.

30. *Diod.* 15.69; *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.15–19; cf. 25.

31. *IG II²*, 1609, line 100. On the date of this inscription, the thesis of Cawkwell (1973a) is superior to others. Harris (1988, 50 at n. 20) rejects Cawkwell’s date, 370/69, because it would imply that Apollodoros served as trierarch in the year when his father, Pasion, died, and Harris finds that unlikely. But Apollodoros, an ambitious man, may have volunteered for the trierarchy even before his father died.

32. [*Dem.*] 49.66. Possibly the ground for the charge, had it been made, was the adoption of Iphikrates by Amyntas of Macedon (*Aischin.* 2.28); Davies (1971, 250) seems to doubt this but does not offer any alternative explanation for the charge.

33. This is the argument of Kallet 1983; cf. appendix 5. Iphikrates stayed with Kotys until shortly after Charidemos entered the service of the Thracian king (*Dem.* 23.132). Charidemos crossed from Abydos to Sestos and entered the service of Kotys in the Attic year when Kephisodotos was general (*Dem.* 23.153–58, 163), that is, in 360/59 (schol. *Aischin.* 3.51). After leaving the service of Kotys, Iphikrates lived for a time at Antissa and then at Drys (*Dem.* 23.132). So he may not have returned to Athens until a year or two after 360/59. He is next attested as an Athenian general in 356/5 (*Diod.* 16.21.1).

34. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.28.

35. *Diod.* 15.71.

36. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.41. For the relationship of Timomachos to Kallistratos, see [*Dem.*] 50.48.

37. Schol. *Aischin.* 1.64 = *Hyper. frag.* 40. In 362 the Athenians transferred command of some operations in the Aegean from Leosthenes to Chares (*Diod.* 15.95.3;

cf. Hyper. *Eux.* 1) and some of the trierarchs who had served under Leosthenes were prosecuted by Aristophon (Dem. 51.8–9).

38. Cargill (1981, 172–76) tries thus to make sense of Diod. 15.95.3; cf. Ain. Takt. 11.13–15.

39. Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.17–23. The date of these operations was, first, not earlier than 366, for they took place after Pellene and the other cities of Achaia had allied anew with Sparta in the aftermath of the third Theban expedition to the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41–43), and, second, not later than 366, for the Athenians recalled Chares from Thyamia when Oropos was seized (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; cf. appendix 5).

40. Diod. 15.66.1; Plut. *Pelop.* 24.5; *Ages.* 34.1; Paus. 4.26–27; 9.14.5; cf. Isok. 6.

41. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15–22; Diod. 15.68–69.

42. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23–26; the quotation is from 7.1.26.

43. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–32; Diod. 15.72.3; cf. appendix 5.

44. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; 7.1.33–40. On the mission of Philiskos, see my previous comments at note 23.

45. Diod. 16.40.1–2.

46. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6–11; Isok. 6.91 (Epidauros).

47. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41–43; cf. appendix 5.

48. Thuc. 8.60.1.

49. Isok. 14.20, 37; cf. Buckler 1980, 19. No more likely occasion for the restoration of Oropos has been suggested. Cf. chapter 3 at note 77.

50. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23.

51. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1; Diod. 15.76.1; cf. Buckler 1980, 193–94.

52. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2–5.

53. Dem. 21.64.

54. Ar. *Rhet.* 3.1411b6–7.

55. Diog. L. 3.23–24. The detail about Hegesippos adds to the credibility of the story. Formerly (1956b, 195–96 = 1967a, 149) I tried to date the trial from Plato's Sicilian journey, but my argument rested on a mistaken date for the death of Dionysios I; see Stroheker 1958, 237 n. 83, and Cawkwell 1961a, 84 n. 2.

56. Plut. *Dem.* 5.1–4. Less credible is the story that Demosthenes now gave up studying under Plato (Hermippos apud Aul. Gell. 3.13 and Plut. *Dem.* 5.7; Amm. Marc. 30.4.5).

57. Aischin. 3.138–39; cf. Cawkwell 1961a, 84.

58. Dem. 20.146; cf. chapter 3 at note 102. Roberts (1982, 69–73) tries with more zeal than success to find programmatic issues in the trials.

59. Aischin. 2.26–29. For Pausanias in 359, see Diod. 16.2.6. The account given by Aischines professes to tell an Athenian court in 343/2 what Aischines had said to Philip in 346, but it may be distorted. In particular, Aischines said that Eurydike had her sons, Perdikkas and Philip, with her when she appealed to Iphikrates. It has been inferred (by Griffith 1979, 204) that Philip was given as a hostage to Pelopidas not in 369 but in 368; for Aischines would not be likely to err on such a point in addressing Philip himself in 346. But the extant words of Aischines are not necessarily what he said to Philip but what he told the Athenians that he had said to Philip. The impartial evidence (Diod. 15.67.4; Plut. *Pelop.* 26; Just. 7.51) says that Pelopidas received Philip as a hostage on his first journey into Macedon, that is, in 369.

60. Dem. 15.9; cf. appendix 5.

61. Xen. *Ages.* 2.26–27; Isok. 15.112; Nep. *Tim.* 1.3; cf. this chapter at note 26.

62. Dem. 23.118, 131–32, 149. Demosthenes misrepresented Kotys as an invet-

erate enemy of the Athenians. For my understanding of his dealings with them and of the position of Iphikrates I am indebted to Kallet 1983, 244–48. A different view is taken by Harris 1989. He thinks that Iphikrates, fearing to be called to account by the Athenians for failure, fled into the service of Kotys and in this capacity fought a naval battle against the Athenians. As Harris suggests, the battle may have arisen between Kotys and Miltokythes. But if the construction put by Harris on the battle is right, it is strange that Demosthenes does not say more about the incident, and it is even stranger that the Athenians forgot it and elected Iphikrates as general a few years later. It is easier to believe that the brief allusion (Dem. 23.130) to the naval battle distorts or exaggerates an unimportant occurrence.

63. Dem. 23.104; cf. [Dem.] 50.4–5. For Hieron Oros as a strategically significant landmark, see Aischin. 2.90 and Dem. 19.156.

64. Dem. 23.119, 131–32, 158, 163. On the date, see appendix 5. Their study in the Academy: Plut. *Mor.* 1126c.

65. Zahrnt 1971, 101–2.

66. Dem. 2.14; Polyain. 3.10.14; cf. 3.10.7. Isokrates (15.113), loyal to his former pupil, says that Timotheos defeated all the Chalkidians. Demosthenes (23.150) says that Timotheos decided to prosecute the war against Amphipolis before that against the Chersonese. But Demosthenes, who did not set out to write a biography of Timotheos, does not say at what point in his adventures Timotheos took this decision. So the remark need not be taken to imply that Timotheos operated against Amphipolis before receiving Sestos and Krithote from Ariobarzanes. The chronology of his movements between 365 and 362 cannot be determined in detail; divergent views are illustrated by Buckler 1980, 167–69 and Kallet 1983, 246 n. 24.

67. Schol. Aischin. 2.31; Aischin. 2.30; Ar. *Rhet.* 2.1380b10–13; cf. appendix 5.

68. Diod. 15.81.6.

69. Just. 16.4.3–4. Justin puts this appeal before the appeal of the Herakleotes to Epameinondas. So it is likely that Timotheos operated in the Propontis before the Aegean voyage of the Theban (364).

70. Isok. 15.108: Sestos, Krithote, Poteidaia, Torone; *ibid.* 113: Poteidaia, twenty-four cities in all. Dein. 1.14: Methone, Pydna, Poteidaia, and twenty other cities. Diod. 15.81.6: Torone, Poteidaia. Polyain. 3.10.15: Torone. Aischines (2.70) says that Timotheos secured seventy-five cities and brought them into the syndesion. But the cities won by Timotheos did not become members of the League; they were conquered. Aischines' figure of seventy-five is a tendentious estimate of the number of cities that had joined the League (Cargill 1981, 45–47). Only he is capable of such confusion.

71. *SIG*³, 180 = Tod no. 146.

72. Diodoros (15.90–93) relates the revolt under 362/1. His account is devoted mainly to telling how each of the leaders tried to betray his comrades and make his peace with the king. So the revolt may not have lasted long. The steps taken by Artabazos to secure the satrapy of Daskyleion were completed in 360/59, when he was persuaded to let his disloyal servant Charidemus escape across the Hellespont into Europe (Dem. 23.153–58). For modern studies, see note 19.

73. Dem. 23.154–57.

74. Harpok. s.v. *Ariobarzanes*; Xen. *Kyroup.* 8.8.4; Ar. *Pol.* 5.1312a15–16.

75. Diod. 15.78.4–15.79.1; Just. 16.4.3–4; cf. Buckler 1980, 155, 160–75. The conjecture of Persian initiative and Persian finance is due to Buckler. On the date, see appendix 5. Cawkwell (1972, 270–71) notes that the Thebans did not cherish naval ambitions after 364 and suggests that the actual expedition was far smaller than

a hundred triremes; as he observes, the Boiotians decreed the building of a hundred ships, but "Diodoros says nothing to imply that the ships were ever built." However, Diodoros leads the reader to suppose that the fleet launched was the same as the fleet voted.

76. [Dem.] 50.4–12, 14–17.

77. Dem. 23.171, 173, 176.

78. *IG* II², 111 = Tod no. 142; schol. Aischin. 1.64 = Hyper. frag. 40; Hyper. *Eux.* 28; *IG* XII, 5, 542, line 43; cf. *IG* II², 404; XII, 5, 594 = Tod no. 141. For recent discussion, see Dreher 1989.

79. Diod. 15.80; Plut. *Pelop.* 31.1–35.2; Nep. *Pelop.* 5.2–4. The contingent supplied by Alexander in 362 is mentioned by Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4. Cf. Buckler 1980, 175–82; Sordi 1958, 218–20.

80. [Dem.] 50.4; Diod. 15.95.1–3; Polyain. 6.2.1–2; Dem. 51.8–9. For the chronology, see Sordi 1958, 223–26. Diodoros's story, that Chares now intervened at Kerkira (15.95.3), does not make sense; see note 38. For the Athenian alliance with the Thessalian League see *IG* II², 116 = Tod no. 147; cf. chapter 5 at note 79.

81. *SIG*³, 175.

82. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5; Diod. 15.82–87. For the embassy of Kallistratos to Arkadia, see Nep. *Epam.* 6.1–3; Plut. *Mor.* 193c–d; 810f; cf. Cawkwell 1961a, 84 n. 4. For the date, see appendix 5.

83. Diod. 15.89.1–2; cf. *SIG*³, 182 = Tod no. 145. The terms are discussed by Ryder 1965, 140–44. Taeger (1930) stressed the fact that the Greeks concluded this peace on their own initiative without Persian intervention.

84. Thuc. 1.102.

85. In 353/2; Dem. 16. Perhaps a Spartan embassy was the occasion of Dem. 6; cf. Calhoun 1933.

86. [Dem.] 50.46, 48.

87. Hyper. *Eux.* 1–2; Aischin. 1.56 and schol.; Dem. 19.180; 36.53.

88. [Ar.] *Oikon.* 2.1350a16–22; cf. Hammond 1979, 187.

89. Skylax 67, cf. Diod. 16.3.7 (Thasos); schol. Aischin. 2.124 (Byzantion); cf. Hammond 1979, 187–88; Griffith 1979, 235.

90. Dem. 20.82; Nep. *Chabr.* 4.

91. Lyk. *Leokr.* 93.

92. Dem. 18.219; 19.297; Aischin. 2.124.

93. Cloché (1934, 308–9) discerned that Athens in the fourth century produced "deux véritables hommes d'état," Kallistratos and Demosthenes; he attributed to them "le sens du possible."

94. Dem. 23.8–10. The military and diplomatic actions carried out by Athenodoros after the death of Miltokythes in 359/8 (Dem. 23.169–71; cf. 175–76) were agreeable to the Athenians; indeed when Demosthenes (23.171) complains that the Athenians failed to supply money to Athenodoros, he implies that Athenodoros was in touch with Athens and could expect material help thence.

95. Dem. 23.8, 10, 12, 170; cf. 180.

96. Dem. 23.8, 11. Citizenship: Dem. 23.23, 65, 89. Citizenship and gold crown(s): Dem. 23.145, 151, 185, 187–88. For the date of the grant of citizenship, see Davies 1971, 571. Cf. chapter 5 at note 110.

97. Diod. 16.2.4–6.

98. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 27, noted with approval by Griffith 1979, 203.

99. Dem. 39; [Dem.] 40; Ar. *Rhet.* 2.1398b2–3; cf. Rudhardt 1962; Davies 1971, 364–68.

100. Diod. 16.2.6; 16.3.3; 16.3.5–6; 16.4.1.

101. B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 29 (1960): 25–28, no. 33. Timokrates the statesman (see next section) may be identical with the eponymous archon of 364/3, as supposed by Jaeger 1938, 25. But the name is too common for that to be asserted with any confidence.

102. Xen. *Revenues* 3.7; cf. Dem. 19.290.

103. Dem. 18.162; 21.218 with schol.; cf. 19.291.

104. See appendix 4. On the family and the property, reference may be made to Davies 1971, 113–39.

105. Aischin. 3.171–72; Dem. 28.1–3.

106. Aischin. 3.51–52.

107. Dem. 27.4–5; cf. 29.43, 45.

108. Dem. 27.15. The context (27.13–16) suggests, though not conclusively, that the remonstrance was made early in the period of guardianship. For the relationship see Dem. 28.3.

109. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 847c, 850f; cf. Cic. *Brut.* 286; *De Orat.* 2.95.

110. Dem. 30.15, 17.

111. Aischin. 2.167; cf. Ar. *AP* 42; Rhodes 1981, 503, 509; Pélékidis 1962, 71–79; Dittenberger 1863, 8–14. Cf. chapter 8, note 118.

112. Dem. 29.1, 8, 59–60.

113. Dem. 30.33.

114. Dem. 28.17; 21.78–80; cf. 154.

115. Dem. 21.78, 205–7.

116. Dem. 29.28.

117. Dem. 30.1–8, 15; the name of the lady's father is known from Dem. 27.56 and 29.48. On the procedure of divorce, see Sealey 1990, 36.

118. Dem. 24.176; on the date, see Lewis 1954, 39–49; *IG II²*, 212 = Tod no. 167; cf. chapter 5 at notes 75–78.

119. Dem. 21.139.

120. Dem. 41, esp. 3–9; cf. Sealey 1990, 38–40. For the law safeguarding solitary daughters, see Isai. 3.42, 68; 10.13.

121. Dem. 55.18. Many readers have asked how this case came to be “an action without assessment” (*agôn atimētos*); a suggestive, though not conclusive, explanation is offered by Wolff 1943.

122. Dem. 36.44. The speech can be dated from 36.19 and 37 to 352/1 (Schaefer 1858, 161–62) or from 36.26 and 38 to 350/49 (Blass 1893, 462).

123. Dem. 24.139–41. Some (Glotz 1926, 240) attribute the Lokrian *lex talionis* to Zaleukos, which may be right. But the theme of blinding a one-eyed man was discussed in schools of rhetoric; Ar. *Rhet.* 1.1365b17–19. Diodoros (12.17) introduces the story of the amendment into his account of the laws of Charondas.

124. Dem. 23.163–68; Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 19; schol. Aischin. 3.51; cf. appendix 5.

125. Aischin. 3.51–52; cf. Schaefer 1885–1887, 1: 453 n. 5, for the explanation adopted here.

126. Dem. 51. The hypothesis attributes the speech to Apollodoros, but on such a point a scholiast could err. The case for Demosthenic authorship was argued by Blass 1893, 242–49 and accepted by Davies 1971, 135–36.

127. Plut. *Dem.* 6.3.

128. Dem. 51.9, 16.

129. Dem. 18.219; 19.297; 24.135.

Chapter 5

1. Diod. 16.7.2. The participation of Tisiphonos in the Euboian conflict is known from schol. Aristeid. *Panath.* 179.6. For the condition in Pherai, see Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35–37; Diod. 16.14.1; Sordi 1958, 235–39.

2. Dem. 8.74 (Timotheos); Dem. 18.99; 21.161 (the voluntary trierarchy); 22.14 (three days); Aischin. 3.85 (five days).

3. *IG* II², 124 = Tod no. 153; Ruschenbusch (1987) maintains that the expedition was dispatched in 358/7, but an uncertainty in his argument is pointed out by Wankel 1988a.

4. Any narrative of the war must rely on Diod. 16.7.3–4; 16.21.1–16.22.2. On the chronology, see Cawkwell 1962b, 34–40; the most helpful indication is Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12, p. 480.

5. Dem. 20.82; Nep. *Chabr.* 4.

6. *SIG*³, 192 = Tod no. 156; *SIG*³, 193 = Tod no. 152.

7. Diod. 16.21. Polyain. 3.9.29 gives Embata as the place of the battle; its location is known from Thuc. 3.29.2 and Steph. Byz. s.v. *Embaton*. The participation of Menestheus in the command is inferred from the fact that he was tried with Timotheos and Iphikrates; see Isok. 15.129. The case against the three men came to trial in 354/3; see Dion. Hal. *Dein.* 13, p. 668, and cf. Cawkwell 1962b, 45–49.

8. Schol. Dem. 4.19; cf. Diod. 16.22.1. Diodoros makes the royalist force number seventy thousand.

9. Diod. 16.22.2. Peace was doubtless concluded about winter 355/4, although it cannot be dated more precisely; cf. Cawkwell 1962b.

10. Diod. 16.34.1–2; for the date, see Sealey 1976a, 468. Badian (1983, 57–60) observes that the Thebans had had good relations with the king in 367 and received a subsidy from him in 351/0 (Diod. 16.40.1–2). He suggests that Diodoros has misplaced the expedition of Pammenes; it took place at an earlier time, when Artabazos was loyal to the king and was resisting rebel satraps, including Autophradates. But Badian's hypothesis supposes not merely that Diodoros has made an error, but also that he has harmonized it with his main narrative, including his report on the service of Chares under Artabazos. It would be more characteristic of Diodoros to leave the error in conflict with the narrative, as at 15.36.4 and 15.95.2–3.

11. Diod. 16.52.3.

12. Diod. 16.40.1–2 (under 351/0).

13. Dem. 24.11–12. It is to be noted that sometime before 333/2 the Athenians gave permission to Egyptian merchants to build a temple of Isis in Athens: *IG* II², 337 = Tod no. 189, lines 42–45.

14. Ar. *Rhet.* 2.1384b32–35. This theory of a resurgence of Athenian imperialism has been restated by Cawkwell (1981b, 51–52: "It may be confidently enough asserted that in the 360s the Confederacy was in no small measure converted into something resembling the earlier empire").

15. The cleruchy is known from Diod. 18.18.9; cf. appendix 5. Toward understanding the incident fundamental importance belongs to Cargill 1983.

16. *SIG*³, 180 = Tod no. 146. In 363/2, on overcoming the revolt in Keos, the Athenians probably restricted the jurisdiction of its cities in cases concerning harbor dues (Dreher 1989). The circumstances are obscure but conflict had probably been provoked by the Thebans (see chapter 4 at note 78).

17. Note 6. It is likely that Androtion was stationed at Arkesine at least as early

as 358/7, that is, before the war broke out (see Tod's comments on no. 152). In sending him on his mission the Athenians were evidently alive to the risk of revolt sometime before the revolt began.

18. Isok. 8.63–105, esp. 82–86 and 95. I am indebted for this argument to Cargill 1981, 176–78. Often in the speech Isokrates talks in moral terms about imperialism without giving illustrations. Davidson (1990), if I understand him aright, would refer such passages to Athenian behavior in the Second League. The speech does not compel that reference, and all the examples that Isokrates specifies for imperialism and its consequences are drawn from the fifth century.

19. Dem. 15.3, 11, 14, 27; Diod. 16.7.3; cf. Hornblower 1982, 206–11.

20. Dem. 15.26. Demosthenes calls the consequent relation of Selymbria to Byzantion *synteleia*.

21. Diod. 16.34.3–4; cf. *IG* II², 1613, lines 297–98.

22. Dem. 3.4–5; cf. Cawkwell 1962c, 131.

23. Diodoros 16.23–33 recounts the opening stages of the Sacred War. On the chronology, see Sealey, 1976a, 463–68, with references to earlier discussions. In a thorough reexamination, Buckler (1989, 148–95) puts the outbreak of war a year earlier with consequences for subsequent hostilities. His strongest arguments are drawn from inscribed Delphic accounts, but there is necessarily an element of interpretation in drawing conclusions from these. See also note 88. On the allies of the two sides, see Diod. 16.29.1; cf. 16.27.3 and 16.37.3. That Hegesippos proposed the alliance with Phokis is known from Aischin. 3.118; cf. Dem. 19.72–74.

24. Contrast Jaeger 1938, 84: "Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the affair between Thebes and Phocis, both Athens and Sparta had leaned toward the side of the Phocian temple-robbers." But the Phokians showed from *Iliad* 2.517, 519 that they were the rightful masters of the sanctuary (Diod. 16.23.5).

25. Dem. 1.8. The siege probably lasted some months, since Diodoros (16.8.2) tells of siege engines and a breach in the wall. After Philip captured Amphipolis, Stratokles was sentenced to hereditary exile (*SIG*³, 194 = Tod no. 150).

26. Dem. 23.116; [Dem.] 7.27.

27. Dem. 2.6; 3.7.

28. By Ste. Croix 1963; cf. Griffith 1979, 238–42.

29. Dem. 1.9; Diod. 16.8.3.

30. Aischin. 2.70, 72; 3.54; cf. 2.21; Dem. 5.14; cf. Isok. 5.2.

31. Meiggs 1982, 131–32.

32. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 225b fin.

33. Poteidaia: Dem. 1.12; Diod. 16.8.3–5. Anthemous: Dem. 6.20; Libanios, *Hypothesis to Dem. 1. 2*. The Athenian expedition: Dem. 4.35.

34. Diod. 16.22.3; *IG* II², 127 = Tod no. 157; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8–9; cf. Dem. 1.23; 23.189. The sequence of Philip's operations in 356 is reconstructed well by Griffith 1979, 246–54.

35. Diod. 16.31.6; 16.34.4–5; *IG* II², 130; cf. Dem. 1.12.

36. Diod. 16.8.6–7; cf. Griffith 1979, 246–50; also on the previous history of Krenides, see Griffith 1979, 234–36.

37. Diod. 16.30.3–16.33.4; cf. note 10.

38. Diod. 16.21.4; Isok. 15.129; Dein. 1.14; Nep. *Iph.* 3.3, *Tim.* 3; Polyain. 3.9.29; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 801f. For the date see Cawkwell 1962b, 45–49.

39. *IG* II², 130; Dem. 8.30.

40. Dem. 22.42–68; 24.160–75.

41. Dem. 24.11.

42. Dem. 20.2, 97, 160. There had been no grants of exemption from the trierarchy or the *eisphora*: 20.26, 28, 129. Since exemption from the *eisphora* had not been granted, there cannot have been exemption from the liturgy of the *proeisphora*.

43. Dem. 20.146.

44. Dem. 22.60. Schaefer (1885–1887, 1: 179–80, 361–63, 415–16) held that the measures were the policy of a single party led by Aristophon. For fuller criticism of his view, see Sealey 1955b, 78–80 = 1967a, 171–75.

45. On the date, see Giglioni 1970, VII–VIII: the work was composed when peace had been achieved (4.40) in a naval war (5.12) but the war for the Delphic sanctuary was still in progress (5.8–9). Giglioni's attempt at a more precise dating (to winter 355/4) rests on doubtful beliefs about the development of the Sacred War.

46. Cawkwell 1963a, 64. From before the war Cawkwell notes *IG* I², 110, line 30, and II², 53; from after the war he notes II², 130, 132, 206, 287, 342, 343, 351, 360, and 373.

47. This is a valid inference from the complaint of Deinarchos (1.96), that Demosthenes had not built buildings in the *emporion*. A few sentences previously Deinarchos mentioned Euboulos, but it does not necessarily follow that Euboulos was the man with whom Deinarchos would contrast Demosthenes on this score, for in the meantime the orator has reproached Demosthenes with many other shortcomings (*pace* Cawkwell 1963a, 64).

48. [Dem.] 7.12; Ar. *AP* 59.5; [Dem.] 33.23; cf. Poll. 8.63; Harpok. s.v. *emmēnoi dikai*.

49. The evidence is collected by Cawkwell 1963a, 64.

50. An early date, shortly before the outbreak of the war, was proposed by Jaeger 1940. A date at the end of the war is defended by Bringmann 1965, 73–95. He concludes: "Die von Isokrates vorgeschlagene 'antiimperialistische' Politik und die Restauration der 'Verfassung der Väter' sind zusammengehörende Teile eines in sich geschlossenen Reformprogramms: Friedensrede und Areopagitikos gehören zeitlich und sachlich aufs engste zusammen" (95).

51. See Isok. 15, esp. 181–92 and 270–90.

52. This suspicion was voiced and grounded more extensively by Harding 1973. His thesis has been challenged by Cargill 1981, 176–78 and by Moysey 1982.

53. Isok. 15.101–31.

54. Drerup 1916, 24–40, especially 27. An alternative and possibly correct reading of Isokrates discerns humor; the *Areopagitikos*, for example, may be not banal advice but a good joke (Harding 1988a).

55. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 166.

56. Dem. 8.30.

57. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 166; Dem. 19.89; 8.45; 9.40; 10.38.

58. The most informative text associating Euboulos with the theoric commission and indicating the extent of its activities is Aischin. 3.25. On the battlements, see schol. Dem. 3.29. It appears from Dem. 18.162 that Euboulos was dead by 330. Previous studies of the statesman have been superseded by Cawkwell 1963a. There is useful material in Buchanan 1962.

59. Dem. 1.19–20; 3.10–13. See appendix 6.

60. Dem. 21.205–7. For the settlement: Plut. *Dem.* 12.3–6; cf. Aischin. 3.52. On the dates of the incident and of speech 21, see Sealey 1955a, 96–101, with the correction offered by Davies 1971, 386. See also chapter 6, note 22.

61. Dem. 19.10–11, 303–6; Aischin. 2.184.

62. Plut. *Phok.* 6.1–7.2 (early career, Naxos); 7.3–4 (Ktesippos); 8.2 (the gener-

alships); 9.6 (the loss of Oropos); 17.3 (Nikokles in 335); 33.4 (Kallimedon); 35.5 (the men executed in 318). (On the operations of 348 in Euboea, see chapter 6). See Tritle 1988, 56–66, 97–98, 101–8. Tritle shows that Phokion, so far from being a mere adherent of Euboulos, began his career in association with Chabrias and Kallistratos and later became an independent leader with a following of his own. A more traditional account of Phokion and of his relation to Euboulos was offered by Gehrke 1976, esp. 32–36.

63. Schol. Aischin. 3.24; cf. Cawkwell 1963a, 58.

64. Dem. 19.297; [Dem.] 35.6.

65. *IG II²*, 107 = Tod no. 131 (cf. chapter 3 at note 94); *IG II²*, 106 = Tod no. 135.

66. Aischin. 2.18, 184; Diod. 16.37.3; Dem. 19.86 with schol. On the expedition, see further at note 85.

67. Aischin. 1.56, 95, 110; Schaefer 1885–1887, 2: 331 n. 6. Therefore the alleged association of Hegesandros with Leodamas (Aischin. 1.69–71, 111) should be dismissed as scandal. Aischines says that Hegesandros as treasurer to Timomachos sailed to the Hellespont (1.55–56) and that Hegesandros was treasurer of Athena in 361/0 (1.110; cf. 109). The known expedition of Timomachos to the Hellespont took place in 361/0 (see appendix 5). Schaefer solved the dilemma by supposing an earlier expedition of Timomachos to the Hellespont; this solution may be excessively charitable to Aischines.

68. Aischin. 1.64, with schol. = Hyper. frag. 40.

69. *SIG³*, 192 = Tod no. 156.

70. *IG II²*, 125 = Tod no. 154. The decree used to be assigned to 357. Knoepfler (1984) saw that it bears on the fighting of 348 but assigned it to 343. In a *Habilitationschrift* submitted at Konstanz in 1991, M. Dreher agrees that the decree refers to the fighting of 348 and assigns it to a date in that year.

71. See chapter 3 at note 97.

72. Harpok. s.v. *Melanopos*; [Dem.] 35.6.

73. Harpok. s.v. *Andron* = Antiphon frag. 14; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 833e.

74. Dem. 22.38. The date given by Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*Amm.* 1.3) for the speech is 355/4. This has been challenged by Lewis 1954, 43–44 and defended by Cawkwell 1962b, 40–45.

75. For the reform see Dem. 22.69–78; 24.176–86. For the share of Timokrates, see Dem. 24.177 fin. On the date, see Lewis 1954, 39–49.

76. Dem. 24.162, 166, 169, 172–75; cf. earlier at note 41.

77. Dem. 24.11–16, 26–31. For his earlier law see *ibid.* 63; on its importance, see Sealey 1987, 89–90.

78. *IG II²*, 212 = Tod no. 167. For a full study of Androtion in public life, see Harding 1976. Previously (1955b) I argued that Androtion and his friends were not associates of Aristophon but independent; it followed that there were at least three groups active about the end of the Social War, enmity between Euboulos and Aristophon being notorious (chapter 4, note 103). Since there were at least three groups, there may have been more. Therefore one should eschew attempts to reconstruct the Athenian political scene as a programmatic conflict in which men aligned themselves with each of two sides. That conclusion can stand, even though some of the views expressed in 1955 need to be modified.

79. Westlake 1935, 134–38; cf. Sordi 1958, 193–223; *IG II²*, 116 = Tod no. 147.

80. This visit is inferred from Diod. 16.14.2 (reading *epanelthōn* = “returning” with the manuscripts), from Just. 7.6.7 (where this visit is confused with a later one),

from the fact that Theopompos mentioned Larissa in the first book of the *Philippika* (*FGrHist* 115 F 34, 35, 48), and from the list of Philip's marriages given by Satyros (Athen. 13.557c). See Sordi 1958, 230–34 and Griffith 1979, 224–25. The inference is doubted by Martin 1981, 188–91.

81. Diod. 16.14.1–2; cf. earlier at note 1; Sordi 1958, 235–44; Griffith 1979, 227–30. As Griffith observes, a relatively small force of six thousand was sent from Thessaly to fight the Phokians in 354 and was defeated at Argolas (Diod. 16.30.4). The weakness of this Thessalian action can be explained if the Thessalians were still divided between Pherai and the cities of the League.

82. Diod. 16.35. Beloch (*Gr. Gesch.* 3.1: 477 n. 1) located the battle in the part of Thessaly called the Crocus Field or Crocus Plain. Elsewhere (1976a, 463–68) I have defended the view taken here of the chronology of the war. A different chronology of Philip's campaigns, defensible but not necessarily preferable, is offered by Martin 1981, 191–200, and by Buckler 1989, 184–85.

83. Diod. 16.37.3. Griffith 1979, 220–22 assembles the reasons for thinking that Philip was chosen archon in 352.

84. Diod. 16.35.5.

85. Diod. 16.38.2; cf. 16.37.3. It is not clear whether the forces sent from Lakadimon (one thousand men) and Argos (two thousand men) arrived at the same time or about the same time; possibly they sailed on the Athenian ships, for a land route through Boiotia would have been difficult. On Pagasai, see Dem. 1.9; cf. Griffith 1979, 278.

86. Dem. 23.8–12, 189; Diod. 16.2.6; 16.3.4; cf. earlier at note 34.

87. Dem. 23.170–71, 173, 189.

88. Dem. 23.183; Polyain. 4.2.22; cf. note 10; Badian (1983, 57–60) puts Philip's journey to Maroneia in 356/5. Buckler (1989, 177–79) has presented anew the case for putting the meeting at Maroneia in 355. Certainty is not possible, but it is perhaps preferable to suppose that the siege of Methone (cf. *IG* II², 130) kept Philip occupied well into 354. Consequently the battle of Neon, with which Diodoros (16.31.6) synchronizes the capture of Methone, is more likely to have been fought in 354 than in 355.

89. Diod. 16.34.3–4.

90. Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*Dein.* 13, p. 655) says that the Athenian expedition to Thermopylai was sent in the Attic year 353–2. This datum is valuable for the chronology of the Sacred War and of Philip's operations.

91. Dem. 1.13; cf. 4.17.

92. Schol. Aischin. 2.81. The two Amadokoi, father and son, are known from Harpok. s.v. *Amadokos*.

93. Dem. 3.4–5.

94. Griffith 1979, 284–85.

95. Dem. 20.21 gives an annual figure of "sixty or a little more" but may minimize the number. Davies (1967) argues for more than 97 in a normal year and more than 118 in a Panathenaic year. Cf. chapter 2 at notes 18–24.

96. Dem. 20.8, 24–25.

97. Dem. 20.2, 18, 29, 97, 127–28, 160.

98. Dem. 20.1, 95–96, 144–46, 152–53, 165. The procedure is not wholly clear; I follow the reconstruction of Hansen 1985b, 350–51.

99. Blass 1893, 268.

100. Dion. Hal. *Amm.* 1.4; cf. *Dein.* 1.111. Blass (1893, 265) was skeptical; but one can accept the tradition that Demosthenes delivered the speech without endorsing

the silly Hellenistic story (Plut. *Dem.* 15.3) that he wished to marry the widow of Chabrias.

101. The name of Diodoros is given in *Dem.* 24.64; the Byzantine hypotheses to *Dem.* 22 may draw it from that passage. On the date, see note 74.

102. *Dem.* 24.11–14, 26–31.

103. This may be inferred with high probability from *Dem.* 24.159 fin.

104. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.2: 261–62.

105. [*Dem.*] 47.21, 44. The view followed here is defended by Rhodes 1982, 5–11. It has been criticized by MacDowell 1986.

106. *Diod.* 16.39.1–7 (cf. 16.34.3). Diodoros implies a date in 351 for the operations of 16.39.1–7; for he synchronizes them with the activities of Phayllos, given in the preceding chapter, and he says that Sparta received help from the deposed tyrants of Pherai. But in 16.39.1–7 he may include events of more than one year.

107. *Xen. Hell.* 7.4.2–3; cf. chapter 4 at note 52.

108. *Paus.* 4.28.1–2; cf. *Dem.* 16.9.

109. *Dem.* 23.149; cf. chapter 4 at note 59.

110. *Dem.* 23.149–51; cf. chapter 4 at note 96. The grant of citizenship is also mentioned, though without any indication of date, by *Dem.* 23.23, 65; *Ar. Rhet.* 2.1399b1–4; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 143.

111. *Dem.* 23.110; cf. *Dem.* 23.13–14; second hypothesis to *Dem.* 23.3.

112. *Dem.* 23.16, 85, 91, 215–18.

113. Wolff 1970, 50–54.

114. 23.49. Elsewhere *agōgimos* is used of persons (*SIG*³, 283 = Tod no. 192, line 13), of things (*IG* II², 125 = Tod no. 154, line 15; *Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.* 5.69.1) and of both (*SIG*³, 399, lines 8–9); cf. Swoboda 1905, 20–27. In 337/6 the Athenians voted that anyone plotting against Philip and fleeing to Athens should be *paradosimos* (*Diod.* 16.92.2); the notion may be the same as *agōgimos*, that is, the person extradited will be treated according to the laws and customs of the state receiving him.

115. *Diod.* 16.34.4; cf. at notes 21 and 89. Kersebleptes acknowledged the Athenian claim to the cities of the Chersonese; he may not have had actual control of them.

116. *Dion. Hal. Amm.* 1.4; followed by the Byzantine hypotheses to *Dem.* 23; cf. *Plut. Dem.* 15.3.

117. *Dem.* 23.92, 186.

118. Cawkwell 1962c, 122–27. See earlier at note 93. Ellis (1966) proposes a date not earlier than January 350, but his argument rests on a strained interpretation of *Dem.* 3.4–5.

119. *Dem.* 15.5. The Persian reconquest of Egypt was accomplished in 343/2 (Kienitz 1953, 170–73; Cawkwell 1963c, 122, 136–38). Diodoros, who reports the reconquest erroneously under 351/0 and 350/49 (16.40.3–16.51.3), says that the same king had failed in an earlier attempt (16.40.3; cf. Kienitz 1953, 100–101).

120. *Dēmos* is used similarly, to denote a group of exiles, at *Xen. Hell.* 5.4.46. On the word *dēmokratia* cf. Sealey 1987, 91–106.

121. The lease lasted eight years (*Dem.* 36.37) and was probably terminated at the beginning of 362/1, when Pasion came of age (cf. appendix 5). The fortunes of the family have been reconstructed by Davies 1971, 427–42; one may also consult Glover 1917, 302–36.

122. *Dem.* 36.5–6.

123. *Dem.* 36.8, 22; 45.3, 37; [*Dem.*] 46.13, 20–21.

124. Dem. 36.10.
 125. Dem. 36.14–15, 32; 45.75; [Dem.] 50.60.
 126. Dem. 36.15, 32.
 127. A date in 352/1 was inferred by Schaefer (1858, 168–69) from 36.19 and 37. A date in 350/49 was inferred by Blass (1893, 462) from 36.26 and 38. But the words “twenty years” in 36.26 and 38 may be imprecise.
 128. Dem. 45.30.
 129. Dem. 36.2. The procedure has been studied by Wolff 1966.
 130. Dem. 36.1; 45.30.
 131. Many years later Demosthenes told his kinsman, Demon, that he had not taken part in any private lawsuit since he began to engage in public affairs (Dem. 32.32). One cannot be sure what deed he regarded as the beginning of his engagement in public affairs.
 132. Dem. 45.6, 51.
 133. Dem. 45.8–28 (Pasion’s will); 45.29–36 (the lease). Against the assertion that he had renounced his claims against Phormion, Apollodoros could only offer arguments of probability (45.40–42).
 134. Aischines says that Demosthenes showed each party’s speech to the other: 2.165; 3.173; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 15.1–2.
 135. Among later speeches illustrating his skill in private cases, attention may be drawn to 39 (in 348/7), 57 (in 346/5), 32 (period of Alexander), and 54 (date uncertain). On speech 39, see chapter 6 at note 24. The others will not be discussed in this book, because they scarcely throw light on the development of Demosthenes as a man or as a statesman.
 136. Her name is given by [Plut.] *Ten. Orat.* 844a and in Byzantine works (the hypothesis to Dem. 27, Zosimos’s *Life of Demosthenes*, Suda s.v. Demosthenes 1) that may draw on that treatise or its source (Caecilius?).

Chapter 6

1. For the alliance of 357, see chapter 5 at note 33. For the condition of 352/1, see Dem. 23.107–9. For the military demonstration, see Dem. 4.17.
 2. Diod. 16.52.9; 16.53–55; Dem. 8.59; 9.11. Previous inquiries into the Olynthian War have been superseded by Cawkwell 1962c. The chronology rests on four indications: (1) Philochoros *FGrHist* 328 F 49 gave the first Athenian expedition as his first event recorded under 349/8. (2) Diodoros distinguished between an early stage, when Philip approached other Chalkidian cities, and a final stage, when he attacked and besieged Olynthos. (3) After capturing Olynthos Philip celebrated an Olympic festival (Dem. 19.192); Cawkwell has identified this rightly with the Macedonian Olympia, which in 335 fell about the end of Boedromion (Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.1–1.11.1). (4) Demosthenes (19.266) says that the Olynthians lost all the cities in Chalkidike before a year had elapsed. Interpretation of this fourth indication is somewhat uncertain, since Demosthenes may minimize the interval for effect and it is not clear whether “all the cities in Chalkidike” includes Olynthos. So there is uncertainty about the season when Philip went to war.
 3. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 49; Dem. 21.161; cf. Cawkwell 1962c, 131. On the duration of the etesian winds, see Cawkwell 1978b, 74 (from mid-June “for anything up to three months”).
 4. Dem. 1.22; 2.11; Diod. 16.52.9.

5. [Dem.] 59.3–8; see appendix 6.

6. Dion. Hal. *Amm.* 1.4; Ellis 1967.

7. The participation of Kleitarchos in the developments of 348 is known from schol. Aischin. 3.86 and Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 160. The main sources for the narrative are Plut. *Phok.* 12–14 and Aischin. 3.86–88. The season is known from the reference to the Choes (12. Anthesterion) and the Dionysia (9–14. Elaphebolion) in Dem. 39.16; cf. 21.163. Reconstruction depends largely on Cawkwell 1962c, 127–30. His findings have been challenged at some points by Carter 1971 and by Brunt 1969, 247–51. The topography and armed operations have been studied by Knoepfler 1981 and Tritle 1988, 76–89.

8. Dem. 21.110, 200, 205–7; cf. Burke 1984.

9. Aischin. 3.85–87. The manuscripts say that Kallias received a force from Philip and Taurosthenes brought the Phokian troops, which is almost nonsense. The scholiast appears to have read “Phalaikos,” where the manuscripts say “Philip.” The reading “Phalaikos” has been defended by Cawkwell (1962c, 129) and some predecessors; “Philip” is defended by Brunt (1969).

10. Schol. Dem. 5.5; Plut. *Phok.* 14.1.

11. Dem. 19.290 with schol.

12. Aischin. 2.12.

13. Dem. 9.57–58; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 160. From the reference to the Eretrian *syntaxis* in Aischin. 3.100 Cawkwell (1978c, 45–46) suggests that Eretria continued to be a member of the Athenian League.

14. Aischin. 3.89–90.

15. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 50. For the dispatch of Charidemos to the Hellespont, see Dem. 3.5; cf. chapter 5 at notes 22 and 93. My reconstruction follows Cawkwell 1962c, 131. The cavalry that proceeded from Eubolia to Olynthos is known from Dem. 21.197; cf. 132. Carter (1971) associates that force with the third expedition to Olynthos; that is not impossible, but it is likely that Eubolia was emptied of Athenian forces appreciably before the third expedition set sail for Olynthos in the summer.

16. Diod. 16.53.2; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 51, 156; Suda s.v. *Karanos*.

17. Diod. 16.53.3; Dem. 19.265–67; 18.48.

18. Cawkwell 1962c, 139–40; cf. Burke 1984, 112.

19. Dem. 21.1–2, 78, 156; cf. chapter 4 at notes 114, 115. MacDowell (1990, 1–13) surveys the circumstances leading to the incident; he concludes that the antagonism between the two men was not political but personal and intense. “Political” is sometimes difficult to delimit.

20. Jaeger 1938, 145.

21. Cawkwell 1978b, 80.

22. The interval is indicated at Dem. 21.13. The outcome of the case is known from Aischin. 3.52 and Plut. *Dem.* 12.3–6. From these texts people have often inferred that the parties settled out of court and the case did not come to trial. MacDowell (1990, 23–28) acknowledges that possibility but notes also another: perhaps the court found for the plaintiff, but when it proceeded to assess the payment to be made, Demosthenes agreed to the relatively moderate sum proposed by the defendant.

23. Aischin. 2.12–14; 3.62. If the plaintiff in a *graphē* won less than a fifth of the votes, he incurred *atimia* (on which see chapter 2, note 50); cf. chapter 8 at note 100.

24. The outcome of the case is inferred from *IG* II², 1622, lines 442–43. Speech 39 was delivered in the year after the battle of Tamynai (39.16–17), as recognized by Rudhardt (1962, 41–42). Davies (1971, 367) puts speech 39 in 349/8; it was spoken

two or three years before [Dem.] 40 (Dion. Hal. *Dein.* 13, pp. 665–66); the latter speech was delivered while Kammys was still tyrant of Mytilene (40.37); and, from an Athenian inscription (*SIG*³, 205 = Tod no. 168), some infer that Kammys was overthrown by 347/6. But since tyranny was not an office and is indeed difficult to define, especially when asserted casually in a forensic speech, the failure of the Athenian inscribed decree to name Kammys does not necessarily imply that he had ceased to be the leading man in Mytilene. On the quality of the two extant speeches against Boiotos, cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893, 2:179 n. 24): “Demosthenes führt eine schlechte Sache und verliert sie, aber die Rede ist sehr geschickt. Der andere Sachwalter hat eine, wie es scheint, gute Sache; den Erfolg vermag ich nicht zu erkennen.”

25. Aischin. 2.15–16. The delay of Aristodemos in making his report should be estimated at about a year, because he had set off not long after the fall of Olynthos and the embassy of ten to negotiate peace was sent not long after he made his report (cf. note 29). Actors, such as Aristodemos (Aischin. 2.15, 19) and Neoptolemos (Dem. 5.6; 19.12, 315), could be employed in negotiations, both because of Philip’s love of the theater (cf. Cawkwell 1978b, 52) and because they were welcome in all cities; in an age that knew no passports, they could travel in safety. Badian and Heskell (1987) offer a different, though defensible, sequence for the events given by Aischines 2.12–18. But their objection to the standard way of reading Aischines’ account is not conclusive. As long as the Athenians were confident of their ability to hold Thermopylai in an emergency, they could entertain steps toward divergent policies at the same time; that is, they could dispatch a force of citizens under Chares for Olynthos, even while they upheld the decree of Philokrates, which invited Philip to send a herald and envoys; the outcome could be expected to tell them which policy was more advantageous. Even so, Badian and Heskell are surely right in drawing attention to the rhetorical artistry of Aischines.

26. Aischin. 3.62; cf. Jones 1957, 106.

27. Aischin. 2.17–19; 3.63.

28. The names are given by Aischin. 2: Aglaokreon (20), Ktesiphon (42, 47), Aristodemos (19), Derkylos (47), Iatrokles (20), Kimon (21), Philokrates (20, 47), Aischines (18, 25, 34, 47), Demosthenes (18, 22). The second hypothesis to Dem. 19.4 completes the list of ten by adding Nausikles and Phrynon; this may be right, but the value of such a source is difficult to assess.

29. The date is not attested. This embassy returned shortly before 8. Elaphebolion (Aischin. 3.67). The second embassy set off soon after 3. Mounichion (Aischin. 2.91–92), waited twenty-seven days at Pella for Philip (Dem. 19.155), and arrived back in Athens on 13. Skirophorion (Dem. 19.58). So the probable duration of an embassy was about a month. Cloché (1915, 119–25) estimated the duration of the first embassy at about twenty-four days; Cawkwell (1960, 424) estimates it at about a month.

30. Dem. 19.163; Aischin. 2.20–43, 82. On *uti possidetis* and Amphipolis, see [Dem.] 7.26. On Halos, see also Griffith 1979, 336.

31. Aischin. 2.45–46; Dem. 19.40, 316; [Dem.] 7.33.

32. The decree requiring the assembly to meet on 8. Elaphebolion is mentioned only by Aischin. 3.66–67. In his speech of 343/2 Aischines does not name that date but gives (1) a meeting of the council to hear the report of the Athenian envoys (2.45–46), and (2) a meeting of the assembly to hear their report (2.47–62); at this meeting Demosthenes carried a decree for holding meetings of the assembly on 18. and 19.

Elaphebolion (2.53, 61). Perhaps the meeting of the assembly on 8. Elaphebolion was the same as the one that heard the report of the Athenian envoys.

33. Aischin. 2.47–62, 65, 109–10; Dem. 19.253–54; 18.28.

34. *IG II²*, 212 = Tod no. 167, lines 53–59.

35. Cf. Aischin. 2.65; but Aischines commits distortion in saying that there were to be no speeches on 19. Elaphebolion. The practice of devoting two successive meetings of the assembly to an important question of foreign policy is attested in the reception given to the Kerkyraians in 433 (Thuc. 1.44.1).

36. Aischin. 3.71–72; Dem. 19.144.

37. Antipater and Parmenion: Dem. 19.69; schol. to Dem. 19.40 and 18.28. Antipater: Aischin. 3.72. Eurylochos is given by the second hypothesis to Dem. 19.5. Probably there were three; for when they were ready to depart, Demosthenes hired three span of mules for them (Aischin. 3.76).

38. Aischin. 3.69–70. The resolution of the allies said nothing about concluding an alliance with Philip. Aischines attaches weight to this omission, but that may be distortion on his part.

39. Aischin. 3.71; Dem. 19.144.

40. Aischin. 3.71–72; Dem. 19.174, 278. At 19.159 Demosthenes alleges that a preliminary version of the decree of Philokrates explicitly excluded Halos and Phokis. It is difficult to know what to make of this allegation, since neither Halos nor Phokis was a member of the syndedrion. For discussion, see Cawkwell 1960, 433–34.

41. Aischin. 2.81.

42. [Dem.] 12.11; Dem. 19.174.

43. This is to be inferred from Dem. 19.36: in a later letter Philip said that he had kept the members of the second Athenian embassy with him so that they could mediate between Halos and Pharsalos.

44. Diod. 16.58; cf. 16.33.4, 16.35.3, 16.56.1–2.

45. Dem. 19.291.

46. Dem. 19.15–16, 144, 307; Aischin. 2.75–77.

47. Aischin. 3.71–72.

48. Theopomp. *FGrHist.* 115 F 166.

49. Dem. 19.278; Aischin. 2.103–4.

50. Aischin. 2.97, 108. Those attested are Aglaokreon of Tenedos (Aischin. 2.126), Derkylos (Dem. 19.175), Iatrokles (Aischin. 2.126), Philokrates (Dem. 19.189, 229), Phrynon (Dem. 19.189, 229–30, 233), Aischines (Dem. 19.229), and Demosthenes (Dem. 19.229).

51. Aischin. 2.82–85, 90; 3.73–75.

52. Aischin. 2.91–92; Dem. 18.25; 19.154.

53. Dem. 19.155.

54. Dem. 19.156; 18.27; 8.64; 9.15; Aischin. 2.90; 3.82. Demosthenes (18.27) and others ([Dem.] 7.37) could also name places of less importance, such as Ergiske and Myrtenon, and Aischines (3.82) made fun of them for this. Cf. Griffith 1979, 555.

55. Aischin. 2.112, 120, 136; Dem. 19.139–40; Just. 8.4.

56. Aischin. 2.120, 136–37.

57. Dem. 18.32.

58. Dem. 19.158.

59. Dem. 19.17–18, 31–32, 58. Demosthenes (19.32) calls as witness the man who proposed the *probouleuma*. Aischines (2.121–22) says that Demosthenes him-

self proposed the customary honors to the envoys, and that afterward, when the assembly met to hear the reports of the envoys, Demosthenes said that the speech of Aischines to Philip had been even better than Aischines said. But Aischines does not call testimony. A more ingenious reconstruction is attempted by Cawkwell 1962d.

60. Dem. 19.19–22, 34–35, 58.

61. Dem. 19.23–24, 35, 45–46; cf. 6.29–30.

62. Aischin. 2.128–29, 137; Dem. 19.36.

63. Dem. 19.47–49, 121.

64. Dem. 19.121–24, 129–30; Aischin. 2.94–95, 140.

65. Dem. 19.211–12; cf. Dem. 19.17, 103, 132, 223, 256. Cf. Wüst 1938, 78–81, also Roberts 1982, 49. On the procedure of accountability, see Ar. *AP* 48.4–5; 54.2; Aischin. 3.17–22; Harpok. s.v. *logistai kai logistêria*.

66. Dem. 19.58–60, 125; Aischin. 2.95.

67. Aischin. 2.140–43.

68. Dem. 19.86, 125; 18.37; Aischin. 2.139; 3.80.

69. I stated this principle in 1956a, 237–39 = 1967a, 62–64.

70. When a pleader in court cannot produce witnesses for a derogatory assertion made to the detriment of his adversary, skepticism is in order. But historians have been curiously willing to accept the allegation that Demosthenes collapsed: “Il eut comme une crise de nerfs” (Glotz and Cohen 1941, 289), “Demosthenes, who spoke last, broke down from nervousness. He was never a ready extempore speaker, and it is quite likely that the nine or ten earlier speeches may have left him at a loss for arguments” (A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *CAH* 6: 235), “His [Demosthenes] whole temperament was nervous. During his audience with Philip in 346 words literally failed him” (Cawkwell 1978b, 80). Yet Schaefer (1885–1887, 2: 197–205) had pointed out reasons for doubting Aischines’ story.

71. Dem. 19.10–11, 303–6; Aischin. 2.79, 164; 3.58, 64.

72. Aischin. 2.57, 79, 164; 3.58, 64; Dem. 19.10.

73. Dem. 19.16; Aischin. 2.58–62; cf. Cawkwell 1960, 418–27.

74. By Cawkwell 1960, 424–25.

75. Dem. 18.23; cf. Cawkwell 1960, 421–22. The assertion of Dem. 18.23 has led some, most recently Wankel (1976, 1: 234), to suppose two sets of embassies; but there is no support for that assertion.

76. Diod. 16.56.3–5.

77. Aischin. 2.132–35; cf. Diod. 16.59.1. Later developments (Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56b) suggest that Nikaia was the main fort; Alponos and Thronion may have been small positions dependent on it.

78. Proxenos at Oreos: Dem. 19.155. The chance remark: Dem. 19.322.

79. Dem. 3.4–5; cf. chapter 5 at notes 22 and 93.

80. Aischin. 2.133–34; cf. Cloché 1915, 119–25.

81. *IG* I³, 6B = *SIG*³, 42.

82. Cawkwell 1960, 430–33; cf. Cawkwell 1978a; Ramming 1965, 34–46; Griffith 1979, 334.

83. The council was required to hold a session in the Eleusinion on the day after the Mysteries: Andok. 1.111. There was opportunity for the procedure of *probolê* at a meeting of the assembly after each major festival: Dem. 21.1–2, 8–11; Lex. Seg. 288. 18; Poll. 8.46.

84. Tod no. 137.

85. I presented this thesis previously (1955c). I have learned since that the Athenian calendar was less regular than I had supposed. The implication of Aischin. 2.37

for the date when Proxenos sailed has been overlooked by Cawkwell (1960, although at 428 n. 2 he recognizes in Aischin. 2.37 an argument for associating the incident with the Lesser Mysteries, not the Greater Mysteries) and by Griffith (1979, 333 n. 3). Ellis (1976, 266 n. 70) offers a more elaborate hypothesis: "For the synchronism: Ais. 2.132ff. Sealey *WS* 1955, 145ff, misdates this assembly misreading Ais. 2.36f. What seems likely is that when intelligence arrived of the change in Phokian leadership, soon after the offer of the Thermopylai towns, Proxenos was sent to discover whether the arrangements still held. Spurned, like the Spartans, by Phalaikos, he remained near by to watch developments and conveyed his report by letter to the *demos*. At this point the first embassy departed. As Demosthenes (allegedly) said, the large force had been voted but it would never be manned. See Cawkwell *REG* 1960, 416ff." But it follows from Dem. 19.155 and 322 (cf. note 78) that the fifty ships commanded by Proxenos sailed to Oreos, where he held them at the time of the second embassy. One might perhaps try to save Ellis's hypothesis by supposing that Proxenos went ahead and was rebuffed by Phalaikos and later his fifty ships sailed to join him. But the Athenians would not be likely to incur the expense of sending fifty ships to sea after their mission had been frustrated; late in 352 they had refrained for a comparable reason from sending forty ships to the Hellespont.

86. Aischin. 2.72; cf. Dem. 4.34; Griffith 1979, 331.

87. Aischin. 2.134.

88. *Ibid.*

89. Diod. 16.59.2–4; cf. 16.61.3–16.63.5; Aischin. 2.140–41; Dem. 19.315–28; 18.35–36, 42–43.

90. Cf. Aischin. 3.81.

91. Dem. 19.51, 126–27, 172; Aischin. 2.95–96, 139.

92. Diod. 16.60. For the first Phokian payment, see *SIG*³, 230 = Tod no. 172. Aischines (2.142–43) said that he had interceded for the vanquished, which may be true, since he called some Boiotians and Phokians as witnesses, but he may have exaggerated the extent of his influence on the settlement.

93. Aischin. 2.162.

94. Dem. 19.128; Aischin. 2.162–63.

95. Dem. 19.128, 132; 5.22; cf. 9.32.

96. Dem. 19.111–13.

97. Dem. 6.22 with schol.; Aischin. 3.140; cf. Griffith 1979, 544.

98. Cf. Dem. 6.35.

99. Thuc. 5.14.4.

100. Thuc. 5.30.3.

101. Thuc. 1.126.1; 7.18.2.

102. [Dem.] 12.16. [Dem.] 12 purports to be this letter.

Chapter 7

1. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 27; Griffith (1979, 203) shows some respect for the opinion of Theopompus.

2. The *locus classicus* on Lower and Upper Macedon is Thuc. 2.99.1–3. On Alexander of Lynkestis, see Arr. *Anab.* 1.25; Curt. 7.1.5–9; Berve 1926 s.v. *Al.* 37; on Harpalos, see Badian 1961, 22. The tension between Lower and Upper Macedon, mostly latent after Philip defeated the Illyrians in 358 but possibly erupting in his assassination, has been illuminated by Bosworth 1971.

3. Diod. 16.3.1–2; Dem. 2.17; Griffith 1979, 705–13.
4. Diod. 16.4.3–7; cf. Griffith 1979, 396.
5. Arr. *Anab.* 4.13.1; cf. Griffith 1979, 401.
6. Cawkwell 1978b, 111; Griffith 1979, 460–61.
7. [Dem.] 12.5.
8. Diod. 16.69.7; Trog. *Prol.* 8; Just. 8.6.3; Didym. 12.64–13.2; cf. Griffith 1979, 469–74.
9. Peconella Longo 1971, 83. She does not give reasons for this assumption.
10. Cawkwell 1978b, 118–23. Adopting less sophisticated language, Will (1983, 9–11) assumes without argument a division of Athenians into pro-Macedonians and anti-Macedonians. Reviewing Will's book, Bosworth remarks: "It has long been accepted that the labels pro- and anti-Macedonian are seriously misleading" (*Gnomon* 57 [1985] 435).
11. Remarks advising caution: for example, Plut. *Phok.* 9.6; 17.1; 22.5–6. At Megara: *ibid.* 15. At Eretria: Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 160. At Byzantion: Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–8. On the independence of Phokion, see Tritle 1988, esp. 101–8, and on his attitude to Macedon, 115. Assuming the existence of a peace party, some (Glotz and Cohen 1941, 244) have regarded Phokion as the commander on whom that party relied. That categorization attributes a strange meaning to the notion of a "peace party," in view of Phokion's distinguished record in warfare. It is sometimes maintained that the choice of a commander to an expedition does not imply his agreement with the policy, and the selection of Nikias to share command of the force sent to Sicily in 415 is cited as an illustration. But the choice of Nikias was sufficiently paradoxical for Thucydides to draw attention to it.
12. Aischin. 3.216–18, 220; Dem. 18.139, 307–8. The voice: Dem. 19.216 *fin.*, 337–39, and cf. 206; 18.285, 308.
13. Cf. Griffith 1979, 456–57. The date of the treatise follows from 5.7, 50, 54–56.
14. Wilcken 1929; Perlman 1957; Bringmann 1965, 96–102. A singularly thorough study of the *Philippos* of Isokrates and related works has been made by Markle 1976. In addition to interpreting the texts, Markle tries to show that the intellectuals, Isokrates and Speusippos, had significant effect toward impeding the anti-Macedonian policies of Demosthenes. But the demonstration rests on the assumption, to be criticized later, that already in 344 the Athenians could recognize Macedon and Persia as adversaries. The thought of Isokrates remains obscure; different interpretations can be defended and none can be refuted.
15. Isok. *Ep.* 2.2–11; Meyer 1909b.
16. Cf. Griffith 1979, 474.
17. The letter is preserved as no. 30 among the Socratic *Epistles*. The authorship of Speusippos was established by Bickermann and Sykutris 1928.
18. Cf. Sykutris (in Bickermann and Sykutris 1928, 81–82): "Das Bild, das diese Schrift von ihm bietet, zeigt ihn gewiss nicht in günstigem Licht. . . . Hass und Gefälligkeit führen seine Feder."
19. Dem. 8.28.
20. Aischin. 1.77–78, 86; Androtion, *FGrHist* 324 F 52; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 52.
21. This can probably be inferred from the fortunes of Boiotos; see appendix 4. Admission of a son to membership in the phratry is illustrated by Isai. 6.21–22; 8.19; Dem. 57.54; [Dem.] 43.11–14, 82; 59.59–60. The procedure of admission to the deme is described by Ar. *AP* 42.1–2.

22. Allegedly scrutinies had been held ca. 509 and in 445/4. Reasons to doubt the historicity of both were furnished by Jacoby, *FGrHist* III b (supplement) I, 158–61.

23. The year is known from Aischin. 1.80 and schol. Aischin. 1.109, the season from 1.157; cf. Wankel 1988b.

24. Dem. 19.283–84.

25. Dem. 19.162 with schol.; cf. Wüst 1938, 46.

26. Dem. 18.252–55; cf. Cawkwell 1978b, 130.

27. [Dem.] 7.32; Dem. 9.12; 10.61; 19.260; cf. Isok. *Ep.* 2.20; Diod. 16.69.8; Trog. *Prol.* 8.

28. Griffith 1979, 525, relying on Dem. 19.320.

29. Dem. 6.22; Griffith 1979, 527–33.

30. Dem. 6.15, cf. 9, 13. At 6.14–15 Demosthenes insists that he is stating what Philip does as distinct from his supposed intentions. Cawkwell (1963c, 200–205; 1978b, 126–27, 132–33) has maintained that many of Demosthenes' allegations of Macedonian intervention are untrustworthy. He has been answered by Griffith (1979, 474–79): the trust the Athenians continued to put in Demosthenes would be inexplicable, if he had been found to be wrong repeatedly. Cawkwell's strongest argument is drawn from [Dem.] 7: looking for Macedonian outrages, the speaker mentions Philip's advance on Kassopia and Ambrakia (7.32) but says nothing about intervention in Messene and Argos, Elis, Megara, or Euboia. Since Philip's troops were sent to Messene and Argos at the request of those two cities, Griffith's explanation is attractive: in speech 7 Hegesippos restricted himself to cases where Philip was not invited by a city or a group within a city, cases that is where Macedonian breach of autonomy was indisputable. Moreover, Cawkwell's inference places a large burden on an argument from silence.

31. Calhoun 1933.

32. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 157, preserved by Didym. 8.7–26; Diod. 16.44.2–4. The date of the Persian reconquest of Egypt has been established by Cawkwell (1963c, 122–23; cf. Wüst 1938, 59–63), and he has pointed out that the interval between the dispatch of envoys to Greece and the armed operations is by no means excessive.

33. [Dem.] 7.18–23; 12.18; Dem. 18.136; Didym. 8.7–26. I have discussed the chronology and interrelationship of the diplomacy of 344/3 in 1978, 300–10 and abstain from repeating in full the arguments against other reconstructions. Two points are crucial. First, speech 6 is earlier than the embassy of Python (cf. Griffith 1979, 489, against Cawkwell 1963c, 124); for the speech has no knowledge of Python's offer and it presents *epanorthōsis* as a slogan initiated by the Athenians. Second, as Jacoby saw (*FGrHist* III b [supplement] I, 531–33), Didymos derived the synchronism of the Persian and Macedonian embassies from Anaximenes, not from Philochoros, and Anaximenes invented the synchronism in order to present the two major monarchies in dramatic confrontation. Two uncertainties, of no great moment, remain. First, the Persian envoys may arrive in Athens before or after the occasion of Demosthenes 6. Second, it is not clear how late in 344/3 Python's embassy fell; Griffith (1979, 489–93) puts it in 344, Wüst (1938, 64–65) argues for the opening months of 343. One must allow for the ensuing embassy of Hegesippos and the Macedonian message, to which [Dem.] 7 responded.

34. The statements of Hegesippos in 343/2 ([Dem.] 7.20, 23) are doubtless more accurate than those made by Demosthenes in court in 330 (18.136).

35. [Dem.] 7.18–19, 30. The order in which the two amendments were presented is neither certain nor important. Cawkwell (1963c, 132) thinks that Philip initiated

the proposal to convert the peace of Philokrates into a common peace, but [Dem.] 7.30 reports this proposal as initiated by the Athenians; cf. Griffith 1979, 490.

36. Bickermann in Bickermann and Sykutris 1928, 27–28.

37. Dem. 18.331. At [Dem.] 12.20 Philip expresses his view of the Amphipolitan question with indignation.

38. Cawkwell (1963c, 133); likewise Wüst (1938, 77 “dieses Meisterstück der antimakedonischen ‘Partei’”; the significance of the quotation marks embracing “Partei” is not explained), Ramming (1965, 97 “die geschickte Intrige des Demosthenes”), Griffith (1979, 491 “the folly of the *demos* on this occasion lay in the failure to recognize the slogan for what it was, a rhetor’s *coup* and nothing more”). With greater discernment Cloché (1934, 251–53) insisted that the reply to Persia was not a success of “le parti macédonien” against “les démosthéniens”; for the reply left the Persian king free to act, provided that he did not encroach on Greek cities, and it conformed to the policy advocated by Demosthenes in speeches 14 and 15.

39. Hdt. 5.22; cf. 8.137–39; Dem. 9.31.

40. Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.2. For skeptical discussion of the letter, see G. T. Griffith 1968 and 1979, 485–86. From the silence of the sources of the next few years, Griffith argues that there was no alliance. That inference is valid, but it does not exclude a mere exchange of noncommittal courtesies. Since kings are not bound by the formulaic language of Athenian decrees, they can invent phrases of every nuance. Napoleon III opened a letter to the tsar with “Mon cher frère,” and received a reply addressed to “Mon cher cousin.” Crucial features of the letter of Dareios to Alexander are defended as authentic by Bernhardt 1988. Those accepting the tradition of a friendly exchange between Philip and Artaxerxes have often assigned it to 344–43 (Kahrstedt 1910, 139; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.1: 538; Glotz and Cohen 1941, 321; Wüst 1938, 89–90).

41. Dem. 19.260, 294–95; 10.10; cf. Diod. 16.63.4–5. Against the doubts of Cawkwell (1963c, 203; 1978b, 126–27), see Griffith (1979, 499–501), who notes that Pausanias (4.28.4; cf. 5.4.9) held Philip responsible for the troubles. On the sequence of crises in 343 (Elis, Eretria, Megara), I cannot improve on Griffith 1979, 497–502.

42. Dem. 9.57–58; 19.87, 204; see appendix 7.

43. Geraistos: Dem. 19.326. The arrest of Euphraios: Dem. 9.59–60. See appendix 7.

44. Dem. 19.294–95, 334; Plut. *Phok.* 15; cf. Tritle 1988, 90–91, and Griffith 1979, 497–99.

45. Dem. 19.116; Aischin. 2.6; cf. Dem. 19.114, 119, 145–46, 245; Hyper. *Eux.* 29.

46. Dem. 19.280–81 with schol. His survival is attested by *IG II*², 1623, lines 163–64. His arrest by the Areopagos under a decree of Demosthenes (Dein. 1.63) may be a later incident, as pointed out by Davies 1971, 478.

47. Aischin. 2.184; cf. Dem. 19.290–91. The time of the year has to be inferred from the silence of Demosthenes about Philip’s advance into Epeiros and toward Ambrakia. That advance can be dated approximately to winter 343/2 from the Athenian response, which included making an alliance with Messene and others in the tenth prytany of 343/2 (*IG II*², 225; see further at note 56). The *Letter of Speusippos* (30.7; cf. note 17) alludes to Philip’s interest in Ambrakia, probably anticipating his advance thither, and was written while papyrus was still scarce in consequence of the Persian operations in Egypt (30.14).

48. Idomeneus apud Plut. *Dem.* 15.5; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 840c; *Hypothesis to Aischines* 2. Roberts (1982, 49–53) discusses the trial and concludes: “Surely Aeschines’

acquittal showed the continued strength of the pro-Macedonian party at Athens." But the speech Aischines delivered in his own defense (2) does not express any pro-Macedonian views. Cf. above, "Alignments in Athens."

49. Aischin. 1.89–94; on the date, see appendix 7.

50. Just. 8.6.4–8; Diod. 16.72.1; *IG II*², 226 = Tod no. 173; cf. Griffith 1979, 505–6, with 308 n. 3. An earlier date (before 349) for the expulsion of Arybbas has been proposed by Errington (1975) and defended by Heskel 1988. But the order given in the decree to the generals to provide for restoring Arybbas suits the Athenian mood of 342 better than the earlier date.

51. [Dem.] 7.32 speaks of three cities; Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 206) adds a fourth. Griffith (1979, 505 n. 3) explains the divergence by supposing that the fourth city yielded without resisting.

52. [Dem.] 7.32; Dem. 9.27, 34; 10.10.

53. [Dem.] 48.24–26. Cawkwell (1978b, 116) objects: "An expedition was hastily sent off to Acarnania which was the area to the south of the Gulf, wholly useless for the saving of Ambracia if indeed it could have got there in time. Nothing happened to Ambracia. Philip clearly had had no intention of attacking it. If he had so intended, nothing that Athens could have done would have stopped him." But the *Letter of Speusippos* (30.7) offers justification for Philip's designs on Ambrakia, so they were to be taken seriously. Also, an Athenian force could reach Akarnania quickly by crossing Corinthian territory (cf. Thuc. 2.93) with Corinthian approval (cf. Dem. 9.34) and sailing from the gulf. There was a causeway across the isthmus (Strabo 8.335, 369, 380; cf. Fowler and Stillwell 1932, 49–51; Hood 1957, 7).

54. Dem. 9.72; 18.244; Aischin. 3.95–97; cf. appendix 7.

55. Aischin. 3.95–102; Dem. 9.66.

56. Dem. 9.66; schol. Aischin. 3.83; *IG II*², 225.

57. Dem. 9.34, where the reading of S is much to be preferred (Bühler 1978).

58. The approximate time of his departure for Thrace is known from Dem. 8.2, 35.

59. Dem. 8.36; 9.58, 61–62; cf. appendix 7.

60. Aischin. 3.83; Plut. *Dem.* 9.6.

61. Griffith 1979, 545.

62. At 18.244 Demosthenes lists his embassies in an order that may be chronological; he mentions the embassy to Thessaly before that to Ambrakia. About this time the Athenians sent an embassy of Aristodemos and others to Thessaly and Magnesia: Aischin. 3.83 with schol.

63. Dem. 9.26; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 208, 209; cf. Wüst 1938, 99–101; Griffith 1979, 533.

64. Dem. 9.32; [Dem.] 11.4; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56b.

65. Didymos 13.3–7; Just. 9.3.1–3.

66. Diod. 16.71.1–2; [Dem.] 12.8–10.

67. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 158.

68. Dem. 8.9, 20, 24–26, 28.

69. [Dem.] 7.41–44.

70. [Dem.] 12.11.

71. [Dem.] 7.39.

72. Libanios, *Hypothesis to Dem.* 8; [Dem.] 7.41–44; cf. Dem. 9.35; 10.60, 65, 68 = 8.58, 64, 66; [Dem.] 12.3, 11.

73. *IG II*², 228 = Tod no. 174; *IG II*², 1628, lines 419–20; 1629, lines 940–41.

74. [Dem.] 7.15 with schol.

75. Griffith 1979, 565.

76. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 159–60; Dem. 18.237; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 845a; cf. appendix 7.

77. [Dem.] 12.5.

78. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 850a; Hyper. frags. 161, 194; Diod. 16.77.2.

79. Jaeger 1938, 180.

80. Griffith 1979, 517–22.

81. Diod. 16.52.2–7. I am indebted to Dr. M. Weiskopf for suggestively skeptical discussion of the incident; he is not responsible for my formulation.

82. Diod. 16.42.2; 16.45.1–6; 16.47.1–4; 16.49.7–16.50.8; 16.52.1–4.

83. Diod. 16.75.1–2.

84. The identification is suggested by Badian (1967, 179–80) from Diod. 17.62.4–6, Tod no. 199, and Curt. 9.3.21.

85. [Dem.] 12.6.

86. Dem. 18.79, 83, 223; Plut. *Dem.* 17.1; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 848d; cf. Wüst 1938, 113; Griffith 1979, 551.

87. Dein. 1.62–63. The man imprisoned was Proxenos, a descendant of Harmodios; cf. Davies 1971, 478.

88. Dem. 18.132–33; Dein. 1.63; Plut. *Dem.* 14.5.

89. Dem. 18.134; Hyper. frags. 67–75; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 850a.

90. P. Oxy. 34 (1968) no. 2686; cf. Sealey 1987, 56–57.

91. Schaefer (1885–1887, 2: 372–74) thought that he discerned in Dem. 19.209 an allusion to the exclusion of Aischines from the Delphic embassy. Wüst (1938, 47–49) thought that Aischines spoke sarcastically of the Areopagos at 1.81, 84, 92; so he put the affair of Antiphon before the trial of Timarchos. Glotz and Cohen (1941, 308) put the scandal of Antiphon toward 344 and supposed that the Areopagos continued its activities for several years. Of the dispute between Athens and Delos, Griffith says (1979, 468): “The date of this is quite uncertain, apart from some general probability that Delos might see prospects in 346, rather than later, of a successful appeal to the Amphictyony against the Athenian administration of her temple.”

92. One of the men against whom the council took action was Charinos (Dein. 1.63). Apparently he was blamed because the people of Ainos joined Philip ([Dem.] 58.37–38). They probably did so in 342, when Philip marched into Thrace (Schaefer 1858, 277). So Charinos might well be denounced by the council in 341 or later.

93. Alliance with Byzantion: Dem. 9.34; 18.87; with Perinthos: schol. Aischin. 2.81. At [Dem.] 12.2 Philip makes an *ex parte* allusion to deterioration of his relations with Byzantion.

94. See note 73; cf. Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–4.

95. [Dem.] 12; Griffith (1979, 714–16) offers reflections on the authenticity of the text and on the chance of discovering in it the voice of Philip as distinct from men of letters whom he may have employed.

96. Griffith (1979, 568 n. 4) defends this date, drawn from Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 54, against Wüst (1938, 127 n. 3), but the balance of the argument is not fully clear. Narrative of the siege depends on Diod. 16.74.2–16.76.4.

97. Diod. 16.76.3–4.

98. Following arguments of M. Pohlenz, Wüst (1938, 136–40) reconstructed the siege of Selymbria from the *Hypothesis to [Dem.] 11*, the scholion to Dem. 18.76, and the documents in Dem. 18.73–79; cf. Griffith 1979, 574 n. 3.

99. Plut. *Phok.* 14.3–4.

100. Didym. 10.34–11.5, drawing on Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 162 and Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292. Justin (9.1.6) gives 170 as the number of ships captured.
101. Dem. 18.73, 76; Didym. 10.24–30.
102. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 55.
103. Plut. *Phok.* 14.5–7; *IG* II², 1628, lines 436–438; 1629, lines 957–59; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 851a; cf. Tritle 1988, 52–53, 92–93.
104. Hyper. frag. 134; Aischin. 3.222; Dem. 18.102–7. The date is inferred from Dem. 18.107. The law of Demosthenes has been noted in discussions of liturgies; see especially Davies 1981, 15–28, Ste. Croix 1953, Rhodes 1982, 5–11, MacDowell 1986.
105. [Dem.] 47.21; the date is known from 47.44; the distribution of the twelve hundred into symmories is illustrated by Dem. 14.16–23.
106. Diod. 16.77.2; *SIG*³, 256 = Tod no. 175.
107. Just. 9.1.7; Dem. 18.139; Porphyrios of Tyre, *FHG* 3: 692; cf. Wüst 1938, 142.
108. Just. 9.1.9–9.3.3; cf. Griffith 1979, 581–83.
109. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56b apud Didym. 11.40–51.
110. Aischin. 3.140; cf. [Dem.] 11.4. The explanation is offered by Griffith 1979, 543.
111. Dem. 9.34; Griffith 1979, 543 n. 4.
112. Aischin. 3.115–30; Dem. 18.139–59. Wüst (1938, 153–55) maintained that the trouble began at the spring *pylaia* of 339. Griffith (1979, 717–19) acknowledged the elegance of Wüst's argument but preferred the fall *pylaia* of 340: "For the plain fact is that the incidents themselves of the whole story do require a full twelve months in which they can happen, and not less than twelve." There are two objections, a weaker and a stronger one, to Griffith's thesis. The weaker one is that he conflicts with Dem. 18.151. Philip was chosen to the Amphiktyonic command at the fall *pylaia* of 339. Demosthenes says that Philip was chosen "at the next *pylaia*" after the extraordinary meeting and the expedition of Kottiphos. But on Griffith's view the next *pylaia* after those events was the spring *pylaia* of 339, a meeting for which he can only offer a short agenda. The stronger objection is that apparently (to judge from the story here reconstructed) some people, presumably Kottiphos and his friends, wished to pursue the quarrel with Amphissa in haste.
113. Dem. 18.150. From Thuc. 1.139.2, it may be inferred that the boundary of the sacred land at Eleusis was not marked; cf. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 155.
114. Aischin. 3.123; Dem. 18.151. The accounts given by the two orators supplement one another and overlap in part; the result of combining them is credible.
115. *SIG*³, 244A line 24, cf. page 314.
116. Aischin. 3.116; Dem. 18.150. Griffith (1979, 585) reads the matter differently.
117. Dem. 18.148 fin.
118. Aischin. 3.126–27.
119. I defended this thesis with references to predecessors in 1978, 310–16. Griffith (1979, 585–88), who was at work about the same time as I was, pays his unwitting tribute to the persuasive power of Demosthenes. Cawkwell (1978b, 141) is more realistic: "he [Philip] entered Greece without the aid of Aeschines or anyone else engaged in the political fisticuffs of the Fourth Sacred War." Ellis (1976, 186–89) supposes that Philip instigated the intended charge of the Amphissians against the Athenians. I regret that in 1978, 314, I did not know of the study of P. de La Coste-Messelière 1949 (I thank D. M. Lewis for drawing my attention to this), which has shown that

Palaos was archon at Delphi in 337/6; so Kotttyphos and Kolosimmos were still the Thessalian hieromnemes in fall 337, and there is no reason to think that they lost Philip's favor.

120. Aischin. 3.128; Griffith 1979, 718.

Chapter 8

1. Hdt. 8.31. The accuracy of Herodotos's report has been defended by Pritchett 1982, 211–33; cf. 1985, 190.

2. Thuc. 3.92–93; cf. Pritchett 1985, 199–206.

3. Thuc. 4.78.1.

4. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6.

5. Diod. 14.82.6–7; cf. 14.38.4–5.

6. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9.

7. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27; Diod. 15.57.2.

8. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23.

9. The diplomatic essentials were recognized by Glotz 1909. The record of payments was corrected by de La Coste-Messelière 1949; cf. Griffith 1979, 592–93.

10. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56.

11. Hignett 1963, 138–40.

12. Cawkwell 1978b, 142; Griffith 1979, 589.

13. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56a; cf. appendix 6. Some historians (cf. Wüst 1938, 158 n. 1) have doubted this order of events and supposed that the decree about the revenues was passed later in connection with the financial terms of the alliance concluded with Thebes; they pay tribute thus to the eloquence of Demosthenes.

14. Dem. 18.160–214; Aischin. 3.137–41.

15. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56; Dem. 18.213.

16. Aischin. 3.141–45, and cf. 106; Dem. 18.238; Mosley 1971.

17. See notably Wüst 1938, 158–66; Griffith 1979, 589–603. The date of the battle is known from Plut. *Cam.* 19.8.

18. Griffith 1979, 592–93.

19. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 56b.

20. Dem. 18.156, 158, 218, 221–22.

21. Polyain. 4.2.8; cf. Aischin. 3.146; Dein. 1.74. The survival of Amphissa is inferred from Diod. 18.38.2 against Strabo 9.419; cf. 427. On exiles, cf. Diod. 18.56.5. Cf. Wüst 1938, 163–64; Griffith 1979, 594.

22. Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 235; Strabo 9.427; cf. chapter 7 at note 57; Wüst 1938, 164; Griffith 1979, 594.

23. Just. 9.3.6–8; cf. Aischin. 3.145–46.

24. Dem. 18.237; cf. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 845a.

25. Dem. 18.237; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 17.3.

26. Diod. 16.85.5. But thirty thousand may be a stock figure for an army of Macedonian infantry in this period; cf. Diod. 16.74.5; 17.9.3.

27. Griffith 1979, 599 with n. 4. Justin (9.3.9) says that “the Athenians” were far superior in numbers.

28. Diod. 16.87; cf. Suda s.v. *Demades* 2; Aischin. 3.227; Dem. 18.282, 284.

29. Lyk. 1.16; cf. 43, 57.

30. Lyk. 1.39.

31. Dem. 18.248; Dein. 1.78–79; cf. Schaefer 1885–1887, 3: 12–13.
32. Plut. *Phok.* 16.3.
33. Dem. 18.248 fin.; Aischin. 3.159.
34. Polyb. 5.10.1–5; Just. 9.4.4–5; Diod. 16.87.3; 32.4.1; Demades, *On the Twelve Years* 9. The terms of peace were reconstructed by Schaefer (1885–1887, 3: 25–31) and his work has been followed, for example by Roebuck 1948.
35. Paus. 1.25.3.
36. Samos: Ar. *AP* 62.2; Diod. 18.56.7; Plut. *Alex.* 28.2; cf. Diog. L. 10.1.1. Lemnos: Ar. *AP* 61.6; 62.2. Imbros and Skyros: Ar. *AP* 62.2. Delos: *IG* II², 1652.
37. Paus. 1.34.1; Demades, *On the Twelve Years* 9; schol. Dem. 18.99; Diod. 18.56.6; Hyper. *Eux.* 16.
38. Plut. *Phok.* 16.4–5.
39. Just. 9.4.6–8.
40. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1; Diod. 16.87.3; 17.8.3–7; Paus. 9.1.8; 9.6.5.
41. Orchomenos and Plataia: Paus. 4.27.10. Orchomenos: Paus. 9.37.8. Plataia: Paus. 9.1.8. The restoration of Thespias is inferred from the statue set up to Philip there: Dio Chrys. 37.42. Cf. Diod. 17.13.5.
42. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.11.
43. *IG* XII, 9, 207.
44. Hyper. *Dem.* 20.
45. The details have been worked out with care from difficult evidence by Roebuck 1948, 84–89.
46. See especially Ryder 1965, 150–62, also Griffith 1979, 634–46.
47. Polyb. 18.11.5 (17.11.5).
48. Deinarchos (1.18) shows that in 335 there was something to prevent the Arkadians from going beyond the Isthmus; cf. Plut. *Arat.* 23.4; Polyb. 38.3.3.
49. Chalkis was secure for the Macedonians by 334 (Arr. *Anab.* 2.2.4; cf. Strabo 10.447; Polyb. 38.3.3). A garrison may have been installed in 335, when Alexander suppressed the Theban rising (as Griffith 1979, 612 n. 3 suggests), or earlier.
50. Diod. 17.3.3; 17.4.3.
51. Diod. 16.89; Just. 9.5.1–7; cf. Plut. *Phok.* 16.5–7.
52. Diod. 17.17.4; Arr. *Anab.* 1.18.4; cf. 1.11.6.
53. Plut. *Phok.* 16.3 (Demosthenes urged the Athenians to fight the battle as far away from Athens as possible. Phokion replied: “My dear sir, let us not consider where we are to fight but how we are to win. If we win, the war will be far away, but if we are defeated, every danger will be present and near”); cf. Tritle 1988, 112.
54. Dem. 18.285; Plut. *Dem.* 21.2. It is not clear whether the funeral speech preserved in the Demosthenic corpus (60) is genuine. Its authenticity was defended against earlier critics by Sykutris 1928. The question need not be confronted here. The speech does not provide additional historical information, and as Sykutris (258) said of it, “Zu D.’ oratorischem Ruhm trägt er freilich kaum etwas bei.”
55. See chapter 7, “Demosthenes and the Areopagos.” The law of Eukrates is *SEG*, 12.87, first published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 21 (1952): 355–59. I proposed this interpretation of the law in 1958 = 1967a, 183–85. Mossé (1970) has pointed out that a law against subversion was in no way opposed to Philip; the agreement creating the League of Corinth guaranteed current constitutions ([Dem.] 17.10, 15).
56. The earlier awards: Dem. 18.83, 222–23. The award and indictment of 337/6: Aischin. 3.11, 24, 27–31. The date of the trial: Dion. Hal. *Amm.* 1.12; Plut. *Dem.* 24.2. Demomeles was a cousin of Demosthenes (Davies 1971, 116).

57. Diod. 16.91–94; Just. 9.6–7; Plut. *Alex.* 10.

58. These are respectively the theories of Griffith 1979, 684–91; Badian 1963; and Bosworth 1971.

59. Diod. 16.92.1–2.

60. Plut. *Dem.* 22.2; cf. Aischin. 3.160.

61. Aischin. 3.77; Plut. *Dem.* 22.3. Other stories of his alleged activities (for example, Aischin. 3.160; Plut. *Dem.* 22.1) may well be doubted. It is also alleged that the Athenians entered into secret communications with Attalos (Diod. 17.3.2). But accounts of secret intentions are always open to suspicion, since good evidence of them could not survive. This allegation may have been invented by the agent of Alexander who assassinated Attalos (Diod. 17.5.1–2).

62. Diod. 17.3–4; Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.1–3; Aischin. 3.161.

63. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.1–1.11.1; Diod. 17.8.1–17.15.5. For the dispatch of weapons by Demosthenes to Thebes, see Diod. 17.8.5; Plut. *Dem.* 23.1. For the supposed Athenian vote, see Diod. 17.8.6. For the Arkadians at the Isthmus, see Dein. 1.18; Diod. 17.8.6.

64. Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.4–1.9.10; Diod. 17.9.1–17.14.4.

65. Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.1–6; Diod. 17.15.1–5; Plut. *Dem.* 23.4–6.

66. Dein. 1.32; Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.6. The quarrel and execution: Diod. 17.30.2–5; Curt. 3.2.10–18.

67. E. Eyck: *Bismarck* (Erlenbach and Zurich: E. Rentsch, 1942–1944), 2: 268–71. To suppose with Will (1983, 44) that Alexander in 335 demanded the surrender of “die makedonenfeindlichen Redner und Strategen” is rationalistic.

68. Plut. *Dem.* 23.4 (the intrusive names are Demon and Kallisthenes; cf. Timokles frag. 4 apud Athen. 8.341e–342a; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3.1: 619 n. 1); Arr. *Anab.* 1.10.4. The Suda, s.v. *Antipatros*, gives the names as those of the men demanded by Antipater after the Lamian War, by which time some of them were dead, and the eleventh name is Kassandros.

69. Possibly Moirokles lurks behind the corrupt name “Prokles” in the Suda. There remains the name Thrasyboulos, occurring only in the Suda’s list; it may be an intrusion that arose from recollection of the fact that Thrasyboulos took part with Epiphalet in the defense of Halikarnassos in 334 (Diod. 17.25.6).

70. Dem. 9.72; cf. chapter 7 at note 54.

71. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 847f, 848e.

72. Diod. 17.25.6–17.27.3; cf. Dein. 1.33.

73. Dem. 18.114; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 844a.

74. Timokles frag. 4 apud Athen. 8.341e–342a.

75. Dem. *Ep.* 3.16.

76. Dem. 19.293.

77. Dem. 21.208.

78. Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.7.

79. Diod. 17.22.5; Arr. *Anab.* 1.29.5–6.

80. Arr. *Anab.* 3.6.1–2.

81. Arr. *Anab.* 2.1.1–2.2.3; the Phoenician and Cypriote contingents are indicated at 2.13.7 and 2.20.1–3.

82. Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.1–2; cf. Badian 1967, 174 with n. 1. Probably two other Athenians, Dropides (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.4) and Aristogeiton (Curt. 3.13.15) served with Iphikrates on this embassy; cf. Sealey 1960b, 39–40 = 1967, 194–95. To save his thesis (see note 115), that from 334 the Athenians adopted a policy of benevolent

neutrality toward Alexander, Will (1983, 71 n. 138) supposes that Iphikrates and Dropides had joined the Persian court long before.

83. Arr. *Anab.* 2.13.4–6; 2.20.1–3.

84. Diod. 17.48.1–2; Curt. 4.1.39–40.

85. Diod. 17.62.4–6. In most respects I follow Badian 1967. He suggests that Memnon, the commander in Thrace, was a relative of Memnon of Rhodes. I differ from Badian in declining to recognize Aischin. 3.167 as adequate evidence for supposing restiveness among the Thessalians and the Perrhaibians. Cawkwell (1969b, 170–73) and Bosworth (1975) offer a later date for the revolt, making it begin late in the summer of 331 and last into 330. Certainty on the chronology is not possible. Aischines (3.133) indicates that the Spartan envoys, whom the syndedion referred to Alexander, had still to set out on their journey when Ktesiphon was tried. But the argument drawn from this indication for a late dating of the revolt is not strong; faced with delicate business, deliberative bodies and diplomats may delay. Bosworth offers more telling arguments from recruitment of reinforcements in Greece and their dispatch to Alexander. The main evidence for the early date for the revolt (accepted by Badian 1967, 190–92) is the statement of Curtius (6.1.21), that the war of Agis ended before the battle of Arbela. Bosworth would counter this by attaching good sense to the remark of Aischines (3.165), a contemporary, that Alexander was “beyond the Great Bear and almost outside the inhabited world.” But perhaps one should not try to attach good sense to so melodramatic a remark.

86. Aischin. 3.165; Dein. 1.34; Diod. 17.62.7–8; Curt. 6.1.20.

87. Diod. 17.63; Curt. 6.1.1–21. That Memnon continued in Thrace is inferred from *IG II²*, 356 = Tod no. 199; cf. Badian 1967, 179–80.

88. Diod. 17.73.5–6; Curt. 6.1.19–21; cf. Aischin. 3.133.

89. Plut. *Mor.* 219e; Ailianos, *V.H.* 2.19. Witty remarks made in other cities about the divinity of Alexander may well belong to 324/3, as is often supposed, but in Sparta the likely occasion for discussing the matter was the negotiations following the death of Agis.

90. Plut. *Mor.* 818e; cf. Jones 1957, 34.

91. They have been discussed by Cawkwell 1961b.

92. Aischin. 3.166–67. Plutarch (*Dem.* 24.1) evidently had no more information than this remark of Aischines.

93. Badian 1967, 172, 183.

94. Cawkwell 1969b, 176.

95. Aischin. 3.17, 24, 27–31; Dem. 18.111–19; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 845f–846a, 851a.

96. Dem. 18.248; cf. Aischin. 3.159.

97. Aischin. 3.24.

98. [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 851b; cf. Tod no. 196; Schaefer 1885–1887, 3: 295–98. Probably about 327 Demosthenes succeeded in restoring good relations with the Bosporan kingdom; relations had been poor for some time, perhaps since the beginning of the sole rule of Pairisades I in 344/3 (Burstein 1978).

99. Cawkwell 1969b, 176.

100. Plut. *Dem.* 24.2–3.

101. Aischin. 3.162; Marsyas, *FGrHist* 135 F 2 = Harpok. s.v. *Aristion*, with Jacoby's note; Berve 1926, 2: 63, no. 120; Badian 1961, 34.

102. Diod. 18.48.2; Plut. *Phok.* 30.4; Badian 1961, 34.

103. Badian 1961, 34 n. 134. Deinarchos (1.101) remarks that Demosthenes never prosecuted Demades for proposing an illegal decree.

104. Mitchel 1962; cf. 1966. But, *pace* Mitchel, the office was probably tenable for one year, not four: Rhodes 1981, 517. In addition to Mitchel's study, there are interesting reflections on Lykourgos by Humphreys 1985.

105. Plut. *Phok.* 17.9; cf. Badian 1961, 34.

106. Plut. *Phok.* 17.6–8.

107. Tritle 1981.

108. Plut. *Phok.* 8.2.

109. Plut. *Phok.* 22.5–6.

110. Lyk. 1.36–37, 41; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 849a.

111. Hyper. *Dem.* 20–21.

112. *IG II²*, 457; [Plut.] *Ten Orat.* 851e–852e.

113. Rhodes 1981, 516. The office in charge of the administration is first attested epigraphically with certainty for 307/6: *IG II²*, 463, line 36; cf. W. K. Pritchett, *Hesperia* 9 (1940): 108–11. It should probably be recognized in *SEG*, 19.119 (first published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia* 29 [1960]: 2–4), an inscription that has been dated to the 320s from the forms of its letters (cf. Rhodes 1972, 108 n. 1).

114. Buchanan 1962, 74–77; cf. Rhodes 1981, 516.

115. Rhodes 1972, 236–37; 1981, 517. The assumption of terms of four years is adopted by Will (1983) without discussion. His main thesis is that Philip after the battle of Chaironeia and Alexander as king tried to conciliate the Athenians with much success; that from 334 the Athenians adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality toward Macedon; that Athenian statesmen, including Lykourgos and Demosthenes, recognized that Athens could only play a leading role by accepting a place within a Macedonian empire; only Hypereides, it is suggested, continued to indulge “ein irrationaler Makedonenhass” (142). Some of the works of building begun by Lykourgos, for example the improvements to the Pnyx, were interrupted by the Lamian War (82, 96), and this interruption lends support to Will's thesis. But if his view is true, it is amazing that Aischines did not expound the merits of conforming to the Macedonian hegemony when the trial of Ktesiphon gave him the opportunity to do so. Reconstruction of the policy of Lykourgos is crucial to Will's thesis. To discount the tradition of that statesman's antagonism to Macedon, Will dismisses letters 2 and 3 of Demosthenes as later forgeries (13–14, n. 78, but see Goldstein 1968) and maintains that Stratokles, proposing honors for Lykourgos in 307, portrayed the honorand as anti-Macedonian to conform to the current liberation of Athens from Kasandros by Demetrios Poliorketes (98–99, 142). But Demetrios, the son of Antigonos, was within the line of claimants to the empire of Alexander. See further the review by A. W. Bosworth, *Gnomon* 57 (1985): 431–36. But as Bosworth recognizes, Will has performed a valuable service by collecting material on Athens in the period 338–22.

116. *IG II²*, 333.

117. For the date, see Lyk. 1.45. For the verdict, see Aischin. 3.252.

118. For the law of Epikrates, see Lyk. frag. 20 (Conomis) = Harpok. s.v. *Epikrates*. For the service of Aischines, see 2.167. For the condition in the 320s, see Ar. *AP* 42. From *SIG³*, 957, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1893, 1: 193–94) drew a strong reason for supposing that the law of Epikrates was made in 336. There has been further discussion of the date but, pending discovery of more inscriptions, Mitchel (1975) has refuted attempts to assign the reform to an earlier period. Will (1983, 94 n. 310) holds that the purpose of the reform was not military training but to foster participation in public life. This view rests not on evidence but on Will's general reconstruction of the policy of Lykourgos.

119. The record has been compiled and scrutinized by Badian 1961, 16–25.
120. His trierarchy is known from *IG II²*, 1631, lines 500 and 681–82. For discussion, see Worthington 1987. Possibly he was related to the Leosthenes who failed in action against Alexander of Pherai in 361 (see chapter 4 at note 80).
121. Curt. 9.7.1–11; cf. Diod. 17.99.5–6; Badian 1961, 26–27.
122. Diod. 17.106.3; 17.111.1.
123. Paus. 1.25.5; 8.52.5.
124. Diod. 17.111.1–3.
125. Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.1–5; Badian 1961, 25–31. On the chronology, see appendix 8.
126. Ar. *AP* 62.6; cf. chapter 5 at note 15.
127. Diod. 18.8.6–7.
128. Dein. 1.81, 103.
129. Hyper. *Dem.* 31; Arr. *Anab.* 7.23.2; Diod. 17.113; cf. Balsdon 1950, 383–88.
130. Arr. *Anab.* 7.12; Curt. 10.10.14–15; Just. 12.14.5; Diod. 18.4.1; 18.12.1; Plut. *Alex.* 49.14; 74.2–6.
131. Plut. *Alex.* 49.14–15; cf. Badian 1961, 37 n. 159.
132. Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.7.
133. Athen. 13.586d, 596b.
134. Diod. 17.108.6–7; on the motives of Harpalos, see Badian 1961, 21–24.
135. Diod. 17.108.7; Hyper. *Dem.* 8–9; Dein. 1.89.
136. Diod. 17.108.7–8.
137. Hyper. *Dem.* 10.
138. Hyper. *Dem.* 2; Dein. 1.1, 4, 82.
139. This follows from Dein. 1.68, where the prosecutor considers the hypothetical supposition that Alexander might demand the gold of Harpalos from the Athenians.
140. Dein. 1.45; on the chronology, see appendix 8.
141. Dein. 1.6.
142. Dein. 1.29, 104. Nine men are known to have been accused; see Hansen 1981b, 48–49.
143. Badian 1961, 34; cf. nn. 101 and 102. The suggested links of Demosthenes and Demades to Hephaistion and Antipater respectively are doubted by Goldstein (1968, 43 n. 33), for no compelling reason.
144. Dein. 1.51, 114; Hyper. *Dem.* 20–21.
145. Plut. *Dem.* 26.2–5.
146. Dein. 1.29, 104.
147. Conviction of Philokles: *Dem. Ep.* 3.31. Acquittal of Aristogeiton: *Dem Ep.* 3.37, 43. Exoneration: *Dem. Ep.* 2.2, 16. The authenticity of the first four letters in the Demosthenic corpus has been defended by Goldstein (1968, esp. 65, 276–81). The letters that are of value for historical information are *Epp.* 2 and 3. Although proof of authenticity is not possible, by putting *Ep.* 3 before *Ep.* 2 Goldstein is able to rebut the most serious objection, that drawn from the fortunes of Philokles. Cf. the reviews of Goldstein by N. C. Conomis (*Gnomon* 44 [1971]: 339–46), G. O. Rowe (*AJP* 91 [1970]: 503–5), and D. M. MacDowell (*CR*, n.s., 20 [1970]: 322–24).
148. On 10 June 323 according to Babylonian evidence (Samuel 1962, 46–47).
149. Diod. 18.4.1.
150. Diod. 17.111.3. His tenure of the Athenian office for 324/3 is known from the inscription found at the Amphiarakon (V. Leonardos, *Archaiologike Ephemeris* [1918]: 73–100); see Goldstein 1968, 277–78; for the text and additional discussion, see Reinmuth 1971, 58–82; cf. Berve 1926, 2: 236, no. 471.

151. The distribution of satrapies is given by Arr. *Succ.* (= *FGrHist* 156 F 1) 5–7; Diod. 18.3; Curt. 10.10.1–4; Dexippos *FGrHist* 100 F 8. Arrian (*Succ.* 7) says that control in Europe west of Thrace was to be left to Antipater and Krateros. The developments at Babylon have been reconstructed by Errington 1970, 49–59.

152. Diod. 18.8.1.

153. Diod. 18.11.2.

154. Diod. 18.9.1–4; 18.10.2–18.11.2. Diodoros's list (18.11.1–2) of those who joined the Athenians is difficult to interpret. It probably includes all who joined them at any stage in the war. His narrative (18.12.3) shows that the Thessalians, or many of them (18.11.1), joined after Antipater had marched south. Karystos (18.11.2) probably joined in consequence of Athenian naval operations in Euboian waters (Walek 1924, 23). The Phokians and Lokrians (18.11.1) are likely to have joined when Leosthenes advanced into central Greece.

155. Plut. *Dem.* 27.

156. Diod. 18.9.5; 18.11.3–5.

157. Diod. 18.14.2.

158. Diod. 18.14.2–4.

159. Diod. 18.12.1 (where "Philotas" is an error for Leonnatos; cf. 18.3.1 and 18.14.4); 18.14.4; cf. Errington 1970, 60–61.

160. Diod. 18.12.2–18.13.3. For the demand for an unconditional surrender, see Diod. 18.18.3. Cf. Walek 1924, 23, 25.

161. These movements are reconstructed by Walek (1924, 26–28) from Diod. 18.15.8–9; *IG* II², 493 and 505. The dispatch of Kleitos from Opis is known from Just. 12.12.8.

162. Diod. 18.13.4–6; 18.14.5–18.15.5. Diodoros (18.13.4) says that the Aitolians went home "because of some national needs."

163. Walek 1924, 26.

164. Diod. 18.16.4–18.17.6; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1; Walek 1924, 28–30.

165. Diod. 18.17.7–18.18.9; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1–2.

166. Plut. *Dem.* 28.1–29.7.

167. Diod. 18.18.7; 18.24.1–18.25.5.

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The abbreviations employed for the names and works of ancient authors are customary or easy to recognize. Fragments of Athenian orators are cited from the editions by Kenyon for Hypereides, by Conomis for Deinarchos and Lykourgos, by Blass for Antiphon, and by Baiter and Sauppe for others. Abbreviations for titles of journals conform to *L'Année Philologique*. Some standard works are abbreviated according to the following list.

Beloch, <i>Gr. Gesch.</i>	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> . 4 vols. in 8. 2d ed. Strassburg: Trübner, 1912–1927.
CAH	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> . 12 vols. 1st ed. Edited by J. B. Bury et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923–1939. (A second edition and for some volumes a third are in progress under various editors.)
FAttCom	J. M. Edmonds, <i>The Fragments of Attic Comedy</i> . 3 vols. in 4. Leiden: Brill, 1957–1961.
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Vols. 1–2. Berlin: Weidmann, 1923–1926. Vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, 1940–1958.
FHG	C. Muller, <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> . 5 vols. Paris: Didot, 1874–1883.
Meiggs/Lewis	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
SIG ³	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> . 4 vols. 3d. ed. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1915–1924.
Tod	M. N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> . Vol. 2, <i>From 403 to 323 B.C.</i> Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.

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